Combined-Arms Teams in the Offense: Maximizing Lethality by Mixing Formations

Otto von Bismarck once said, “Fools say that they learn by experience. I prefer to profit by others’ experience.” Like Bismarck, the U. S. Army can draw lessons about the deployment of ar mored brigade combat teams at the National Training Center. Brigades learn crucial lessons on the battle fields of Erdabil Province, where the price of failure is pride instead of blood. In more than a year of fighting in Erd abil Province, Demon Mechanized-Infantry Battalion (MIBN) has conducted many attacks to penetrate or seize pieces of key terrain. We’ve found that operating as cohesive combined-arms teams is paramount to success. During offensive operations, combining arms at the company level and be low maximizes lethality by mixing formations of platforms that have complementary capabilities to act as “hunters and killers”; provide ground-force commanders with the assets necessary to both isolate with armor and rapidly seize terrain with dis mounts; and pair peer leaders with di verse experiences and perspectives from the Infantry and Armor Branches. MIBN structure The MIBN is the core maneuver forma tion of the brigade tactical group (BTG). The BTG operates with three MIBNs, a tank-company reserve, a combat-engineer company, an anti-armor troop and a modified reconnaissance battalion (Figures 1a and 1b). MIBNs are formed by a habitual relationship between infantry and armor companies, where the two company commanders alternate leading the for mation as the MIBN commander. A similar relationship exists at the pla toon level to form the mechanized-infantry company (MIC). The smallest maneuver element in the MIBN is the mechanized-infantry pla toon (MIP), typically comprised of one main battle tank (MBT) and two boye vaya mashina pekhoty (BMP)-3s, commonly referred to as opposing-force (OPFOR) surrogate vehicles (OSVs) (Figures 2a and 2b). The task-organization of mixed assets down to the MIP level allows MIBN commanders to use the strengths of both platforms to mitigate the weak ness each have individually. Also, each MIP and MIC has the same task-organization and is prepared to seamlessly assume the mission of their adjacent units. Unit employments The key difference between the task-organizations of the Donovian forma tions and U. S. combined-arms teams is the integration of formations down to the lowest level possible. In Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-90.1, the Abrams and Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFVs) remain independent platoons (Figure 3). Teams are either an armor-company team with two tank platoons and one BFV platoon or a mechanized-infantry company team with two BFV platoons and a tank platoon. This means a tank platoon can not effectively assume a BFV platoon’s mission to seize terrain. In the same way, a BFV platoon is less effective at isolating the objective from enemy ar mor.

Figure 1a. Rotational task organization. Figure 1b. List of assets available by troop/company.

The MBT and BMPs work to maximize each other’s strengths while helping to mitigate vulnerabilities. Typically the MBT conducts most of the “killing” in the offense while the BMPs lead the formation and “hunt” or identify tar gets for the MBT to engage. This pro vides a mix of capabilities down to the MIP level across the formation. In the offense, MIBNs will typically task-organize forces into a combat-reconnaissance patrol, fixing force, assault force and exploitation force (Figure 4). It is important to note that adversary BMP-3s are capable of transporting dismounted infantry. Within the MIBNs, OSVs do not replicate that ca pability. As a result, BMPs are employed forward of MBTs as internal fix ing forces down to the MIP level. They lack the armored protection of an MBT but are capable of destroying or sup pressing light armored targets at rang es exceeding the MBT’s capabilities. The high rate of fire of the BMPs’ 30mm cannon allows engagements of light armored targets out to 2.5 kilo meters. The platform also employs the AT-10 missile system to engage heavily ar mored targets out to four kilometers but remains exposed during the en gagements. MBTs use the time and space created by the BMPs to maneuver to destroy targets with the 125mm main gun (Figure 5). Attacks can either be enemy- or ter rain-focused. However, as we are re quired to replicate a battalion-sized el ement with only two troop-/company-sized elements, Demon MIBN rarely conducts enemy-based attacks. When tasked with a terrain-based objective, it’s essential for the attacking force to possess enough combat power to both isolate with armor and rapidly seize terrain with dismounts. The com bined-arms team, with its various ca pabilities, is a perfect fit for an isola tion force. While moving to the objective, BMPs act as the lead vehicle or element. The BMPs will identify and fix threats for MBTs to maneuver on within direct-fire range. Once the enemy mounted combat power in the objective’s vicin ity has been destroyed, dismounts rapidly move forward, clear enemy fighting positions and seize terrain. Using dismounts that are part of the same organization – under one ground-force commander’s direct operational control – ensures smoother coordination between the isolation force and dismount elements, allow ing more rapid employment of dis mounts once conditions are set. The synchronization of the exploitation force is especially critical when at tempting to dismount on the objective. While the dismounted element is seizing terrain, the isolation force uses its mounted platforms and weapon systems within the MIPs to maximize direct-fire controls along enemy reinforcement avenues of approach by ori enting its missiles from BMPs on can alizing terrain at the maximum engagement line, while MBTs cover avenues requiring more rapid rates of fire on larger formations. An example of an attack with a terrain-based objective is a mission that De mon MIBN conducted to seize Brigade Hill. Demon MIBN had defended the Colorado Wash for 48 hours before the Figure 2a. Example of a MIBN task organization. Figure 2b. Demon MIBN MIC formation SOP.

attack. The day of the attack, the en emy assessed in the area of operations (AO) was two platoons of BFVs defend ing in the vicinity of Brigade Hill, with two dismounted-infantry platoons defending Brigade Hill itself. As men tioned, MIBNs do not maintain an in ternal dismounted-infantry force, re quiring the BTG to provide a company of dismounted infantry in four Light Medium Tactical Vehicles (LMTVs) and a platoon of smoke trucks to Demon MIBN to enable the attack. The MIBN commander task-organized the unit into four company-sized ele ments. Two MICs were tasked to at tack along Route Eagles and Route Queens, respectively, to fix combat power on the north and south sides of Brigade Hill. The third MIC was tasked to attack along Route Hendrix using the smoke platoon’s concealment to secure a foothold for the infantry to dismount on the objective’s west side. The task of the dismounted-infantry company was to seize Brigade Hill (Figure 6). The mission was successful for a num ber of reasons. The two MICs on Eagles and Queens attacked simultaneously and established attack-by-fire (ABF) positions to fix the BFV platoons in the vicinity of Brigade Hill. There were minimal losses on both sides, but the fixing forces prevented the BFVs from effectively engaging the third MIC, which attacked about five minutes later. This third MIC continued along Hen drix with concealment from the smoke platoon and the four LMTVs of dis mounts close behind, in trail mode, arriving at Brigade Hill with no losses and quickly establishing a foothold for the infantry to establish a dismount point. The third MIC continued to sup press the enemy dismounted platoons as the friendly infantry consolidated for its dismounted attack. The infantry Soldiers established communications with the MIC at Brigade Hill and systematically cleared through the com plex terrain, calling for the MIC to sup press, shift and lift fires ahead of their advance (Figure 7). Ultimately, the dismounted company was able to destroy the two dismount ed platoons on Brigade Hill while only losing a squad. This is a prime example of how combined-arms maneuver, us ing strengths to make up for weak nesses of each asset, resulted in a suc cessful attack. A second example when Demon MIBN executed a mission to seize apiece of key terrain was an attack to seize Hill

910. During the attack to seize this hill, Demon MIBN altered the traditional MIBN task-organization by dismount ing 3rd Platoon from Blackjack Troop, sacrificing the manning of six BMPs. In addition to the MIBN’s two remaining MICs (three MBTs and six BMPs each), a tank platoon (three MBTs) and one dismounted-infantry platoon, a pla toon of smoke trucks was attached for the mission. Also, a section of two Kill er Troop anti-armor boyevaya raz vedyvatelnaya dozornaya mashina (BRDMs) would be operating in the area. Prior to execution, Demon MIBN was preparing for a BTG attack scheduled 24 hours later. To execute this attack, Demon would conduct forward-pas sage-of-lines through another MIBN to attack to seize Hill 910 and then con duct a relief-in-place with a dismount ed-infantry platoon from the dis mounted-infantry company. Demon MIBN initiated movement through the Central Corridor and established an attack position in Hidden Valley. Once the BTG gave the order to attack, the MIBN travelled along Route Queens to Brigade Hill and then ma neuvered north toward Hill 910. The first MIC fixed the south side of the objective, while the second MIC iso lated Hill 910 from reinforcements in the Colorado Wash (Figure 8). Figure 3. Depiction of company team in line, platoon wedges (from ATP 3-90.1, Figure 2-4). Figure 4. Typical concept sketch for employment of MIBN in the offense.

Figure 5. OPFOR weapon capabilities, both actual and Multiple Integrated Laser-Engagement System (MILES). Key: SO KOL = OPFOR helicopters replicating Hind attack helicopters. AT-5 = vehicle-mounted AT missile. 2A45M = AT towed cannon. T-90/T-80 = MBTs. BMPs 2/3 = infantry fighting vehicles. BTR-90 = wheeled armored personnel carrier. AT-13D = dismounted AT missile. W-87 = 35mm automatic grenade launcher. Mk-19 = 40mm automatic grenade launcher. 2S6 = tracked self-propelled anti-aircraft weapon. SA-24 = shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missile. ZU-23 = 23mm anti-aircraft auto-cannon. M107 = 50-caliber Dragunov sniper rifle. M110 = 7.62mm Dragunov sniper rifle. M2 = 50-caliber 12.7mm heavy machinegun. M240B/M249: 7.62mm machinegun and 5.56mm machinegun, respectively. M4 = 5.56mm car bine. The second MIC conducted a battle handover with the Killer Troop section in the vicinity of Traffic Circle and began clearing deadspace while the antiarmor section provided overwatch. The MIC and anti-armor section continued alternating bounds while clear ing deadspace for each other until they had destroyed a platoon of Abrams in the eastern edge of the Washboard and established a blocking position on the eastern entrance to the Colorado Wash, effectively isolat ing Hill 910 from reinforcements to the west. The tank platoon then maneuvered with the support of the first MIC and smoke trucks to destroy a pla toon of BFVs defending the west side of Hill 910 and a platoon of BFVs de fending to the east and southeast of the objective. Once the fixing element and tank platoon had achieved enough suppression of the objective, smoke trucks continued to provide conceal ment as the dismounted platoon ma neuvered forward and dismounted on the south side of the objective. Third Platoon dismounted on the objective, then cleared north across Hill 910, destroying a platoon of enemy dis mounts and Javelin observation posts (OPs) using small arms and hand gre nades (Figure 9). Once the hilltop was clear of enemy, 3rd Platoon established a hasty defense with Javelins and destroyed another section of BFVs west of the objective. Once all enemy combat power in the area was destroyed, Demon MIBN called forward a second MIBN to escort a dismounted-infantry platoon to conduct relief-in-place. After conduct ing relief-in-place on Hill 910, Demon MIBN withdrew to the support zone to continue preparations for the next BTG attack. Leader development Another critical benefit of the com bined-arms team is mixing leaders. By pairing peer leaders with different experiences and perspectives from the Infantry and Armor Branches, organizations can benefit from subject-matter experts with specialized maneuver training from both the mounted and dismounted perspectives. The armor officer may not be as familiar with em ployment of sniper and Javelin OPs. The infantry officer is not likely to be as familiar with berm drills and movement formation drills. By pairing these two complementary leaders, the for mation gains the knowledge from two perspectives for planning and execut ing operations. Not only does this Donovian frame work for combined-arms teams allow