Tactical Application of Army Design Methodology: GEN Eisenhower’s Response to German Ardennes Offensive

Summer 2018 Tactical Application of Army Design Methodology: GEN Eisenhower’s Response to World War II German Ardennes Offensive by MAJ Amos C. Fox The U.S. Army exists to solve problems, whether that be to fight and win the nation’s wars, provide humanitarian assistance, or any other number of problem sets. However, the Army does not act without first planning. Because of this, the Army conducts conceptual and detailed planning to enable it to accomplish a given mission. While the military decision-making process (MDMP) and troop-leading procedures are used for detailed planning at tacti cal levels, the Army Design Methodol ogy (ADM) provides Army leaders an excellent tool for conceptual planning at all levels of war. ADM enables its practitioners in understanding and vi sualizing problems of all types, and to craft an operational approach to move beyond the current problem toward a desired future state. This article explains the utility of ADM while highlighting the doctrine and theory upon which it is written, and then briefly surveys GEN Dwight D. Eisenhower’s actions immediately fol lowing the German Ardennes offensive of 1944 to illustrate ADM in a realworld scenario. Author Nassim Taleb provides an excel lent starting position for understand ing ADM’s utility. “Unless we concen trate very hard, we are likely to unwit tingly simplify the problem because our minds routinely do so without our knowing it,” writes Taleb.1 With that in mind, ADM’s primary utility resides in its ability to assist the practitioner in avoiding oversimplification in relation to a given problem set, regardless of the problem’s character. Similarly, Army doctrine supports this concept, stating that ADM is “[a] methodology for applying critical and creative think ing to understand, visualize and de scribe unfamiliar problems and ap proaches to solving them.”2 ADM as framework ADM contributes to sense-making and problem-solving by providing a frame work to comprehensively think about the situation. The framework, while not a formal step-action drill, consists of interdependent activities which in clude framing an operational environ ment, framing the problem and devel oping an operational approach. Re framing – or revisiting previous thoughts, deductions or templated ac tions – is a vital component of ADM and is the predominate driver of ADM’s symbiotic character. The first activity of ADM instructs the practitioner to frame the operational environment. In doing so, the practitio ner “[s]eeks to understand what is go ing on and why and what the future operational environment should look like.”3 Environmental framing assists the practitioner in seeing beyond their own self- and socially-constructed re ality. Environmental framing assists leaders in understanding how one’s “here” can be someone else’s “there” and that reality is subjective, thus “one-size fits all” thinking should be avoided when examining the charac teristics of the environment.4 Taking this idea a step further, ADM helps overcome the traps of random ness, or the absence of knowledge, through the meticulous process of en vironmental framing.5 Defense consul tant Douglas Macgregor argues that leaders must begin framing the envi ronment by asking first-order ques tions – who are we fighting, where are we fighting and how are we fighting – to understand the environment in which one is operating.6 Army doctrine provides a number of other heuristics to assist the practitioner, including brainstorming, mind-mapping, meta-questioning, questioning of assump tions and the use of the “four ways of seeing.”7 The result of environmental framing is a definition of the current state and the endstate, both of which are represented graphically and through a written narrative.8 Following environmental framing, the designer must frame the problems that stand between the current state and the desired endstate. These problems, which require resolution, provide the nucleus in which the operational ap proach develops. The problem frame, like the environmental frame, is artic ulated through a graphic and a narra tive.9 The Army acknowledges three types of problems – well-structured, medium-structured and ill-structured – their defining characteristics being how each varies in relation to the problems’ perception, solution, execu tion and necessity for adaption.10 Prob lem framing employs the same tools and techniques as environmental fram ing to develop a problem statement. The problem state is a succinct state ment that captures the essence of the problem at hand. Using the outputs from environmental and problem fram ing, the design practitioner transitions to developing an operational ap proach. The operational approach, or the broad general actions that must be completed and associated objectives that must be met to arrive at the de sired future state, provides the basis for planning guidance used during MDMP. The operational approach — which is not a course of action (CoA) — is most often expressed through the use of the elements of operational art. Furthermore, it provides “[f]ocus and boundaries for the development of CoAs during the MDMP.”11 Following the completion of ADM’s three prima ry activities, it is good practice to re frame to ensure all outputs of ADM are in harmony with one another. The concept of reframing is a vital component in ADM. Reframing is the process used to check progress, verify the direction of the plan, revisit previ ous facts and assumptions that drove the planning effort, and account for entropy – the gradual tendency for things to lose efficiency over time and devolve toward chaos.12 Reframing is continuous and monitors “[t]he opera tional environment and progress to ward obtaining endstate conditions and achieving objectives.”13 Army doc trine suggests reframing when assess ments show a lack of progress, vital

Summer 2018 assumptions are proven invalid, major events (positive or negative) occur, a change in mission or the endstate oc curs, or whenever the commander or planning team deems it necessary.14 Eisenhower and Battle of Bulge One of history’s better-known exam ples of reframing and ADM is found in Eisenhower’s response to the German winter counteroffensive of 1944, or what became known as the Battle of the Bulge. Eisenhower’s actions serve as both an example of ADM but also a mental model for thinking about how to apply ADM within an organization. In what historian Carlo D’Este labeled a “last-ditch gamble,” Hitler sprang the Ardennes offensive “[t]o destroy all Al lied forces north of a line running from Bastogne to Antwerp” and to “compel the Allies to sue for peace.”15 The of fensive, launched Dec. 16, 1944, caught the Allies by surprise by slash ing through the Ardennes Forest with four army groups toward Antwerp.16 In doing so, the torrent of the German at tack pinned Allied forces in the vital road network at Bastogne. The light ning German attack stunned GEN Omar Bradley, commander of 12th Army Group, whose force absorbed the pre ponderance of the attack. The attack all but annihilated the Bradley’s 106th Infantry Division and 28th Infantry Divi sion, while other units, such as 2nd In fantry Division and 14th Cavalry Group, fought to hold on.17 To make matters worse, the attack oc curred when 12th Army Group pos sessed no operational reserve. This forced Eisenhower to mobilize the stra tegic reserve (101st Airborne Division and 82nd Airborne Division) as a tem porary stop-gap to provide time in which to hastily develop a thorough re sponse.18 During the process, the Ger man salient continued to grow, encir cling Bastogne and all but trapping 101st Airborne within the city.19 On Dec. 19, Eisenhower summoned a trusted team of subordinate com manders, staff officers and advisers to Verdun to conduct what is known to day as the ADM. Eisenhower and his planning team discussed the situation, developing both an environmental frame and a problem frame while de fining the Allied current and desired future state. The team agreed that the Germans attacked with several army groups through restricted terrain, in in hospitable weather, creating a large sa lient in the Allied lines around Bas togne. If action was not taken soon, the Germans possessed the ability to complete their penetration while anni hilating Allied forces along the way. Therefore, the Allies had to stop the German attack while regaining their balance to push the Germans back to their previous starting position. During ruminations on an operational approach, LTG George Patton said he could pivot his Third Army 90 degrees to the north, move the 100 miles from Lorraine to Bastogne and attack the underbelly of the German salient – all while weathering the hardships of a bitter western European winter.20 After deliberation, more conceptual plan ning and reframing, Patton’s recom mendation was approved.21 As a result of the approved operation al approach and its derivative detailed planning, 4th Armored Division of Pat ton’s Third Army broke through the German salient Dec. 26.22 ADM key to success The 4th Armored Division’s rendezvous with 101st Airborne Division at Figure 1. GEN Dwight D. Eisenhower used a tactical application of today’s Army Design Methodology to counter the Na zis’ Ardennes Offensive during the Battle of the Bulge.

Summer 2018 Bastogne was the first indicator of suc cess, but more importantly, it demon strates the tangible results of Eisen hower’s ADM exercise at Verdun. The 4th Armored Division’s success – a har binger of operational victory at the Battle of the Bulge – was a direct by product of effectively framing the en vironment, framing the problem and devising a comprehensive operational approach that drove detailed tactical planning for subordinate formations.23 The process was highlighted by cre ative and critical thinking in which the senior commander and his trusted lieutenants successfully understood, visualized and described the situation at hand and subsequently developed a broad set of actions to move from the current state to their desired endstate. Lastly, when dealing with ADM, it is in structive to harken back to the old cav alryman, Patton, who writes, “The best is the enemy of the good. By this I mean that a good plan violently exe cuted now is better than a perfect plan executed next week”24 – Patton’s idea being that one must not allow the pur suit of perfect information derail the planning process. The practitioner of ADM must know when and where to apply brackets around the problem. If done correctly, ADM greatly enhances the practitioner’s ability to under stand, visualize and describe a problem set while developing a comprehensive operational approach to drive detailed planning. ADM is a versatile and effec tive tool all planning teams must be comfortable employing. History provides many examples of ADM, including Eisenhower’s planning conference at Verdun Dec. 19, 1944. To take it a step further, Eisenhower’s conference provides a mental model that demonstrates how to implement and execute the practice of ADM. MAJ Amos Fox is a plans officer for 1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss, TX. Previ ous assignments include plans officer, Combined Joint Forces Land Compo nent Command-Operation Inherent Re solve, Baghdad, Iraq; commander, Troop L, 2nd Squadron, 16th Cavalry Reg iment, 199th Infantry Brigade, Fort Ben ning, GA; commander, Company D, 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regi ment (ACR), Fort Irwin, CA; assistant operations officer, 1st Squadron, 11th ACR, Fort Irwin; and commander, Head quarters and Headquarters Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Car son, CO. MAJ Fox’s military education includes School of Advanced Military Studies, Command and General Staff College, Airborne School, Maneuver Captain’s Career Course, Cavalry Lead er’s Course, Bradley Fire Support Vehi cle Course and Field Artillery Officer Basic Course. He holds a bachelor’s of science degree in secondary education from Indiana University-Purdue Univer sity at Indianapolis and a master’s of arts degree in secondary education from Ball State University. MAJ Fox’s awards include the Tom Felts Leader ship Award; the Draper Armor Leader ship Award, Fiscal Year 2013; member of 11th ACR’s honorary rolls; and the Or der of St. George (Bronze). He is also a recipient of Silver Spurs. Notes 1 Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable, New York: Random House, 2010. 2 Army Training Publication (ATP) 5-0.1, Army Design Methodology, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2015.

3 ATP 5-0.1.

4 Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckman, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge, New York: Anchor Books, 1966. 5 Ibid. 6 Douglas Macgregor, Margin of Victory: Five Battles that Changed the Face of Modern War, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2016.

7 ATP 5-0.1.

8 Ibid. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 Everett Carl Dolman, Pure Strategy: Power and Principle in the Space and In formation Age, New York: Frank Cass Publishing, 2005.

13 ATP 5-0.1.

Summer 2018 Acronym Quick-Scan 14 Ibid. 15 Carlo D’Este, Patton: A Genius for War, New York: Harper Perennial, 1995. 16 GEN of the Army Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, New York: The Modern Li brary, 1989. 17 Antony Beevor, Ardennes 1944: The Battle of the Bulge, New York: Viking Publishers, 2016. 18 Ibid. 19 B.H. Liddell Hart, The German Generals Talk, New York: Quill Publishing, 1979. 20 Carlo D’Este, Decisions in Normandy, New York: Konecky and Konecky Books, 1983. 21 The author acknowledges the lack of detail regarding the operational approach – this is intentional and a byproduct of keeping the article focused on the utility of ADM, and not necessarily on the product it produced. More of the major actions included temporarily reassigning upward of half of Bradley’s 12th Army Group to Field Marshal Bernard Mont gomery’s 21st Army Group to allow Brad ley to singularly focus on cleaning up his front before receiving those forces back from Montgomery. A number of counter offensives from 12th Army Group and 21st Army Group were conducted also, seeking to augment the effects wrought from Third Army’s attack in the south. 22 D’Este. 23 The author acknowledges this is a sim plification of how the operational-level fight unfolded. Detailed information was intentionally omitted to keep the article focused on the utility of ADM for tactical purposes. 24 LTG George S. Patton Jr., War as I Knew It, New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1995. ACR – armored cavalry regiment ADM – Army Design Methodology ATP – Army training publication CoA – course of action MDMP – military decision-making process Figure 3. Generals Omar N. Bradley, Dwight D. Eisenhower and George S. Patton in Bastogne, early 1945. (U.S. Army photo)