Training Battalions to Fight and Win in LSCO: The Importance of Battle Drills, Playbooks and Home-Station Training

Notes

1. Max Hunder, “Ukraine rushes to create AI-enabled war drones,” Reuters, July 18, 2024. https://www.reuters.com/technology/artificial-intelligence/ukraine-rushes-create-ai-enabled-war-drones-2024-07-18/2 Christian Brose, The Kill Chain (United States: Hachette Books, 2020), p 19-20. 3 Milford Beagle, Jason C. Slider, and Matthew R. Arrol, “The Graveyard of Command Posts,” Military Review Online Exclusive (March 2023), 9.
2. Nicholas Fiorenza, “UK Procures Smash C-UAS Fire-Control System, Janes, July 15, 2024. https://www.janes.com/osint-insights/defence-news/air/uk-procures-smash-c-uas-fire-control-system 5 Northrop Grumman. 2024. “Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems (C-UAS).” Accessed August 18, 2025. https://www. northropgrumman.com/what-we-do/land/counter-unmanned-aerial-systems-c-uas.
3. James E. Rainey, “Continuous Transformation – Transformation in Contact”, Military Review Online Exclusive (August 2024).
4. Thom Hawkins and Andrew Orecho-vesky, “Logistics for Data – Getting battlefield data to the right place at the right time: The mess versus the mesh,” Army AL&T (Winter 2024 Issue), 64. 8 John Antal defines human on the loop as an autonomous system that can identify and decide to engage targets where the human operator’s involvement is activating/deactivating the weapon or terminating an engagement “before unacceptable levels of damage occur.” John Antal, 7 Seconds to Die (Oxford, UK: Casemate, 2022), Glossary.
5. Beagle, Slider, and Arrol, pg 9. 10 Pete Hegseth, “Army Transformation and Acquisition Reform,” memo dated April 30, 2025.
6. Michael D. Doubler, Busting the Bocage: American Combined Operations in France, 6 June – 31 July 1944 (Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, 1988), 34.
7. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Survivability Operations, ATP 3-37.34 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, April 2018), Chapter 1. 13 Beagle, Slider, and Arrol, “Graveyard of Command Posts”, 6. U.S. Army organizations at the brigade level and below understand this dynamic and have made significant adjustments to increase tempo. Observer controller/trainers (OC/Ts) at the U.S. Army’s combat training centers (CTCs)emphasize the importance of issuing timely orders and building flexibility in tactical plans.3 A best practice highlighted by the Army’s Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) OC/Ts is brigades adhering to the “1/3-2/3 rule” during a three-day battle period.4 This means that a brigade uses only 24 hours to plan and issue an order, giving subordinate echelons the ability to plan and rehearse over 48 hours at echelon before execution. This abbreviated planning timeline is akin to the early Indianapolis Colts no-huddle offense and its ability to utilize available time to survey the defense and call the optimal play at the line of scrimmage. In this scenario, maneuver battalions are given the time necessary to run their own military decision-making process (MDMP) and implement the optimal plan for the current conditions in the operational environment. Undoubtedly, there are numerous situations in LSCO where this technique is appropriate and enables success. However, even the abbreviated timeline highlighted above does not align with the tempo at which divisions execute operational transitions and issue orders to brigades during warfighter exercises (WFXs) in LSCO scenarios. Therefore, in addition to proficiency in MDMP, maneuver battalions must be trained to execute battle drills when tempo dictates minimal time for preparation and no time to plan. During WFXs, the changing nature of the operational environment (OE) often leads a division to issue fragmentary orders that drastically change a subordinate brigade’s task and by MAJ Chris Garlick and LTC Dave Devine Training Battalions to Fight and Win in LSCO: Training Battalions to Fight and Win in LSCO: Figure 1. An example zone reconnaissance “play” from a current cavalry squadron playbook. (U.S. Army graphic) purpose less than twelve hours before the execution of an operation.5 Given the simulated environment of a WFX, well-rested and all-knowing brigade staffs can quickly implement changes and ensure common understanding with “pucksters” serving as their subordinate battalion commanders as they are co-located within the same room. These “pucksters” are then immediately ready to execute as they have sole responsibility for maneuvering entire battalions and do not need to ensure common understanding at the company and platoon level. Undoubtedly, this order dissemination process would be very different on a modern battlefield whereby a brigade had to contend with disparately located subordinate units, contested communications, sleep deprivation, enemy actions, and a litany of other issues. Even the best brigade would be hard-pressed to adhere to the 1/3-2/3 rule and issue a plan in under four hours, a full twenty hours quicker than the JRTC best practice highlighted above. Still, battalions, companies, and platoons would each need to undergo their own planning and orders dissemination process before common understanding of an optimal plan could be achieved. Instead, it is necessary that maneuver battalions develop a “playbook” and train on battalion-level battle drills or “plays” before experiencing combat. Like the Oregon Ducks posterboard play calls, a maneuver battalion playbook with one-word radio calls for numerous operations would allow battalions to rapidly disseminate a feasible plan and ensure common understanding down to the platoon level. This playbook postures the battalion for success when tempo dictates that near-immediate action is necessary. As stated by GEN George S. Patton there Figure 2. Recreation of an example deliberate attack “play” from a 1990s era armor battalion playbook. (U.S. Army Graphic) are occasions in LSCO in which, “A good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan executed at some indefinite time in the future.” How Can Battalions Do This? Maneuver battalions must make changes to their home station training plans if they hope to successfully implement battle drills during CTC rotations or war. The first step is to utilize working groups to develop a battalion playbook to illustrate how the battalion organizes and executes its typical mission sets. At a minimum a maneuver battalion playbook should include a “card” or “play” on hasty attack with a flanking maneuver left, hasty attack with a flanking maneuver right, frontal attack, movement to contact, hasty breach, defense of a linear obstacle, and a mobile defense. A cavalry squadron playbook should include “plays” for screen, guard, zone reconnaissance, the reinforcement of a cavalry troop by the tank company, passage of lines, and reconnaissance handover between troops. These working groups must include representatives of all warfighting functions so that each “play” outlines a coherent scheme of intelligence collection, fires, protection, and sustainment in addition to the scheme of maneuver. Once developed, battalion leader professional development (LPDs) can be held to review the product and ensure common understanding of each play down to the platoon level. Leaders must understand that this is not the right way in which the battalion will execute these missions in any scenario, only a template used to ensure immediate common understanding when MDMP is not feasible. Finally, staffs must understand that, in execution, they are still responsible for rapidly distributing updated graphic control measures, fire support control measures, identifying triggers, and producing any other fighting products the commander deems necessary to adapt the “play” to the operational environment in which it will be executed. It is not enough for battalions to produce and distribute the playbook, they must also put it into practice during training. Time must be dedicated on the battalion training calendar for multiple companies to rehearse “plays” collectively under the command and control of a battalion command post. Tactical exercises without troops (TEWTs), the close combat tactical trainer (CCTT), and reduced force exercises are outstanding techniques to conduct this training within realistic resourcing constraints. Multiple iterations of situational training exercises (STXs) comprising force-on-force scenarios are invaluable in improving a battalion’s ability to succeed on short notice as they allow leaders to make mistakes, learn, and retrain. Ensuring that these events receive the same focus and prioritization as live-fire exercises greatly increases a battalion’s capacity for agility and it’s ability to react quickly within the bounds of the commander’s intent. What Can Division and Brigade Headquarters do to Enable Success at the Battalion Level? Battalions cannot develop playbooks in a vacuum as they must be nested within the context of how their brigade and division intends to fight. For example, an armored or armored strike division that is unlikely to employ more than one infantry battalion in an air assault does not need multiple maneuver battalions prioritizing air assault operations in collective training. Conversely, an armored strike division cannot assume an adequate number of subordinate battalions will master the combined arms breach absent guidance and oversight. Divisions must clearly prioritize and articulate the tasks that subordinate brigades and battalions must be prepared to execute. Brigades must do the same for battalions and companies. This articulation can be done through “how we fight” products and LPDs but must be reinforced through actionable, relevant annual training guidance. Training guidance cannot simply regurgitate all regulatory annual training requirements but must prioritize areas in which subordinate organizations must excel, areas where they must perform to standard, and- most importantly- areas where units can assume risk and remain untrained. Divisions and brigades that simply list all regulatory requirements absent prioritization are pushing risk decisions down to lower levels. Some portion of training will still be omitted Figure 3. Deliberate attack play phased description. (U.S. Army Graphic) or conducted at a substandard level, but those prioritization decisions will be made by company grade officers and junior noncommissioned officers rather than senior leaders. Furthermore, divisions and their subordinate brigades must ensure their unit culture inculcates effective and adaptive LSCO-oriented training. In the words of former United States Army Europe and Africa (USAREUR) commander LTG (R) Arthur Collins Jr. – himself no stranger to leading Soldiers during transition periods between wars – “skillful senior commanders can bring their armies into battle under favorable conditions, but it is the small unit leaders who win the battle.6 All Army organizations perform a host of necessary activities that may degrade from training if not managed appropriately. These activities include- but are not limited to- personnel actions, inspections, promotion boards, supply activities, planned and unplanned maintenance, unit social functions, and community outreach. These requirements exist to ensure a unit remains administratively prepared to perform its mission, therefore senior leaders must consistently message the importance of warfighting. If unit commanders fail to place the appropriate emphasis on high-quality, battle-focused training, then even the most well-developed playbook has little value. While division and brigade leaders work to establish appropriate training environments, battalion-level leaders must do their part and meet their higher headquarters in the middle. These lower echelon commanders must manage administrative requirements without missing the “forest for the trees” by focusing on what is urgent rather than what is essential. LTG Collins observed that even as far back as the 1970s, many battalion commanders and their staff officers complained about a lack of training time and the crushing weight of excessive training requirements issued by higher headquarters.7 Yet, in his experience, such units simply suffered from a failure to prioritize resources (especially time) or emphasize appropriate training – these commanders let their training manage them rather than managing their training.8 With effective playbooks in hand, battalion and company commanders must reinvigorate emphasis on combined arms training through the execution of the STX lanes, TEWT iterations, and other methods described above. What Other Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy (DOTmLPF-P) Changes are Required? Above the division level, the larger U.S. Army can help facilitate adaptation through additional changes across the DOTmLPF-P spectrum. From a personnel standpoint, much has already been written about the fiscal and family stability benefits of adopting a U.S. Army divisional system that required less permanent change of station.9 An additional benefit of increased Soldier stability is that it enables battalions to capture lessons learned from collective training and implement standard operating procedures (SOPs) that are understood at echelon. Currently, battalions peak in combat readiness every two years after a CTC rotation; Figure 4. The Army West Point Black Knights (6-6) defeated the Navy Midshipmen (5-7), 17-11, Dec. 9 in the 124th edition of the Army-Navy Game presented by USAA. (Photo by Class of 2025 Cadet Eli Wright)