Like Moths to a False Flame: Lethality and Protection Through Deception Operations

The ongoing war in Ukraine has demonstrated the deadly efficiency of modern battlefield targeting. Rapid sensor-to-shooter integration, enabled by signals intelligence (SIGINT), geo spatial intelligence (GEOINT), and un manned aerial systems (UAS) reconnaissance, has shortened kill chains to the point where detection often leads to immediate engagement. High-value assets, identified through electronic emissions or ground-based reconnais sance, face a severe risk of engagement and destruction. The prevalence of SIGINT collection, integration of UAS, and massed indirect fires in the doctrines of American adversaries rep resents a complex problem that can be mitigated by the use of tactical deception.1 Russia and China both employ multi-layered information collection and rap id sensor-to-shooter systems. Command and Control (C2) nodes are an example of High-Value-Targets (HVT) targeted by adversary doctrines and are a convenient example for exploring the use of, and opportunities created by, deception. Adversary doctrine de scribes the following kill chain for en gaging C2 nodes: mobile SIGINT collec tors locate command nodes, UAS con firm the target location, and artillery at echelon execute massed fires strikes before blue force commanders can re act. The threat to U. S. forces this system represents is not theoretical, it un folds daily on the battlefields of Ukraine and represents the conditions under which American forces are ex pected to fight and win. These doc trines are replicated every rotation at the National Training Center (NTC), where the Troopers of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (Blackhorse) serve as the professional opposing force (OPFOR). Blackhorse provides units with a critical opportunity to train against the techniques America’s adversaries use daily. Unexercised solutions already exist within Army for mations to mitigate the effects of the modern battlefield’s shortened kill chains. By understanding adversary collection techniques, reducing signa ture, and presenting deception signa tures, battalions can disrupt enemy targeting cycles and create opportuni ties for lethal response. Threat Collection Doctrine Russia and China prioritize rapid target acquisition, integrated information collection, and fire control automation as core tenets of their military doctrine. The 7-100 series doctrinal manuals lay out their shared approach to largescale combat operations (LSCO), detail ing the reliance on multi-layered information collection systems that feed directly into massed indirect fires, shortening the time between detection and engagement. SIGINT plays a criti cal role in this process, by geolocating friendly forces C2 nodes and tracking emissions from communications and mission command information systems. GEOINT, collected by UAS, sup plements SIGINT data by confirming target locations and conducting battle damage assessment (BDA) to refine follow-on strikes. This integrated tar geting process ensures that friendly forces are rapidly engaged before they can reposition, react, or conceal themselves. For U. S. forces, the threat posed by this level of collection and targeting cannot be overstated because of our reliance on digital mission command systems. The ability of adversaries to rapidly detect and engage formations means that any electronic emissions or movement bears significant risk of compromise and targeting. Without ef fective mitigation measures, units risk being outpaced in the decision-making cycle, allowing the enemy to dictate the tempo of battle. Blackhorse repli cates these conditions at NTC, ensuring that rotational training units (RTUs) experience the same information-driven targeting process they will face in combat. By understanding how adver saries collect and process information, by CPT Paul Dolan

U. S. forces can better prepare to dis rupt, degrade, deny enemy kill chains. Threat Replication Blackhorse executes information collection operations by integrating SI GINT, UAS, and ground-based recon naissance to target friendly command and control C2 nodes, thereby disrupt ing decision-making processes. Their layered sensor network operates in a sequence designed to detect, validate, and engage targets in real time. The Networked Electronic Support Threat Sensors (NESTS) system collects SIGINT, identifying emissions from satellite-based communications, while the Ver satile Radio Observation and Direction (VROD) system intercepts frequency modulated (FM) transmissions to lo cate and classify targets. Identification of likely targets by SIGINT cues UAS to confirm targeting data and refine col lection. Due to limited time on station, UAS only remain on their assigned named areas of interest (NAIs) long enough to confirm targeting data be fore moving on to identify additional targets in support of the maneuver fight. Small UAS (sUAS) may conduct BDA later if required. Once validated, the Blackhorse Regimental Targeting Intelligence Cell (RTIC) processes the refined target data and passes it to fires elements for strike execution. This sensor-to-shoot er process mirrors adversary work flows, where electronic detection leads to physical compromise and rapid engagement. The effectiveness of this process underscores the necessity for signature management, deception, and counter-fire strategies to disrupt enemy kill chains. Defeat through Deception Deception is a fundamental aspect of modern warfare but is typically rele gated to a survivability operation. Successful battlefield deception forces ad versaries to misallocate resources, de lay decision-making, and strike false targets. FM 3-90 defines deception as actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary decision-makers about friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations.2 Adversary intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) networks rely on rapid detection, classification, and engagement. By integrating deception, friendly forces can manipulate enemy perception, disrupt targeting cycles, and increase survivability.3&4 Deception operates across all domains and targets two specific deminision: physical and technical. Together these dimensions infulence the cognitive, or human, dimension of decision making. Physical deception uses false positions and decoys to mislead enemy analysts into assessing a decoy as a legitimate target. Technical deception manipulates the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) by emitting signals that mimic actual targets, causing adversary collectors to misinterpret the data. C2 nodes have both a physical and techni cal signature, making them a useful ex ample for exploring the requirements of a deception story.5 Figure 1. NESTS in the vicinity of Strawberry Fields oriented towards Dazashah collecting on rotational brigade MCP and enabler signatures in the Pass Complex targeting Joint Battle Command-Platform. (Photo by 11th ACR Regimental S2)

Units generate deception stories by creating signatures inside the collected spectrums, that force adversary ana lysts to make false assessments. In the electronic spectrum, the deception node must emit signatures that mimic a C2 node. This requires units to allocate FM and Joint Battle Command-Platform (JBCP) capability to the deception node as both systems are present in MCPs. JBCPs constantly update their location data to the network, creating a continuous low-power emis sion. JBCP emissions are commonly assumed to be too weak to be detected, this is a false assumption. In addition to being detectable, the static nature of C2 nodes allows enemy analysts to accurately classify their emissions as a C2 node and initiate a queuing cycle and kill chain. Reinforcing the deception story re quires physically constructing the de ception node to present a believable target. After SIGINT assets identify a likely MCP, adversary doctrine calls for UAS or ground reconnaissance to validate the target. Blackhorse repli cates this effect with a dedicated MQ- 1C Gray Eagle during NTC rotations. When UAS collection begins, the de ception node must match the physical signature of an actual MCP. To achieve this, units must equip the deception node with wheeled vehicles, tentage, antennas, and other identifiable MCP-associated equipment. Battalions can improve deception ef fectiveness by creating deception kits from non-functional or excess equipment components. Broken antennas simulate active communication architecture, while trailers transporting generator mockups and fuel cans rep licate life support systems. Worn-out power cables present the image of power distribution to tents, reinforcing the illusion of an operational command node. Because high quality thermal sensors are widely available common commercial markets, the deception node should also mimic the thermal signature of an operational command node. Crews can simulate a generator’s thermal signature by piping exhaust from the towing vehicle into the decoy, allowing it to escape through a repli cated exhaust port. Properly routing exhaust tubing and covering both the vehicle and the fake generator with camouflage netting obscures the de ception and breaks up its physical signature, making identification of the deception story as a deception less likely. Damaged shelters staged as command post structures further reinforce the deception story without risking mis sion-essential assets. Integrating these elements allows units to construct deception nodes capable of withstanding both SIGINT and GEOINT validation. To reduce risk, all personnel should withdraw from the deception node once it establishes. A technique to im prove the deception teams survivabil ity is to locate them in offset security positions, several hundred meters away, minimizing exposure while maintaining operational control of the node. Using wired connections to FM radios enables deception teams to Figure 2. FM NEST Emission Assessment for 2/11 TOC (Photo by 11th ACR Regimental S2) transmit from secure positions, in creasing the deception node’s electro magnetic (EM) signature while keeping personnel protected. This method strengthens deception by making the site appear active while preserving force survivability. Another technique to strengthen technical deception is to equip the deception node with a CX- 13298 Retrans Cable, commonly known as a “dog bone”. This cable al lows the deception node to act as are trans site, mimicking the radio traffic of the actual C2 node while simultaneously allowing the C2 node to broad cast lower power transmissions, reducing the likelihood of electronic detection. The final step in any deception operation is concealing the actual asset. While the deception nodes attract en emy collection by design, the real MCP must obscure or eliminate the signatures that would expose its location. This requires reversing the techniques used to make the deception node appear authentic and ensuring the protected asset remains undetected. Minimizing electromagnetic emissions is the first priority. JBCP should operate on communications windows, establish offset from the MCP, or estab lish behind terrain that completely masks horizontal emissions. FM radios should connect by hardline to an offset antenna farm, preventing immediate correlation between transmissions and the MCP’s physical location. ATP 6-02.53, “Techniques for Tactical Ra dio Operations,” details how antennas can offset more than two miles using ASIP remote operations via hardline connection, reducing the MCP’s expo sure to SIGINT collection.6 When using a retrans setup on the deception node, the C2 node can locate in terrain that masks FM communication forward but allows broadcasts to hit the retrans system. These techniques not only improve concealment but also reinforce the deception story by generating EM emissions at the decoy location. Beyond SIGINT mitigation, the physical composition of the MCP should be structured to blend into the operation al environment while still meeting op erational requirements. Use of vehicles and equipment incongruent with an MCP, reducing the size of the node, and collapsing assets during periods of UAS reconnaissance all contribute to the deception story by representing the C2 node as a different asset. Reports of contact with UAS should trigger protection battle drills, including breaking down easily identifiable equipment, applying additional cam ouflage, or even jumping the command post to prevent the presentation of an easy target. Once the ISR threat is neu tralized or off-station, units can restore digital communications as needed. Leveraging Lethality from Deception A well-integrated deception plan must align with counter-reconnaissance, fires, and intelligence planning, anticipating how and when enemy collection Figure 3. JBC-P NEST Emission Assessment for Troop CP and 2/11 TOC (Photo by 11th ACR Regimental S2) assets will react, and how to actively counter their efforts. This concept is rooted in reflexive control, a strategy developed by the Soviet Union in the 1960s and 1970s. Reflexive control seeks to manipulate an adversary’s de cision-making process by shaping their perception, leading them to take actions that are predictable and favor able to the initiator. In this context, deception forces the enemy into a pre dictable reaction, which friendly forces can prepare to exploit. Given the passive nature of SIGINT col lection, the first engagement window occurs when enemy UAS attempts to validate the deception target. To coun ter this, units should establish anti-air ambushes near MCPs and deception nodes, positioning short-range air defense (SHORAD) or mobile air defense teams in ISR flight corridors. This al lows friendly forces to engage enemy ISR platforms before they collect ac tionable intelligence, denying the enemy the ability to confirm or refine tar gets. If the enemy cannot validate the target with UAS, they may deploy ground reconnaissance teams to confirm or deny its presence. By identifying and secur ing ground infiltration routes, units deny the enemy access to the decep tion node, reinforcing the perception that a high-value target is present while creating opportunities to trap and destroy enemy reconnaissance elements before they can collect. If deception is successful, the enemy will likely commit fires assets against the deception node without validation, encouraged in their belief that these protective efforts are aligned against a real asset. The final engagement opportunity, where counter-fire radar, ground moving target indicator (GMTI) radar, and national level collection can detect and track enemy fires assets that have unmasked for a valueless engagement. Friendly forces can track and destroy these targets, preventing their use against friendly forces and creating hesitation to unmask assets for future strikes. By integrating deception with air de fense, counter-reconnaissance, and counter-fire operations, units can force the enemy into predictable, exploit able mistakes while preserving their own combat power. Deception is not passive. It is a deliberate operation that includes all warfighting functions and sets conditions for the enemy to fail.7 Conclusion By understanding adversary collection techniques, reducing the signature of high-value targets, and leveraging deception to shape enemy behavior, units can force adversaries to misallocate ISR and fires assets, disrupting their kill chain and protecting friendly forces. Current conflicts are occurring in high ly contested ISR environments, where failure to integrate deception will result in rapid targeting and engagement. Deception is not just a defensive tool, it shapes the battlefield by forcing ad versaries to react to false information, creating opportunities to disrupt their targeting cycles and degrade their effectiveness. A well-integrated deception plan must synchronize with recon naissance, fires, and intelligence planning to maximize survivability and cre ate conditions for decisive action. Success in deception is not based on what friendly forces do, but by what the enemy demonstrates they believe, measured by the actions they take. When applied effectively, deception forces adversaries to waste resources, commit to false targets, and fight based on a reality that no longer ever existed. Notes 1 ATP 7-100.1, “Russian Tactics”, 2024 2 FM 3-90, “Tactics”, 2019 3 ATP 7-100.1, “Russian Tactics”, 2024 4 ATP 7-100.2, “North Korean Tactics”, 2024 5 FM 3-90, “Tactics”, 2019 6 ATP 6-02.53, “Techniques for Tactical Ra dio Operations”, 2019 7 FM 3-90, “Tactics”, 2019 Paul T. Dolan, a Captain in the Army, is currently assigned as a Battalion Intelligence Trainer with Panther Team at the National Training Center in Fort Ir win, California. Prior to this, he served as a Squadron Intelligence Trainer with Cobra Team, also at the National Train ing Center. Previous assignments include Battalion Intelligence Officer for 2-8 Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division; Current Operations Intelligence Officer for Task Force South East in Paktia Province, Afghanistan; and Platoon Leader for Bravo Troop, 1-40 Cavalry, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division. His military schooling includes the Armor Basic Officer Leader Course at Fort Benning, Georgia; Stryker Leader Course at Fort Benning, Georgia; Military Intelligence Captains Career Course at Fort Huachuca, Arizona; and the Army Space Basic Cadre Course at Peterson Space Force Base, Colorado. Dolan holds a Bachelor of Arts in Studies in War and Peace from Norwich University and is currently pursuing a Master of Science in Unmanned and Autonomous Systems from Embry Riddle Aeronautical University.