Protection across the Domains: Electronic Warfare in the Armored-Cavalry Squadron

Current military conflicts in Iraq, Syria and Ukraine show how civilian drone technologies are cheap, plentiful, sophisticated and effective when em ployed in a military manner. The ar mored reconnaissance squadron’s (ARS) modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) has no viable response as of 2018. In fact, while as signed electronic-warfare (EW) personnel by MTOE, the ARS does not actual ly own any EW equipment. Right now, there is a window of oppor tunity for the ARS (and the cavalry community as a whole) to step forward as the leader in the brigade’s EW fight and to shape how the ARS will integrate itself into the Army’s multi-do main battle for years to come. Protection gap Two excerpts from the Russian New-Generation Warfare Study conducted by the Potomac Institute and published on ARMY magazine’s Website in 2016 highlight the current risk to the modern ARS: “Ukrainian units have ob served up to eight Russian [unmanned aerial vehicle] overflights per day, and the constant awareness of being observed and targeted is often a traumat ic experience that instills fear and in hibits movement, particularly in day light. The combination of small-size, limited radar cross-section or infrared signature, and lack of acquisition until they are over or past the target, makes engagement with surface-to-air mis siles a low-probability and high-cost proposition.” And: “In July 2014, Russia launched fire strikes with long-range artillery and multiple-rocket launchers employing top-attack munitions and thermobaric warheads against two Ukrainian mech anized battalions in the open. This in tensely concentrated fire strike lasted only a few minutes, yet inflicted high casualties and destroyed most ar mored vehicles, rendering both battalions combat-ineffective.” The preceding should not be a sur prise. The exact situation described was replicated and documented in our own training centers and relayed to this very publication. In the July-September 2016 issue of ARMOR, CPT Joshua Christian published apiece perfectly outlining the gap in EW protec tion. Christian describes how a cavalry squadron executed a screening operation and attempted to gain contact with the opposing force (OPFOR) during an exercise at the Joint Multina tional Readiness Center. Without warn ing, the squadron command post (CP) is destroyed when the OPFOR gains aline of bearing to the squadron CP with electromagnetic (EM) detection equip ment, cues a reconnaissance asset (a drone in this case), gains an accurate grid and destroys the CP with massed indirect fires.1 All this occurred without the squadron or troops identifying any form of con tact prior to indirect fire on their posi tions. Christian used the preceding scenario to demonstrate in his article the importance of passive protection, but what should be addressed is the role of active protection in this scenario. Army Technical Publication (ATP) 3-20.98 identifies the purpose of the cavalry squadron in security operations as “provide early warning and reaction time, deny enemy reconnaissance efforts and protect the security area to give the commander freedom of maneuver.” Right now the question the cavalry community should be asking it self is: “Does the cavalry squadron have the capability to do this?” The an swer unfortunately is no. The unit tasked with providing security and reconnaissance for the rest of the brigade is at risk of becoming funda mentally obsolete if it cannot protect itself from being observed, disrupted and engaged without providing early warning and maneuver space to the brigade. Passive measures are indeed apart of the solution, but the squadron must leverage active measures to adapt to the rapidly changing technological environment and avoid obsoles cence. Integrating active EW into reconnaissance formations The squadron is the logical home for a robust and thorough EW capability. A doctrinal screen line consists of multiple observation posts (OPs) operating in depth, within supporting range and distance of each other, and large lines-of-sight overlooking likely avenues of approach and named areas of interest. Consequently, supplementing our OPs with EW equipment would simultane ously enhance the OPs and the equip ment’s capabilities. Integrating EW into the ARS’s MTOE allows the squadron screen or guard to instantly begin operating among multiple domains. Despite the rumors, unmanned aerial systems (UASs) and intelligence, sur veillance and reconnaissance systems are not undetectable, invulnerable, in visible platforms. Indeed, they may be difficult to see, hard to hear and hard to engage, but they emit detectable electromagnetic (EM) signatures all the same. The technology to detect these signatures is real, proven and in use in combat zones around the world. Systems like the Danish Wingman from Mydefense or the Versatile Radio Observation and Direction (VROD) the Army is now taking steps to field pro vide electronic-frequency-detection capabilities. These devices are manportable sensors that alert the user with an audible or visual cue when a UAS’ distinct EM signature is received by the antenna. However, current fielding sees these devices consolidated at the brigade level, along with the rest of the brigade’s EW and counter-UAS capability. While these field ings are a step in the right direction, they do not go far enough and need to be organic to the ARS. Another method of reinforcing the ARS’ EW capabilities is to provide it more active EW jamming capabilities. Using currently fielded kinetic air-defense assets to engage UAS assets is an unrealistic proposition for multiple reasons. It remains an economically poor trade-off to kinetically engage cheap drones with sophisticated guided missiles. Also, detecting the physical signature of small UASs is a daunt ing prospect under field conditions. A promising option for the cavalry community is therefore active EM jam ming. Active jamming can occur at ech elon from the OP and upward. Systems such as VROD Modular Adaptive Transmit (VMAX) currently in use or the Northrup Grumman’s Drake system are manportable EM jammers that can deny UAS command and control and Global Positioning System signals in a large area. Active jamming can be used in the same manner as an “area effect” weapons system. Area jamming is pref erable to more traditional point weap ons systems, as it allows the individual Soldier to cover a greater area, some thing critical for any force establishing a screen line. There is a trade-off in weight, power and EM signature requirements, but there is an overall net increase in protection for the squadron and the bri gade. Multiple OPs linked with com mon active EW equipment in a screen or guard could be quite effective in dis rupting or denying enemy UAS recon naissance efforts. Some may argue that the brigade-level EW team could simply be tactically controlled by the ARS, but devices such as the VROD and VMAX could more easily be carried forward by a 19D onto an OP and operated passively for hours, only raising an alarm when there is a UAS within line-of-sight of the system. The ARS screen would now have the ability to gain EM contact with the UAS and can report its pres ence, even if it could not be physically seen. This vital reporting could facilitate more active or passive measures in alignment with the commander’s re connaissance and security guidance, cue additional reconnaissance or air-defense assets at echelon or even facilitate informing decisions linked to the commander’s critical-intelligence requirements. Larger and more powerful systems such as the Army’s vehicle-mounted Sable Fury jamming and signal-detection system could (and should) beech eloned at critical nodes such as the troop CP, squadron CP and various squadron-trains locations. These sites have inherently larger physical signatures, lack immediate mobility, have lower protection and have higher pay off value for the enemy. The squad ron’s command and sustainment nodes are likely the closest to the enemy and are in most danger of detection as it coordinates the ARS across the entire brigade’s frontage. Vehicle-mounted passive sensors and active jammers would add to the security and capability of these critical nodes with low or no impact to the staff and logistical personnel using them. Setting chemi cal sensors out with the establishment of a CP or tactical-assembly area for protection is normal, and so now too should be the establishment of EM sensors. By integrating EW ability into the ARS, the possibility of EW fratricide ncreas es measurably. The use of EW systems will unavoidably degrade an ARS’ own ability to communicate with friendly forces no matter how well positioned or aimed those systems are, and if not planned or coordinated, may prevent an armored brigade combat team (ABCT) from being able to use its own mission-command systems to maxi mum effect. This degradation can be heavily (if not entirely) mitigated by adding (and using) EW personnel at the squadron level who can collaborate efforts horizontally and vertically to min imize EW fratricide. ATP 3-20.96 iden tifies that an ARS staff should plan to operate beyond traditional frequency-modulation communications, using al ternate communications methods and retransmission stations as necessary.2 The ARS should be, by doctrine, the unit most familiar operating in a con strained communications environment, and an EW-saturated area is just one example of that possible con straint. Current EW assets potentially available to U. S. and allied forces are controlled at brigade and echelons above brigade and are not organic to Army maneuver forces – and certainly not the squadron. EW will play its most decisive role in the opening salvos of any conflict, long before any theater- or division-level assets can be expected to action in support. The primary EW gap in to day’s fight is persistent EW capability available to the line units required to screen and advance against potential adversaries. Current platforms are of ten mounted on vulnerable and highly visible aerial platforms that, by their nature, will not be responsive to the requirements of forces potentially in contact. What is needed are assets and tactics at the troop and squadron level that can mitigate the negative impacts of such emergent technologies on U. S. operations while simultaneously lever aging them to enable the U. S. warfighter to perform his or her job in a chang ing environment. Integrating active EW into indirect fires The solution to the current capability gap in electronic warfare is threefold:

1) integrate counter-UAS technology in the short to medium term; 2) continue to develop active anti-UAS technology in the long term; and 3) integrate coun ter-UAS EW capability into the maneuver and fires warfighting functions (WfF). Counter-UAS technology often consists of radio jammers that deny the ability to control and communicate with any UAS assets. Such equipment could be used simultaneously to prevent un wanted communications while also denying enemy UAS freedom of maneu ver. There are multiple systems on the market as well as being fielded now that will provide mounted and dis mounted forces the ability to detect and deny enemy UAS effective operation. Active EW capabilities, although most complementary to the missions of cavalry squadrons, would be of distinct use to the fires and protection WfFs. For example: first deployed in the mid- 80s, the Bulgarian R-045 Sharshel is an electronic area-denial weapon deploy able by 122mm and 152mm artillery.3 A battery fire mission provides the capability of jamming communications in nearly an entire grid square for up to an hour. The same technology can be integrated into our own indirect fires and operate in a similar fashion as the family of scatterable mines. In today’s complex and nebulous conflicts where multiple state and non-state actors of varying alignments and allegiances operate in close quarters, the ability to employ non-lethal but selective coun ter-capability weapon systems should not be overlooked. An ABCT’s ARS is the logical home for counter-UAS capability. A doctrinal screen line consists of multiple OPs, operating in depth and within support ing range and distance of one another. By integrating counter-UAS systems into an ARS’s MTOE, an ABCT’s screen becomes capable of denying enemy forces the ability to easily achieve their own reconnaissance or security objectives. Neither does integrating counter-UAS and EW assets into the ARS preclude retaining the same complementary capabilities at brigade level. Reconnaissance formations must always orient on force, facility or area to be protect ed, thereby placing them in the ideal location to employ and position EW as sets. The ability to deny any potential enemy the ability to freely use drone and radio communications within an area is absolutely critical. With the current ongoing developments in drone technology, such capabilities should be considered and controlled at the same level that obscuration indirect fires are. While pushing down such capabilities will needlessly complicate communications in any attempts to use ro tary and fixed-wing assets, the requi site additional planning time required will be more than offset in the ability to protect friendly forces from easy de tection and destruction. CPT Kevin Zhang commands Battle

Acronym Quick-Scan ABCT – armored brigade combat team ABOLC – Armor Basic Officer Leader’s Course ARC – Army Reconnaissance Course ARS – armored reconnaissance squadron ATP – Army technical publication CP – command post EM – electromagnetic EW – electronic warfare MCCC – Maneuver Captain’s Career Course MTOE – modified table of organization and equipment OP – observation post OPFOR – opposing force UAS – unmanned aerial system USMA – U. S. Military Academy VMAX – VROD Modular Adaptive Transmit VROD – Versatile Radio Observation and Direction WfF – warfighting function Company, 1-8 Cavalry, 2/1 ABCT, Fort Hood, TX, and has recently returned from a deployment to the Korean Theater of Operations. Previous assign ments include battalion plans officer, 1-8 Cav; squadron assistant S-3 for 4-10 Cav, 3rd ABCT, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, CO, forward-deployed to Jordan; executive officer, Troop C, 4-10 Cav, 3rd ABCT, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson; and platoon leader, Troop A, 4-10 Cav, 3rd ABCT, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson. CPT Zhang’s military schools include Armor Basic Officer Leader’s Course (ABOLC), Maneuver Captain’s Career Course (MCCC), Air-Assault School, Airborne School and Army Reconnaissance Course (ARC). He holds a bachelor’s of science degree in military history from the U. S. Military Academy (USMA), West Point, NY. CPT Michael Grdina commands Demon Company, 1-1 Cav, 2nd ABCT, 1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss, TX, and re cently returned from supporting Operations Inherent Resolve and Spartan Shield. Previous assignments include platoon leader in Troop A, 4-10 Cav, 3rd ABCT, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson; troop executive officer in Troop B, 4-10 Cav, and Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 4-10 Cav; and squadron planner for 1-1 Cav, 2nd ABCT, 1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss. CPT Grdina’s military schools include ABOLC, MCCC, ARC, Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leader’s Course and Cavalry Leader’s Course. He holds a bachelor’s of science degree in defense and strategic studies from USMA. Notes 1 CPT Joshua T. Christian, “Mastery of the Fundamentals of Passive Counter-reconnaissance to Survive against a Hybrid Threat,” ARMOR, July-September 2016. 2 ATP 3-20.96, Cavalry Squadron, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, May 2016. 3 “Wingman 101: Wearable Drone Detector,” MyDefense; accessed May 4, 2018, http://mydefence.dk/military-customers/ wingman101/. 4 “Company’s mobile acoustic sensing and electronic attack innovations detect and defeat emerging threats in complex sce narios,” Northrup Grumman; accessed May 10, 2018, https://news.northrop grumman.com/news/releases/northropgrumman-demonstrates-counter-uas-technologies-at-black-dart-exercise. 5 “Electronic Warfare Equipment,” Defense Industry Group PLC Bulgaria; accessed June 10, 2018, http://www.digplc. com/communicationselectronics5.html. 6 “2CR trains on Enhanced Electronic War fare Systems,” U. S. Army; accessed Nov. 14, 2018, https://www.army.mil/ article/184853/2cr_trains_on_enhanced_ electronic_warfare_systems. Donovan Research Library, Maneuver Center of Excellence, hosts Armor student papers on various subjects, http://www.benning.army.mil/library/content/Virtual/virtual.htm, and back issues of ARMOR magazine, http://www.benning.army.mil/library/content/Virtual/CavalryArmorJournal/index.htm — currently through 1888-1973 but building up to the early 1980s. Some back issues are also available on eARMOR, http://www.benning.army.mil/armor/earmor/