Lessons-Learned in Company-Team Engagement-Area Development

Defensive operations are an essential part of large-scale combat operations, enabled by the efficient and deliber ate execution of engagement-area (EA) development at the platoon and company levels. With that in mind, Company B, 1st Battalion, 64th Armor Regiment (“Black Knights”), conducted defensive operations during Operation Combined-Arms Resolve XVII (CBR XVII), identifying best practices and lessons-learned that will benefit maneuver leaders in the planning and execution of EA development. Maneuver leaders must create a unit-specific de fense battle drill, formalize it in their tactical standing operating procedures (TSOP) and use it in time-constrained environments. The Black Knights conducted tactical missions throughout CBR XVII at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center, Hohenfels Training Area, Germany. The Black Knights fielded two organic tank platoons, one attached mechanized-infantry platoon, one organic headquarters element and an at tached field-maintenance team. The Black Knights’ defense of EA Knight stands out as a mission with valuable lessons-learned throughout the plan ning process. The defense creates conditions for the offense that allows friendly forces to regain the initiative. Also, the defense can retain decisive or key terrain, deny vital areas to the enemy, attrit or fix an enemy as a prelude to the offense, counter enemy action and increase an enemy’s vulnerability.1 Every defensive operation includes EAs at echelon. An EA is an area where the commander intends to contain and destroy an en emy force with the massed effects of all available weapons and supporting systems.2 EA development is a complex action demanding parallel planning and prep aration if the platoon is to accomplish the myriad of tasks for which it is responsible.3 Platoon and individual preparations must produce a cohesive and integrated defense that nests with the company scheme of maneuver. The lessons-learned by the Black Knights will empower maneuver leaders with the knowledge to enhance their ability to conduct EA develop ment. EA development Step 1: Identify all likely enemy avenues of approach (AoAs). The Black Knight company commander identi fied enemy AoAs using map reconnaissance and the enemy situa tional template (SITTEMP). The com mander briefed platoon leadership about two AoAs to EA Knight along main supply routes (MSRs) AoA A and AoA B. As platoons identified battle positions (BPs), leaders recognized more AoAs. Once local and far security was established by the Black Knights and battalion scouts, the Black Knight commander allowed platoon leaders time to conduct thorough leaders’ reconnaissance and report back. The leader reconnaissance at the platoon level provided true bottom-up refine ment for the likely enemy AoAs.4 Within EA Knight, Platoon G observed a network of trails leading into the company area of operation (AO) from restricted and severely restricted terrain to the south. The network of trails produced several routes through AoA

C. Left unaddressed, AoA C would al low the enemy to bypass EA Knight and flank Black Knight BPs. To counter the problem, Platoon G reported the severity of the trail network in the southern sector, allowing the commander to design a plan for the defense with AoA C as a focus for direct-fire and obstacles. This is an example of why leaders at the lowest level must take initiative, identify Figure 1. AoAs A, Band C, entering AO Black Knight. (U. S. Army graphic by 1LT Mara S. Tazartus) discrepancies on the ground and rapidly report the information to enhance the commander’s understanding of conditions on the battlefield. Covered and concealed routes for friendly resupply operations and friendly counterattack or subsequent offensive operation AoAs were not ad dressed during this initial step of EA development. Although this step fo cuses on the enemy, an implied and crucial part of this step is also the analysis of friendly AoAs. Failure to develop friendly AoAs resulted in confu sion regarding which trails in AoA C could be blocked with obstacles. Therefore, it is important for maneuver leaders to incorporate time for leader reconnaissance to initiate crucial bottom-up refinement and estab lish friendly AoAs for resupply, counterattack and offensive operations. Step 2: Determine likely enemy schemes of maneuver. The enemy scheme of maneuver predicted the en emy approaching from AoA C. Along AoA C, the enemy would use mechanized infantry and scouts to clear the ground, make contact with the small est force possible, and ultimately set conditions for boyeva mashina pekho ty (Russian fighting vehicles) and T-72 tanks to navigate the trails to bypass the friendly EA. During the rush to accomplish the steps of EA development, Black Knight focused heavily on preparation for the main body attack. Black Knight did not conduct rehearsals or disseminate specific information related to contact with the advance guard’s spoiling attack until within an hour of the attack. For commanders and the S-2 shop, the preferred method of communicating the enemy’s scheme of maneuver is an event template (EVENTTEMP). EVENT TEMPs explain the enemy in motion: time, rates of march, all forms of con tact and enemy decision points. EVENTTEMPs break down the enemy into its various elements, including re connaissance, advance guard, main body (to include fixing, penetration and exploitation forces) and the enemy reserve. An EVENTTEMP is superior to a SIT TEMP, which is a static snapshot of how the enemy is arrayed at a given time. If the enemy scheme of maneu ver had been briefed as an EVENT TEMP, then platoons would have been better prepared for the advance guard. EVENTTEMPs also allow leaders to develop intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance plans to confirm the enemy’s scheme of maneuver and to apply fires in target areas of inter est to attrit the enemy during their movement. Step 3: Determine where to kill the enemy. The Black Knights maintained EA Knight and its boundaries as it was originally briefed, but half of Platoon G and three Bradley Fighting Vehicles were oriented on AoA C rather than the EA itself based on the templated enemy scheme of maneuver. The focus within the EA was the MSR and the open area to the far south. The enemy would make contact with Platoon G’s element oriented on AoA C, which would turn the enemy north toward the open areas in EA Knight. The turn ing movement would remove the en emy’s ability to maneuver undetected around or behind Black Knight BPs. Every weapon, squad or track does not need to be oriented on target-reference points (TRPs) within the EA. Areas and routes surrounding EA Knight required security and observation, re quiring EA Knight to break into smaller EAs at platoon level. With this in mind, leaders must be empowered to make necessary recommendations and changes to EA BP locations and secu rity posture to successfully defend against a complex enemy. Step 4: Plan and integrate obstacles. Black Knight used organic Class IV for all obstacles in and around EA Knight. Leaders placed obstacles in-depth to fix and turn enemy forces along AoA

C. Tank platoons cross-loaded organic Class IV in support of the Platoon G obstacle belt emplaced in the south. Taking the initiative to cross-load or ganic Class IV proved critical to the overall success of the obstacle plan. If Black Knight had waited for the battal ion-task-force engineer assets to sup ply materials, advise on location and emplace obstacles, obstacles would not have been in place for the arrival of the enemy’s advance guard. The ini tiative taken by platoon leadership to communicate, cross-load equipment and emplace obstacles based on the commander’s intent produced a suc cessful obstacle belt fast enough to impact the operation. Due to the severely restricted terrain to the south, Platoon G fighting positions and BPs were within 100 meters of the trails and obstacles. The prox imity of friendly positions to the obstacles they observed prevented obstacles from integrating indirect fires. This reliance on a direct fire, without the indirect-fire component, de creased the effectiveness of the obstacles. For best results, all maneuver leaders should strive to achieve both direct- and indirect-fire integration with obstacles emplaced during EA de velopment. The indirect-fire integration with ob stacles often serves as a forcing function for the dissemination of obstacle-location grid coordinates. The exact obstacle locations and compositions in EA Knight were never disseminated throughout the company. Therefore, most of Black Knight had limited knowledge of the location and composition of obstacles to the south. The failure to disseminate obstacle in formation resulted in a degraded ability to reverse breach and quickly counterattack following a successful defense. The information gap would have proved detrimental if the company had immediately gone on offense because most leaders would not have known which trails were accessible or blocked by obstacles. Defensive oper ations are complex and involve numer ous individuals working interdepen dently at multiple echelons.5 Creating shared understanding in the small de tails like obstacle locations allows work at all echelons to produce a co hesive plan. Step 5: emplace weapon systems. Em placing weapon systems is crucial to a successful defense. Emplacement refers to verification of all BPs: primary, alternate, supplementary and subse quent BPs, as well as hide sites. Any position where a vehicle will fight from or maintain a prolonged presence needs to be scrutinized. Each Black Knight platoon emplaced weap ons systems (M1A2 and M2A3) orient ed on EA Knight and relevant AoAs. All platoons emplaced weapon systems to allow observation and concentration of direct fires using company TRPs. The company TRPs were linked to terrain, but the terrain was not as distinct and differentiable on the ground as it appeared on the map. Each platoon thought it understood the TRP loca tions based on its maps and graphic overlays, but discrepancies existed among all platoons. The lack of com monly understood TRPs failed to achieve mutually supporting and over lapping fields of fire. Unfortunately, Black Knight failed to create a shared understanding early in the EA devel opment process by not marking TRPs according to the company TSOP. The Black Knight TSOP called for plac ing Velocity System 17 (VS17) marker panel triangles on each TRP for day time visibility. The VS17 triangles could be tied to a terrain feature or at tached to a picket and pounded into the ground. Black Knight lacked a de fined night-marking SOP or the re sources to create night markings while conducting EA development. The Black Knight SOP has since been updated to include the following night-marking SOP: Use a picket with two nine-volt batteries connected on the inside, facing the friendly BP or fighting position. (The batteries facing toward friendly positions create a thermal signature gunners will identify.) Day and night TRP markers should be immediately emplaced after the re ceipt of company graphics. Having marked TRPs is crucial to achieving mutually supporting and overlapping fields of fire. Black Knight emplaced weapon systems and finalized BPs based on each platoon’s terrain-association-informed concept of the TRPs. When the company began marking TRPs, Black Knight was unknowingly H-2 hours away from an incoming en emy spoiling attack. As Platoon G began emplacing TRP markings, the other platoons realized they could not see Platoon G’s selec tions for TRPs 8 and 9. Neither of the tank platoons identified the markers, which revealed a 400-meter stretch of deadspace in EA Knight. This was bad because you should not leave your unit’s mutually supporting and overlapping fields of fire to chance. To prevent this problem, leaders must conduct pre-combat inspections and be forward-thinking in supply requests for upcoming missions. Get the mark ing material and mark TRPs early in the EA development process. Identify deadspace early enough in the planning process to place registered tar gets in the locations that direct fires cannot cover. Creating and compiling sector sketch es is another important step in em placing weapons systems. The initial sector sketches each vehicle creates in the process of establishing initial se curity do not absolve Soldiers and leaders from continuing to update the accuracy of these sketches. Vehicles must produce more sketches for every fighting position and BP. In Black Knight, the quality of sector sketches varied drastically between different platoons. Commanders and platoon leaders must ensure sector sketches are detailed enough to aid in planning to defend against complex at tacks.6 Detailed sketches should cover:

• Key weapon locations;

• Weapon orientation;

• Obstacle locations;

• Areas of responsibility;

• Most likely enemy AoAs;

• Likely attack positions; and

• Accurate distances and locations of anything in the weapon’s sector. The preceding list incorporates locations and positions that are non-exis tent or unknown during the initial cre ation of the sector sketch. Much like BPs and fighting positions themselves, sector sketches should be continuous ly improved to paint the most accurate picture of the battlefield. Teach good habits when building sector sketches: use a laser rangefinder to get accurate distances and maintain one compass per vehicle to verify left and right lim its, for example. If all sector sketches had met the preceding standard and produced a consolidated sketch, the TRP-placement issue Black Knight faced could have been identified and resolved sooner through an accurate comparison of left and right limits. Step 6: Plan and integrate indirect fires. Fires planning and integration occurred at the company and battal ion levels. Fires were connected to the enemy’s scheme of maneuver and the battalion obstacle belt. Black Knight targets had redundant observers, and all vehicle commanders had grid coor dinates and preplanned target (PPT) locations on graphic overlays. All ve hicle commanders in Black Knight knew the triggers and engagement cri teria for company fire missions, and this should be the goal for all units as they plan for fires. The next step is to rehearse calling the fire missions. Include vignettes and scenarios during rehearsals that force leaders to analyze the intent behind the engagement criteria so they can make decisions about when to call the mission. Black Knight rehearsed the primary observers calling fire missions but did not include alternate observ ers or other leaders in the company. Commanders and leaders must under stand the time it takes for mortars and artillery to impact after a call for fire. This must be rehearsed given the anticipated enemy rates of march to pro vide timely and accurate fires. During actions on contact in the defense, two chances to call fire missions on targets of opportunity arose. How ever, both fire missions were unable to be processed due to an inability to properly clear air and ground. When given the opportunity, register all potential fire targets while in the defense. Having more registered targets will make it easier to capitalize on tar gets of opportunity because the process can be streamlined to adjust fire missions off a known PPT. Step 7: Rehearse the execution of operations in the EA. Black Knight con ducted rehearsals frequently through out defensive operations. Company leaders conducted rehearsal-of-concept (RoC) drills and radio rehearsals. At platoon level, every vehicle re hearsed movement between all hide sites and BPs to ensure driver confidence. Platoon RoC drills and radio re hearsals addressed contingencies, vi gnettes of potential enemy movement and casualty evacuation. The only rehearsal in the Black Knight TSOP not used during the EA-development process was a terrain-model rehearsal. Terrain-model rehearsals are the preferred method of rehears ing for a company-team and could have resolved issues Black Knight en countered in the defense. For exam ple, a terrain model could have creat ed a shared understanding of all obstacle locations. An important part of radio rehearsals was identifying communications dead space and BPs that would require are lay to the Black Knight command post. Leaders should strive to identify com munications shortfalls early, decide if the position is advantageous enough to warrant enacting a communications contingency plan and create a plan and set of priorities for a relay.

Some of the issues Black Knight en countered during the EA development process could have been resolved sim ply by referencing and following through with the Black Knight TSOP. The TSOP instructs the marking of TRPs with VS17 panels and provides a call-for-fire resource to facilitate fire rehearsals at all levels. The Black Knight TSOP provides detailed instruc tions and an example of a correctly drawn sector sketch. The existence of a Black Knight TSOP, regardless of how Soldiers and leaders referenced it, allowed the Black Knights to perform at a high level. Re search identifies that units with devel oped TSOPs for defensive operations performed better on most critical tasks. When assessing EA develop ment and characteristics of defense, units with a TSOP performed better on all 14 items measuring those aspects of defensive operations; 11 of those comparisons reached statistical significance.7 High-achieving tactical organizations create, update and use TSOPs. With that in mind, you should empower your organization to create and refine a TSOP to improve tactical outcomes in EA development. Conclusion EA development is a complex series of simultaneous events. Maneuver lead ers must achieve the doctrinal steps of EA development and recall, and to implement lessons-learned from person al experience and the experiences of others. They should also ensure the unit-specific TSOP is updated and widely used to achieve the best out come. Leaders will find success in syn thesizing the tasks above by creating unit-specific defense battle drills. Create a defense battle drill and re hearse using that battle drill thorough ly and often, not only during a com bat- training-center rotation. Due to the required time to conduct deliber ate defense to standard (72-96 hours for an armored brigade combat team), units often default to training and executing a hasty defense in the field. Therefore units need to employ cre ative methods to train deliberate defense to standard to build proficiency. Conducting deliberate defense train ing is the only method of validating whether the unit defense battle drill is comprehensive and universally under stood. Units can perform deliberate defense over multiple days in the Close Com bat Tactical Trainer or Virtual Bat tlespace 3. Units can work through de liberate defense over time, having ve hicles populate in the last-used fight ing position after a break in training. A full operations order, including an enemy EVENTTEMP, can be briefed and generated in different areas of the battlefield accordingly. Platoons will react to each element of the enemy attack and use the EVENTTEMP as the guideline for how to array vehicles and adjust security during different parts of the operation. Over time, as profi ciency increases, leaders can adjust mission factors and variables to provide more challenging dynamic and complex operational environments. Tabletop exercises with key leaders af ford a chance to gain familiarity with the defense battle drill before enter ing a fully tactical environment. The defense battle drill, including TSOPs and best practices, learned over years of operations, must be disseminated and used to the point of becoming a commonly understood system. CPT Kyle Frazer describes this process in Infantry magazine: “Expounding on this concept of systems establishment, we can boil the defense down to a bat tle drill. This requires commanders to analyze reoccurring tasks, identify who is responsible for the execution and decide the standard to which one must execute. Battle drills are a funda mental way we fight and one we are familiar with, but the key to battle drills is that they are clearly defined and rehearsed. If you can break down the process of the defense, you can provide a framework and establish a sequential battle drill for the defense.”8 A defending force contains enemy forces while seeking every opportuni ty to transition to the offense.9 A clearly defined, rehearsed and under stood defense battle drill will help units and leaders conduct EA develop ment with increased proficiency, resulting in more effective defensive operations overall. Increased success and lethality in the defense will create con ditions that allow leaders to seize the initiative and transition to a counter attack or offense. Maneuver leaders need to create the defense battle drill that is right for their unit, incorporate the battle drill and its subcomponents into a TSOP and continuously refer to these re sources. The preceding steps, paired with lessons-learned from Black Knight’s execution of EA development, provide the foundation for greater success for all maneuver leaders in the most challenging aspects of the de fense. 1LT Mara Tazartus is the tank-platoon leader, 3rd Platoon, Company B, 1st Battalion, 64th Armor Regiment, 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, GA. Previous assignments include Headquarters Platoon leader, Company B, 1-64 Armor; and assistant S-4, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1-64 Armor. 1LT Tazartus’ military schools include Armor Basic Officer Leader Course, Bradley Commander’s Course, Scout Leader’s Course and Maneuver Leader Maintenance Course. She has a bachelor’s of science degree in busi ness administration and management information systems from Northeast ern University. 1LT Tazartus earned the Expert Soldier Badge. 1LT Tazartus ro tated to Camp Casey, Republic of Ko rea, from April-July 2021 in support of 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division’s regionally aligned forces mission.

Acronym Quick-Scan Notes 1 Field Manual (FM) 3-90, Offense and Defense,” July 2019. 2 Ibid. 3 Army Techniques Publication 3-20.15, Tank Platoon, July 2019. 4 CPT Kyle Frazer, “Engagement-Area Development in a Compressed Time line,” Infantry, Spring 2018, https:// www.benning.army.mil/infantry/magazine/issues/2018/APR-JUN/PDF/9)Frazer-EA%20Dev_txt.pdf. 5 C. Vowels, W. A. Scroggins, Kyle T. Dan iels, Paul M. Volino, “Defensive Operations in a Decisive-Action Training Environment,” U. S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, July 2017. 6 “Company Defense Planning Needs Improvement,” Center for Army Lessons Learned, https://call2.army.mil/docs/ doc4688/Tip_132.pdf. 7 Vowels, Scroggins, Daniels and Volino. 8 Frazer. 9 FM 3-90. AO – area of operation AoA – avenue of approach BP – battle position CBR XVII – (Operation) Combined-Arms Resolve XVII EA – engagement area EVENTTEMP – event template FM – field manual MSR – main supply route PPT – preplanned target RoC – rehearsal of concept SITTEMP – situational template SOP – standing operating procedures TRP – target-reference point TSOP – tactical standing operating procedures VS17 – Velocity Systems 17 (marker panel) Hosted by the U. S. Army Armor School at Fort Benning, GA Troopers from across the nation compete to determine the “best scout squad” in the U. S. Army. This competition physically and mentally challenges all troopers by rigorously testing their knowledge, tactical competence and fortitude in the fundamentals of reconnaissance and security operations. Scout teams run a gauntlet of tasks to evaluate their cavalry-specific skills such as reconnaissance fundamentals, target identifi cation, call for fire, troop-leading procedures, day and night livefire, obstacle courses, observation-post establishment, helicopter-landing-zone establishment, knowledge of weapons, communication devices and sensors, and physical endurance. Visit the Website at http://www.benning.army.mil/armor/gainey cup/ for more information. The Gainey Cup is named for CSM William J. “Joe” Gainey, the first senior-enlisted adviser to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, then a newly created position. The position was estab lished to advise the chairman on professionally developing en listed personnel assigned to Joint billets. Gainey began to serve in this position Oct. 1, 2005. He retired April 25, 2008, after near ly 33 years of service. 2023 Gainey Cup 2023 Gainey Cup May 1-5, 2023 May 1-5, 2023 CSM William J. “Joe” Gainey.