Premortem Gets Desired Wargame Outputs with Economy of Effort

There is possibly nothing more terrify ing for a young field grade officer than being informed, while you are leading your new staff members through the military decision-making process (MDMP) during the leader training pro gram (LTP), that the U. S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) commander is on ground and coming by to observe your wargame. There is also likely nothing more horrifying than having that FORSCOM commander tell the en tire room full of senior leaders as well as your staff that he is “disappointed.” Fortunately for the author, and the reason I am still in the Army writing this today, is that what retired GEN Michael X. Garrett was referring to when he expressed his “disappointment” was that we were executing the wargame in the same fashion he did when he was a junior staff officer. This comment was informative and raised the question, why is it there has been so little development in the execution of the staff wargame? Further reflection on battalion-level war gaming through multiple LTPs and combat training center (CTC) rotations (as an observer/ coach/trainer, and member of a rotational training unit) suggests the status quo is indeed insufficient. But while my understanding from the rest of GEN Garrett’s com ments is he would have liked to see more technology incorporated to the existing process to make it more 21st Century, I would like to suggest a sim pler alternative to the current battal ion-level MDMP wargaming methodology. When doctrine changes A rule of thumb about doctrinal development is there are two conditions un der which doctrine should change: when something is NOT in doctrine, but it works, or when something IS in doctrine, and it stops working. I sug gest today’s Army has arrived at the second condition state when it comes Figure 1. GEN Michael X. Garrett, commanding general of U. S. Army Forces Command from 2019 – 2022 (seated center of photo), observes an LTP wargame in 2019. (U. S. Army photo by the Fort Drum Public Affairs Office) to war-gaming operations at the brigade/battalion and below level. Controversial hot-take time: In 17 years, I do not believe I have executed a “to standard” battalion-level MDMP war game. We are, of course, taught the doctrine at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC). Everyone can recall terms like “box method,” “belt method,” “avenue in depth,” and “action/reaction/counterreaction,” but I would challenge the reader to serious ly consider if, given the time con straints of an LTP or CTC rotation, you’ve ever truly done, or seen it done, as explained in the CGSC classroom. I recall the block of instruction where we watched an out-of-date video of what looked like staff officers dissect ing every aspect of a very complex plan in excruciating detail. While it was ex cellent and informative, and likely completely appropriate for an Operation OVERLORD or Operation DESERT STORM type operation, I just couldn’t envision it happening in a swamp at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). Nor was the demonstration executed in a seemingly time constrained environment. No one in the video even looked tired. It was not like any JRTC, National Training Center (NTC), Joint Multinational Readiness Center, or Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center planning session I have ever seen. But if the schoolhouse answer might not work at the speed of the cur rent fight, what other options are there to execute something approach ing a wargame? Enter premortem Enter the world of academia and the concept of the premortem or (to mod ify the term to sound more Army like) the before action review (BAR). In his 2007 Harvard Business Review article, “Performing a Project Premortem,”1 the psychologist Gary Klein outlined the premortem as an incredibly simple mental model for changing the way a project team can identify and assess potential failures in a project. Simply put, the model discards the framing question of “what could go wrong?” with a project or plan and instead asks the participant to time warp into a fu ture where failure has already been realized and ask, “what did go wrong?” I suggest this simple re-framing could be the perfect solution to the abbreviated battalion-level tactical wargame.

Winter- Imagine if instead of a potentially cum bersome and confusing action/reaction/counterreaction dynamic where the operations officer fights the plan against your own battalion S-2, you simply completed the plan then prof fered the following thought exercise: “Now that the plan is complete, mentally transport yourself into the future. We have lost the battle or failed to accomplish our objectives. In two minutes, think through the details of what hypothetically happened and identify why we have lost.” Then, solicit exact and specific failures from the entire team present. This would allow a ho listic look at the entire operation from each warfighting function member of the staff which has the potential to tease out individual shortcomings which could be missed (i.e., missed the forest through all the trees) during the more doctrinally prescribed wargame methodology. Good mental tool This is also a mental tool to have the staff conduct as a form of war-gaming when conducting the Rapid Decision Making and Synchronization Process, or when they are gathering the tools to conduct war-gaming during deliberate planning. One of the tools is every participant’s premortem/BAR list. The identified planning lead is then able to execute the premortem/BAR adjudica tion as part of step zero of the wargame to establish the start set. Essentially, this forces every member of the planning team to execute an indi vidual wargame to submit their pre mortem. Then, the team can execute the wargame as a group to minimize risk and friction thereby ensuring as efficient of an operation as possible. To some readers, this may seem like the Red Team conceptual tools employed to eliminate bias and decision-making pitfalls. This could be the foundation for implementing a “10th Man” rule during planning. Junior field grade of ficers and senior staff NCOs are consistently asked “how do we ensure we are producing a good product?” The pre mortem/BAR is one way to at least show how we are NOT producing a bad one. Best of all, this process is already be ing used unofficially in places. Another anecdote from this article’s co-author (who did not realize they were per forming a premortem/BAR at the time), occurred during a rotation at NTC which illustrates the positive impact of the premortem/BAR on mission accomplishment. Tasked to seize the fictional training city of Razish, the combined arms battalion was to anchor the left flank of the brigade as it wagon wheeled into, and then cleared, the central corridor from east to west. The battalion commander decided to infiltrate two companies of dismount ed infantry through the John Wayne Foothills, with their Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFV) following in support through John Wayne Pass. The one tank company would conduct a sup port by fire from Hill 876 and Hill 780. Following the battalion operations or der brief, the battalion commander asked where we would fail. I respond ed that the enemy would conduct a chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) attack into John Wayne Pass and the surrounding foothills to block the attack. This resulted in all BFVs being task organized to the tank company and all dismounts conducting the attack in mission oriented protec tive posture 2. Upon first contact the enemy chemically gassed John Wayne Pass. Fortunately, the dismounts were prepared and took no casualties from the CBRN attack. Ultimately the battal ion seized its objective as we were able to mass our combat power without suffering CBRN attrition. In this one in stance, the saving grace came not from the deliberate war-gaming taking many hours, but from one simple question to one company commander. To compound the problem, reflect on the following question: How often has a brigade or battalion combined arms rehearsal (CAR) devolved into a second wargame because the outputs of the first wargame proved insufficient? In the premortem/BAR, the identified failure points could then dictate the scope of the CAR so key leaders spend time reviewing identified critical fail ure points to resolve instead of rede veloping the plan, which often happens. Take away This abbreviated technique of the pre mortem or BAR is not meant to replace the detailed and rigorous war-gaming necessary for larger and more complex operations like an Overlord or a Desert Storm. Given that current war-gaming methodology is not satisfactory for the lower echelon tactical level or in a time constrained environment, the premor tem or BAR is away to get at the desired conceptual outputs of a wargame in an economy of effort manner. LTC Scott Dawe is the Security Force Assistance Brigade Doctrine Branch Chief, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, Maneuver Center of Excellence, Fort Moore, GA. His previous assignments include U. S. Army Military Professional Exchange Program (MPEP) Officer, Kingston Ontario, Canada; executive officer, 3rd Squadron, 71st Cavalry Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, NY; and training officer, 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum. LTC Dawe’s military schools include Airborne School, Air Assault School, and Pathfinder School. LTC Dawe has a bachelor’s of science degree in history from U. S. Military Academy, West Point, NY. He also has a master’s of business administration degree in supply chain management from the Whitman School of Management at Syracuse University and a certificate of advanced study in national security affairs from the Maxwell School of Citizenship at Syracuse University. MAJ Anthony Mollica is the Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) Doctrine Branch Chief, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, Maneuver Center of Excellence, Fort Moore, GA. His previous assignments include battalion operations officer observer/coach/ trainer; mechanized infantry O/C/T team chief; company commander; and Security Force Advise and Assist Team reconnaissance officer in charge. His military schools include Command and General Staff Officers Course, the Maneuver Captain’s Career Course, and the Infantry Basic Officer Leadership Course. MAJ Molica holds a bachelor’s of science degree in computer security and information assurance from Norwich University and a master’s degree in operational studies from the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College.

Winter- Notes 1 Gary Klein, “Performing a project pre mortem,” Harvard Business Review; 2007. Acronym Quick-Scan BAR – before action review BFV – Bradley Fighting Vehicle CAR – combined arms rehearsal CBRN – chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear CGSC – Command and General Staff College CTC – combat training center FORSCOM – U. S. Army Forces Command JRTC – Joint Readiness Training Center LTP – leader training program MDMP – military decision-making process NTC – National Training Center