Mission Command (Building Responsive, Flexible Teams)

Summer 2020 Mission Command (Building Responsive, Flexible Teams) by MAJ Jim Plutt Jr. Mission command empowers subordi nate situational decision-making and decentralized execution, but it is not simply subordinates doing what they want within broad intent. Do we want to leave actions at an ambulance-ex change point unscripted and open to interpretation? What about establish ment of an observation post, recovery operations or logistics-status report ing? Mission command requires three foundational elements: standardiza tion, shared understanding and train ing designed to build expertise. With out this foundation, we may hope to execute through disciplined initiative and mission orders, but instead we will find ourselves overcome by rou tine problems we could have solved weeks or even months earlier. If we do have standard operating pro cedures (SOPs) and common unit language, we may find they suffer from a lack of routine review, update and rehearsal. Our leaders apply their time and energy to solving problems that should be standardized drills or procedures instead of executing on commander’s intent, and the first true test of “how we fight” is at the com bat-training center (CTC) or even in combat. Therefore units must train to develop shared understanding and rapidly act during multiple repetitions and sets while maintaining subordinate focus on unique problems. In other words, units are capable of using mission command when they do the routine things routinely. Units solve problems ‘out of contact’ At the National Training Center (NTC), we often see that units solve problems by placing leaders at the point of fric tion. However, when points of friction include our most routine problems, we quickly find more points of friction than leaders to apply to them. Units lack the collective training experience to execute using mission orders, and mission orders themselves are often unhelpful, unproduced or never dis tributed. When this happens, every thing must be solved in the moment. There is little cohesion, and trust rap idly evaporates. We see that units want to execute within commander’s intent, but without shared under standing and strong foundations, they cannot act, and so we see them wait ing on higher-echelon guidance. Fortunately, units can avoid many of these problems by simply standardiz ing and certifying routine actions as SOPs. SOPs are merely deciding in ad vance how to solve the preponderance of the issues we know we’ll encounter. Problems as varied as camouflaging command nodes, conducting radio op erations and establishing an observa tion post all benefit from SOPs, given they are produced, rehearsed and fol lowed. Standardize via collaboration The commander is one of the most ex perienced Soldiers in the formation, but as Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, Mission Command: Com mand and Control of Army Forces, re minds us, commanders also “recognize that they do not know everything, and they recognize that they have some thing to learn from even the most ju nior subordinate.” Commanders who understand this can establish an envi ronment that fosters collaboration and learning. Discussion in a classroom with a whiteboard is a better opportunity to influence how leaders will execute their many individual and collective tasks than discussion in a period of darkness under direct-fire contact. Sit ting down with junior leaders provides an invaluable perspective for the com mander to understand the depth of knowledge within the formation. They Figure 1. A Stryker Mobile Gun System fires its main gun during force-on-force training during live-fire conditions at NTC during Rotation 20-05. (U.S. Army photo)

Summer 2020 also learn to appreciate the challenges the formation faces. It gives subordi nate leaders the opportunity to share ideas without fear of reproach, and gives more senior leaders the oppor tunity to understand how subordinate leaders think about common prob lems. It is an important first step in de fining best practices. It is also a venue for resolving conflict; it is better to ad dress divergent ideas about execution in a calm classroom than after line of departure. From this initial dialogue, units can be gin to develop SOPs. Imagine a battal ion that collaborates to standardize actions at a logistics-release point (LRP). The unit would identify mark ings, timelines, security requirements, leader requirements and all other ac tions required to execute this opera tion expertly within an SOP. As a next step, the unit could execute an LRP us ing the SOP, certifying the LRP’s execu tion. After execution, a collaborative team would update the SOP, capturing changes in execution. The unit would now have a functional SOP for LRP op erations: shared confidence and shared experience, linking collective competence and shared understand ing. An important part of the process is units routinely revisiting and updating their SOPs. It may be monthly or quar terly, paired with a training progres sion or focused on a CTC rotation, but it must occur. It allows training to feed back into collaboration in a cyclical manner, maintaining shared under standing throughout the unit. It devel ops a culture with a living SOP, a way that “we” do it, allowing central ideas to permeate throughout the organiza tion. It is the lynchpin to operating on limited guidance from higher head quarters. It also provides new leaders a voice for their experience and on-ramps them into the unit more quickly. Training and trust ADP 6-0 states that “tactically and technically competent commanders, subordinates and teams are the basis of effective mission command.” We describe doctrine as “common lan guage,” but doctrine is a guide or framework, lacking specific unit Figure 2. A Bradley Fighting Vehicle observes a named area of interest (NAI) at NTC during Rotation 20-04. (U.S. Army photo) language to “speak” mission com mand. Building SOPs and certifying them during training builds another kind of common language within a unit and generates trust. The power in this common language allows the commander to know when he or she orders an LRP in execution that everyone knows exactly how to do it. Shared understanding of unit SOPs, paired with demonstrated compe tence in routine drills and procedures, builds trust at echelon and allows dis ciplined initiative. Subordinates are trusted because they have been certi fied to execute; they know “what” to do and “how” to do it. This is built-in doctrine within the principles of “train as you fight.” Mission orders An untrained unit will find it cannot execute on mission orders. Without the common language or standardiza tion described, commanders can only ensure their intent is met and reduce risk to mission by being more prescrip tive and exerting higher control. For commanders, this costs time and en ergy. For subordinates, this may ap pear as micromanagement and delays decision-making. For the unit, this los es opportunities. With standardization and demonstrat ed competence, mission command is

Summer 2020 possible through the use of mission orders. Good mission orders provide everything a subordinate must know and nothing else. Good mission orders do not contain the “whats” and “hows” collaboratively built during SOP development, much less superflu ous products with useless excess infor mation. They do provide enough infor mation and products to synchronize and give subordinates the key infor mation they need. The mission-orders process itself should be SOP. The subordinate lead ers who will execute commander’s in tent should be part of its develop ment, providing input to unit products and required touchpoints. In the best mission-orders processes, subordi nates should receive what they expect and when they expect it, and nothing more. Conclusion When successful, mission command frees leaders from solving routine problems at the point of friction. It re lies on routine, enabling momentum. It allows units to operate on shared confidence and shared experience, re lying on collaboration and expertise built through training long before the line of departure. Mission command is less nuanced and abstract than one might think, and it certainly requires more structure than is initially appar ent. It is a culture within a unit that must be stewarded routinely. With a sufficiently strong foundation, we do not have to tell subordinates how to do things. We can tell them what to do, empowering them to use their full ingenuity. This is mission command. MAJ Jim Plutt Jr. is the cavalry squad ron S-3 trainer/(Cobra) NTC Opera tions Group, Fort Irwin, CA. His previ ous assignments include S-3, 2nd Stryk er Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, Joint Base Lewis-McChord (JBLM), WA; S-3, 2nd Infantry Battalion, 1st Infantry Regiment, 2-2 Infantry, JBLM; small-group leader, Maneuver Captain’s Career Course (MCCC), Fort Benning, GA; commander, Bravo Troop, 3rd Squadron, 38th Cavalry Reg iment, 201stBattlefield Surveillance Bri gade (BfSB), JBLM; and S-3 Plans, 3-38 Cav, 201st BfSB. MAJ Plutt’s military schools include the Armor Basic Offi cer Leadership Course, MCCC, Austra lian Command and Staff College – Joints, Basic Airborne School, U.S. Army Ranger School, Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leader’s Course, Joint Firepower Course and U.S. Army Jump master Course. He has a bachelor’s of business administration degree in fi nance from Kent State University and Figure 3. A Soldier puts an RQ-11 Raven unmanned aerial system into opera tion to observe an NAI at NTC during Rotation 20-05. (U.S. Army photo) a master’s degree in military and de fense studies from the Australian Na tional University. Notes 1 ADP 6-0, Mission Command (Command and Control of Army Forces), Washing ton, DC: Army Publishing Directorate, 2019. ADP – Army doctrine publication BfSB – battlefield surveillance brigade CTC – combat-training center JBLM – Joint Base Lewis-McChord LRP – logistics-release point MCCC – Maneuver Captain’s Career Course NAI – named area of interest NTC – National Training Center SOP – standard operating procedures Acronym Quick-Scan Figure 4. Soldiers dismount ahead of their M1127 Stryker Reconnaissance Vehicles to conduct reconnaissance of an obstacle during a zone recon naissance. (U.S. Army photo)