Critical Information For Informed Decision Making

Summer 2025 Friendly force information require ments (FFIRs) are a powerful tool for informing decisions throughout an op eration if routinely reviewed and re fined as the fight evolves. During Warf ighter 25-01, the 1st Armored Division did not review the FFIR until after the mid-rotation after-action review (AAR). The division’s initial approach to oper ations prioritized the speed of the ar mored brigade combat teams (ABCT) to gain a position of relative advantage compared to the enemy. After a diffi cult wet gap crossing that slowed the pace of operations, the enemy estab lished their defense. They emplaced their long-range shooters and estab lished a robust air defense bubble. The division’s emphasized speed as a key condition for success early in the op eration. The division required a change in approach, but switching objectives for subordinate units would not suf fice. The staff needed to challenge the assumptions that led to the prioritiza tion of speed. After the first few days of execution the staff better under stood the enemy but needed a better understanding of the necessary friend ly conditions. Thus, the 1st Armored Division switched its rapid approach to a more deliberate conditions-based approach. The Division Artillery Brigade focused on targeting the enemy’s air defenses, which enabled the Aviation Brigade to destroy enemy artillery, which provid ed maneuver space for the brigade combat teams (BCT) to gain the neces sary ground to jump the general sup port rocket battalions into their next set of position artillery areas. This cycle repeated until the enemy’s air defense bubble collapsed, which en abled the Aviation brigade to conduct a mass attack and the BCT to rapidly maneuver across large swaths of land and envelop the enemy’s position. In a deliberate effort, 1st Armored Divi sion effectively changed its approach in using the FFIR to inform a condi tions-based approach that ultimately informed the commander’s decisionmaking ability to make rapid, informed decisions. The 1st Armored Division initially exe cuted this change without deliberately readdressing the FFIR, which created a blind spot in planning and execution. The initial FFIR are listed below. By this point in the operation, the divi sion had already crossed both rivers Critical Information for Informed Decision Making by MAJ Christopher Salerno Soldiers with 5-7 Cavalry, 1st Armored Brigade Team, 3rd Infantry Division ref erence a training area map. (U.S. Army Photo by SFC Richard Hoppe)

Summer 2025 and was opening a ground line of com munication to our partners on OBJ VI OLET. The division conducted a daily assessment of the operation, but did not deliberately relook the assump tions made during the military deci sion-making process (MDMP) and de termine if they needed to be read dressed. When the division’s leadership direct ed a deliberate reassessment of FFIR after the mid-rotational AAR, the divi sion staff initially struggled with how to approach developing the new FFIR. After a brainstorming session, the team decided to approach it through the warfighting functions based on how the division wanted to fight. This is in line with Field Manual (FM) 5-0, Planning and Orders Production, which states, “A Commander’s Critical Information Requirement (CCIR) is specified by a commander for a specif ic operation, applicable only to the commander who specifies it, situation dependent and directly linked to a cur rent or future mission, and time-sensi tive.”1 The staff adopted this new ap proach and examined each warfighting function by risk to the overall opera tion. The intent was twofold, first to catch both problems that were bub bling before they erupted, and second ly to better understand if the division was positioned to seize opportunities as this would inform both the planners and current operations team to enable decisions. Additionally, the new FFIR prioritized concerns that would impact the artillery and aviation brigades over the maneuver brigades. The new FFIR are listed below: The G35 team led the effort to develop the new FFIR, but coordinated with the functional cells for input on what would break this chain. This FFIR is not perfect and the G35 team should have included the G4 at the rear command post for better clarity on sustainment issues that could break this approach. The enemy routinely targeted friendly air defense systems. The protection team revalidated the prioritized pro tection list daily through the protec tion working group and decision board. A whole staff approach to developing the FFIR can inform this process as it visualizes what will become more im portant over time and informs the PPL decisions made by the working group and decision board. A continual refine ment of the FFIR would have highlight ed that the key to the aviation brigade team’s operation was time on station. As the division progressed, forward aerial refueling points (FARP) became integral to increasing time on station before the aviation brigade could jump forward. There is risk associated with any decision, but prioritizing securing a FARP even if it meant pulling combat power from the close fight would have enabled the division’s ultimate rapid maneuver forward. The FFIR is not an all-encompassing list, but a forcing function to force the staff to think through how the operation will unfold and where decisions will need to be made. As the plans team develops branches and sequels the division staff need to reassess the FFIR. A properly fleshed out FFIR shows that the divi sion staff understands the operating environment. The FFIR is just one example of how di vision staff needs to relook its products throughout an operation and not as sume that everything is complete with orders production. The collection man ager routinely reassessed the priority intelligence requirements and associ ated indicators throughout the opera tion, but understanding the enemy is only one half of the equation when it comes to a decision. The decision mak er needs to understand, “is informa tion the commander and staff need to understand the status of friendly force and supporting capabilities.”2 The FFIR is not a stagnant product and reassess ing it forces the staff to relook their running estimates and if they enable decision making. This connects back to the Division’s critical path. The assessments working group (AWG) should be determining whether the assumptions made throughout the planning process re main accurate. This is in line with what the Mission Command Training Pro gram (MCTP) recommends in their fis cal year (FY) 2023 key observations that one of the outputs of the AWG is to, “update, change, add or remove critical assumptions.”3 This assessment will ultimately inform whether the di vision staff will need to form a cross-functional team (CFT) lead by one of the integrating cells to address those issues identified by the AWG. The as sessment working group should help the staff better understand the opera tional environment.4 Implicit in this is understanding the assumptions initial ly made during the planning process about the operational environment. The staff needs to challenge those as sumptions based on the actual experi ence operating in that environment. This can then feed the working groups and decision boards throughout the day. The division commander can approve the output of this staff work during the Commander’s decision board. This will Figure 1. FFIR utilized by 1st Armored Division during the initial phases of Warfighter 25-01 (U.S. Army Graphic)

Summer 2025 inform the division commander’s un derstanding of the operational envi ronment, which he can communicate to the subordinate commanders during the Commander’s visualization. A crit ical path that focuses on specific issues is important, but the Division staff can ‘lose the forest through the trees’ if it does not reassess its assumptions that underpinned the original plan. The FFIR is one element of the original plan that should be readdressed, but it is not the only factor that the staff should routinely readdress throughout the op eration. The Division’s planners should be responsible for facilitating the reas sessment of planning assumptions dur ing the AWG, which can be split be tween the G5 team and the G35 team depending on the time horizon. MAJ Christopher M. Salerno is the G35, 1AD. His previous assignments include Maneuver Captain’s Career Course Small Group Leader, Fort Moore, GA; Troop OC-T, Cobra Team, National Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA; Troop and HHC Commander, 2nd ABCT, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Cavazos, TX; and Platoon Leader, 1-89 CAV, 2nd IBCT, 10th MTN Division, Fort Drum, NY. His military schools include Armor Basic Officer Leader’s Course; Maneuver Captain’s Career Course; and Naval War College. MAJ Salerno has a Bach elor of Science degree in Business Man agement from Boston College; a Mas ter of Science degree in Organizational Leadership from Columbus State Uni versity; and a Master of Arts degree in Defense and Strategic Studies from the United States Naval War College. Notes 1 Field Manual 5-0, Planning and Orders Production, (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 2022), 5-57. 2 Field Manual 5-0, Planning and Orders Production, (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 2022), 1-85. 3 Mission Command Training Program, “FY 23 Mission Command Training in LargeScale Combat Operations Key Observa tions,” 4 Field Manual 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and Operations, (Washing ton, DC: U.S. GPO, 2022), 4-35. Figure 2. Updated FFIR based on guidance obtained from FM 5-0, Planning and Orders Production (U.S. Army Graphic)