Counterreconnaissance, Cavalry Corps and Division Operations

The Army published anew Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, in October

2022. Then FM 3-98, Reconnaissance and Security Operations, was pub lished in January 2023. At Fort Cavazos, TX, 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, is now testing the division cavalry (divcav) task-organization and mission. Considering these new developments in task-organization and doctrine, this article is an analysis of those updates through a multidomain operations (MDO) lens to determine capabilities and gaps, as well as implications in fu ture Cavalry missions. The purpose of this article is to clearly articulate the definition of counterreconnaissance and why understanding it is important to future MDO. Counterreconnaissance C o u n t e r r e c o n n a i s s a n c e, counter-reconnaissance, or counter reconnaissance? FM 3-0 uses both counterreconnaissance and counterreconnaissance.1 FM 3-98 uses coun terreconnaissance.2 Training and evaluation outline (T&EO) reports use counter-reconnaissance and counter reconnaissance.3 This question encapsulates the confusion surrounding counterreconnaissance, where multi ple interpretations of what it means to conduct counterreconnaissance can all be true simultaneously.4 FM 3-98 defines counterreconnais sance as “a mission task that encom passes all measures taken by a com mander to counter enemy reconnaissance efforts.”5 Counterreconnais sance as it is currently defined is too broad, so that it has no meaning or no shared understanding. The problems with this catchall mis sion task are highlighted using the following hypothetical scenario. A squadron commander orders troop commanders to conduct counterrecon naissance missions. The squadron commander orders troop commanders to execute a screen, with the primary task of conducting counterreconnais sance, but the squadron commander wants each troop commander to pro vide a backbrief with their proposed course of action (CoA). The first troop commander has trained his/her unit using T&EO “Plan Counter Reconnaissance Measures at Company Level” and focuses on camouflaging the formation to prevent observation, and then the troop commander devel ops a communication plan for the troop.6 This troop commander takes active steps that provide his/her for mation passive benefits. The second troop commander has re cently read FM 3-98 and knows the

“purpose of counterreconnaissance is to destroy, defeat or repel all enemy reconnaissance elements,” and choos es to focus on creating permissive engagement criteria to facilitate the de struction of the enemy reconnaissance.7 The third troop commander only plans to execute the screen mission. What ever action the troop takes to protect friendly-force information and engage the enemy reconnaissance as part of the screen is the troop’s “counterre connaissance,” but deliberately planning counterreconnaissance separate ly is not an action the troop command er intends to undertake. The troop commander plans the screen and any thing that occurs during the screen that leads to the destruction of the enemy reconnaissance is “counterrecon naissance” because it is already apart of “all actions taken.”8 For this troop commander, counterreconnaissance is not a tactical mission task per se but a byproduct of the screen mission. Which commander is correct in this hypothetical scenario? Each com mander could justify his/her chosen CoA using current doctrine or training aids. However, the hypothetical scenario highlights common misunder standings. How to conduct counterre connaissance is not shared among Cavalry professionals. FM 3-90-1, Offense and Defense, Volume 1, states that “both the commander and the subordinate must have a common understanding of the ‘what’ and ‘why’ of the operation” in reference to each tactical task.9 Old vs. new definition The current definition of counterre connaissance is “a tactical mission task that encompasses all measures taken by a commander to counter enemy re connaissance and surveillance efforts. Counterreconnaissance is not a dis tinct mission but a component of all forms [types]10 of security operations.”11 However, I propose the following definition: “Counterreconnaissance is a distinct tactical mission task that is the sum of active efforts by the command er to counter enemy reconnaissance efforts by destroying, defeating or repelling all enemy reconnaissance elements within capabilities.” Counterreconnaissance needs to be a distinct mission vs. a component of all types of security for the following reasons:

• A tactical mission task is the specific activity performed while executing a type of operation, and reconnaissance and security (R&S) are shaping operations.12

• B y c o m p a r i s o n, a r o u t e reconnaissance may be executed as part of an area or zone reconnaissance or a reconnaissance-in-force. Route reconnaissance is not treated as a component of all reconnaissance operations, or tactical mission task that is not a distinct mission because it can be executed as its own distinct tactical mission task.

• Being a distinct mission implies deliberate planning and unique tasks that must be completed. The proposed new definition focuses explicitly on active efforts because the current counterreconnaissance definition includes passive effects as part of the sum of all measures taken by a commander. Specifically, “Plan Counter Reconnaissance Measures at Company Level” includes as part of conditions the requirement to “develop a passive and active counter-reconnaissance [sic] plan.”13 The standard for this task is to develop a plan that “pre vents the enemy from collecting information about friendly operations and destroys enemy reconnaissance elements.”14 The performance measures that are evaluated for “go/no-go” status are camouflaging, developing a communi cations plan, establishing critical friendly zones and conducting troopleading procedures.15 Each perfor mance measure is an active task with passive effects. Passive effects are better captured by masking, anew concept introduced in FM 3-0. However, FM 3-0 does not provide a definition of masking. In a recent interview, retired COL John An tal provides a working definition of masking: “Masking is the full-spectrum, multidomain effort to deceive enemy sensors and disrupt enemy tar geting.”16 The passive elements of counterreconnaissance are better captured within this definition of masking because they achieve the desired deception and disruption. The passive efforts currently included in counterreconnaissance doctrine may contribute to success but arguably cannot directly cause the enemy re connaissance to be defeated, destroyed or repelled. The primary purpose of a Cavalry for mation conducting any security mission is not simply to survive but to pre vent the enemy from collecting intelligence about friendly information and CoAs. To do that, active measures must be taken to deny the enemy commander access to his reconnais sance assets and the information those assets provide. The Cavalry performs a critical purpose for its respective commanders: to be the eyes and ears of the commander, enabling the commander to visualize, understand and direct subordinate units. The Cavalry fights the enemy reconnaissance as a zero-sum equation. The Cavalry prevents the en emy commander from being able to visualize, understand and direct his subordinates. Specifically, counterre connaissance enables the friendly-force commander to get inside the enemy’s decision cycle by attacking the enemy’s reconnaissance assets and simultaneously places the friendly-force commander in a position of relative advantage on the battlefield. The final concept to discuss is the fo cus on destroying, defeating and repelling all enemy reconnaissance elements within capabilities. A screen mission includes a requirement to conduct “counterreconnaissance to destroy or repel enemy reconnais sance units,” but the primary purpose of a screen is to provide early warning to the protected force.17 The proposed primary purpose of counterreconnais sance as a distinct tactical mission task is the destruction or defeat of the enemy reconnaissance to blind the ene my commander. As an analogy, use the examples of reconnaissance-in-force and movement-to-contact. A movement-to-contact is an “offensive operation designed to develop the situation and establish or regain contact.”18 Contrast that mission with a reconnaissance-inforce, which is “designed to discover or test the enemy’s strength, dispositions and reactions or to obtain other information.”19 A reconnaissance-inforce develops the situation to create favorable conditions for subsequent tactical tasks just as a movement-to-contact does. The focus of doctrine lies in the purposes of the respective missions. A movement-to-contact is an offensive operation in which the goal is “to make initial contact with a small element while retaining enough combat power to develop the situation.”20 A reconnaissance-in-force is “an aggres sive reconnaissance, which develops information and intelligence in contact with the enemy to determine and exploit enemy weaknesses.”21 The dis tinction is important because the spe cific tasks that must be accomplished change with the change in purpose. The intent is critical to mission command and disciplined initiative, and the distinction implies a difference in action by the follow-on force. A movement-to-contact follows the characteristics of the offense and is an offensive task. If achieved, it enables the follow-on force to conduct an at tack. A reconnaissance-in-force fol lows the fundamentals of reconnais sance and develops the understanding of the operational environment for the commander. In the discussion of a screen vs. counterreconnaissance, the purpose of conducting a screen is ear ly warning and the purpose of con ducting counterreconnaissance is the destruction of enemy reconnaissance. Recognizing that distinction in pur pose necessarily creates different tasks that must be accomplished to be successful, provide a different intent for mission command and offer different follow-on actions for the commander. Training Units can train to be successful at counterreconnaissance. Building out a full mission-essential task list is beyond the scope of this article, but the T&EO report, “OPFOR [Opposing Force] Execute Counterreconnias sance,” is currently the best doctrine for training and executing counterre connaissance.22 Given the inclusion of passive measures, the conditions and standards need to be modified, but the planning and execution perfor mance steps and measures are a good framework for how counterreconnais sance can be executed. During planning, the Cavalry forma tion can determine the objectives, identify collection requirements and task-organize to defeat enemy reconnaissance elements.23 During execu tion, Cavalry formations can use ground maneuver, aviation, unmanned aerial vehicles or electronic-warfare assets to locate, monitor and set con ditions for actions to destroy or defeat enemy reconnaissance.24 Cavalry for mations also execute movement and maneuver to identify routes, probable lines of contact and kill zones that sup port indirect fire and direct fire to destroy or defeat enemy reconnaissance elements.25 So what? In my previous article, “Multidomain Operations in Large-Scale Combat: A Cavalry Perspective,” in ARMOR’s Spring edition, I articulate the need for distinct Cavalry formations at the corps and division levels. The underly ing premise of both articles is regard less of how force modernization comes to fruition regarding the Cavalry, even if a corps does not have an organic Cavalry formation, the corps should still have a Cavalry formation in large-scale combat operations (LSCO).

In combat, if a corps commander does not possess an organic Cavalry ele ment, the commander of the joint, all-domain fight is going to requisition either a Cavalry unit from a subordinate unit, most likely a Cavalry squadron, or assign a R&S operation to a subor dinate maneuver force, likely a brigade combat team. Thinking through what a corps R&S operation might entail in LSCO is the reason the definition and tasks associated with counterrecon naissance, as discussed in this article, are so important. First, in terms of reconnaissance missions, corps will operate in anew theater where the commander’s under standing of the operational environment is not complete. This implies the use of a reconnaissance-pull technique to develop the situation by conducting zone-reconnaissance missions. A focus on counterreconnais sance training increases survivability during zone reconnaissance. Second, the possibility of a Cavalry for mation being able to realistically per form a guard or cover that prevents observation and direct or indirect fires in a multidomain environment is prob lematic. A screen mission is achiev able, but with the scenario of a corps attempting to disrupt and disintegrate anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) zones, providing early warning to the corps commander has limited impact. Executing counterreconnaissance is achievable to deny the enemy commander information in countering the disruption and disintegration of his/ her A2/AD zone by friendly forces. Cavalry formations serve their respective commanders; the corps Cavalry mission is different from the divcav mission. Historically, Cavalry forma tions conduct security missions more than reconnaissance operations.26 For both penetration divisions, how is the divcav placing the division in a posi tion of relative advantage on the battlefield? If the division is penetrating and security is the more common operation, then the divcav is likely exe cuting a flank guard. If the divcav is conducting reconnaissance operations, then the corps has already de veloped familiarity with the operation al environment, and divcav executes area reconnaissance to push into ar eas where specific priority intelligence requirements for the division com mander can be answered. Conclusion In summary, this article argues that counterreconnaissance is more correctly defined as the deliberate actions taken to defeat, destroy or repel the enemy’s reconnaissance assets. The passive effects of current counter reconnaissance doctrine are better captured as part of the masking con cept. If this redefinition is accepted in future doctrinal publications, support ing T&EOs require adjustments and the framework for those changes is supported by the T&EO “OPFOR Execute Counterreconnaissance.” While divcav is currently being developed and implemented, a clear gap remains at the corps level. It is critical to begin thinking through what those operations entail in a MDO en vironment before force structures are designed to fulfill future require ments. This article offers counterre connaissance as the most suitable security mission for a corps Cavalry for mation, relative to alternative security missions. Counterreconnaissance as sists the corps commander in achiev ing decision-cycle dominance. CPT Joshua Perkins is a Cavalry Lead er’s Course (CLC) instructor, assigned to 3rd Battalion, 16th Cavalry Regiment, Fort Moore, GA. His previous assign ments include commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry Regiment, Fort Cavazos, TX; commander, Company B, 3rd Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment, Fort Cavazos; battle captain, Train-Ad vise-Assist Command-South, 1st Cavalry Division, Kandahar, Afghanistan; and division battle captain, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Cavazos. CPT Perkins’ military schools include CLC, Maneuver Captain’s Career Course and the Army Reconnaissance Course. He has a bachelor’s of science degree in finance from the University of South Florida and a master’s of arts degree in inter national relations from the University of West Florida. CPT Perkins’ awards include the Meritorious Service Medal and the Afghanistan Campaign Medal with C device. Notes 1 FM 3-0, Operations, Department of the Army, October 2022. 2 FM 3-98, Reconnaissance and Security Operations, Department of the Army, Jan. 10, 2023. 3 Task 71-9-6510 and Task 171-720-0008, “Plan Counter Reconnaissance Measures at Company Level,” Department of the Army, July 22, 2022. 4 For clarity, counterreconnaissance is used throughout this article. If a direct quote is used from doctrine, counterre connaissance replaces any misspelling. 5 FM 3-98. 6 Task 171-720-0008. 7 FM 3-98. 8 Ibid. 9 FM 3-90-1, Offense and Defense, Volume 1, Department of the Army, March 2013. 10 FM 3-98 now refers to types of R&S vs. forms. Doctrine referenced in this article that includes the term “form” is changed to “type or types” throughout the rest of this article. 11 FM 3-90-1. 12 Ibid. 13 Task 171-720-0008. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 16 Retired COL John Antal, “Sooner Than We Think: Command Post Survivability and Future Threats with retired COL John Antal,” “The Convergence – An Army Mad Scientist podcast,” Aug. 4, 2022, https://theconvergence.castos.com/pod casts/5043/ episodes/62-sooner-than-we-think-command-post-survivability-and-future-threats-with-col-ret-john-antal. 17 FM 3-98. 18 FM 1-02.1, Operational Terms, Department of the Army, March 2021. 19 FM 3-98. 20 Army Doctrine Publication 3-90, Offense and Defense, Department of the Army, July 2019. 21 FM 3-98. 22 Task Number “71-CO-8506, OPFOR Execute Counterreconnaissance,” Department of the Army, Nov. 11, 2016. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid. 26 Nathan A. Jennings, “Reconsidering Di vision Cavalry Squadrons,” School of Advanced Military Studies, May 25, 2017. Acronym Quick-Scan A2/AD – anti-access/area-denial CLC – Cavalry Leader’s Course CoA – course of action Divcav – division cavalry FM – field manual LSCO – large-scale combat operations MDO – multidomain operations OPFOR – opposing force R&S – reconnaissance and security T&EO – training and evaluation outline