Bullets or Weapons: Rethinking Army’s Approach to SUAS Integration

Winter-Spring 2024 Bullets or Weapons: Rethinking Army’s Approach to SUAS Integration by LTC Mitchell Payne At Fort Moore’s 2023 Maneuver Warf ighter Conference, senior leaders from across the military gathered to discuss the future of maneuver warfighting. GEN Randy A. George, Chief of Staff of the Army, laid out four focus areas, which included the need for continu ous transformation. One example he mentioned was how the Army needs to fundamentally reexamine how we think about small, unmanned aircraft systems (SUAS).1 He asserted that we need to stop thinking about the SUAS as an item in itself, indicating a need to holistically reframe how we look at SUASs at echelon. Along that vein, at the lowest echelon (squad, section, platoon), mini-SUASs should be treat ed like mortar rounds, not mortar tubes. Current situation Currently, the lowest echelon of the Army that has a dedicated SUAS as signed to it is the company/troop lev el, which typically has an RQ-11 Raven SUAS. The current cost per Raven is up wards of $35,000 per individual drone system, with a per-system cost of more than $250,000.2 Other commercial off the shelf (COTS) systems currently in place in training come at a cost of more than $25,000 per unit.3 Due to those high costs and the current structures in place for air space management, those SUAS re sources are held and controlled at the company or battalion level, which in herently restricts the use of SUAS at the lowest echelons. Furthermore, the high dollar value associated with those items often precludes junior leaders from using the equipment out of fear of losing the SUAS. Concurrently, due to the high costs of each of those sys tems, the equipment accountability of those systems requires a higher degree of scrutiny. These costs also inherently limit the availability of those systems at the platoon and squad levels; cur rently, companies or troops are only authorized one Raven System. Organizations like the Maneuver Cen ter of Excellence are making strides to procure less expensive COTS SUAS sys tems, with a cost of $1,059 per sys tem.4 This is certainly a positive step in pushing SUAS to the lowest possible levels. Despite the lower cost per sys tem, however, if the organizational and cognitive frameworks at hand do not change as well, then the Army will still face the same integration and usage challenges. Army leaders at all levels must stop thinking of the SUAS as end-items in themselves. But what happens if we contrast the current approach with a different ap proach – a reframed perspective? What dismounted infantry squad thinks twice (or even once) about the cost per round when they engage en emy forces with the dismounted M240b machine gun? What reconnais sance troop commander thinks about the cost per round when directing their Bradleys to engage enemy reconnais sance elements with 25mm in a coun ter-reconnaissance fight? The U.S. Army fundamentally needs to reframe how we think and treat mini-SUAS at lower levels. Army leaders need to learn to see mini-SUAS as bullets in a weapon system, not as an equipment system itself. To a large degree, the U.S. Army is be hind our pacing threats and military partners in how we look at SUAS. Aus tralia has been sending disposable cardboard drones for use against Rus sian forces in Ukraine. In late August 2023, Ukrainian forces reportedly used those cardboard drones to attack an airfield in Kursk Oblast in western Rus sia. The attack damaged a Mig-29 and four Su-30 fighter jets, two Pantsir an ti-aircraft missile launchers, gun sys tems, and an S-300 air surface-to-air missile system.5 Recent conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaijan saw the use of armed and unarmed drones as a turning point in the war for better targeting and even the destruction of armored forces.6 Ukrainian citizens with no previous training are currently using commer cially purchased consumer-level mini-SUAS drones to conduct reconnais sance on Russian forces in Ukraine, of fering an “unprecedented advantage” to Ukrainian forces.7 Do we think that anyone in any of those military forces is wasting their time conducting a Fi nancial Liability Investigation of Prop erty Loss for each cardboard drone or commercial mini-quadcopter they lose? Reframing our perspective Among other things, there are four steps the U.S. Army can take to re frame our perspective on the account ability and use of drones. If we adopt a “disposable” framework for looking at drones, then the Army needs to re examine 1) how we supply mini-SUAS drones to the lowest echelons, 2) how we account for mini-SUAS drones, 3) how we incorporate mini-SUAS drones into our lowest echelon (e.g., squad, section and platoon) unit training, and

4) how we enable the use of mini-SUAS drones in our low echelon training. Supply If the Army looks at drones from a completely disposable framework, then the Army should reexamine the supply systems at work to get mini-SUAS drones into the hands of squad, section, and platoon leaders. Barring anything else (and operations security aside), remote-controlled quadcopter drones with 1080p camera interfaces are available on online for $49.99 with free two-day shipping.8 Alternatively, professional-level 3D printers are available for $4,000 - 10,000 dollars per unit,9 and multiple designs for 3D-printed drones already exist at a single Web search. With the appropriate design schematics, small-scale drones could be printed for $500- $1,000 in materials and delivered to companies and platoons on daily logis tical resupply. Mass-producing small-scale drones at the battalion and be low level could produce 250 disposable drones for the cost of one RQ-11 Raven

Winter-Spring 2024 system. The technology to 3D print drones currently exists – the U.S. Army just needs to rethink its current cogni tive and organizational frameworks to implement it. Accountability Tied to this are the equipment ac countability processes at the unit level. If we keep the machine-gun/ammuni tion analogy for SUAS, no leader thinks twice about the cost per round when firing 7.62mm rounds. Those leaders are responsible for broad accountabil ity of the ammunition associated with those systems but are not required to account for every single piece of brass or bullet expended in training. Army leaders should treat mini-SUAS drones the same way. The Army should main tain a broad degree of accountability for overall systems, but free up lower-level leaders from property investiga tions if we lose a “disposable” drone. Imagine a logistical patrol that resup plies 3D-printed mini-SUAS drones to a company or reconnaissance troop, where that troop first sergeant is not required to account for each drone by serial number but can instead sign for them one batch at a time. How might mini-SUAS usage rates improve if lead ers across all levels were no longer concerned about recovering a “dispos able” mini-SUAS drone? Incorporating drones in small unit training If we consider small-scale drones as truly disposable, then this will inher ently increase the capability to incor porate these drones into all aspects of training from the dismount infantry team or squad to the mounted recon naissance platoon. In all warfighting functions and across all branches, small-scale drones can and should be used. At the 2023 Maneuver confer ence, GEN James E. Rainey, command ing general of U.S. Army Futures Com mand, said, “We’re kidding ourselves if we think we’re going to avoid fight ing in cities.”10 Accepting this premise, why should we put our armored vehi cles in harm’s way when we could iden tify hazards in the immediate area with one or more small-scale disposable drones? Why should our dismount in fantry squads walk into the unknown when they could contact a squad-level disposable SAUS first? Alternatively, incorporating small-scale disposable SUAS should be an inherent aspect of reconnaissance operations. When dismount scouts establish a hide site, the first thing they should do is throw the recon squad quadcopter in the air to provide additional situation al awareness. If that disposable SUAS identifies a potential target, that can que higher echelon (brigade) un manned aircraft system assets with GPS capability to support indirect fire missions. Enabling drones in small unit training roles The current training requirements to fly the RQ-11 Raven or other COTS SUAS currently in use require multiple degrees of training and certification. This training starts with online training, introductory flights, and subsequent monitored and unmonitored flights, all of which take about two weeks per in dividual SUAS operator for mini drones. Once the operator is certified, howev er, using the SUAS still requires a high degree of coordination, including re questing airspace, establishing a re stricted operating zone (ROZ), and var ious training report roll-ups. Airspace requests on Army installations are also limited by civilian airspace manage ment, which requires Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) coordination for every single time a SUAS is flown.11 Contrast this with the reality that if one were to leave a military post, any grade-school-aged child can (and does) fly commercially procured drones with out filing a flight plan through the FAA. More to the point, it bears asking if the Ukrainian military requires Ukrainian civilian drone operators to file flight plans before they use their disposable commercial drones to identify, target and destroy Russian forces in urban centers. The main premise of this paper is that the U.S. Army should fundamentally rethink small-scale mini-SUAS drones as inherently disposable. If one accepts this premise, then the Army should also align training practices and struc tures to better reflect how it will fight. If we treat small-scale drones as disposable, then the Army should con sider placing a blanket ROZ over instal lations that would allow unlimited small-scale mini-drone operations at low-level altitudes below a reasonable threshold (e.g., 200 feet above ground level). Organizationally, if the Army continues to place multiple require ments for the training and operation of small-scale drones, then the Army will never bridge the cognitive gap be tween reframing doctrine and actual practice. Conclusion On the final day of the 2023 Maneuver Warfighter Conference, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command G-2 gave a brief that discussed the threats that the Russian and Chinese militaries pose. In that brief, he highlighted the importance and relevance of SUAS in the current Ukrainian war and the sub sequent observations that both the United States and the Chinese military have been making.12 Large-scale com bat operations in the future will be characterized by the proliferation of SUAS at all echelons. If the Army fails to reconsider how it thinks about SUAS – if we continue to treat all SUAS like a weapon system and not as an expend able round – then we run the risk of falling behind our peers. Current drone technology is making drones cheaper, faster, and more avail able to all members of the population. Unfortunately, the Army’s antiquated modes of thinking and training require ments for SUAS are causing us to lag behind our peers and competitors. If we do not change our cognitive and or ganizational frameworks, then Russia’s lessons learned in Ukraine will become the U.S. Army’s lessons to re-learn in future conflicts. LTC Mitchell Payne commands the 5th Squadron, 15th Cavalry Regiment at Fort Moore, GA. His previous assignments include serving as the Chief C2 observer/coach/trainer (O/C/T) for the Mission Command Training Program, Fort Leavenworth, KS; battalion/task force commander in the 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, GA; brigade executive officer, 188th Infantry Brigade, Fort Stewart; and squadron executive officer, 5th Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, 1st

Winter-Spring 2024 Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, Fort Wainwright, AK. LTC Payne’s military schools include Armor Officer Basic Course, Fort Knox, KY; Armor Captains’ Career Course, Fort Knox; and the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS. LTC Payne has Ph.D. in organizational leadership and human resource development from Regent University, a master of military arts and science degree from the Command and General Staff College, and he holds a bachelor’s of arts degree in philosophy from Wheaton College. LTC Payne’s awards include the Bronze Star Medal, Meritorious Service Medal (with Silver Oak Leaf) and the Combat Action Badge. Notes 1 GEN Randy A. George, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. “We need to think about SUAS like a keyboard or a mouse…” 2023 Maneuver Warfighter Conference, Open ing Remarks, Sept. 12, 2023. 2 General costs are public domain infor mation and available as follows; “RQ-11 Raven Unmanned Aerial Vehicle,” Army Technology.com, RQ-11 Raven Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, United States of America (army-technology.com). Specific informa tion can be found using the Force Man agement System Website (FMS Web). Accessed Sept. 12, 2023. 3 Valerie Graves, Equipment Purchase Quote – RQ 28 Skydio X2 SUAS, ADS sys tems. July 25, 2023. 4 Roger Davis, Equipment Purchase Agree ment – DJI Mini 3 Pro SUAS, Adorama Systems. Aug. 24, 2023. 5 Paul Cureton, “How Australian card board drones became a critical innovation in the Ukraine war.” ABC News, Sept. 2,

2023. How Australian cardboard drones became a critical innovation in the Ukraine war - ABC News. 6 Benjamin Brimelow, “A brief, bloody war in a corner of Asia is a warning about why the tank’s days of dominance may be over,” Business Insider, Nov. 24, 2020. Drones Use in Armenia-Azerbaijan War Raises Doubt About Tanks’ Future (busi nessinsider.com). 7 Matt Burgess, 2022; “Small drones are giving Ukraine an unprecedented edge.” ARS Technica, May 8, 2022. Small drones are giving Ukraine an unprecedented edge | Ars Technica. 8 Amazon.com; Accessed Aug. 13, 2023. Amazon.com: DEERC D40 Drone with Camera for Kids, D40 FPV HD 1080P Mini Aircraft for Adults Beginner, Foldable Quad Hobby RC Plane, Toys Gifts, 2 Bat teries 20 Mins Flight Time, Easy to Fly,1 Piece, Black : Toys & Games. 9 3D Sourced. 2023. “How Much Does a 3D Printer Cost? (Price & Maintenance).” 3D Sourced, Aug. 8, 2023. How Much Does a 3D Printer Cost? (Price & Mainte nance) - 3DSourced. 0 GEN James E. Rainey, Army Futures Command Commanding General remarks; Maneuver Warfighter Conference, Fort Moore, GA; Sept. 13, 2023. 11 Federal Aviation Administration, 2023, “Certificated Remote Pilots including Commercial Operators,” https://www.faa. gov/uas/commercial operators; Accessed Sept. 14, 2023. 12 Ian Sullivan; “Russia/China Deep Dive Brief;” 2023 Maneuver Warfighter Confer ence, Fort Moore, GA; Sept. 14, 2023. Figure 1. Dr. Dan Kingsley (left), senior managing engineer at Exponent, tests a drone’s tether cable during Allied Spirit 24 at the Hohenfels Training Area, Joint Multinational Readiness Center, Germany, March 6, 2024. Allied Spirit 24 is a U.S. Army exercise for its NATO Allies and partners at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center. The exercise develops and enhances NATO and key partners interoperability and readiness across specified warfighting functions. (U.S. Army photo by Spc. Micah Wilson) Acronym Quick-Scan COTS – commercial off-the-shelf FAA – Federal Aviation Administration ROZ – restricted operating zone SUAS – small unmanned aircraft systems