Iron Brigade’s Combat-Team Pursuit of Mobile Command-Post Capabilities

Iron Brigade’s Combat-Team Pursuit of Mobile Command-Post Capabilities by COL Charles Lombardo and MAJ Ken Selby Command posts (CPs), no matter the formation which sets them up, are a concern for today’s battlefield. As GEN Mark Milley, Army Chief of Staff, said at the Association for the United States Army luncheon Oct. 4, 2016, “Our bri gade [CPs] must be able to jump with in two to three minutes or they will be destroyed.” Since 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 1st Armored Division, spent the past six years serving as the Army Experimen tal Task Force (AETF) for the Brigade Modernization Command (BMC) and the Army Capabilities and Integration Center, we have some lessons-learned to share with the force. The Army es tablished 2/1 Armor under BMC to evaluate the network and other Army modernization technologies and to de velop tactics, techniques and proce dures (TTPs) for their employment.1 This article’s purpose is to describe the Iron Brigade’s final assessment during Army Warfighting Assessment (AWA) 17.1 in October 2016 and to offer po tential TTPs to improve expeditionary and uninterrupted mission command (MC), leveraging the Warfighter Infor mation Network-Tactical (WIN-T) Incre ment 2 network and mobile CP solu tions.2 Gaps While 1st Armored Division and 2nd BCT have made great strides in developing expertise for integrating the WIN-T In crement 2 network, the brigade has not been able to make the required progress in developing the entire MC system,3 particularly the CP’s materiel aspects, and in refining the doctrine that tactical echelons use to simulta neously command-and-control com bined-arms maneuver and wide-area security in decisive action (DA). The fact that the Standardized Integrated Command Post System (SICPS) is in sus tainment phase has further exacerbat ed the materiel gap in capitalizing on the gains of uninterrupted MC. In addition to addressing the aging and static tent-based CP solutions, the Army needs to relook the codification of doctrinal TTPs for brigade-and-be low CP. Our current doctrine, Field Manual (FM) 3-96, Brigade Combat Team (October 2015), describes the six principles of MC and lays out MC tasks. The FM even provides duty descrip tions for the staff officers. However, what the FM doesn’t contain is the sci ence aspects of command-and-control at BCT or battalion level. Current doc trine doesn’t address the application of personnel and networks to the dif ferent echelons of CPs within the bat talion or brigade. The “old” way – something like the configuration in Figure 2, which is an illustration from FM 71-123, dated September 1992 – is still worthy of em ulation. The graphic clearly identifies the personnel, network and multiple CP configurations from the initial SICPS methodology. In addition to the doctrine and layout of CPs from a network and hardware perspective, our current doctrine lacks the how-tos of integrating personnel. In the DA environment – with the focus on continuous operations and removal of “suspension of battlefield effects” – the BCT must account for the integra tion of key personnel in their staff roles for CP analysis and functions as well as for the CP’s security aspects. The BCT must integrate key staff personnel into dedicated security teams of the distrib uted CPs. This shift to DA should jump-start a doctrine, organization, training, mate riel, leadership and education, person nel and facilities review of personnel (nodes) networks, functions and secu rity over time in an attempt to place the appropriate personnel by echelon in each CP. A second gap in our MC systems is the CP materiel solution. The current CP structure is vulnerable to a variety of attacks and lacks mobility as well as Figure 1. 2/1 Armor’s main CP in May 2016 during NIE 16.2. The unit’s previous CP had a large footprint (11 tents and 2 battalion TAAs; long setup/teardown times; and a significant logistical tail, nor was it survivable in a DATE environment.

Summer 2017 survivability. Near-peer threats are able to detect and target MC nodes due to their large signature. As a re sult, the operational force seeks to standardize CPs that are austere, mo bile, expeditionary and – from an elec tromagnetic (EM) aspect – able to match mobility and survivability with the subordinate maneuver forces they support. Note that the physical and EM signa ture of large CPs present a significant opportunity for the opposing force to disrupt the BCT’s initiative by employ ing effective combined-arms attacks that deplete BCT resources while hin dering the BCT staff’s ability to syn chronize reconnaissance, fires and lo gistical support. Acknowledging these unsettling reali ties, 2/1 Armor identified that its CP was vulnerable to precisely this type of coordinated attack in a decisive-action training environment (DATE) construct. The vulnerabilities:

• It looked like a CP. The brigade’s CP consisted of 11 Airbeam tents centering off one large tent; three 40- foot wings housed the brigade warfighting functions (WfF) and command group.

• It was big. The CP’s sheer size presented a clear confirmation to a reconnoitering enemy that the CP was either a brigade- or division-sized element.

• It took too much time. Setup and teardown times ranged between 10 to 20 hours, depending on Soldier training and experience level.

• It consumed too much manpower and transportation resources. The CP required extensive manpower and lift assets using many offloaded transit cases and up to 5,000 feet of CAT-5 cabling.

• It ate too much power. This large and overly cumbersome CP consumed large quantities of resources and power generation that required a significant logistical tail. Fixes With an upcoming National Training Center rotation, the brigade decided to immediately reduce our CP footprint during AWA 17.1. To combat the cum bersome and static CP structure, 2/1 Armor’s vision was to capitalize on the WIN-T Increment 2 network by creat ing an uninterrupted-MC philosophy that enabled the BCT to exercise MC across multiple locations with built-in WfF and leader redundancies. This CP would be capable of fusing intelligence and enabling subordinate units to si multaneously prosecute the hybrid enemy in the DATE. Achieving this dis tributed MC TTP gives the commander “reach.”4

• Look. Leveraging upgraded vehicle capabilities developed during six years as the AETF under the network-integration evaluations (NIE), 2/1 Armor replaced the Airbeam tents with four M1087 expansible vans, two M1079 vans and two Light Medium Tactical Vehicle-linked Sesolinc containers. Facilitated by BMC, the brigade upgraded one M1087 that housed 10 workstations with Secure Internet Protocol Router (SIPR)/Non-secure Internet Protocol Router (NIPR)/Coalition enclaves, two built-in projectors, five mounted whiteboards, light-emitting diode (LED) lighting and an improved environmental-control-unit (ECU) system. The 2/1 Armor also used two upgraded M1079 vans converted into CP platforms (CPP) that eliminated the four-humvee SICPS-solution CPPs.

• Size. By employing three more M1087s and two more M1079s, the brigade reduced its footprint from 17 to one 20-foot-by-32-foot tent with accompanying vehicles. This vehicle-based CP housed the S-2, S-3, S-4 and S-6 sections as well as a Temporary S e n s i t i v e C o m p a r t m e n t e d Information Facility (T-SCIF) and mobile brigade intelligence-support element (BISE). From this design, the brigade leveraged its WIN-T Increment 2 on-the-move (OTM) capability employing two points of presence (PoP) as an enroute CP.

• Time. Incorporating this mobile CP concept, the brigade developed an early-entry CP as well. After multiple CP jumps during AWA 17.1, 2/1 Armor decreased BCT jump times from 18 hours to under two hours near the exercise’s end. Also of note, the CPP trucks are invaluable should a vehicle breakdown occur, as the server stacks are easily removable while housed in transit cases. The opposite is true with the Army SICPS solution, as hard-mounted server-stack removal requires hours of tedious work while the network remains cold.

• Manpower and transportation. To lessen electromagnetic-field (EMF) Figure 2. BCT main CP with established SICPS (T configuration). (From FM 71- 123, Figure 1-3)

Summer 2017 emissions while further reducing the CP’s footprint, 2/1 Armor developed a tactical-operations center (TOC) 1/ TOC 2 concept that distributed the infrastructure geographically while still being interconnected using MC systems. TOC 1 is analogous to a BCT tactical-actions center (TAC) but robust in capability. Using vehicles to plug in and out of different TOC configurations, 2/1 Armor created scalability that provided redundancy and depth in MC and gave the commander options to choose the capabilities he wanted at each CP, depending on the mission set. The 2/1 Armor increased survivability as well by distributing the footprint using hardened vehicles and lowering the EMF signature in any one location. This CP design complicated the enemy’s reconnaissance efforts since the MC nodes broadcast battalion-size elements. Reducing the footprint forced the bri gade staff to eliminate redundant com mand, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems plus com puter-screen clutter. Shrinking seat ca pacity also placed more personnel on security, facilitating insurgent ground-attack deterrence. The brigade also eliminated many sleep tents while dis persing the engineer and fires battal ions into noncontiguous tactical-as sembly areas (TAAs), further distribut ing the brigade’s MC nodes. The bri gade also eliminated boot tents con necting the vehicles to the tents to fur ther reduce setup times. Using a fold-out awning attached to the vehicle platform is an alternative boot option the United Kingdom’s army uses and can be set up in less than two minutes. The Iron Brigade used a variety of plat forms: M1087 and M1079 vehicle up grades were conducted by a contract ed design and engineering company or by unit personnel using military work orders. The ECU upgrade was the most critical, however. The standard M1087 ECU is too loud and hinders verbal communication, forcing the staff to ei ther turn it off during meetings – pro ducing an uncomfortably hot environ ment – or shouting with the ECU kept on. Also, the BCT used a container-based-system CP node for our CPP and for the build of the alternate CP. These recent restorations have led to a Defense Lo gistics Agency Class IX parts-kit solu tion that can be procured or modern ized in the Army system using Global Combat Support System (GCSS)-Army.

• Power. Further CP footprint reduction measures and time-saving include intelligent power generation/ distribution, transport convergence via Modular Communications Node-Advanced Equipment (MCN-AE) and wireless CP capability. Increasing power-generation efficiencies while reducing generator clutter further reduces the CP footprint and gives time back to noncommissioned officers and mechanics. The 2/1 Figure 3. 2/1 Armor mobile CP endstate during AWA 17.1.

Summer 2017 Armor used the Advanced Medium Mobile Power Source microgrid during NIEs 16.1 and 16.2 and decreased the CP generator count from 14 to four 60-kilowatt generators running in parallel using intelligent power distribution. The entire power-generation package fits on one C-17 pallet. Also, the MCN-AE performed well during NIE 16.2 and replaced the bulky Trojan system’s two humvees and trailers with two Pelican cases. This system linked into the WIN-T Increment 2’s tactical-component network (TCN) for network access while showing no visible degradation in bandwidth capacity. These complementary CP systems provide more footprint reduction options to BCTs working to shrink their CPs. The vehicle-based configuration is a logical and cost-effective solution to produce a scalable, survivable and ex peditionary BCT CP designed to fight Figure 4. 2/1 Armor employs distributed MC capability while reducing EMF in any one location. and win in a DA environment. This CP configuration does not require an Army acquisitions-system develop ment and fielding cycle, as the materi el solution already exists in our inven tory. Multi-domain battle poses a significant problem to large stationary TOCs, indi cating that the current Army SICPS BCT CP solution requires changes to MC node design and configuration. Coun tering this requires CP mobility, scal ability and survivability that is achiev able with the proposed CP design de scribed in this article. BCTs should not wait years for a future Army-approved BCT CP solution and subsequent field ing with a “fight tonight” readiness goal. We recommend consideration to implement this actionable CP concept for all BCTs as an interim solution while the Army develops a long-term solu tion commensurate with Command Post 2025 concept-of-operations (CONOPS) principles. COL Chuck Lombardo commands 2/1 Armor, Fort Bliss, TX. Previous assign ments include seminar leader, School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), Fort Leavenworth, KS; special assistant to the commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Eustis, VA; squadron commander, 2/1 Cavalry, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA, and Zabul, Afghanistan; squadron S-3, ex ecutive officer and BCT S-3, 1/1 Caval ry, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX; and troop commander, 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Carson, CO. He holds a bachelor’s of arts degree in psychology from Missouri State Univer sity, a master’s of arts degree in hu man-resource management from Web ster University and a master’s of arts degree in strategic studies from SAMS. MAJ Ken Selby is the deputy G-3, 1st Ar mored Division, Fort Bliss, TX. Previous assignments include deputy brigade

Summer 2017 commander, 2nd Armored BCT (ABCT), 1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss; battal ion executive officer, 1-35 Armor, 2nd ABCT, 1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss; battalion operations officer, 1-35 Ar mor, 2nd ABCT, 1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss; and mission planner, South west Regional Support Team, Joint Task Force-North, Fort Bliss. His military schooling includes Command and Gen eral Staff College, Cavalry Leader’s Course, Armor Captain’s Career Course and Field Artillery Officer Basic Course. He holds a bachelor’s of arts degree in psychology from the University of California-Davis and a master’s of arts degree in management and leadership from Webster University. His awards include the Bronze Star Medal with two oak-leaf clusters, Defense Meritorious Service Medal and Meritorious Service Medal. Notes 1 https://www.army.mil/article/51926/ brigade-modernization-command/. 2 See Army News Service, https://www. army.mil/article/177286/awa_171_in creasing_the_pace_of_battle_in_a_coali tion_environment, for more information. 3 Army Doctrinal Reference Publication 6.0, Mission Command, defines mission command system as the arrangement of personnel, networks, information sys tems, processes, procedures, facility and equipment that supports the philosophy of mission command as well as the mis sion-command warfighting function. 4 This interpretation of reach is defined as collaboration, shared situational under standing and effective relationships with key actors. From Mission Command Net work Vision and Network, Mission Com mand Center of Excellence, Fort Leaven worth, KS. Figure 5. Modernized M1087 Expando van as a combat information center (CIC) variant. Thirty minutes forward-opera tions establish time.

Summer 2017 ABCT – armored brigade combat team ADAM – air-defense airspace management AETF – Army Experimental Task Force AFATDS – Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System AMDWS – Air and Missile Defense Workstation or Army Missile Defense Warning System A/V – audiovisual AWA – Army Warfighting Assessment BCT – brigade combat team BFT – Blue Force Tracker BISE – brigade intelligence-support element BMC – Brigade Modernization Command CIC – combat information center CONOPS – concept of operations CP – command post CPoF – Command Post of the Future CPP – command-post platform CUOPS – current operations DA – decisive action DATE – decisive-action training environment DCGS-A – Distributed Common Ground System-Army ECP – entry control point ECU – environmental-control unit EM – electromagnetic EMF – electromagnetic field EMS – electromagnetic signature FM – field manual FSC – forward-support company HDMI – high-definition multimedia interface JBCP – Joint Battle Command Platform JMC – Joint Modernization Command LED – light-emitting diode MC – mission command MCN-AE – Modular Communications Node-Advanced Equipment NetOps – network operations NIE – network integration evaluation NIPR – Non-secure Internet Protocol Router NOSC – Network Operations and Security Center OE – operational environment OSRVT – One-System Remote Video Terminal Acronym Quick-Scan OSRVT-SA – One-System Remote Video Terminal situational awareness OTM – on-the-move PoP – point of presence RF – radio frequency SAMS – School of Advanced Military Studies SICPS – Standardized Integrated Command Post System SIPR – Secure Internet Protocol Router SME – subject-matter expert STT – small tactical terminal SVOIP – Secure Voice over Internet Protocol TAA – tactical-assembly area TAC – tactical-actions center TCN – tactical-component network TFOCA – tactical fire-operations cable assembly TOC – tactical operations center TSCIF – Temporary Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility TTP – tactics, techniques and procedures WfF – warfighting function WIN-T – Warfighter Information Network-Tactical

• Gene E. Salecker, Rolling Thunder Against the Rising Sun [commercial publication]. Details operations of Army tank units in the Pacific during World War II – good illustration of the use of armor to sup port forcible-entry operations.

• Donn Starry, Mounted Combat in Vietnam [CMH publication]. Readable text detailing the role of ar mor/cavalry in counterinsurgency; high lights versatility and adaptive qualities at a time when mounted counterinsur gerncy doctrine was largely nonexistent.

• Robert S. Cameron, Armor in Bat tle [CMH/APD publication]. Collection of tactical engagements spanning experience of American armor from the interwar years through Opera tion Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom.

• Jon T. Hoffman (ed), Tip of the Spear: U.S. Army Small Unit Action in Iraq, 2004-2007 [CMH publica tion].

• John J. McGrath (ed), Between the Rivers: Combat Action Iraq 2003- Continued from Page 56 2005 [CSI publication].

• William G. Robertson (ed), In Con tact! Case Studies from the Long War, Vol. 1 [CSI publication].

• Donald P. Wright (ed), Vanguard of Valor: Small Unit Actions in Afghani stan, Vol 1 [CSI publication].

• Donald P. Wright (ed), Vanguard of Valor: Small Unit Actions in Afghani stan, Vol. 2 [CSI publication].

• David Zucchino, Thunder Run [com mercial publication]. Detailed description of the planning, prep aration and execution of the April 2003 ar mored operations into Baghdad.

• Kendall Gott, Breaking the Mold: Tanks in the Cities [CSI publication]. Collection of urban operations in which armor played a significant role.

• Asymmetric Warfare Group, The Defense of Battle Position Duffer National Training Center narrative cov ering electromagnetic warfare, spec trum management, operational security, social media, information operations and others. Focused on brigade and be low.

• William Haponski, Danger’s Dra goons: The Armored Cavalry of the Big Red One in Vietnam, 1969 Can tigny Park: First Division Museum, 2014. Discussion of an armored-cavalry task force conducting multi-national combat operations in restrictive terrain.

• James Sawicki, Cavalry Regiments of the U.S. Army, Dumfries, VA: Wyvern Publications, 1985

• Stephan Bourque and John Bur dan, The Road to Safwan: The 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Denton: Univer sity of North Texas Press, 2007 Describes an armored-cavalry squadron conducting forced entry. Recommended Reading for Professional Development