Learning from Combat-Training Centers: Lessons in Small Unmanned Aerial Systems Employment for High-Intensity Conflict at Squadron Level

Summer 2018 Learning from Combat-Training Centers: Lessons in Small Unmanned Aerial Systems Employment for High-Intensity Conflict at Squadron Level by CPT Peter L. Kerkhof and LTC Steven E. Gventer Two Ukrainian mechanized battalions were destroyed July 9, 2014, by an in tense artillery barrage near the town of Zelenopillya.1 The battalions had been observed, identified and targeted through the use of small drones. Inde pendent analysis later assessed that BM-21s sitting nine kilometers away had launched the bombardment. The Ukrainian losses were devastating and sent a shock through the country’s political and defense establishment. This event, together with the Russian invasion of Crimea, served as a wake-up call to many in the U.S. gov ernment and military that the threat of high-intensity conflict was back in ear nest. In Europe, the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) rapidly adapt ed to account for this threat by empha sizing small unmanned aerial systems (SUAS) threats and massed artillery fire in its training scenarios. However, one persistent trend JMRC has observed over the past three years is that rota tional training units (RTU) have strug gled to respond to this training stimu lus.2 In early 2017, as 2nd Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment, prepared for deploy ment to the Suwalki Gap as the first North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) enhanced-forward-presence (eFP) battle group – established to de ter aggression on NATO’s eastern flank – the unit knew from two recently completed JMRC rotations that, like the RTUs, the squadron’s SUAS capabil ity was not performing adequately rel ative to the threat. During mission analysis, it became clear that in the event of a crisis, 2/2 Cav would be the first element in contact and would have to fight without brigade intelli gence, surveillance and reconnais sance (ISR) support.

Summer 2018 The unit made the critical realization, informed by the Ukrainian experience and underscored by the lethality of the opposing forces (OPFOR) at JMRC, that high-intensity conflict required differ ent organizational arrangements for SUAS than the counterinsurgency (COIN) fights the Army has been in for the last decade-and-a-half. By adapting employment concepts and organiza tional constructs, and using lessons-learned from JMRC rotations, 2/2 Cav consolidated its SUAS and created an effective reconnaissance, surveillance and target-acquisition capability dur ing the eFP deployment. This experi ence led to valuable lessons-learned that can benefit other units in both combat-training center rotations and future deployments. SUAS in COIN vs. high-intensity conflict By early 2017, 2/2 Cav had recently completed two JMRC rotations – Allied Spirit 4 and Allied Spirit 5 – separated by a four-month deployment to the Baltic states as part of Operation Atlan tic Resolve. Based on the unit’s experi ence at Allied Spirit 4, the squadron es tablished a sustained command em phasis on SUAS. By Allied Spirit 5, the number of trained operators had dra matically increased, and during the ro tation, the unit’s SUAS flight hours were substantially higher. Yet the squadron still did not achieve the de sired effects for reconnaissance and in telligence collection (IC). It became clear there was a gap be tween the capability of the systems and the way they had been employed, in particular the RQ-11B Raven. The Raven is a line-of-sight (LoS)-controlled aircraft that can range up to 10 kilome ters and has a 60-90 minute flight time. It can be hand-launched and then re covered through a crash landing from nearly any open area. It has a stabilized camera that provides a 10-digit grid to the center of the field of view and can transmit this view to the operator and any One-Station Remote Viewing Ter minal (OSRVT) in range. The Raven can operate in visibility and ceiling require ments that would ground larger plat forms, such as the Shadow. Finally, the Raven flies so low and has such a small radar cross-section that it’s less vulner able to air defense. In sum, Raven is a highly mobile system that, in decent weather, and a contested environment, can provide quality full-motion video and targetable data anywhere within 10 kilometers of the user. Despite its advantages, in practice, 2/2 Cav had not been able to fully leverage this capability. During Allied Spirit 4, Operation Atlantic Resolve, Allied Spir it 5 and the early days of the deploy ment to Poland, troops managed their own SUAS system training and employ ment. This is the established practice for how to use the RQ-11B Raven sys tem as described by journal articles in Infantry and ARMOR magazines.3 This is understandable after the Army’s COIN experience over the past 15 years. Having a Raven at an isolated outpost was the only way for a compa ny-level formation to have its own re connaissance asset at isolated combat outposts in Iraq or Afghanistan. Battal ions could rely on abundant theater-level ISR for whatever collection they needed. However, the operational environment and threat are different today. In the case of 2/2 Cav, the squadron would fight together in a relatively compact front, and the contact with enemy forc es would be a matter of days, not months. Troop-level UAS doctrine and practice simply did not suit the re quirements for the squadron in the “new” high-intensity environment. Consistent with prior practice, 2/2 Cav’s troops all located their Raven sys tem within their troop command post (CP). But their CPs were usually locat ed in a covered and concealed position to increase survivability. This negated two of the features Raven teams need ed: an open area for launch and recov ery, and terrain that provided good LoS to their target area. Also, having the Raven system at the troop CPs added another link in the chain of reporting, delaying the reaction to whatever the Ravens observed. The upshot for the squadron was that the troops’ Ravens were always includ ed in the squadron IC plan, but little was expected or received from them because they were rarely airborne and rarely reported. The squadron needed to change the organization of SUAS sys tems to fully exploit the Ravens’ capa bilities. Consolidation The solution was to consolidate the management of SUAS teams at the squadron level for training and exercis es. The 2/2 Cav created a SUAS section consisting of two SUAS teams, each equipped with a ground-control sys tem (GCS), multiple RQ-11B airframes and multiple SUAS operators. Each team would have four Soldiers and a Figure 1. An RQ-11B Raven, an SUAS employed by 2/2 Cav, is launched by a Soldier in Iraq. (U.S. Army photo)

Summer 2018 humvee with enough communications capability to talk on the squadron com mand and fires net. When the squadron deployed for exer cises, the team would be tasked direct ly by the S-3 based on the IC plan the S-2 had developed. The team would then be controlled via the squadron fires net by the squadron fire-support officer (FSO). The goal of consolidation was to fully leverage 2/2 Cav’s SUAS systems to be able to answer priority information requirements (PIRs) and provide observation for sustained and accurate fires on enemy forces. This consolidation solved several prob lems. The largest problem was loca tion. As with almost every system that every army has ever used, terrain is the biggest employment consideration. The establishment of separate teams gave 2/2 Cav’s SUAS the flexibility and mobility to fly from the best location to have LoS on their airframe as it sur veilled the target and to be able to launch and recover their airframe. This was achieved without putting the troop CPs at risk and eroding the troop commander’s ability to fight. It also solved the problem of commu nication. By establishing them as a sep arate entity with a direct link to squad ron fires, the reporting chain was flat tened. This increased visibility of what the SUAS was seeing and increased the speed at which the asset could be used to answer PIRs and acquire targets. The consolidation of the SUAS systems at the battalion/squadron level went against established doctrine and the way Ravens had been employed in combat for more than a decade – since their fielding in 2006. The move also deprived company/troop commanders of a critical reconnaissance capability as well as badly needed manpower. There would be disadvantages and un intended consequences. Consolidation was a good idea on paper, but 2/2 Cav needed to test the concept in practice to justify the downsides. Testing In May and June 2017, 2/2 Cav partici pated in two NATO exercises in close succession: Puma 17 and Saber Strike

17. Both exercises included a force-on-force (FoF) exercise against host-nation units playing the OPFOR, one in Poland and the other in Lithuania. These exer cises provided the perfect opportunity for 2/2 Cav to test the concept of a squadron SUAS section. Puma 17 was a four-day FoF. Each night the squadron held an ISR synch meet ing to allocate airspace and discuss the collection plan. The S-2 provided an update on the enemy situation and anticipated course of action (CoA) for the next day. The squadron S-2 and FSO deconflicted airspace and time, and the S-2 then briefed the IC plan to the SUAS teams. When the teams un derstood their airspace, named areas of interest (NAI), what indicators they were looking for and their flight times, they departed and prepped for their mission. At this point, 2/2 Cav was not as com fortable assuming risk in where the SUAS teams were deployed, so they stayed within one to two kilometers of the squadron tactical-operations cen ter. This prevented them from getting into the fight in the initial phase of the FoF. In the latter half of the FoF, the fight moved closer. Following the IC plan, the SUAS team using the RQ-11B Raven conducted a seven-kilometer sortie and found two companies of Boyeva Mashina Pekhoty (BMPs) and one platoon of T-72s. The enemy had consolidated after the previous day’s actions in preparation for continuing the attack the next day. This answered the PIR about enemy composition and disposition and then allowed the squadron to call for fire and have sig nificant effects on the enemy force. In Saber Strike 17, 2/2 Cav deployed a squadron (-) task force from Poland to Lithuania to participate in a two-day FoF. The task was to conduct a guard on the perimeter of a wet gap crossing. The 2/2 Cav’s area of operations was a small piece of a 30 kilometer x 50 kilo meter maneuver-rights area in central Lithuania. The squadron S-2 rapidly de veloped enemy CoAs (ECoAs) based on the brigade S-2’s products and then an IC plan. The squadron staff then coor dinated with the brigade to open a re stricted operating zone for UAS opera tions. The squadron SUAS section, now equipped with one RQ-20 Puma, then deployed to good local terrain that fa cilitated LoS to their tasked NAI. The next morning the UAS team launched their airframe and conducted an 11-ki lometer, 90-minute sortie. On this sor tie, they observed an enemy BMP pla toon at the NAI they were tasked with. This confirmed the ECoA, provided ear ly warning for the troop commander who was deployed forward and al lowed 2/2 Cav to request brigade fires Figure 2. British, Romanian and U.S. Soldiers discuss operating procedures for their eFP battle group during the defensive phase of the multinational field-training exercise that was part of Saber Strike 17 in Bemowo Piskie, Poland, June 14, 2017. Saber Strike is a U.S. Army Europe-led multinational combined-forces exercise conducted annually to enhance the NATO alliance throughout the Baltic region and Poland. (U.S. Army photo by SGT Justin Geiger)

Summer 2018 to destroy the enemy platoon. Saber Strike and Puma demonstrated that consolidating UAS worked. In two exercises with different OPFOR and dif ferent terrain, the UAS section achieved the desired effects. The UAS section was able to effectively follow the IC plan, answer the commander’s PIRs and perform as a highly effective observer for accurate fires. Refining solution After 2/2 Cav validated consolidation, the next step was to man, train and equip the UAS section appropriately. The squadron manned the section us ing two Raven master trainers and six soldiers from the rifle and headquar ters troops who were mission-qualified Raven operators. The section then ac quired two more pieces of custom equipment. The first was an extend able mast to raise the antenna’s height. Through experimentation in different types of terrain, it became clear that being able to raise the directional an tenna three to five meters in the air would increase link quality at extended ranges. The second piece of custom equipment was a power converter. This allowed the teams to charge the UAS airframe battery and the GCS battery while fly ing. Initially, charging batteries pre-mission was enough, but once teams became more proficient and began to run near-continuous flying operations, charging during missions became nec essary. The squadron also coordinated more specialty training: fire-support coordi nation exercises (FSCXs) to integrate with squadron and troop fires, and weekly proficiency flights with specific goals. The UAS operators conducted a week-long call-for-fire class with the squadron FSO, using the Call for Fire Trainer so all the UAS operators would be capable of acting as an observer for fires. The squadron also had the UAS opera tors attend the company-intelligence-support team class to give them a bet ter understanding of IC and the threat. This specialty training helped develop a better understanding of the fight for the junior infantry and armor noncom missioned officers and Soldiers who were assigned as UAS operators. Next, the squadron developed a train ing lane with troop FSOs and the UAS section. During the situational-training exercise lane, the troop FSO was in control of the UAS and used it to find and track the “OPFOR” and then call for fire while receiving the UAS video on the troop’s OSRVT. This event in particular helped build the confidence of troop FSOs and the UAS section in their effectiveness and capability.4 For their proficiency flights, the teams focused on two specific goals: em placement time and sortie distance. After every proficiency flight, master trainers were instructed to record the time from when they parked to when their airframe was in the air, and then time on station. The next exercise was to attempt to fly to the maximum range that they could for each sortie (this required booking airspace in ad vance). These two metrics may not seem important at first blush, but they are the two primary factors that dic tate the SUAS team’s effectiveness. The emplacement-time metric focused the teams on refining and smoothing out their setup so they could do it quickly and efficiently, which meant they were on station faster with less downtime and more consistently. The range forced the team to conduct bet ter microterrain analysis and get in the habit of picking the best ground for their mission. Elevation and trees are huge factors; where the team parked the system with respect to the wood line and elevation dictates how far they can fly. Final tests At the end of 2/2 Cav’s deployment to Poland, the squadron conducted a fi nal exercise: Dragon 17. Once again, the UAS section was deployed to sup port. These teams were immensely successful. In this four-day FoF, they flew 20 flight hours and 31 sorties. They also acted as the observer for 13 fire missions that destroyed more than 20 enemy vehicles. The 2/2 Cav re ceived the team’s reporting over the frequency-modulation net and dynam ically retasked them as needed. Fur thermore, troop commanders and FSOs received the feed on their OSRVTs and reporting on the squadron fires net. This provided them with better situational awareness and early warn ing. The team consistently provided timely intelligence to answer PIRs and performed as an effective observer for fire missions. The final validation of the consolida tion of SUAS concept was at Allied Spir it 8, another exercise at JMRC. As the unit prepared for the exercise, it was clear that this would be a much more demanding test of the system. Hohen fels Training Area (HTA) is small (only seven kilometers x 14 kilometers) com pared to the Joint Readiness Training Center and the National Training Cen ter but makes up for it with rolling hills and deep valleys that compartmental ize the fight. The small size of HTA also compresses the airspace available, making airspace management a chal lenge for RTUs. Also, JMRC is home to 1-4 Infantry, U.S. Army Europe’s profes sional OPFOR. JMRC prides itself on placing RTUs under multiple forms of contact at all times and stressing unit systems to the point of failure. For the rotation, 2/2 Cav fielded two squadron UAS teams, each with three soldiers; one humvee; a GCS; and Puma and Raven SUASs. Each team was led by one of the Raven master train ers. These teams worked for the squad ron and then coordinated with the nearest troop for local security. Despite challenging weather condi tions, 2/2 Cav flew 21 hours during Al lied Spirit 8; most RTU battalions fly less than one hour. In comparison, 1-4 Infantry flew 31 hours with their Raven systems.5 The section answered PIRs, served as an observer for fire missions and supported maneuver throughout the exercise. Employing the SUAS sec tion during the defense was particular ly challenging. Weather on several days restricted the flight of SUAS systems when the OPFOR elements made con tact. However, when 2/2 Cav received the OPFOR’s main attack, the UAS sec tion was able to get eyes on the enemy exploitation force and serve as an ob server for troop mortars. In the offense, the SUAS section was much more successful. The UAS sec tion answered the commander’s PIR of determining the enemy’s defensive po sitions during multiple sorties. UAS ob served OPFOR emplacing obstacles in

Summer 2018 an occupied town, which allowed 2/2 Cav to disrupt this OPFOR activity with indirect fires. The UAS section also pin pointed multiple enemy reconnais sance elements in the unit’s security zone, cued by audible contact from the scout platoon and ground moving-tar get indicators. This allowed 2/2 Cav to destroy or suppress enemy recon ele ments and establish a security zone. The UAS section also identified enemy battle positions oriented on 2/2’s planned avenue of approach. This in telligence changed the squadron’s as sessment of the enemy’s defense and change the scheme of maneuver. Conclusion Consolidating 2/2 Cav’s SUAS platforms as a squadron asset proved successful. It dramatically increased the squad ron’s ability to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance. The 2/2 Cav became much more effective at concentrating its forces at the decisive point and placing sustained and accurate fires on the enemy. The sacrifice of two to three Soldiers from the troops and the loss of their organic SUAS systems was paid back with an increased capability that benefited the squadron and troop fights. This would not have succeeded with out sustained command emphasis. The creation of this section was not insig nificant in resources and time. Without the continued support from squadron leadership, the friction in creating this section could have prevented success. The echoes of the artillery barrage at Zelenopillya and the Russian invasion of Crimea have caused the U.S. Army to rethink how to prepare for high-in tensity conflict. JMRC’s commitment to faithfully replicating that threat through the aggressive use of UAS sys tems and fires have provided an invalu able training stimulus. The 2/2 Cav’s experience at Allied Spirit 4 and Allied Spirit 5 drove the unit to innovate and become more lethal. By the end of Al lied Spirit 8, 2/2 Cav had definitively turned the tables: the squadron UAS were just as effective as the OPFOR’s. The 2/2 Cav would not experience its own Zelenopillya. CPT Peter Kerkhof is S-2 of 2/2 Cav. Acronym Quick-Scan Previous assignments include regimen tal assistant S-2, 2nd Cavalry Regiment, Vilseck, Germany; assistant S-2, 3rd Ranger Battalion, 75th Ranger Regi ment; regimental assistant S-2, 3/75 Ranger Regiment; and military-intelli gence (MI) company executive officer, 524th MI Battalion, 501st MI Brigade, Camp Carroll, South Korea. His assign ments include three deployments: as S-2 for NATO eFP battle group, Poland, while S-2 of 2/2 Cav; to Afghanistan as the joint-task-force team’s J-2 while 3/75 Ranger Regiment’s assistant -2; and to Afghanistan as targeting-team lead while regimental assistant S-2, 3/75 Ranger Regiment. His military schooling includes NATO Staff Officer Orientation Course, Joint Interrogation Management Course, MI Captain’s Ca reer Course, Ranger School and MI Ba sic Officer’s Leadership Course. CPT Kerkhof holds a bachelor’s of science degree in mathematics and economics from the U.S. Military Academy. LTC Steven Gventer is the Grizzly Team’s senior Armor and Cavalry observer/ coach/trainer, Operations Group, JMRC, Hohenfels, Germany. Previous assignments include eFP battle-group commander, 1st NATO eFP Battle Group-Poland, Orzysz, Poland; squad ron commander, 2/2 Cav, Vilseck; mili tary assistant to the Deputy Chief of Operations, NATO Joint Forces Com mand-Naples, Naples, Italy; and bri gade S-3, 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX. He is a graduate of the NATO Asym metric Warfare Course, Australian Command and General Staff College, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, Armor Officer’s Captain’s Ca reer Course, Armor Officer’s Basic Course and Officer’s Candidate School. LTC Gventer holds a bachelor’s of sci ence degree in education from Baylor University. His awards and honors in clude the Bronze Star Medal with “V” device, the Bronze Star with three oak-leaf clusters (OLCs), Purple Heart with one OLC, Distinguished Meritorious Service Medal and Meritorious Service Medal with four OLCs. Notes 1 S. Woodford, “The Russian Artillery Strike that Spooked the U.S. Army,” re trieved from Mystics & Statistics, a blog on quantitative historical analysis hosted at http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/ blog/2017/03/29/the-russian-artillery-strike-that-spooked-the-u-s-army/, March 29, 2017. 2 LTC Matthew T. Archambault, CPT Frank lin G. Peachey, CPT Sean D. Hayball and SSG Drew D. Lincoln, “OPFOR vs. RTU [SUAS] at JMRC,” Infantry, July-Septem ber 2017. 3 CPT John Albert, “A Practical Guide for Excellence in Company Unmanned Air craft Systems Operations,” ARMOR, July-September 2016; CPT Christopher J. Coly er, “Tactical Employment of the Raven SUAS,” Infantry, April-June 2016. 4 “Fox FIST and the OSRVT,” Oct. 24, 2017; retrieved from Center for Army Lessons-Learned, https://call2.army.mil/toc. aspx?document=17560. 5 Correspondence with 1-4 Infantry’s bat talion S-2. BMP – Boyeva Mashina Pekhoty CoA – course of action COIN – counterinsurgency CP – command post ECoA – enemy course of action eFP – enhanced forward presence FoF – force-on-force FSCX – fire-support coordination exercise FSO – fire-support officer GCS – ground-control system HTA – Hohenfels Training Area IC – intelligence collection ISR – intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance JMRC – Joint Multinational Readiness Center LoS – line-of-sight MI – military intelligence NAI – named area of interest NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization OLC – oak-leaf cluster OPFOR – opposing forces OSRVT – One-Station Remote Viewing Terminal PIR – priority information requirement RTU – rotational training unit SUAS – small unmanned aerial system UAS – unmanned aerial system