Enabling the Brigade Combat Team: Headquarters and Specialty Company Commanders Maximize Scarce Resources

by CPT Alfred J. Flores, CPT Dallas Hopkins, CPT Jeffrey Nielsen, CPT Jordan R. Scanlan and CPT Jennifer St. Remy The commanders of headquarters and headquarters company (HHC), head quarters and headquarters troop (HHT), headquarters and headquarters battery (HHB) and the military-intelligence company (MICo) of a brigade combat team (BCT) are uniquely situated to influence their unit’s com bined-arms fight during large-scale combat operations (LSCO). While serving in these roles, the au thors of this article served together during National Training Center (NTC) Rotation 21-09, and they collected tac tics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) to share with other BCTs. By training together prior to deployment, task-organizing their elements effectively, po sitioning themselves to facilitate cross-boundary communication and coordinating directly via the Joint Battle Command-Platform (JBC-P), these commanders maximized scarce re sources for their entire BCT. BCT fight The BCT fight is complicated and re quires close coordination and synchro nization across multiple warfighting functions to execute well.1 Fortunate ly a BCT is organized into seven subor dinate battalions that each have key leaders available to identify and solve friction points. As peers (and key leaders) in their respective battalions, the HHC, HHT and HHB commanders should train together prior to deployment and coordinate directly during operations to assist the Figure 1a. The BCT fight. Figure 1b. Task-organization.

battalion and BCT staffs in synchroniz ing critical assets to meet the brigade commander’s intent. When battalions plan in isolation, they frequently de fault to assigning their “headquarters and headquarters” (HH) commander to their own forward-support compa ny (FSC) to try and “get parts for the battalion.” This course of action indicates a lack of synchronization between the battalions and their peer units in the BCT rear area and is a sub-optimal course of action for the entire brigade. In stead, the HHC commanders can syn chronize the close fight; the HHT, HHB and MICo commanders can synchro nize the deep fight; and the HHT, HHC/ brigade engineer battalion (BEB), HHC/BCT and HHC/brigade-support battalion (BSB) commanders can syn chronize the rear area. To operate as a team, specialty com manders and battalion/BCT staffs need to understand “the BCT fight.” A common LSCO operational framework is to split the BCT areas of operation (AO) into a close fight (where the maneuver battalions make direct-fire contact); the deep fight (where recon naissance and fires assets shape the future close fight); and the rear area (where command and sustainment nodes operate).2 This framework en ables the BCT to engage the enemy across all domains using multiple forms of contact. Figures 1a and 1b are example sketch es of the reconnaissance, fires, counter-fire, attack aviation, electronic warfare, command and sustainment assets arrayed in a BCT fight. The blue lines in Figure 1b highlight the effects of friendly units in an AO relative to their enemy targets. The yellow stars highlight recommended HH commander locations relative to the forward line of own troops (FLOT) and coordinated fire line (CFL) to max imize their ability to influence each AO. Arraying the HHB/HHC/HHT com manders with the entire BCT AO in mind enables them to act with greater independence and efficiency, and it synchronizes all six warfighting functions for the brigade commander. Deep fight: Sensor-shooter loop The BCT deep fight includes every thing from the CFL to the division fire-support-coordination line (FSCL). The key prosecutors of this fight include the cavalry-squadron commander, fires-support battalion commander and brigade executive officer to syn chronize the staff. The deep fight is inherently complex because it requires the careful synchronization of assets across the intelligence, maneuver, fires, protection and command-and-control (C2) warfighting functions to decide, detect and deliver effects on the enemy. While the BCT and battalion staffs are responsible for most of this synchronization during the operations process, the HHT, HHB and MICo commanders can set conditions for unit success through training at home station and direct coordination in the field. A key initial step among the HHT, HHB and MICo commanders to improve the BCT fight is to conduct capabilities briefs to and from each of their units. In a combined-audience setting among themselves, the staff primaries – the MICo platoon leaders, the counter-fire radar-section leader and the reconnaissance-troop commanders – should each brief their equipment, task-organization, capabilities and key planning considerations when detached from their parent units. These conversa tions will enable the leaders and subject-matter-experts present to estab lish shared TTPs and conduct better planning in the field. If able, the HHT, HHB and MICo com manders can recommend and re source a fire-support coordination command-post (CP) exercise through their respective battalion leaders to validate their military decision-making process (MDMP), troop-leading proce dures (TLPs) and current operations together. This training event pays div idends both for individual company/ troop/battery mission-essential task proficiency and overall BCT staff readiness, according to Training Circular (TC) 6-0.2.3, Training the Mission Command Warfighting Function for Battalions, Brigades and Brigade Combat Teams.3 Figure 2. HHT snipers train to call-for-fire in the close-deep fight at Yakima Training Center in May 2021. (U. S. Army photo by CPT Jeffrey Nielsen)

In the field, the HHT, HHB and MICo commanders can continue to facilitate the BCT deep fight by coordinating directly to fill in any coordinating instructions not completed by their respective staffs. These three leaders can establish shared JBC-P, very-high-frequency and frequency-modulation networks to ensure mutually support ing effects are synchronized/nested with the battalion and BCT command er’s intent. A successful TTP is for these three commanders to conduct one touch point per day to confirm the location and task-organization of their de tached units; compare intelligence and fires matrices for synchronization; and prepare shared recommendations to provide up the chain of command. This peer-to-peer coordination has the potential to exponentially increase the BCT’s ability to answer priority intelli gence requirements, identify high-payoff targets (HPTs) and maximize effects on the enemy that directly sup port other combined operations. The BCT’s ability to shape the deep fight directly impacts its success in the close fight by desynchronizing and re ducing the enemy’s combat power pri or to direct-fire contact. Close fight: HHC kill teams The BCT close fight generally stretches from the FLOT to the CFL. The key prosecutors of this fight include the maneuver battalion commanders, the brigade/battalion operations officers, and maneuver-company commanders. A common technique is for maneuver battalions to assign their HHC com manders to the combat trains com mand post (CTCP) as an alternate CP, but we observe two shortfalls with this technique:

• The CTCP generally lacks the redundant tactical-internet systems (Command Post Computing Environment and Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System) to function as an alternate CP; and

• The CTCP has enough leader presence provided by the FSC that another commander is redundant. An alternate technique is to assign the HHC commander with his/her organic scouts and mortars to create an “HHC kill team” (HKTs). HKTs have multiple benefits for the battalion and BCT. Maneuver-battalion HHC commanders are usually second-time commanders with the requisite training and experience to operate on shorter timelines and with less guidance. This naturally makes them good as higher control for their organic scouts, as scout platoons will often step off early in the battalion’s opera tions process. HHC commanders can position themselves to give refined guidance to the scouts in stride while communicating directly with the mor tar platoon and tactical-operations center (TOC) to detect targets and de liver effects. The increased communication and controlled maneuver enables the HKTs to destroy HPTs beyond the maneuver company’s AOs but prior to the CFL us ing observation posts (OPs), small un m a n n e d a e r i a l s s y s t e m s, signals-intelligence collection teams and mortars. Suitable targets for HKTs include enemy OPs, dismounted squads, antitank crews, motorized-vehicle sections, individual fighting vehi cles and individual unprotected main battle tanks. This capability creates a battalion-level “deep-close” fight that shapes enemy formations prior to direct-fire contact without adding work to the battalion staff. This technique incurs a small amount of risk to the maneuver battalions’ ability to manage its command and sustainment nodes in the rear area. This risk is best mitigated by following our recommendation on rear-area cross-unit coordination. Support area: Maximizing scarce resources The BCT rear area includes everything between the FLOT and the next higher headquarters’ support activity or Figure 3. CPT Jeffrey Nielsen (left), the 8-1 Cavalry HHT commander, conducts TLPs with 2LT James Donnelly, medical-platoon leader, at NTC during September 2021. (U. S. Army photo) boundary. The key prosecutors of this fight include the engineer-battalion commander, support-battalion com mander and unit command sergeants major. The key tasks associated with facilitating rear-area activities are ter rain management, local security, logis tics and route clearance. BCT staffs often prioritize their Step 7 of MDMP, orders production, by com pleting as much of the close and deep fight plan as possible while delegating rear-area tasks to the BEB. However, the BEB does not organically possess the excess combat power to conduct these tasks alone and is unlikely to receive supplementary maneuver units during LSCO. Fortunately, the HHT, HHB, HHC BEB and HHC BSB com manders are available to share scarce resources to accomplish these tasks. These commanders have inherent du ties and responsibilities that align them well to coordinate across adja cent units. The HHT commander man ages long lines of communication to reach the recon troops through other unit AOs. The HHB commander man ages radar sections across the full BCT AO. The HHC BEB commander coordi nates as many as 12 subordinate elements when assigned responsibility for attached enablers and the BCT TOC. The HHC BSB commander se cures the brigade-support area (BSA) in direct coordination with unit FSCs. Their individual unit capabilities can combine the rear area into an effec tive battlespace that is synchronized and secured without pulling combat power away from the close fight or deep fight. The first step in fighting a successful rear area is terrain management. The BCT rear area experiences friction when nine retransmission sites, seven CTCPs, seven battalion TOCs, four Role I’s (unit-level medical care), three po sition areas for artillery and one brigade TOC compete for scarce suitable terrain. In the absence of planning, these assets tend to cluster together forming massive, unsecured assembly areas that concentrates the enemy’s HPT list into one enticing target. A simple yet effective TTP to syn chronize each of these nodes is for the HHT, HHB, HHC BEB and HHC BSB commanders to directly compare/ share their individual common oper ating pictures (COPs) twice daily to identify where critical sustainment and C2 nodes are going to run into each other. While these commanders should not adjudicate which unit gets priority for terrain, they can provide unified recommendations that inform their battalion and BCT staff to manage terrain according to plan ning factors distinct to each unit’s re quirements and capabilities. This mi nor amount of synchronization will prevent critical BCT assets from jumping locations just to be bumped off by another unit and waste crucial time finding anew location. These commanders can play a similar role in maximizing scarce resources by maintaining a rear-area COP reported via JBC-P to each other and their high er headquarters. As each unit pre pares for, executes and assesses its routine movements across the BCT’s ground lines of communication, it can confirm security and manage traffic. This task is very easy for rear-area commanders to accomplish. The alter native – delaying a convoy or altering its route – can cause fratricide or trig ger convoys to stack on each other along narrow routes. A successful TTP is for the HHT com mander and headquarters section, operating out of the cavalry CTCP, to con duct a section-sized route reconnaissance-and-security patrol during their routine logistics packages. If the BCT has an attached military-police pla toon, the BEB’s HHC commander can coordinate for it to provide route se curity, route management and local-population engagement. Combined, these procedures can increase the ef ficiency of the BCT’s rear area, enabling the nodes established there to better support the close and deep fights, and buy back precious combat power that would otherwise be expended securing units that have the ability to secure themselves. Figure 4. Medics conduct amass-casualty training event while operating a Role 1 shared to support two battalion AOs at the Yakima Training Center in August 2021. (U. S. Army photo by CPT Jeffrey Nielsen)

Conclusion The BCTs of today and tomorrow are tasked with synchronizing multiple as sets across all six warfighting functions to achieve maneuver and effects in multiple domains. The headquarters and specialty-company commanders within a BCT are critical assets, with the potential to positively influence the BCT’s ability to fight in the deep, close and rear areas during home-station training and in the field. There fore, these key leaders should be trained to work together parallel to the chain of command and deliberate ly arrayed across the BCT fight as HKTs, deep-fight coordinators and rear-area responsible officers. In the face of greater complexity and competing priorities, these changes will increase the BCT’s lethality with out adding more requirements to the battalion and BCT staffs. CPT Alfred Flores is the Raptor 14/09 military-intelligence (MI) observer/ coach/trainer at the Joint Multination al Readiness Center (JMRC), Hohenfels, Germany. Previous assignments include MICo commander, Company D, 14th BEB, 2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), Joint Base Lewis-Mc Chord (JBLM), Tacoma, WA; infantry rifle-company commander, Company A, 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment, 2nd SBCT, JBLM; and targeting officer/team chief, Brigade Intelligence Cell Mobile Command Group, HHC, 2nd SBCT, JBLM. CPT Flores’ military schools include infantry one-station unit training, Airborne School, Emergency Medical Technician Basic Course, Ranger School, MI Basic Officer Leadership Course, Joint Human Intelligence Interrogation Management Course, Biometrics Operations Special ist Course, Company Intelligence-Sup port-Team Course, Rifle Marksmanship Instructor Course, Foreign Disclosure Officer Course, MI Captain’s Career Course and North Atlantic Treaty Organization Military Engineering Multi national Advisory Course. He has a bachelor’s of science degree in multi media arts and animation from The Art Institute of California – Los Angeles. CPT Flores’ awards and badges include the Meritorious Service Medal (MSM), Ranger Tab, Combat Infantry Badge and Expert Infantry Badge (EIB). CPT Dallas Hopkins is a team leader, Troop A, 3rd Squadron, 3rd Security Force Assistance Brigade, Fort Hood, TX. His previous assignments include commander, HHC, 14th BEB, JBLM; commander, Company A, 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry Regiment, JBLM; assistant operations officer, 1-17 Infantry, JBLM; and executive officer, Army Military Working Dog School, Joint Base Lack land, TX. CPT Hopkins’ military schools include Airborne School, Military Po lice Basic Officer Leadership Course, Infantry Basic Officer Leader’s Course (IBOLC), Maneuver Captain’s Career Course (MCCC), Cavalry Leader’s Course and Ranger School. He has a bachelor’s of science degree in kinesi ology allied health from the University of North Texas. CPT Hopkins’ awards include the MSM. CPT Jeffrey Nielsen is the brigade operations trainer, Mustang Team, 7th Army Training Command, JMRC. Previous assignments include commander, HHT, 8th Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, JBLM; commander, Company C, 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment, JBLM; battle major, 7th Infantry Division, JBLM; and battalion logistics of ficer, 1st Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment, Fort Bragg, NC. CPT Nielsen’s military schools include U. S. Military Academy (USMA), IBOLC, Air borne School, Ranger School and MCCC. He has a bachelor’s of science degree in mathematics and environ mental engineering from USMA. CPT Nielsen’s awards include the MSM. CPT Jordan Scanlan commands HHC 1-17 Infantry, 2-2 SBCT, 7th Infantry Di vision, JBLM. His previous assignments include rifle-company commander, Company B, 4-23 Infantry, 2-2 SBCT, 7th Infantry Division; brigade/battalion assistant S-3, 4-23 Infantry, 2-2 SBCT, 7th Infantry Division; aide de camp to the commander, Research, Development and Engineering Command, Natick Laboratory, Natick Soldier Systems Center, MA (now reflagged as Combat Capabilities Development Command under Army Futures Command); and rifle-platoon leader; Company C, 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry Regiment, 1st BCT, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, KY. CPT Scanlan’s military schools include IBOLC, MCCC, Ranger School, Airborne School, Sabalauski Air-Assault School, Maneuver Leader Maintenance Course and Combat Lifesaver Course. He has a bachelor’s of arts degree in political science from Pacific Lutheran University. CPT Scanlan’s awards and badges include the MSM with 1st oak-leaf clus ter, Ranger Tab and EIB. CPT Jennifer St. Remy commands Headquarters and Service Company, 7th Infantry Division, JBLM. Her previ ous assignments include commander, Company A, 2nd BSB, 2-2 SBCT, JBLM; support operations/transportation officer, 2nd BSB, 2-2 SBCT; support-operations planner, 2nd BSB, 2-2 SBCT; battalion S-4, 52nd BEB, Fort Carson, CO; and executive officer, Company B, 704th BSB, 4th Infantry BCT, Fort Carson. CPT St. Remy’s military schools include Ordnance Basic Officer Leader’s Course, Unit Movement Officer Course, Support Operations Course (PH I) and the Logistics Captain’s Career Course. She has a bachelor’s or arts degree in law and society from Pennsylvania State University, a master’s of science degree in acquisition in supply-chain management from the University of Maryland Global Campus and a mas ter’s of business administration degree in business management from the University of Maryland Global Campus. CPT St. Remy’s awards include the

MSM.

Notes 1 “Deep Maneuver,” Part 5, Large-Scale Combat Operations Volume I, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons learned. 2 Field Manual 3-96, Brigade Combat Team, 2021. 3 TC 6-0.2, Training the Mission Command Warfighting Function for Battalions, Brigades and Brigade Combat Teams, July 2019, Figures 1-5 and 2-2.

ADA – air-defense artillery AO – area of operations BCT – brigade combat team BEB – brigade engineer battalion BSA – brigade-support area BSB – brigade-support battalion C2 – command and control CFL – coordinated fire line COP – common operating picture CP – command post CTCP – combat-trains command post EIB – Expert Infantry Badge EW – electronic warfare FLOT – forward line of own troops FSC – forward-support company FSCL – fire-support coordination line FTCP – field-trains command post HH – headquarters and headquarters HHB – headquarters and headquarters battery HHC – headquarters and headquarters company HHT – headquarters and headquarters troop HKT – HHC kill team HPT – high-payoff target IBOLC – Infantry Basic Officer Leader’s Course JBC-P – Joint Battle Command-Platform JBLM – Joint Base Lewis-McChord JMRC – Joint Multinational Readiness Center LOG – logistics LRP – logistics release point LSCO – large-scale combat operations MCCC – Maneuver Captain’s Career Course MDMP – military decision-making process MI – military intelligence MICo – military-intelligence company MRTR – mortar MSM – Meritorious Service Medal NTC – National Training Center OP – observation post SBCT – Stryker brigade combat team TC – training circular TLP – troop-leading procedure TOC – tactical-operations center TTP – tactics, techniques and procedures USMA – U. S. Military Academy Acronym Quick-Scan