Space- Contested Environment: Reclaiming the Maneuver Advantage

Winter 2025 I magine a battlefield shrouded not in smoke and fog but in si lence. A silence not of peace but of disruption. No satellite com munication connecting commanders to their troops. No early warning systems detecting incoming threats. No Global Positioning System (GPS) guiding logis tics, maneuver, or precision munitions. This scenario is not science fiction - it is a real possibility in future large-scale combat operations (LSCO). For de cades, the U.S. Army has enjoyed near-uncontested access to space, a critical advantage underpinning our success in global conflicts. That advantage is rap idly eroding. Potential adversaries are actively developing capabilities to dis rupt, degrade, and deny our access to space based assets, transforming the “silent battlefield” into a strategic vul nerability. For future Army warfighters, understanding the space domain, not just as a technical realm but as an in tegral component of every maneuver, is no longer optional. Understanding how to fight against a near-peer space-enabled adversary is imperative to our success and, potentially, our survival. At the National Training Center (NTC), we are unwilling to accept a future where our divisions and brigade com bat teams (BCTs) are unprepared to face a near-peer space enabled adver sary. Senior space officers continuous ly dedicate time and effort to develop future warfighters who are prepared for this new landscape. This paper will examine the growing threat to our attacks is growing rapidly, and our ad versaries are learning and adapting to operate in a space degraded environ ment. Successfully disrupting the sta tus quo during LSCO could impede our ability to maneuver, communicate, maintain situational awareness, pro tect, and sustain the force, effectively negating many of our current techno logical advantages that are critical for carrying out many of the characteris tics of offense, defense, and transition. The Army Combined Arms Center (CAC) Handbook, “Operating in a De nied, Degraded, and Disrupted Space Operational Environment (D3SOE),” published in 2018, is filled with obser vations from combat training centers (CTCs) that reacted to a space degrad ed environment.1 After years of obser vation, the CAC encourages command ers and staffs to be more aware of en cryption shortfalls, apathetic electro magnetic interference (EMI) reporting standards, and the lack of awareness of space threats. In comparison, all nine final rotational after action re views (AARs) from BCTs at NTC in 2024 had nearly identical recommendations. Progress towards addressing these shortfalls has come up short in the last seven years. Even units completing a NTC rotation in back-to-back years of ten repeated the same mistakes, dem onstrating a lack of emphasis from command teams across the formation. The status quo can no longer be ac cepted. Deliberate changes are re quired to prepare for the realities of the future battlefield. by MAJ Heidi Beemer Armor In a Space-Contested Environment: Reclaiming the Maneuver Advantage space based capabilities utilized by the BCT, outline how Army leaders can adapt the training and procedures of their formations to mitigate these risks, and highlight the importance of integrating space considerations into all aspects of planning and execution. We will focus on deliberate actions by the maneuver commander, their staff, and the space subject matter experts (SMEs), ensuring their formations are prepared for the inevitable degraded space operational environment (OE). The Evolving Threat & Why It Matters Reliance on space is not a weakness in itself, it is a consequence of the incred ible advantages it provides. GPS offers precise navigation and targeting and enables massing. Satellite communica tions (SATCOM) enable secure and re liable command and control across vast distances. Space based intelli gence, surveillance, and reconnais sance (ISR) offers critical situational awareness, answers to commander’s priority questions, and battle damage assessment. However, this reliance cre ates a single point of failure. Adversar ies recognize this vulnerability and have developed counter-space capabil ities, including jamming, spoofing, and cyberattacks. These are not hypothetical threats. We have seen evidence of adversaries em ploying electromagnetic warfare (EW) tactics to jam and spoof GPS signals during exercises and real-world events. The potential for more sophisticated

Winter 2025 Trying Something Different In preparation for their rotation to NTC, the 1st Cavalry Division (1CD) wanted to break the pattern and en sure they were prepared for their rota tion in the spring of 2025. The Grey wolf BCT returned to the box after a ten-month turnaround. Field grade of ficers in the operations, intel, and sig nal sections were set on improving their performance. One area where they fell short the first time was their ability to fight in and through the space degraded environment. The team pro actively sought resources to better prepare themselves for the next fight. Before heading to NTC for their plan ning conference, Greywolf contacted the Army Space Training Division (ASTD), a Space and Missile Defense Command Center of Excellence direc torate. This division (DIV) is the Army's lead for developing, coordinating, and executing space training and educa tion. The Greywolf S3 asked specifical ly for additional space instruction dur ing their planning conference. In De cember 2024, two space officers from NTC, senior space trainer, myself (Space Ghost), and the resident OPFOR space officer (Space Horse) joined forc es with ASTD home-station and CTC specific space trainers to deliver an hour-and-a-half instruction focused on the real-world threats posed by our en emies to senior staff officers across the BCT. The conversation quickly migrated towards the OE replicated by Black horse, controlled by the Operations Group, and the tangible procedures maneuver units could employ to com bat the enemy effects, preserve com bat power, and survive in a space de graded environment created at NTC. The group left with a better under standing of integrating space into their planning process. They were excited to implement the troop procedures and protective measures they learned to defeat Blackhorse later that spring. Motivated by their initial training and armed with a will to win, Greywolf bri gade (BDE) and the 1CD Space Support Element (SSE) coordinated ASTD’s sup port during their January combined arms live-fire exercise (CALFEX) valida tion, the culminating exercise before heading to NTC. The space section in vited me to visit Fort Hood and ob serve Greywolf’s training firsthand. My trip's goal was to better understand the evolution of home-station space training to help shape the OE at NTC, and to find the right balance of parity to appropriately challenge units pre pared for NTC's complex and dynamic environment within the scenario de sign. The plan was for ASTD trainers to pro vide GPS jamming effects during the final company situational training ex ercise (STX) lanes preceding the live fire. The task for companies was to conduct a breach during a period of darkness. Once I arrived in Texas, the BCT had already run a few training it erations. Initial observations made by the ASTD trainers suggested the dura tion of the lane was too short for the company leadership to notice the dis ruption of GPS on their Joint Battle Command-Platforms (JBC-Ps). After consultation, the plan evolved to have the ASTD trainers, and the division space officers conduct individual train ing with the team leaders and above in the assembly area before they started the lane. Before the training, the ASTD trainers turned on their jammers and demonstrated the direct effects of GPS jamming on the troop’s Defense Ad vanced GPS Receivers (DAGRs) and JBC-Ps. The ASTD trainers also ex plained the use of the jammer finder app on the DAGR and its use in finding enemy jammers. Overall, the company leadership was engaged in the training and was excited to take tangible action to defeat Blackhorse, their future ad versary. With the SSE’s presence and engagement, the team provided local expertise that directly supported a bet ter understanding of the OE expected in future conflict. My visit to Fort Hood was short, but the value was immense. While inter acting with the 1CD SSE, I witnessed firsthand the team's dedication to their subordinate units. The team meticu lously crafted a training glide path for Greywolf, outlining a proper crawl, walk, run strategy to develop their awareness and procedures when en countering the threat posed by a space degraded environment. What was unique about this staff section’s ap proach was how well they leveraged outside resources to ensure their unit was ready for the final test on the na tional level. Inviting dedicated assets like ASTD to support training and find ing creative solutions like inviting an NTC observer controller/trainer (OC/T) to assist with training provided both exposure and emphasis to the nature of the OE. As an outside observer who routinely interacts with all echelons, I am often provided excuses as to why Figure 1. Bravo Company (Bandits), 11th Cyber Battalion, culminated months of home-station training with participation in NTC rotation 25-03. (U.S. Army photo by Steven Stover)

Winter 2025 subordinate training takes the back seat to ongoing division or corps prior ities. Space cadre and 3Y space trained Soldiers are frequently relied on to in form the BCTs and below on tactical space operations. When ASTD CTC trainers and OC/Ts interact with these formations at NTC, we routinely en counter Soldiers unaware of the threats of a space degraded environ ment and the individual and collective tasks required to survive and thrive in this environment. However, 1CD SSE subverted this narrative, and the Grey wolf BDE validated the effectiveness of this training strategy by achieving ex cellent results at NTC a few months lat er. Greywolf Excels: Lessons in Action All that was left was for Greywolf to perform at NTC during rotation 25-06. As a result of the dedicated space training integrated into preexisting ex ercises, Greywolf delivered one of the best performances of the last several years in maintaining primary, alter nate, contingency, and emergency (PACE) communications. During the ten days of force-on-force (FoF), Blackhorse conducted 108 hours of EMI across frequency modulation (FM), JBC-P, and GPS, affecting all main command posts across the area of op eration (AO). The brigade continuously reacted and reported EMI in the form of FM, JBC-P, and GPS jamming. Half way into the battle, during a battle as sessment radio call, the Commander of Operations Group (COG) remarked that Greywolf was excelling at managing PACE and that Blackhorse needed to continue to find new creative ways to challenge the training unit with 11th ACR’s jamming plan. Generally, at this point in the rotation, the senior train ers determine if the effects of jamming are preventing the training unit from meeting their training objectives. For Greywolf, the COG sought ways to con tinue pushing the BCT, and the training unit continued to react and adapt to the degraded environment. There were several ways that Greywolf excelled in this contested environment. First, they demonstrated a rapid adop tion of key loading procedures. Units repeatedly reported completing this task after initial training, and spot checks confirmed successful imple mentation, indicating effective training delivery and a clear understanding of the critical importance of encryption in protecting communications and nav igation systems. Greywolf implement ed a JBC-P validation lane during re ception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) requiring all ve hicles to validate JBC-P and DAGR com munications security (COMSEC), with a dedicated BDE S6 team. These reports were tracked in the daily commander’s update brief to ensure that subordi nates met task requirements from the RSOI operations order (OPORD). The unit also demonstrated increasing familiarity with jammer detection tools. The consistent use of the DAGR jammer finder application during FoF and the units’ ability to understand its function were significant positives. Company-grade leaders across the bri gade demonstrated an understanding of using their DAGR to confirm inter ference and gain directional informa tion. This suggests a growing capability within units to assess and respond to EW threats independently which re sulted in further tipping and cueing at the BDE level, which resulted in jam mers being located and destroyed through the targeting process several times during the rotation. Successfully navigating a communica tion PACE plan is always challenging for units during training. Greywolf com fortably demonstrated the ability to recognize interference on JBC-P, the unit’s alternative communication method, and the BCT protected prima ry communication. The BCT even mo bilized retransmission (RETRANS) to ensure FM communications were not affected when the main command post received direct jamming effects. Lastly, the BDE consistently empha sized reporting and situational aware ness. A strong positive was the repeat ed discussion of reporting procedures for suspected EMI. Even when initial reports were inaccurate, the emphasis on reporting itself is crucial. Battalions reported jamming effects to the BCT S6 sections. They even ensured adjacent battalions were notified of the jam ming environment, demonstrating a growing awareness of the importance of collective intelligence gathering and the need to share information to coun ter EW threats effectively. Signals Figure 2. Blackhorse observation post conducts GPS and JBC-P disruption in the Southern Corridor against 3/1CD on D+1. (Photo by MAJ Ryan Genard)

Winter 2025 intelligence (SIGINT) Soldiers were identifying jammers using a specialized geospatial data visualization applica tion, stimulated by the NTC foundry us ing integrated broadcast service (IBS) exercise layers to locate jammers on the battlefield in near real-time. By the last battle period, the EW platoons ef fectively targeted equipment on the high-payoff target list and removed them from the battlefield. Throughout the rotation, 1CD SSE also created situational awareness products to support Greywolf. Space officers an alyzed satellite overflight information, providing optimal times to conduct larger movements and critical events without detection. They also conduct ed navigation warfare analysis, exam ining the effects of satellite geometry on GPS-guided munitions and mapping and characterizing jammers using live data from several GPS and geospatial analysis tools. They utilized yet anoth er GPS interference and navigation tool to model these effects on the environ ment and determine impacts on ma neuver units and patterns of life from the Blackhorse EW teams. All of this was done from Fort Hood, TX, produc ing products within 24-48 hours, and showing how DIV SSEs can support their subordinate units in near realtime during national training exercises. Overall, the BCT demonstrated a con sistent willingness to engage in train ing on GPS and SATCOM interference and implement mitigation strategies. Troops were eager to listen, knowl edgeable, and actively working to load keys and utilize tools like the DAGR jammer finder, suggesting a strong unit culture of preparedness and a recogni tion of the evolving EW landscape. Continuing Success The lessons learned from 1CD should be heard and replicated across the Army. The goal is not to add new train ing modules but to integrate space considerations into existing training ex ercises through the OE. This approach, “adapt, don’t add,” is crucial to mini mizing additional time requirements and maximizing the impact of training. Units should find ways to implement recommendations faster to improve overall effectiveness in a space degrad ed environment. There are specific tasks that should be accomplished by commanders, staff, and space SMEs before CTC rotations and deployments to ensure tactical formations are pre pared for the environment they will in evitably face. Recommendations for Commanders The Army’s formations require leader ship and prioritization to improve un derstanding and proper reaction to a space degraded environment. Senior noncommissioned officers (NCOs) are also critical in executing these priori ties across the formation and champi oning these causes to effect change. The following should be considered by command teams: Educate unit’s roles in multi-domain operations. As part of the imperatives outlined in field manual (FM) 3-0, Op erations, ensure your units are protect ing against constant observation, Figure 3. Space planning considerations for MDMP. (Graphic from Army Space Training Division)

Winter 2025 which includes surveillance within the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS).3 Noise and light discipline are no longer enough. Units need to understand the EMS footprint they are emitting and ways that adversaries are using space to observe friendly forces. Command ers must emphasize protection as tac tical formations are tasked with surviv ability and being ready to fight. Elec tromagnetic considerations such as ra dio silence, minimizing transmission time, and utilizing terrain masking all should be integrated into individual and collective training to better under stand how degraded space affects the tenets of multi-domain operations (MDO), agility, convergence, endur ance, and depth. Emphasis should also be placed on redundancy in communi cation, as well as the execution of mis sion command. Mandate and verify encryption disci pline. Issue a clear command policy re quiring encryption of all navigation and communication systems during train ing and operations. Navigation encryp tion is only required once a year. En cryption is the single best way to com bat the effects of terrestrial jammers, yet it is rarely prioritized or executed. Incorporate this action into yearly training and/or maintenance plans to ensure compliance. Command teams must verify encryption as part of predeployment communications exercise (COMMEX).

Prioritize Realistic Training Scenarios. The Army’s current training methodol ogies often assume unfettered access to space. This needs to change. You must actively request and support sce narios that simulate GPS and SATCOM denial to allow your formations to see it themselves and work through a dy namic and complex environment while executing their mission-specific tasks. NCOs and Soldiers need an under standing of jamming, spoofing, and the EMS. This can be done by incorporat ing reaction to EMI and use of the DAGR jammer finder app in individual training, Soldier of the Month boards and expert badge training events. Emphasize Alternate Communication and Navigation methods. Ensure all units are proficient in utilizing their communication and navigation PACE plan. Conduct regular drills to practice switching between methods. Com manders must become comfortable providing clear and concise guidance, task and purpose, and utilizing mission command with subordinate command ers. Units should remain proficient with redundant digital and analog products for when disruptions do oc cur. NCOs and Soldiers need dedicated training and proficiency in methods in dependent of GPS and SATCOM. This includes map reading, land navigation (using compass and terrain associa tion), analog graphics production, ana log communication (field phones, run ners, visual signals), and understanding of radio frequency (RF) propagation. Recommendations for Staff Planning The future of combat is guaranteed to stress the BDE staff in ways not yet seen. Nine forms of contact and con tinuous observations require deliber ately including space in the planning processes to ensure integration across warfighting functions (WfF). Staff should consider the following: Coordinate with DIV SSE. Proactively coordinate with the DIV SSE to under stand their capabilities and limitations and ensure seamless support during rotations or deployments. Request and coordinate for training across WfF framed in terms of success in Figure 3. Bravo Company, 1-12 Compnay Commander CPT Donovan Canaday conducts GPS degraded familiarization training with the Army Space Training Division at Fort Hood in January 2025. (Photo by CPT Kyle Geiser)

Winter 2025 defeating opposing force (OPFOR) to get subordinate units excited for the training. Integrate Space Effects into Deliberate Planning. Across WfF, incorporate po tential space degradation scenarios into all phases of the military decisionmaking process (MDMP). This should include wargaming the effects of GPS denial, SATCOM loss, and ISR disrup tion, and all WfF should be considered. In lieu of an Annex N to Base Orders, space considerations should be includ ed throughout the OPORD. Update SOPs for Space Degradation. Revise standard operating procedures (SOPs) to address procedures for oper ating in a space degraded environ ment. Include guidance on alternate navigation methods, communication protocols, and reporting procedures for EMI both up to higher and laterally to adjacent units. Demand Pre-Deployment Data Prepa ration and Ensure Equipment is on Hand. Require EW/SIGINT personnel to prepare for deployment or training with pre-processed data, strike warn ings, and access to relevant intelli gence tools. The cyber-electromagnet ic activities (CEMA) cell needs to have access to a Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPR) token and be comfortable with real-world SIPR tools. Ensure crosstalk between staff sections to ensure the signal section is bringing the Global Broadcasting System (GBS) for use by the intelligence section. Schedule Regular MIST Training. Inte grate Multi-INT Spatial-Temporal (MIST) tool suite training into the unit’s training calendar, ensuring all relevant personnel receive recurring updates and proficiency training. Ensure all ap propriate personnel [17E, 35 series, battlefield information collection and exploitation system (BICE)] receive training on interpreting and utilizing real-time jamming data within Fusion Analysis and Development Effort (FADE)/MIST, and leaders can quickly and efficiently disseminate key findings to stakeholders. Leveraging SIGINT is a force multiplier for maneuver forma tion. Units that do well in this intel function often do well at CTCs. Recommendations for SSE/Space Professionals DIV requirements are the necessary priority for every DIV SSE. However, there remains a deliberate require ment to focus on enabling the BDE. Advocate for Realistic Training. Advo cate for more realistic GPS/SATCOM denial scenarios during CTC rotations and other training exercises. Integrate ASTD into training events early, which allows the team to provide training re sources and expertise. Ensure forma tions are prepared for training events by encrypting positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT)-enabled devices and coordinating times for hands-on expo sure before effects are integrated into collective training. Develop Unit-Specific Space Risk As sessments. Conduct unit-specific space risk assessments to identify vulnerabil ities and develop tailored mitigation plans that the BDE can action across WfF. Ensure space is integrated across staff sections and help units under stand the specific risks they are taking. The CEMA section is your space liaison officer (LNO) on the ground in the BCT; leverage this section to speak on be half of the space domain to the BDE leadership and staff. Pre-Rotation Unit Briefings. Conduct comprehensive pre-rotation briefings for incoming units, covering potential space threats, mitigation strategies, and available support resources. Focus on actions at the individual level and include mitigation techniques to help the unit win. Leverage 3Y Space Cadre within the formation to support train ing efforts and proficiency. Participate with training unit in realtime. Utilize the exercise data dissem inated by asset via integrated broad cast service (IBS) to follow the fight on FADE/MIST, GPS Operational Analysis Tool (GOAT), and the National Recon naissance Office (NRO) tool Bodhi. In coordination with the CTC SSEs, find opportunities to practice developing and disseminating space threats anal ysis and products to your organic units throughout the rotation. Fighting with your organic higher headquarters will always be more beneficial than report ing to a constructive high command (HICOM).

Looking Ahead: Preparing for the Future Conflict The threat to space based assets will only grow in the coming years. As we look towards the next fight, the Army must prioritize the development of re silient systems and adaptable training methodologies. A shift in mindset is Figure 4. U.S. Army SSG Russell L. Kojo representing TRADOC, operates the Defense Advanced GPS Receiver during the Urban Warfare Orienteering Course in the U.S. Army Best Warrior Competition on Fort Lee, Va., Oct. 20, 2010. (U.S. Army photo by SPC Venessa Hernandez)

Winter 2025 required – from assuming unfettered access to space to preparing for a con tested environment. All DIVs have a requirement to ensure their subordinates are ready to exe cute in a D3SOE. Space officers at NTC have worked diligently to implement both the Army Space Training Strategy and the Army Electromagnetic Warfare Strategy in our own training plan.4 We started with our own home station re sponsibilities, ensuring space and EW effects are taught at OC/T Academy for both permanent party and guest OC/ Ts. We have started to provide visual ization of EW effects on our combat training center - instrumentation sys tem (CTC-IS) battle tracking system, so the COG and all OC/Ts are made aware of the impacts of the contested envi ronment. This procedural change has ensured the rotational training unit (RTU) is provided world class coaching on how to properly react to live EMI. We have also strengthened partner ships with DIV and corps SSEs to en sure that staff are able to support their subordinate units at NTC and pass along lessons learned to further devel op their units for future operations. Training centers owe their training au dience an environment that is increas ingly complex and dynamic, forcing units to continually adjust their tactics, techniques, and procedures, ultimate ly improving their ability to operate ef fectively and survive in a space degrad ed environment. Continued efforts from our team have ensured that a D3SOE environment continues to be accurately replicated here at NTC. With support and emphasis from the NTC Commanding General, we have also in corporated an MDO range to help in troduce BCTs to a disrupted environment and allow them to see the effects on the equipment and PACE before beginning FoF. We have also worked closely with Blackhorse EW to ensure our planned effects during the rotation are at parity with the capabil ity of the RTU and increase in complex ity over the three phases of FoF and providing a crawl, walk, run training environment. Our team is looking ahead to procure sensors and emitters to further develop our ability to repli cate a degraded environment across the training area to provide a less stat ic jamming environment and allow our training audience a better opportunity to see themselves in the EMS. A pre dictable jamming environment fosters complacency; a dynamic one breeds resilience and innovation. The lessons learned from NTC rota tions are invaluable. They demonstrate that the Army is progressing in raising awareness of space vulnerabilities and improving encryption practices. The si lent battlefield may be a reality, but the Army can maintain its advantage and prevail with proactive preparation and a resilient commitment. There is clearly still work to be done, but our ability to operate effectively and deci sively even when the skies are silent will shape our future. Major Heidi Beemer is the Senior Space Operations Officer at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, CA, call sign Space Ghost. She was commis sioned through the Virginia Military In stitute ROTC program as a Chemical Defense Officer. MAJ Beemer deployed with the 1st Calvary Divisions Sustain ment Brigade to Bagram, AF in support of Operation Resolute Support. She commanded the 181st Hazard Re sponse Company of the 48th Chemical Brigade at Fort Hood, TX from 2017-

2019. She has two master’s degrees, the first from Embry Riddle Aeronauti cal University Worldwide in aeronau tics, concentration in space studies, and the second from the Naval Post graduate School in space systems op erations. She served as an assistant professor of physics at the United States Military Academy from 2021-

2023. MAJ Beemer accepted a func tional area transfer to Space Opera tions in 2023. She is enthusiastic about promoting tactical Space and helping brigade combat teams prepare to fight in a Space degraded environment in fu ture conflict. Notes 1 Manning, J. R., and J. P. Nielson. Tactical Staff Considerations for Winning in a D3SOE. Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, 2024. https:// www.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/704611. pdf. 2 Department of the Army. FM 3-0, Oper ations. March 2025. Army Publishing Di rectorate. 3 United States Army. Army Space Train ing Strategy. U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, 2024. 4 United States Army. Army Electromag netic Warfare Strategy. Department of the Army Office of the Deputy Chief of Sat G-3/5/7, 2025.