The Return of Cavalry: a Multi-Domain Battle Study

Summer 2017 by MAJ Nathan A. Jennings, MAJ Amos C. Fox, MAJ Adam L. Taliaferro, MAJ David W. Griffith and MAJ Kyle

T. Trottier The U.S. Cavalry has enjoyed a long his tory as both an enabling and decisive tactical force during American land power campaigns. From its earliest manifestations in 1775 to its incorpo ration into the modernized Armor Branch in 1950, the Army’s primary mounted arm employed mobility, fire power and eventually protection to ag gressively shape conditions across the battlefield’s breadth and depth while providing distinct advantages to the larger combined-arms force. This record of evolving contributions, which ranged from dedicated recon naissance-and-security (R&S) efforts in World War II to more generalized roles during recent counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns in Southwest and Central Asia, has once again found the “spurs and Stetsons” community at a doctrinal, material and organizational crossroads.1 The tradition’s newest inflection point centers on the unique service that le thal, mobile and survivable cavalry forces can potentially contribute to the Army’s emerging multi-domain battle concept. As argued by GEN David Per kins, 15th commander of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRA DOC), it requires “flexible and resilient ground formations that project combat power from land into other domains to enable joint-force freedom of action.”2 In contrast to recent conflicts where scouts and tankers typically fought as general-purpose Soldiers, this emerg ing paradigm – which leverages emer gent technologies to shape “deep fights” with cross-domain effects – of fers opportunity for fast-moving ar mored forces, and cavalry in particular, to assume critical roles in dislocating and disintegrating enemy networks. This advance holds potential to expand the purpose and identity of the Armor Branch. Context and background The Army’s return to focusing on peer competition finds its mounted-maneu ver proponent recovering from a di minishment of perceived value after years of optimization for stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. While the Armor Branch, and its caval ry subset, strained to reconcile urgent COIN demands and traditional doctri nal mandates, the broader institution seemed to place increasingly less im port in formations designed to conduct forceful R&S. This perceived loss of stature was reflected in intellectual questioning of the need for cavalry, ob servations of diminished enthusiasm for joining the branch at West Point, degradation of skills and identity, and the simultaneous loss of corps- and di vision-level cavalries in favor of less-capable squadrons assigned to brigade combat teams (BCTs).3 The decision to create less-resourced humvee, Stryker and armored-cavalry squadrons with a relatively anemic al location of mechanized platforms stemmed from the Army’s embrace of BCT modularity. The transformation aimed to empower economized recon naissance, surveillance and target ac quisition with emerging technologies by shifting emphasis from aggressively fighting for information to attaining sit uational awareness through stealthy observation.4 As assessed by a 2014 Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) study, the resulting composition – be reft of the organic tanks and rotary wing of the legacy armored-cavalry regiments (ACR) and division-cavalry squadrons (DIVCAV) – “left the force structure without an organization that possessed the organic assets, doctrinal underpinning and specialized training to execute the broad range of tradi tional cavalry missions.”5 This perceived relegation of cavalry functions, at least in terms of resourc es, inflicted subtle identity confusion on the “combat arm of decision” as a generation of leaders predominantly gained combat experience in stability operations. The ambiguity was further clouded as the Army eliminated tank-pure battalions, moved the Armor Cen ter to the “home of the infantry” and reorganized its final deployable ACR as a Stryker BCT. Simultaneously, infantry leaders increasingly assumed com mand of cavalry squadrons and troops populated by 19-series Soldiers, while Armor officers at the U.S. Military Academy reported, albeit anecdotally, the dilution of the branch’s “brand” when cadets struggled to understand its distinctive history, functions and purpose.6 A third area of institutional concern centered on the predictable diminish ment of tactical and technical acumen among officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) in both combined-arms battalions and cavalry squadrons as they trained for COIN. As argued by then-BG Scott McKean, who served as Chief of Armor from 2014 to 2016, ob served trends from combat training centers demonstrated “a significant degradation in our knowledge and abil ities to conduct [R&S] operations.”7 This included a loss of stabilized gun nery expertise, degradation of mainte nance competence, atrophy of infor mation-collection skills and diminished familiarity with time-honored ceremo nies and customs for many leaders. Despite these setbacks, the American cavalry force has begun to regain its distinctive relevancy within the broad er institution in recent years. In 2016, the armored squadrons replaced their humvees with more M3 Cavalry Fight ing Vehicles (CFVs) and gained a tank company to allow increased lethality and survivability. Simultaneously, the squadrons of the Stryker BCTs assumed training responsibility for their bri gade’s anti-tank and Mobile Gun Sys tem (MGS) companies, thereby uniting heavier firepower and wheeled scouts. This focus on empowering R&S opera tions – often reflecting increased inte gration of cyber-electronic, unmanned surveillance and informational tech nologies – indicates a growing appre ciation by senior Army leaders for the dynamic role cavalry will perform in fu ture campaigns.8 The squadrons of the infantry BCTs, though optimized with motorized scouts and light infantry to facilitate tactical and strategic mobility, have continuing challenges resulting from modularity. As assessed by the 2014 MCoE study, they “lack the passenger-carrying capacity, protection and mo bility required for [R&S] operations” while maneuvering with a dearth of “organic mobile, protected firepower.”9 Comprising most of the cavalry force at about 59 percent, the lighter squad rons’ modest vehicle density and logis tical requirements conflict with the

Summer 2017 doctrines of select parent divisions that emphasize dynamic aerial move ment across extended distances and restrictive terrain.10 Despite recent improvements, the Ar my’s cavalry formations still lack the robust combined-arms capabilities once enjoyed by ACRs and DIVCAVs. The possession of organic scout or at tack rotary wing, in particular, has his torically delineated R&S capabilities at tactical and operational levels. With out the air-ground maneuver profile of their predecessors, the current squad rons, regardless of increased CFV, Abrams or MGS densities, remain lim ited in capacity to aggressively and in dependently fight for information. While the integration of emergent technologies is creating new possibili ties, these issues will inform the cur rent cavalry force’s ability to support multi-domain operations with en hanced speed and lethality across ex panded frontages and distances.11 Multi-domain battle The Army’s renewed focus on defeat ing peer-adversary complex defenses, even as it innovates to expand the ag ing 2nd Offset into 21st Century warfare, emphasizes land corps and division “deep fights” designed to create ad vantageous conditions. By incorporat ing simultaneity, depth, synchroniza tion and flexibility, as argued by Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, Opera tions, “commanders seek to seize, re tain and exploit the initiative while synchronizing their actions to achieve the best effects possible.”12 Since the institution now possesses a historically low quantity of maneuver brigades to attain offensive mass or endure unan ticipated attrition, it has become in creasingly vital for advance ground el ements to integrate indirect, aerial, cy ber, electromagnetic and information al fires to dynamically shape battlefield outcomes. While all Army tactical forces boast de grees of operational reach and tactical agility, cavalry formations – both wheeled and mechanized – are ideal elements to host, integrate and syn chronize joint fires while sustaining high-tempo movement. Even as air borne, air-assault and attack-aviation entry becomes problematic due to im proving enemy area-denial (AD) capa bilities, ground penetration by fast-moving, lethal and survivable forma tions holds potential to exploit kinetic and electromagnetic joint capabilities to dislocate enemy defenses. While cavalry will always conduct traditional R&S missions, the emerging paradigm offers opportunities to lead integration of multi-faceted fires and deep-strike actions. This revitalized approach, which incor porates insights from past campaigns of scale and depth, requires the Army to examine its current brigade-centric cavalry structure. As argued by LTG H.R. McMaster, who commanded 3rd ACR in Iraq in 2005, “trends in armed conflict that include all domains con tested, increased lethality and range of weapons, complex and urban terrain, and degraded operations all argue for increasing importance of [R&S] capa bilities at all echelons.”13 In the context of multi-domain battle, this means that current divisions and corps lacks opti mal elements to enable and exploit di verse joint fires during forceful and wide-ranging “recon-strike” – sensor-to-shooter tactics that synchronize col lection and fires networks – through out contested domains and spaces.14 The Army has a variety of options to create specialized means and doctrine to defeat complex defenses. While combined-arms battalions and cavalry squadrons in BCTs remain indispens able for enabling success in “close fights,” the emerging R&S brigade ex cursion – where select BCTs temporar ily train to conduct historical ACR mis sions – provides an immediate, if inef ficient, option for enabling corps-level forced entry. Alternatively, divisions could create large air-ground task forc es with the ability to execute dispersed maneuver from across subordinate bri gades. A more optimal solution would be, as proposed by the Commission on the Future of the Army, to form R&S strike groups (RSSGs), specifically de signed with enhanced ground, aerial and intelligence capabilities to enable echeloned joint efforts.15 The establishment of larger and more effective cavalry formations to execute Figure 1. Example R&S force.

Summer 2017 reconnaissance, security and strike op tions for corps and theater armies would allow the Army to better con tribute to joint campaigns. As suggest ed by retired LTG David Barno in his 2015 report, “The Future of the Army,” reimagining the capabilities of legacy ACRs, even if only through doctrinal solutions, “would give division and corps commanders a scalable forma tion” with the necessary mobility, pro tection and firepower to conduct “screening and guard missions, as well as a myriad of long-range independent operations in support of other maneu ver units.”16 This capability would ulti mately allow rapid bridging of air and land component efforts as cavalry teams maximize cross-domain fires. The adoption of a focused recon-secu rity-strike doctrine and philosophy in a joint context would also offer broader benefits across the full range of mili tary operations. Units with enhanced mobility, lethality, protection and tai lored technological packages have his torically provided valuable economy-of-force options to corps and theater commands in diverse settings. While 11th ACR proved its value during distributed-security operations in Viet nam when they employed superior op erational reach and firepower to over match Viet Cong opponents, the Amer ican constabulary regiments that pa trolled West Germany following World War II demonstrated similar benefit when their mechanized presence en sured relative peace during a period of precarious political transition.17 A final benefit of modernizing cavalry contributions would include allowing the Army to better contribute to na tional strategic deterrence. By provid ing regional combatant commands with forces optimized to reconnoiter over distance while leading the tactical synchronization of cross-domain fires — similar to Operation Atlantic Resolve but with teams specifically designed to collect information and strike AD net works – the institution would fulfil its doctrinal imperative to “prevent con f l i c t a n d s h a p e s e c u r i t y environments.”18 Reminiscent of the services performed by ACRs along the Iron Curtain during the Cold War, for ward-positioned R&S brigades, RSSGs or comparable task forces in places like Eastern Europe would reassure allies and deter adversaries by amplifying operational simultaneity, depth, syn chronization and flexibility in unified land operations (ULO). Branch identity The Army’s embrace of multi-domain battle offers further opportunity for Armor Branch, and its cavalry subset, to modernize the internal perceptions, external expectations and joint impli cations of its organizational identity. The U.S. military’s shift in emphasis to ward achieving more rapid and deci sive “windows” of advantage across enemy disruption and security zones, while providing early access for key en ablers, creates the need for agile and survivable ground partners. Armor and Cavalry leaders, with organizational culture and material expertise suited for dispersed maneuver, serve as ideal Figure 2. R&S support to joint-force entry.

Summer 2017 hosts to maximize cross-domain efforts during joint operations.19 Since, as argued by LTG McMaster, the Army’s “competitive advantage doesn’t come from a single branch or single technological capability” but instead emanates from the “ability to employ a broad range of technologies and ca pabilities in combination with each other.”20 Therefore, the Armor commu nity should continue to lead integra tion of both traditional and emerging cross-domain fire and maneuver; this demands capitalizing on emergent re quirements for ground elements able to combine reconnaissance, security and strike capability across expanded theater depth in the face of complex AD networks. The “rebranding” would subtly shift the traditional “jack of all trades” mentality of scouts to “cross-domain leaders” as cavalry forces po sition to allow joint forces to dislocate and degrade adversary capabilities. While the Armor Branch will always re tain its singular status as the Army’s proponent for mounted maneuver, expansion of its identity within a multidomain context can broaden its “com bat arm of decision” moniker to in clude a greater range of decisive im pacts. This would imply that scouts and tankers bring not only unmatched di rect-fire lethality but also the destruc tion of diverse joint fires – kinetic, cy ber, electronic, informational – as only mounted forces capable of high-tempo warfare can reliably enable. While all Army communities contribute distinc tive capabilities, Armor, with responsi bility to dominate R&S, owns the im perative to shape “deep fights” for joint force commands. This broadening of organizational em phasis holds implications for how the mounted-maneuver community, and the Army writ large, should perceive Armor and Cavalry leaders at various stages of development. Beginning with company-grades, the traditional man date, as described by LTG Sean MacFar land, that armored forces be “led by officers and NCOs who are properly trained and qualitied to operate at high speeds across large distances” could be joined with unique expertise to coordinate and apply cross-domain fires from a panoply of 21st Century en ablers.21 While all tactical leaders must attain combined-arms proficiency, 19-series officers and NCOs who oper ate early, independently and forward in cavalry troops and tank companies are natural candidates to integrate the joint armament. Commanders and staffs, according to Army reconnaissance doctrine, “man age assets by cueing, mixing and re dundant employment” of systems to “collect the most critical information with multiple perspectives.”22 Armor-Branch field-grade officers and senior NCOs in mechanized and motorized squadrons, as well as echeloned head quarters, must accordingly exercise su perior competency in planning and leading the tactical application of cross-domain fires. As premier manag ers of diverse enablers during ULO, 19-series majors, lieutenant colonels and sergeants major offer the depth and breadth of expertise for empower ing maneuver with both traditional and Figure 3. A continuum of expertise.

Summer 2017 newer technologies. This tactical acu men makes them indispensable con tributors to any command. If Armor and Cavalry Soldiers are mas ters of integrating cross-domain ef forts, those who rise to colonel and command sergeant major have inter nalized the ability to negotiate the broader complexities of multi-domain battle. The mounted-maneuver com munity’s focus on planning, facilitating and leading diverse teams with tai lored task-organization creates team-builders with aptitude for complex problem-solving and strategic deci sion-making. Following the examples of iconic leaders like GEN George Pat ton and GEN Creighton Abrams, senior Armor leaders, after decades of attain ing comfort leading dispersed and mo bile formations across distance, pro vide the joint force with adaptive and agile practitioners.23 Maximizing this branch-wide “brand” of cross and multi-domain expertise requires focused training in the profes sional military education of all tankers and scouts. As argued by BG John Ko lasheski, 50th Chief of Armor, the Armor School has long served as the “institu tion of choice for developing agile and adaptive leaders” that can “operate in any environment” and “are capable of integrating combined arms.”24 As the U.S. military anticipates engagement in increasingly complex settings, the con tinuous integration of newer technolo gies to complement traditional en ablers in decisive-action training pro grams will ensure that 19-series Sol diers, from private to colonel, are pre pared to maximize the potential of ma neuver and fires to shape future oper ating environments. Emerging horizons GEN Mark Milley, 39th Chief of Staff of the Army, recently warned that “land-based forces now are going to have to penetrate denied areas for the rest of the joint force” while having the capa bility to “operate in all domains simul taneously.”25 Armored forces, when maneuvering as combined-arms teams, have the potential to adopt more decisive roles in multi-domain battle efforts as they enable rapid forced-entry across contested battle fields. While all Army branches and warfighting functions contribute criti cal capabilities, task-organized cavalry formations offer a unique combination of mobility, protection and firepower to dislocate and disintegrate sophisti cated enemy defenses through recon naissance and strike actions. Continuing advancements in emerging technologies will only increase the in tensity of 21st Century conflict as the United States designs new doctrines and structures to combat emergent threats. The Armor Branch, and its cav alry subset, will assume increasingly prominent roles in facilitating offensive campaigns of scale by dispersed joint task forces. Eventually, this may in clude increased incorporation of ground and aerial drones, robotic ar mored proxies, emergent swarm tac tics and unprecedented cyber-elec tronic devastation as scouts and tank ers unleash cross-domain fires.26 If the COIN wars in Iraq and Afghanistan seemed to marginalize the cavalry tra dition, the complexity, tempo and depth of the multi-domain battlefield may demand its return to prominence. (Editor’s note: Questions about this ar ticle may be sent to MAJ Nathan Jen nings, lead writer and point of contact, at nathan.a.jennings2.mil@mail.mil.) MAJ Nathan Jennings is a student in the School of Advanced Military Stud ies (SAMS), Fort Leavenworth, KS. Pre vious assignments include assistant professor of history at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, NY; Headquar ters Troop commander and Troop C commander, 4-9 Cavalry, 2nd BCT, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX, and Iraq; platoon leader, Company B, 1-34 Armor, 1st BCT, 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, KS, and Iraq; and 19D cavalry scout in 2nd ACR (Light) with Operation Iraqi Freedom tours in Baghdad and Kirkuk, Iraq. His military schooling in cludes the Command and General Staff Officer’s Course, Cavalry Leader’s Course (CLC), Maneuver Captain’s Ca reer Course (MCCC), Armor Officer Ba sic Course (AOBC) and Air-Assault and Airborne schools. MAJ Jennings holds a bachelor’s of arts degree in history from Northwestern State University of Louisiana and a master’s of arts degree in American history from the Universi ty of Texas at Austin. He won the Perry Prize for the best master’s thesis at the University of Texas at Austin in 2013 and 1st place in the U.S. Army Armor School’s 2015 Starry Writing Competi tion. He is author of the book, Riding for the Lone Star: Frontier Cavalry and the Texas Way of War, 1822-1865. MAJ Amos Fox is also a student at SAMS. Previous assignments include commander, Troop L, 2nd Squadron, 16th Cavalry Regiment, 199th Infantry Bri gade, Fort Benning, GA; commander, Company D, 1st Squadron, 11th ACR, Fort Irwin, CA; assistant operations of ficer, 1st Squadron, 11th ACR, Fort Irwin; commander, Headquarters and Head quarters Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th Cav alry Regiment, 2nd Armored BCT (ABCT), 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, CO; and assistant operations officer, Bri gade Special Troops Battalion, 2nd ABCT, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson. MAJ Fox’s military education includes Command and General Staff College (CGSC), MCCC, CLC, Bradley Fire Sup port Vehicle Commander’s Course, Field Artillery Officer Basic Course and Airborne School. He holds a bachelor’s of science degree in secondary educa tion from Indiana University-Purdue University at Indianapolis and a mas ter’s of arts degree in secondary edu cation from Ball State University. MAJ Fox’s awards include the Draper Armor Leadership Award, Fiscal Year 2012; member of 11th ACR’s honorary rolls; and Order of St. George (Bronze). He is also a recipient of Silver Spurs. MAJ Adam Taliaferro is a student at SAMS. Previous assignments include board recorder, Department of Army Secretariat, Human Resources Com mand, Fort Knox, KY; aide-de-camp to the commanding general, U.S. Army Cadet Command and Fort Knox; troop commander, Headquarters, 3rd Squad ron, 73rd Cavalry, 1st BCT, 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC; commander, Troop B, 3rd Squadron, 73rd Cavalry, 1st BCT, 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg and Rabiah, Iraq; and platoon leader, Troop B, 4th Squadron, 73rd Cavalry, 1st BCT, 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg and Paktika Province, Afghanistan. MAJ Taliaferro’s military schools in clude SAMS’ Advanced Military Studies Program, College of Naval Command and Staff at the U.S. Naval War Col lege, Jumpmaster Course, MCCC, CLC, Airborne School and AOBC. He holds a bachelor’s of science degree in

Summer 2017 economics from Middle Tennessee State University and a master’s of sci ence degree in administration from Central Michigan University. MAJ Talia ferro also has a master’s of arts degree in defense and strategic studies from U.S. Naval War College. His awards in clude the Bronze Star with one oak-leaf cluster, Purple Heart, Combat Action Badge and Senior Parachutist Badge. MAJ David Griffith is a student at SAMS. Previous assignments include commander, Headquarters and Head quarters Troop, 3rd Squadron, 3rd Cav alry Regiment, Fort Hood, TX; com mander, Company M, 3-3 Cav, Fort Hood; assistant S-3, 3-3 Cav, Fort Hood; scout-platoon leader, Troop E, 2nd Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment, Fort Hood; and tank-platoon leader, Com pany C, 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor Bat talion, Fort Riley, KS. His military schools include Air Command and Staff College, MCCC and AOBC. MAJ Griffith has a bachelor’s of science degree in psychology from Northwestern State University and a master’s of arts de gree in military operational art and sci ence from Air Command and Staff Col lege. MAJ Kyle Trottier is a student in the Ad vanced Military Studies Program, Fort Leavenworth KS. Previous assignments include instructor, MCCC, Fort Benning GA; brigade plans officer, 3rd BCT, 101st Airborne Division; troop commander, 1st Squadron, 33rd Cavalry Regiment, 3rd BCT, 101st Airborne Division; assistant operations officer, 3rd Battalion, 320th Field Artillery Regiment, 3rd BCT, 101st Airborne Division; and battalion S-4 (logistics), company executive officer and platoon leader with 2nd Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment, 1st ABCT, 3rd In fantry Division. MAJ Trottier’s military schools include CGSC, MCCC, Northern Warfare School, AOBC and Ranger and Airborne schools. He has a bachelor’s of arts degree in criminal justice from Texas Christian University and a mas ter’s of arts degree in organizational and business security management from Webster University. Notes 1 Dr. Robert S. Cameron, To Fight or Not to Fight, Fort Leavenworth: Combat Stud ies Institute Press, 2010. 2 GEN David Perkins, “Multi-Domain Bat tle: Joint Combined-Arms Concept for the 21st Century,” ARMY magazine, December 2016. 3 For a critique of cavalry relevance, see Vincent Thomas, “A Dying Breed: The United States Cavalry in Today’s Army,” published by SAMS, Fort Leavenworth, 2013; for a critique of BCT cavalry re sourcing, see Todd Poindexter, “Trans forming Mechanized Reconnaissance: How the Armored Brigade Combat Team Cavalry Squadron should be Structured for [R&S] Operations in the Near Future,”

SAMS, 2014.

4 Cameron. 5 Whitepaper, “Cavalry Squadron Capabil ity Review,” MCoE, April 17, 2014. 6 CPT Thomas Spolizino, “Not Just Infantry with Tanks: Who We Should Be and Why the Army Needs Us to Be It,” ARMOR, Ju ly-September 2014. 7 BG Scott McKean, “Redefining and Re learning the Role of the Cavalry Squad ron,” ARMOR, July-September 2015. 8 Leah Kilpatrick, “Cavalry brigade combat team assumes new design, transition nearly complete,” Army News Service, Feb. 17, 2016. 9 “Cavalry Squadron Capability Review” whitepaper. 10 Force Management System Website, U.S. Force Management Support Agency. 11 Cameron. 12 ADP 3-0, Operations, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, August 2009. 13 LTG H.R. McMaster, correspondence with MAJ Nathan Jennings, Nov. 5, 2016. 14 Barry Watts, “The Evolution of Precision Strike,” Center for Strategic and Budget ary Assessments, 2013; Ian Easton, “Chi na’s Evolving Reconnaissance-Strike Capa bilities,” The Japan Institute of Interna tional Affairs, 2014. 15 National Commission on the Future of the Army, Jan. 28, 2016. 16 Retired LTG David Barno and Nora Ben sahel, “The Future of the Army: Today, To morrow and the Day after Tomorrow,” At lantic Council, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, September 2015. 17 GEN Donn Starry, Mounted Combat in Vietnam, Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1978; Cameron. 18 TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Com plex World, October 2014. 19 GEN Perkins. 20 LTG McMaster, 2015 Maneuver Warf ighter Conference, Fort Benning, Sept. 15- 17, 2015. 21 LTG Sean MacFarland, 2015 Maneuver Warfighter Conference, Fort Benning, Sept. 15-17, 2015. 22 Field Manual 3-98 Reconnaissance and Security Operations, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, July 2015. 23 Lisa Alley, “U.S. Army Observes 75th An niversary of Armored Force,” ARMOR, Ju ly-September 2015. 24 BG John Kolasheski, “Chief of Armor Hatch: Applying Lessons-Learned,” AR MOR, July-September 2016. 25 GEN Mark Milley, quoted in “Army $40B Short on Modernization vs. Russia, China: CSA Milley,” Breaking Defense, Oct. 3, 2016; also quoted in “Miserable, Disobe dient and Victorious: GEN Milley’s Future U.S. Soldier,” Breaking Defense, Oct. 5, 2016. 26 Tim Baxter and Tom von Eschenbach, “Manned-Unmanned Teaming,” Ground Combat Technology, April 24, 2014; John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “Swarming and the Future of Conflict,” RAND Nation al Defense Research Institute. Acronym Quick-Scan A2/AD – anti-access/area denial ABCT – armored brigade combat team ACR – armored-cavalry regiment ADP – Army doctrinal publication AOBC – Armor Officer Basic Course BCT – brigade combat team CFV – Cavalry Fighting Vehicle CGSC – Command and General Staff College CLC – Cavalry Leader’s Course COIN – counterinsurgency DIVCAV – division cavalry IADS – Integrated Air Defense System JFACC – Joint Forces Air Component Command JFLCC – Joint Forces Land Component Command JFMCC – Joint Forces Maritime Component Command MCCC – Maneuver Captain’s Career Course MCoE – Maneuver Center of Excellence MGS – Mobile Gun System MI – military intelligence NCO – noncommissioned officer OBJ – objective RSSG – reconnaissance and security strike group R&S – reconnaissance and security SAMS – School of Advanced Military Studies SOF – Special Operations Forces SPT – support TRADOC – U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command ULO – unified land operations