Ukrainian Combat Employment of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle

I n the face of a determined adversary, tactical innovations are of ten deviations from established military doctrine. Combat in Ukraine demonstrates this principle vividly, particularly regarding the employment of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV). Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-21.71, Mechanized Infantry Platoon and Squad, 15 October 2024, outlines doctrine for BFV utilization. The Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) adapted the principles found in U. S. Army doctrine and in some cases, deliberately diverged from them to achieve battlefield success against a superior enemy. This essay argues that the AFU experience with the BFV offers valuable lessons for U. S. Army doctrine and tactics, highlighting the need to prioritize adaptability and decentral ized initiative within mechanized forces. By examining both U. S. Army doc trine and Ukrainian battlefield applications, this analysis identifies key areas where tactical innovation can inform future force development and enhance the effectiveness of mechanized operations. Armor and Cavalry leaders should read this article to understand how to foster a culture of adaptation and empower subordinate leaders to exploit opportunities on the battle field. The BFV story starts with The Food Machinery Corporation that introduced the vehicle in 1981 to engage enemy armor, provide mobile fire support, and transport infantry. The U. S. Army fields several variants including the M2A2 Operation Desert Storm Situa tional Awareness (ODS-SA), M2A3, M2A4, and M3 (cavalry version). A 600-horsepower Cummins VTA-903T, 8-cylinder, 4-cycle, V turbo super charged diesel engine powers the BFV and it carries a coaxial 7.62mm M240C, a 25mm M242 Bushmaster chain gun, and a dual tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (TOW) missile launcher. The platform effectively en gages infantry, light vehicles, and ar mored threats in both offensive and defensive operations. Its armor protects against small arms fire and shrapnel, and advanced sensors and target ing systems enhance situational aware ness for the three-person crew and safeguard the seven infantry passen gers. The BFV honors its namesake, Former General of the Army Omar Bradley’s, emphasis on practicality and soldier survivability. Ukraine’s opera tional use of the vehicle reflects principles that diverge from ATP 3-21.71. This essay first examines U. S. Army doctrine, then analyzes real-world bat tles where the AFU deviated from a doctrinal approach. Finally, it con cludes that tactical innovation should drive larger changes at higher echelons. Doctrine U. S. Army doctrine establishes a uni fied operational framework at strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Army Doctrine Publications (ADPs) de fine principles; Field Manuals (FMs) detail warfighting tactics; and ATPs outline procedures for lower echelons. For example, ADP 3-0, Operations, 21 March 2025, Chapter 3-4 defines com bined arms as, “the synchronized and simultaneous application of arms to achieve an effect greater than if each element was used separately or se quentially.” FM 3-90, Tactics, 31 July 2019, describes the tactical sequence of find, fix, finish, and follow through. Tactics reflect combined arms principles, and ATP 3-21.71 serves as the primary doctrinal reference for mechanized infantry platoons and squads. BFVs are critical assets in tight ly coordinated combined arms formations. This approach requires standard ization, a common operating picture, and close coordination. This coordina tion enables the BFV to deliver infan try and mobile firepower as part of a combined arms team. In contrast, the AFU uses the platform in dispersed, semi-autonomous groups. ATP 3-21.71 prioritizes tightly integrated, combined arms actions. The AFU emphasizes flexibility, autonomy, and initiative at the platoon level. Ukrainian command ers often employ the platform for mo bile fire support and to place dis mounted infantry further from objectives than ATP 3-21.71 prescribes. Distinctive challenges faced by the Ukrai nians drive this doctrinal divergence. These challenges include strained lo gistics, unreliable maintenance, and reduced manpower. The following sections detail ATP 3-21.71’s description of offensive and defensive tactics, then explicitly contrasts them with Ukrainian practices. U. S. Army tactics center on synchro nized layered fire support requiring platoons to operate within closely linked formations. ATP 3-21.71, Chapter 3-174, directs that offensive opera tions require mounted support elements to deliver suppressive fire coor dinated with maneuver. This includes precisely timed shift fire commands to prevent fratricide and sustain operational tempo. In contrast, Ukrainians adapt by employing BFVs for independent breakthroughs, ambushes, and anti-tank operations, prioritizing flexibility and speed. Commanders task BFV-mounted TOW missiles with en gaging armor targets. Junior leaders exercise greater autonomy in decisionmaking. This shift from centralized, combined arms actions toward decen tralized, localized initiative, highlight a core doctrinal change. ATP 3-21.71 directs mounted infantry squads to utilize the BFV to close on the objective and dismount at the last covered position before assault. The AFU commonly dismount infantry at greater distances from the objective and use the BFV as a fire support plat form. Ukrainian forces make this adjustment because they anticipate antiarmor threats. Their focus is on sup pressing Russina positions before dis mounting infantry. This contrast high lights ATP 3-21.71 emphasis on rapid and protected infantry deployment. The AFU prioritizes survivability and standoff fire support. Ukrainian employment of the BFV in defensive operations, diverges from ATP 3-21.71, Chapters 4-14 and 4-15, which recommend positioning the ve hicle in area defense or as support for mobile defenses. The AFU instead deploy the platform to support mobile anti-armor teams and conduct am bushes against advancing Russian col umns, often using a single fighting ve hicle for these actions. These tactics leverage the platform’s survivability and mobility to disrupt enemy momen tum. The BFV’s combat effectiveness also boosts infantry morale. Ukrainian

Spring forces demonstrate doctrinal innova tion and operational pragmatism by adapting the BFV to dynamic defensive roles. ATP 3-21.71, Chapter 4-88, recommends hull-down engagements within layered defenses. Ukrainian units employ BFVs as mobile fire bases and obstructions along key avenues of approach. Operational necessity drives tactical innovation in contested envi ronments as this adaptation illustrates. Ukrainian forces integrate these tactics into their overall defensive campaign to create a strategic advantage through unpredictability and rapid response ca pabilities. These moves in turn complicate Russian strategic planning and execution. This approach highlights tactical flexibility and aligns with Ukraine’s broader strategy of leveraging asym metrical warfare to counter superior forces. The BFV enables the success of com bined arms operations by integrating infantry and armor to create layered defenses. The AFU adopted this model, prioritizing mobile defenses, ambush tactics, and rapid repositioning over static formations. The AFU had limited time and resources that strained their ability to fully replicate U. S. Army training environments. The demand of rapid necessity instead of U. S. Army schoolhouse standards, created an environment of impromptu tactics. The BFV now functions as a mobile fire base, engaging Russian units from con cealed positions and relocating to maintain tactical advantage. These ad aptations suggest that future North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations could benefit from smaller, dispersed BFV sections. The M3 re mains an effective platform without combined arms coordination. The Ukrainian approach potentially invites unmanageable risk such as the isolation of elements from the response of friendly quick reaction forces (QRF). Excessive autonomy for junior leaders could also lead to resource misalloca tion and fratricide. Overall, these ad aptations demonstrate both operation al innovation and the platform’s versatility in large-scale combat operations (LSCO). The Battle of Robotyne In 2023, Ukraine received its first M3s and rapidly integrated them into front line operations. NATO instructors accelerated crew training. This enabled Ukrainian units to adapt ATP 3-21.71 to their operational needs. The late Au gust early September counteroffensive that captured the town of Robotyne was the first step laying the foundation for the breach of the Surovikin Line. The Surovikin Line was a Russian ech eloned defensive line integrating lay ered minefields, trench networks and mutually supporting strongpoints. It required deliberate breaching opera tions in which the M3 supported ex ploitation and eventual penetration. AFU used the vehicle’s capabilities to adopt more aggressive and autono mous tactics, demonstrating the BFV’s versatility and ability to reclaim con tested ground.

The Kyiv Independent reported that the 47th Mechanized Brigade used the BFVs to transport assault teams close to enemy lines. The 25mm Bushmaster cannons suppressed Russian positions, enabling infantry to dismount and clear trenches with the protection of covering fire. Pvt Oleksandr Hlush chenko, a gunner, described how “the enemy’s anti-tank teams tried to neu tralize us, but the Bradley’s speed and firepower gave us the edge in respond ing before they could strike”. 1 Such firsthand accounts underline how ave hicle often criticized in the U. S. has proven indispensable on Ukraine’s bat tlefields. Ambush Tactics in the Luhansk Region In Luhansk, AFU mechanized units em ployed the platform’s mobility and fire power to conduct ambushes in dense forests. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense announced the destruction of several Russian vehicles, including BMP-3s and T-72 tanks. A Ukrainian platoon leader recalled: “We set up along a tree line, waiting for a Russian convoy to enter our kill zone. The M3s opened fire with 25mm bushmaster cannons and TOW missiles, knocking out the lead and rear vehicles, trapping the convoy. We then dismounted and finished the rest with anti-tank guided missiles and small arms.”2 Ukrainian troops love the BFV’s reli ability. Pvt Viktor Khamets, inter viewed by The Wall Street Journal, ex plained: “We were advancing when Russian artillery zeroed in on our position. The Bradley took multiple hits, but the crew survived, and we man aged to withdraw while continuing to fire. It saved my life.” Sgt Andrii Sokolov echoed this sentiment: “Knowing we have a vehicle that can withstand RPG hits and keep moving changes everything. It allows us to push forward with confidence”.2 These accounts demonstrate not only battlefield effectiveness but also the psychological ad vantage the vehicle provides to the AFU. Comparing doctrine to practice reveals how a vehicle designed for the Cold War has been adapted for LSCO. Conclusion The successful integration of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle into the Armed Forces of Ukraine combat operations provides a compelling case study in tactical adaptation. Despite divergenc es from the standardized procedures outlined in ATP 3-21.71, the AFU lever aged the M3’s inherent capabilities of mobility, firepower, and survivability to achieve significant battlefield effects. This adaptation, driven by logistical constraints, personnel limitations, and the unique challenges of the conflict, underscores the importance of foster ing a culture of innovation and empow ering small-unit leaders to exercise violence of action. For NATO, the Ukrainian experience offers critical lessons regarding the continued relevance of legacy platforms in LSCO. The enduring value of prioritizing innovation at all echelons of command is the need for doctrinal flexibility in the face of evolv ing threats. Further study of these adaptations will be essential to inform fu ture doctrine, training, and moderniza tion efforts, ensuring NATO maintains a decisive advantage in future con flicts. First Lieutenant Jack Lynch is an Infantry officer currently serving as a pla toon leader in the 278th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Tennessee National Guard. He is a graduate of Officer Candidate School and Infantry Basic Officer Leader Course both at Fort Ben ning, Georgia. He earned a bachelor of arts in philosophy from The University of Mississippi.