Missed Opportunities: How Stryker Brigade Combat Teams are Misusing Organic Signals Intelligence, Electronic-Warfare Capabilities

The Universal Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Cavalry Squadron Organization al and Operational Concept defines the cavalry squadron as “a combined-arms formation which employs movement, direct and indirect fires, information-collection capabilities [and] joint enablers, and reports using mis sion-command systems to develop the situation.”1 But do BCTs employ all their organic capabilities to their maximum potential and enable squadrons to do all the preceding? Squadrons must continuously develop situational understanding for the en tire Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT) while protecting the main body to prevent it from fighting at a disad vantage and, overall, to facilitate winning the war. The BCT has an incredible set of capabilities – electronic attack (EA), electronic support (ES) and direc tion-finding – to help the mission. Moreover, better integration of elec tronic warfare (EW) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities into the squadron will enhance the cavalry’s ability to develop situational under standing for the brigade commander. This article identifies the problem with current integration of organic SIGINT and EW assets, proposes a solution for the squadron to better develop situa tional understanding and recommends tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) for optimal employment. Problem SBCTs misuse and underuse EW per sonnel and assets. Currently, the SBCT controls the EW plan and execution at the operational level, so electronic-warfare officers (EWOs) at lower echelons become message carriers rather than implementers and advisers to their commanders. In many cases, they are viewed only as another person to carry out unrelated details such as am munition pick-up, radio-transmission operation, entry-control-point duties, etc. Unfortunately, battalion and squadron EWOs do not possess the equipment to train on or enough per sonnel to push down to platoon and squad levels; squadrons possess only one staff sergeant (E-6) and one sergeant (E-5) to plan and implement all EW operations. When it comes to SIGINT, most compa ny and troop commanders do not understand how to use low-level voice intercept (LLVI) teams effectively, or they neglect them entirely. With a high operational tempo, administrative tasks, planning operations and time con straints, it is difficult for the command er to include additional assets. In the same way, squadron staffs fail to properly integrate SIGINT capabilities into maneuver plans. Planners do not un derstand the capabilities and restric tions and, as a result, fail to implement this significant asset. After all, it is human nature to ignore things we do not understand. Furthermore, commanders are task-organizing teams to infantry battalions even though there is no immediate need for EWOs or LLVI teams in their mission set. The infantry’s primary job is to close with and engage the enemy; their movement has to be rapid and forceful. Unfortunately, LLVI and EW equipment is limited when it comes to freedom of maneuver because Soldiers can’t effectively collect and engage with it on the move. By the time they are able to engage, it is too late. For this reason, cavalry squadrons must be the primary implementers of LLVI and EW systems. Solution The cavalry squadron’s focus is to gain and maintain contact with the enemy; they are the eyes and ears of the battlefield. Scouts are trusted not only to find the enemy but also with the em ployment of direct fires at the squad and platoon levels. The BCT command er relies on scouts to shape a tactical and operational response so he can op timally deploy the infantry. EW and LLVI technology add to the reconnais sance fundamental to maintain contact before, during and after operations, facilitating the targeting process. The inherent limitation of EW and LLVI capabilities (limited operational range and terrain restrictions) fits ideally with squadron missions. The squadron is the first to deploy and the last to leave. Scouts naturally find the terrain that is the most advantageous, which is the perfect placement for the EW and LLVI teams. All systems are able to collect on the move and will not interfere with squadron operations. Teams can be embedded with the mounted and dismounted elements, and they can operate out of Strykers. Electronic reconnaissance will enable the troops on the ground and the squadron commander to maximize their collection efforts while maintaining freedom of maneuver. To win the war, we must maximize as sets rather than rely on higher-echelon assets that will be task-organized only for limited periods. To do so, leaders must pull all EWOs out of the battalions and create tactical EW teams in the same manner as LLVI teams. LLVI teams are comprised of two- to three-Soldier sections that can be task-organized when the mission requires it. These teams belong to the military-intelligence company (MICO). The MI CO’s mission-essential task list (METL) includes performing intelligence, sur veillance and reconnaissance, and pro viding intelligence support to target ing. In the same way, EW teams have to belong to the MICO to fulfill the same METL requirements and to max imize their capabilities. Teams will be under a noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC), who will be positioned at the squadron and act as the link between the teams and the brigade EWO. Separated from the battalion, the teams and NCOIC can focus on continuous training to maintain their skills. Furthermore, LLVI and EW teams can train together to conduct offensive, defensive and collection tasks. Finally, squadron S-2s should attend a school to certify as military-occupation specialty 35G, a SIGINT/EWO. Most S-2s are young, with limited intelligence experience and understanding; some of them are branch-detailed. Squadron S-2s must be the subject-matter expert (SME) during the planning and execution process to deploy assets and continuously educate com manders on the capabilities of EW and

LLVI.

Recommended TTPs To optimally integrate LLVI and EW ca pabilities within the SBCT at squadron level, commanders must embed teams with the S-2 during the military deci sion-making process (MDMP), deploy LLVIs with scout observation posts (OPs), integrate EW with dismounted or mounted teams and invest in new technology (Figure 1). During the planning process, squadrons must imbed EW and LLVI teams with the S-2 section. This maximizes the output of Step 3 of MDMP, where the S-2 and S-3 join forces in course-of-action (CoA) development. What is better than the SMEs having a voice in the mission plan? Also, those EW and LLVI teams gain full awareness of what the elements on their right and left are doing, not to mention putting faces to the people on the ground to build trust within a team. LLVI systems are sensitive in nature and have to be imbedded with dis mounts at OPs. LLVI provides commanders with force protection, early warning and target acquisition. During mission analysis, the S-2 team con ducts a detailed terrain analysis by sur veying for ideal OPs. They also provide line-of-sight products that identify the equipment capabilities and limitations of the squadron and LLVIs. To provide detailed and accurate collection, LLVI teams require less than 10 minutes to set up. With the set OP, they observe enemy locations, intercept communi cations, analyze traffic and disseminate intelligence. One of the most exclusive tasks LLVI teams provide is communications intelligence (COMINT). COMINT gathers any communication from enemy emits to identify and further define the enemy’s intent. The teams set up in the same manner as OPs and can sustain and se cure themselves. To maximize their effectiveness, squadrons must imbed EW teams with mounted or dismounted elements. These teams do not require a specific setup. Mounted EW teams place their antenna on a Stryker and conduct op erations, while dismounted EW teams conduct missions independently with out need for additional platforms. Tactical EW provides EA and ES to include early warning, collection and direction-finding. Successful employment of EA allows the squadron to separate enemy for mations and command-and-control el ements through jamming, thus forcing the enemy to switch to targetable fre quencies, deploy forces early, delay their movement or change its CoA. “Encouraging” the enemy on what fre quencies to use reduces its ability to effectively use the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) and focuses LLVI to determine the enemy commander’sin tent while continuously painting the enemy’s common operating picture for commanders throughout the SBCT. Through EMS usage, the S-2 is able to cross-reference frequencies of interest to confirm/deny and identify the type of equipment the enemy is using. Moreover, the S-2 will be able to deter mine which elements are in the disrup tion, battle and support zones, and which CoA the enemy is employing. ES operations identify the enemy’s EM Figure 1. LLVI and EW doctrinal template.

equipment’sand systems’ vulnerabili ties. A single EW or LLVI team can pro vide aline of bearing, indicating the di rection of the signal and emitters. Add ing two more teams provides the accu rate geolocation of the enemy and al lows for the scouts to get “eyes on” the enemy to ultimately identify high-value target lists/high-payoff target lists and answer the commander’s priority intelligence requirements. ES allows the squadron to detect frequencies at greater ranges, provide real time early warning of the enemy deployment status and increase our reaction time while augmenting the squadron’s se curity tasks. The SBCT must invest in new EW and SIGINT technologies. Paul McLeary, a foreign-policy senior reporter covering the U. S. Department of Defense’sand national security issues, once said, “American military officials are being forced to admit they’re scrambling to catch up to [EW] capabilities that Russia possesses.”2 He is not wrong. Currently, we have people, but where is the equipment? No one knows. The equipment that exists for the U. S. Army is extremely outdated and is sitting somewhere on shelves, just like the skills of our EWOs. Meanwhile, Russia has deployed powerful and so phisticated EW equipment into the countries of Georgia, Ukraine and Syria to disrupt those governments’ means of communication and coalition operations. Will it turn into another fight in which the U. S. Army is reactive and scroung es to find countermeasures? Or do we need to maximize our efforts to con duct active electronic collection and plan and train for electronic offensive operations? The Army must invest in new technol ogy. In Fiscal Year 2016, only $12.69 million of the U. S. Army’s budget of $127 billion was requested to fund EW development.3 “If you go to a unit to day in the Army and you say, let me see your ‘[EW] equipment,’ and you go to the EWO and he opens up his wall lock er, it’s empty,”4 said COL Jeffrey Church, the Army’s senior EW officer in 2015. If the Army wants to conduct offensive EW operations, it relies on borrowed assets from the Navy. An of fensive jamming capability is not slat ed to enter the U. S. Army until 2023.5 Conclusion In the end, EW and LLVI complement each other. Either one can find a fre quency and pass it to the other while actively collecting intelligence. This fa cilitates the squadron’s understanding of the operational environment during final planning and allows the employment of electronic fires to shape con ditions for a successful fight. To facili tate EW and LLVI operations, BCT com manders must imbed teams at the squadron and troop level. The collec tion and scout teams must train together to synchronize and complement each other’s operations and ultimately help the squadron’s mission accomplishment. Without using our organic assets to their full capacity and train ing Soldiers in the proposed formation, it can negatively impact mission execution. CPT Elena Cherepanova is the S-2 for 8th Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, 2nd SBCT, 2nd Infantry Division, Joint Base Lewis-McChord (JBLM), WA. Previous assignments include intelligence planner/future operations, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2-2 SBCT, JBLM; assistant S-2, 4th Battalion, 17th Infantry Regiment, 1st SBCT, 1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss, TX; human-intelligence platoon leader, MICO, 6th Squadron, 1st Cav, 1-1 SBCT, Fort Bliss; and intelligence, surveillance and re connaissance platoon leader, MICO, 6-1 Cav, 1-1 SBCT, Fort Bliss. CPT Cherepanova’s military schools include the Signal Intelligence/Electronic War fare Officer Course, Military Intelligence Captain’s Career Course, Joint Human Analyst Targeting Course, AntiTerrorism Course and Military Intelligence Basic Officer Leadership Course. She holds a bachelor’s of science de gree in pure mathematics from Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis, Indianapolis, IN. Notes 1 Universal BCT Cavalry Squadron Organizational and Operational Concept, Feb. 29, 2016. 2 Paul McLeary, “Russia’s Winning the Electronic War,” Foreign Policy, Oct. 21, 2015; accessed April 1, 2017 at http://for eignpolicy.com/2015/10/21/russia-winning-the-electronic-war/. 3 Exhibit R-2, RDT&E Budget: Electronic Warfare Development, Global Security, February 2015; accessed April 01, 2017 at www.globa.security.org/military/library/ budget/fy2016/army-peds/0304270a_5_ pb_2016.pdf. 4 Sydney J. Freedberg, “Army’s Electronic Warfare Cupboard is Bare: No Jammer un til 2023,”Breaking Defense, July 20, 2015; accessed April 1, 2017 at www.breaking defense.com/2015/07/armys-electronic-warfare-cupboard-is-bare-no-jammer-un til-2023/. 5 Ibid. Low-level voice intercept Electronic warfare Primary use Collection asset Weapon asset Mission Find and intercept enemy communications and determine enemy’s intent Identify and locate emitters to support communications jamming Output Collects all communications data to provide analysis Collects data to determine enemy’s equipment to conduct jamming Capabilities Early warning Electronic attack Force protection Electronic support Communications interception Frequencies interception Target acquisition Table 1. LLVI vs. EW.

BCT – brigade combat team CoA – course of action COMINT – communications intelligence EA – electronic attack EMS – electromagnetic spectrum ES – electronic support EW – electronic warfare EWO – electronic-warfare officer LLVI – low-level voice intercept JBLM – Joint Base Lewis-McChord MDMP – military decision-making process METL – mission-essential task list MICO – military-intelligence company NCOIC – noncommissioned officer in charge OP – observation post SBCT – Stryker brigade combat team SIGINT – signals intelligence SME – subject-matter expert TTP – tactics, techniques and procedures Acronym Quick-Scan Recommended Reading for Professional Development Listed by general subject rather than command echelon Profession of arms

• Don Higginbotham, George Washington and the American Military Tradition [commercial publication].

• Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider, American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldiers and the State in the New Era [commercial publication]. American Civil-Military Relations of fers the first comprehensive assessment of the subject since the publica tion of Samuel P. Huntington’s field-defining book, The Soldier and the State. Institutional development

• Bruce Godmundsson, On Armor [commercial publication]. Overview of evolution of combined arms organizations from World War I through Cold War; analyzes combined arms teams from a multi-national per spective, including the United States.

• George Hofmann and Donn Starry (eds), Camp Colt to Desert Storm [commercial publication]. Anthology that includes set of articles devoted to principal eras in Armor Branch history; includes chapter on U. S. Marine Corps armor development.

• Robert S. Cameron, To Fight or Not to Fight? [CSI publication]. Overview of doctrinal and organizational trends related to reconnais sance organizations and related issues; provides context for understand ing current state of cavalry/recon.

• John J. McGrath, Scouts Out! [CSI publication]. Overview of reconnaissance organizations in modern armies; multinational perspective.

• Robert S. Cameron, Mobility, Shock, and Firepower [CMH publication]. Provides context for understanding the ear ly development of the Armor Branch and its evolution from a platform-centric orien tation into a set of unique capabilities amid the constraints of organizational precedents, budgetary limitations and uncertain ty RE the capabilities of new technology.

• Martin L. Van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton; 2nd Edition [commercial publication]. A second edition of this classic work, commenting on the role of logistics in warfare.

• John Stone, The Tank Debate: Armour and the Anglo-American Military Tradition [commercial publication]. Analysis of tank development from World War II to 2000 with focus upon shaping factors and technology limitations; multina tional perspective.

• National Training Center Operations Group, Training for Decisive Action: Stories of Mission Command [CSI pub lication].

• Scott C. Farquhar (ed), Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation Cast Lead [CSI publication]. Chronicles the Israeli Defense Force’s efforts to identify and apply lessons learned from 2006 to operations in Gaza; and transition from counterin surgency-centric orientation toward a more traditional combined-arms ap proach, not unlike current shifts in U. S. Army in the last few years. Platform development

• David E. Johnson, Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U. S. Army, 1917-1945 [commercial publication]. Johnson examines the U. S. Army’sin novations for both armor and aviation between the world wars, arguing that the tank became a captive of the conservative Infantry and Cavalry Branch es, while the airplane’s development was channeled by airpower insurgents bent on creating an independent air force.

• Orr Kelley, King of the Killing Zone [commercial publication]. Highly readable overview of the devel opment and fielding of the Abrams tank.

• Blair W. Haworth, The Bradley and How it Got That Way [commercial publication]. Overview of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle and the factors influencing its development; also provides contextu al understanding of mechanized infantry evolution.

• Mark J. Reardon and Jeffery A. Charlston, From Transformation to Combat: The First Stryker Brigade at War [CMH publication]. Continued on Page 56