Painting the Picture: Executing a Better Combined-Arms Rehearsal

Why do we do rehearsals as an Army? Everyone knows (or has at least had it repeated to them multiple times) that the combined-arms rehearsal (CAR) is one of the most critically important events a unit will do before executing an operation.1 Some leaders might go so far as to say a half-done plan with a well-executed rehearsal will still allow mission success. But if we accept that rehearsals are important, it still bears asking the question, Why do we do them? Our current doctrine asserts that we do rehearsals to identify friction points in the plan, facilitate internal coordination and help Soldiers build a lasting mental picture of the sequence of the events.2 Others may see re hearsals as avenue to discuss contingencies with staff and leaders. All these reasons are critical aspects of a well-executed rehearsal, but they are secondary effects to a more primary function. Army units execute rehears als to synchronize military efforts in purpose, space and time3 to achieve a shared understanding of the commander’s visualization between the staff and subordinate leaders. If we accept this premise as the under lying reason why we conduct rehears als, the next question logically follows: Do our current rehearsals synchronize efforts in purpose, space and time? Put another way, do we walk away from our rehearsals with a shared understanding of what everyone is doing (what, why) at a given time (when) and in a given space (where)? Problem with rehearsals In 2019, Netflix released a critically ac claimed television series based on the fantasy-novel series by Andrzej Sap kowski entitled The Witcher. In the first season, arguably the most confus ing aspect that generated negative feedback4 was the season’s timeline. The show’s first season was not told sequentially – it had multiple story lines across multiple timelines that tied together in the final episode of that season. Unfortunately, the main problem with the TV show – the multiple stories across multiple timelines – is the same fundamental problem with how we execute our rehearsals. This is partially because we have a gap in our doctrine. Our current doctrine on rehearsals promotes a format that inherently compartmentalizes staff functions and subordinate actions throughout the brief.5 While this format certainly high lights the depth of knowledge of the individual briefer, the current CAR script construct does little to meet the ultimate purpose of the CAR: to syn chronize efforts in purpose, space and time to achieve shared understanding. This means while individuals may have a solid understanding of their part of the operation (the “what, where and why” of the operation), the disjointed nature of the current briefing format leads to a critical lack of understand ing about the “when” of the operation. The fires lead might have a great understanding of the overall fires concept, but if he/she does not layer that in time with the rest of the operation, it becomes increasingly difficult to understand what fires is doing at a spe cific time to support the maneuver fight. By its very nature, time is the one aspect that synchronizes everything be cause everything we do happens in time. Without a solid synchronization of the operation in time, we cannot achieve any degree of shared organi zational understanding between staff and subordinates.6 Among other things, this has two distinct implica tions. First, if we do not rehearse and syn chronize operations in time, it be comes immensely harder to anticipate or identify operational friction points. As an example, if one does not clearly state when the start-point time is dur ing a rehearsal, we cannot see if the intelligence-collection (IC) assets are in place to shape the deeper fight at the right time. Another perspective is in the air-assault planning process where rehearsals are tied to a distinct “h-hour” sequence, to ensure that suppression of enemy air-defense fires, lift assets and ground forces are synchronized to mass elements of combat power at the decisive place and time. Second, if we do not rehearse and syn chronize operations in time, then we will lack an understanding of what the enemy forces are doing at that time. Most CAR scripts start with an intelli gence representative briefing the enemy scheme of maneuver by phase. This tangibly means that in a good CAR, a G-2 or S-2 representative will walk onto the terrain model and lay down enemy icons on the map. Once that is briefed, the typical CAR script typically transitions to the other warf ighting functions and subordinate units’ briefings. The problem with this construct, how ever, is that the enemy remains static as everyone else briefs their portion because the G-2 or S-2 has already finished their part of the CAR script. A static enemy cannot tell anyone else what the enemy is doing in time. This results in a myopic focus on each indi vidual silo of excellence without an understanding of how friendly actions are affecting enemy actions. Further more, when the enemy remains static, commanders and leaders cannot gain an appreciation of enemy decision points and subsequent opportunities to exploit enemy decision points or friction points. 5 ways to improve CARs If what we as an Army are doing for re hearsals does not allow us to meet the intent of the rehearsal, what can we do differently? Among other things, here are five discrete actions that organizations can take to improve their rehearsals.

1. Ditch the current script. If the current script does not help synchronize operations in time, get rid of it. The current script typically focuses on each briefer briefing his/her aspect of the operation – telling in detail the “what, where and why” of their piece. Instead, rather than making time an afterthought, organizations should make it the first aspect in which we synchronize operations in the rehearsal. Doing this requires that we ditch the script – unit leaders must instead cognitively reframe how we look at re hearsals. To our credit, our current doctrine supports the idea that a CAR should not be a rigidly scripted event but leave room for appropriate dialogue.7 Unfortunately, the desire to not look foolish in front of your commander or your commander’s commander means that many people prepare robotic scripts and shy away from a true dialogue between leaders at echelon. This means that people rely on scripts to look well-informed at the cost of ac tually synchronizing the operation across the organization.

2. Make it a story. Instead of relying on the previous way of doing rehears als, Army leaders must make their re hearsals more like a story. At the most basic level, when telling a story, you start at the beginning and talk about what happens until you get to the end. The current script does not tell one story, it tells 15 different stories – one for each staff function and subordinate commander. One way to make it more like a story is to functionally design your rehearsal away from a script and more toward a simulation. To do this, you must start with elements in place and then show (in time) the movement and actions of each element – both enemy and friendly – on the terrain model. As time progresses, this will help the collective group of staff leaders and sub ordinate commanders visualize how the enemy and friendly forces will move in the battlefield, which will better allow them to visualize the fight, identify enemy and friendly friction points, plan and think about contingencies during the rehearsal.

3. Embrace the matrix. To tell a better story, unit leaders must ditch the cur rent script and adopt anew one. This does not mean that the staff must create a whole other script; whenever possible, units should rely on the work they have already done to work more efficiently.8 In that spirit, planning staff may already have a document that synchronizes operations in time which they could use as a baseline rehearsal script: the synchronization matrix. The synchronization matrix is a fight ing product produced in the military decision-making process or the rapid decision-making synchronization process (RDSP) that organizes operations by unit, task and purpose across time.9 When used as a rehearsal script, the synchronization matrix will by its very nature force the rehearsal to account for actions and time. Even at the high est levels, using the synchronization matrix as a rehearsal script makes use of an existent product that should have the appropriate amount of detail, aligned in time to facilitate the shared visualization of the operation. Some may object to this, arguing that a well-done synchronization matrix is too detailed to facilitate an effective dialogue in the rehearsal. This is a val id point, and one may respond by be ing selective in the information that is briefed in the rehearsal. Alternatively, the use of multiple rehearsals in addi tion to the combined-arms rehearsal (for example, the fires/intel rehearsal or the sustainment rehearsal) may al low alternative venues to delve a little deeper into the specifics of the operation nested within the overall maneuver plan. Table 1 offers an example CAR script using the synchronization matrix.

4. Look down and in. Regardless of the specific script organizations use, often units fail to understand the com plexities of the operation and the necessary internal coordination to make the rehearsals more effective. For ex ample, rarely do maneuver units discuss casualty levels or attrition of combat power as they discuss their associated tasks and purpose on the terrain model. However, those are the ex plicit data points that will highlight the potential friction points or command er decision points (DPs).10 Further more, it is those very data points that will drive further staff coordination to provide the necessary sustainment support to promote operational endurance.11 Units executing rehearsals need to look down and in at themselves and the enemy. They need to understand the effects of their operations in time on the enemy, which will help them to identify enemy DPs and potential op portunities to exploit enemy friction points. Such examination will drive refinement to the IC and fires elements, which will further enable maneuver.

5. Look up and out. Simultaneously, well-executed unit rehearsals will also look up and out. As an essential aspect of our operations, units do not oper ate independently of each other, but within a larger framework that may in clude multidomain operations.12 This requires organizations to not only look down and in (internally) but also up and out. No organization conducts op erations in a vacuum; every action will affect the enemy and impact adjacent units, nested within the higher commander’s intent. This applies as much at the platoon and squad levels as it does to the division and corps levels of warfare. This further necessitates a time-driven approach to rehearsals, because (particularly at the division and corps lev els) most of the multidomain assets they may request are inherently linked to time, whether it is the air-tasking order or various convergence windows for multidomain assets. Units that cannot articulate or rehearse their plan in time cannot understand when they will need more external assets – or, more importantly, when they will need to request those assets to re ceive them at the appropriate time. Without a shared understanding of the operation in time, units often are unable to receive the right asset at the right time for those assets to be of any use, leading to catastrophic loss of combat power and inability to accom plish their mission. Distributed rehearsals Another aspect worth mentioning related to improving rehearsals in the modern fight is the necessity to execute them in a distributed format. The realities of large-scale combat operations in today’s environment require mobile command posts (CPs) simply to

Table 1 continued.

survive. As CPs become more and more distributed, however, they also start to mitigate their functionality. This tenuous balance requires a care ful understanding of how to manage command-and-control responsibilities. Units therefore must be able to execute rehearsals in a distributed fashion. Two options may facilitate these distributed rehearsals. First, at the division and higher level, many units have simulation-operations Functional Area (FA) 57 officers assigned to them. These officers have the training capability to build simulations that can help graphically depict the rehearsal as a simulation. This requires a degree of preparation on the unit’s part as well as the appropriate simulation software to depict the operation this way. Also, in a tactical environment, there Table 1 continued. Figure 1. Graphic to establish line of departure. First graphic in a distributed CAR brief. (Graphic by author) may be bandwidth issues to consider with this option. For units below the division level or those that do not have FA57 simula tion officers organic to their formations, a second option is available. Conceivably, to support a rehearsal for a discrete combat operation, a unit may take a fixed hourly period and break it down into hourly increments. Planners can then take the operation al graphics and show the movement of units and operations in time and space across the hourly slides. (Figures 1-8, a distributed CAR brief) With the appropriate knowledge-management procedures, this rehearsal script could be posted where all parties can receive shared access and execute the rehearsal from their re spective CP or command-and-control node. With minimal front material, a unit could post a brief at 30 slides for a distributed rehearsal and achieve a high degree of synchronization and shared understanding. Conclusion Despite the gaps in our current doctrine, one thing is certain: rehearsals are a critical component to successful mission accomplishment at every ech elon. Many units, however, waste crit ical time by executing rehearsals in a desynchronized and silo-centric man ner. This does nothing to add to the shared understanding of all Soldiers because it doesn’t tie the operation together in time. Time is the most ba sic synchronizing function and there fore the most important aspect of suc cessfully telling a coherent story. LTC Mitchell Payne is command-and-control warfighting-function chief, Operations Group C, Mission Command Training Program, Fort Leavenworth, KS. Previous assignments include bat talion/task force commander, 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, GA; brigade executive officer, 188th Infantry Brigade, Fort Stewart; battalion exec utive officer, 1st Battalion, 306th Infantry Regiment, 188th Infantry Brigade, Fort Stewart; squadron executive Figure 2. Saber Squadron forward-passage-of-lines. Second graphic in a distributed CAR brief. (Graphic by author) Figure 3. Movement of passage lanes. Third graphic in a distributed CAR brief. (Graphic by author) officer, 5th Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, Fort Wain wright, AK; and battalion executive of ficer, 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry Regiment, 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team. LTC Payne’s military schools in clude the Armor Basic Officer Leader’s Course, Maneuver Captain’s Career Course and Command and General Staff College (CGSC). He has a bache lor’s of arts degree in philosophy from Wheaton College and a master’s of military arts and science degree from CGSC (thesis in applied ethics). He’s also a doctor of philosophy candidate in organizational leadership at Regent University School of Business and Leadership. LTC Payne has previously published works on RDSP, assess ments, leader cognition and the Army ethic. Notes 1 Field Manual (FM) 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and Operations, May 2022. 2 Ibid. 3 FM 3-0, Operations, October 2022. 4 Tim Surette, “The Witcher’s Complicated Season 1 Timeline, Explained,” TV Guide; accessed online, Dec. 14, 2021, https://www.tvguide.com/news/the-witcher-season-1-timeline-netflix-when-are-things-happening-chronological-or der/. 5 FM 6-0. Figure 4. 1st Brigade FPoL/counter-reconnaissance fight. Next graphic in a distributed CAR brief. (Graphic by author) Figure 5. Disruption-zone fight. Fifth graphic in a distributed CAR brief. (Graphic by author) 6 Joint Publication 2-0, Joint Intelligence, defines synchronization as “the arrange ment of military actions in time, space and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time,” as cited in FM 3-0. 7 FM 6-0. 8 LTC Mitchell Payne, “RDSP in LSCO,” Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2022. 9 FM 5-0, Planning and Orders Production. 10 LTC Mitchell Payne and J. Watts, “Staff Facilitation of Commander Decision-Making,” Center for Army Lessons-Learned (pending publication). 11 FM 3-0. 12 Ibid.

Figure 8. Attack to seize Objective Pats. Last graphic in a distributed CAR brief. (Graphic by author) Figure 6. Movement to attack Objective Pats. Sixth graphic in a distributed CAR brief. (Graphic by author) Figure 7. Shaping Objective Pats. Seventh graphic in a distributed CAR brief. (Graphic by author)

CAR – combined-arms rehearsal CAS – close air support CGSC – Command and General Staff College CP – command post DP – decision point FA – functional area FSO – fire-support officer Acronym Quick-Scan FPoL – forward passage of lines IC – intelligence collection IDF – indirect fires ISR – intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance IVO – in vicinity of LD – line of departure MEDOPS – medical operations NAI – named area of interest PAA – positioned area for artillery PL – phase line PLoC – probable line of contact RDSP – rapid decision-making synchronization process TAA – tactical-assembly area