Establishing the Foundation of Success – The Gunnery Training Program

Winter-Spring 2024 Establishing the Foundation of Success The Gunnery Training Program by LTC Chuck Bies and CSM Gary John Kurtzhals In his contribution to the 1992 Military Review issue focused on the impact of leadership, Lewis Sorley wrote his ar ticle on GEN Creighton Abrams. He highlighted the positive changes Abrams made in the 3rd Armored Divi sion as the assistant division com mander, specifically: “The primary training activities in an armored divi sion are field maneuvers and tank gun nery.”1 The same can be said today of our ar mored brigade combat teams (ABCTs), and more specifically the combined arms battalions (CAB) within them. The central purpose of a CAB is to meet the enemy on any ground and destroy it. If the CAB cannot effectively and effi ciently destroy the enemy in contact, then little else the CAB does matters. The building blocks of this lethality for the CAB are tank and Bradley crews and infantry squads. While field ma neuvers, maintenance, and other read iness drivers always remain relevant, for the purposes of this article, we fo cus our discussion solely on Abrams tank and Bradley Fighting Vehicle le thality. Since the central purpose of a CAB is to maneuver and destroy the enemy with direct fires, it therefore stands to reason that all the CAB’s efforts must be directed towards supporting the gunnery training program. A gunnery training program and successful gun nery are not events that occur in isola tion; rather they are the output that highlights the efficacy of a unit’s sup porting activities. If a command cannot maintain its warfighting and support ing equipment at a high state of readi ness, the result will be evident in gun nery performance. If a command can not synchronize staff and leader efforts to plan and resource training, the re sult will be evident in gunnery perfor mance. The highest operational readi ness rate and effective maneuver means little if crews cannot hit what they are shooting at. Gunnery is the dipstick that we can use to effectively measure the readiness of a CAB. By executing a focused gunnery train ing program detailed in this article, the 1st Battalion, 68th Armor Regiment “Sil ver Lions” out of the 3rd ABCT, 4th Infan try Division, experienced dramatic suc cess between 2021 and 2023. This ar ticle highlights the best practices used by the Silver Lions as a recommended way forward for the armor force as we seek to increase our lethality and pro ficiency in preparation for future largescale combat operations. Background The fall 2021 gunnery density had not gone well for the Silver Lions. The first tank company to go through the gun line was plagued with problem after problem. On the maintenance side, the company dead lined five tanks by the time it completed Gunnery Table (GT) III, had dropped to just one full mission capable (FMC) tank for the last day of GT VI, and by the end of the gunline the company had no FMC tanks re maining. The second tank company fared only slightly better Both compa nies discovered widespread deficien cies and failures in their tank fire con trol systems. By the time both compa nies were through, 12 of the 27 firing crews were “Q2 (status),” or unable to achieve seven of 10 qualified engage ments with a total score more than 700/1000. The infantry company expe rienced more success, but the volume of issues on the bushmaster guns kept the few master gunners and armament repairers up for days on end. Though the battalion was able to claim the top Bradley crew in the brigade, six of the 20 firing crews were also Q2. This poor performance required intro spection and a thorough postmortem to identify why the battalion had per formed so badly. There were several causes that were long festering left of execution that caused the battalion to fail, but in short, the battalion did not have a culture of lethality or a coher ent gunnery training program to unite its activities. Therefore, creating an ef fective gunnery training program be came the battalion’s number one pri ority as we prepared to deploy to Eu rope in support of Operation European Assure, Deter, and Reinforce. We iden tified several supporting lines of effort to “turn the ship around.” Those lines of effort were platform preparation, skill training, simulator usage, and Master Gunner development. Essential to this was defining success and under standing what metrics and activities are critical to success. Through deliberate execution of the identified lines of effort, the Silver Li ons experienced a dramatic turn around of its Gunnery Training Pro gram and success in gunnery as seen below. The number of tank crew Q2s dropped from 12 in October 2021 to Figure 1. 1-68 Armor Gunnery Performance from 2021 through 2023. (U.S. Army graphic by LTC Chuck Bies and CSM Gary John Kurtzhals)

Winter-Spring 2024 four in June 2022 and two in July 2023. Similarly, the number of Bradley crew Q2s dropped from six in October 2021 to three in June 2022 and July 2023. In total, the number of qualified (Quali fied, Superior, and Distinguished) in creased by 87 percent for tank crews and 29 percent for Bradley Crews. Platform Preparation You can’t mass against the enemy when you are slant zero. In short, it is more important to be 10/10 qualified with a score of 901 than it is to be 9/10 with a score of 969. Similarly, it is more meaningful for a combat formation to have 0/29 Q2 crews and 1/29 distin guished crew than it is for a formation to have 12 distinguished crews and 1/29 Q2 crews. The single most important indicator of a crew’s capacity to achieve high scores, which translates to the ability to kill on the battlefield, is the ability to achieve first round “target” sensing. Conduct of fire trainers (COFTs) like the Advanced Gunnery Training System (AGTS) and Bradley Advanced Training System (BATS)/Conduct of Fire Trainer – Situational Awareness (COFT-SA) both measure crew performance mea sures, specifically time to target iden tification, time to fire, and system management. However, the key metric that commanders need to pay atten tion to is the percentage of first round targets. With this metric in mind, ar mament accuracy checks (AACs) on the tank and prep to fire checks (PtFCs) on the Bradley take on supreme impor tance. In many CABs, AACs and PtFCs are typ ically only executed immediately prior to a gunnery density. Unfortunately, doing so fails to exercise the fire con trol system and line replaceable units/ line replaceable modules routinely, in creasing the probability of faults going undetected. Additionally, there is less time available for unit maintenance to remedy failed AACs and PtFCs, putting platform readiness at risk for training. In 1-68 Armor we found this to be de ficient and implemented a standard of AACs and PtFCs to be executed and re ported monthly. This requirement was tracked and monitored by bumper number and reported at battalion training meetings. After initially imple menting this practice, we identified several platforms that were deficient. We also identified a training and edu cation gap throughout the formation from private through sergeant first class. The practice of executing AACs and PtFCs every month increased crewmember proficiency and under standing of their platforms. In terms of guaranteeing accuracy, AACs and PtFCs are essential and re quire routine execution. The tank AACs consist of six checks that ensure the fire control system is fully operational and verifies special inputs to the bal listic solutions are implemented prop erly for all fire control components and main gun ammunition. A tank that fails any one of the six AACs may fire errat ically, may require a discrete computer correction factor, and it loses the prob ability of sustained accurate fire re gardless of a correct boresight. The Bradley PtFCs are less intensive but important nonetheless in terms of ensuring that the sights and the gun remain aligned, reducing sight back lash, and ensuring key components of the fire control system, such as the equilibrator, are functioning properly. What we found was that most Bradley crews were following the instructions in the Bradley Commander’s Display but were unaware of the additional tasks found in Appendix B of Field Manual (FM) 3-20.21, Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT) Gunnery. Ensuring that crews are executing AACs and PtFCs regularly and to standard re quires command emphasis. This is not a master gunner problem, it is a com mand problem, and it requires engage ment from commanders at echelon to correct. Skill training “Everyone doing his best is not the an swer. It is first necessary that people know what to do,” said W. Edwards Deming.2 In terms of preparing crews better for live fire training and combat, 1-68 Ar mor took a two-prong approach cen tered largely around how feedback is provided during training coupled with basic crewmember skills. In practice, this forced the team to re-evaluate our execution of Vehicle Crew Evaluator (VCE) certification, and Gunnery Skills Testing (GST). The first issue we attacked was -VCE training and certification. Previously, VCEs were trained and certified only prior to gunnery densities using the VCE Exportable Package (VCEEP) from the Maneuver Center of Excellence. While the VCEEP remains an effective teaching tool and we were meeting the standard of annual recertification, we found that the frequency of instruction was too low to maintain proficiency for certified VCEs to provide quality feed back and ensure consistent scoring. Further, the challenges with schedul ing ranges in Poland often resulted in training being scheduled and conduct ed on relatively short notice (two weeks out as opposed to six or more weeks out). To provide flexibility to re spond to training opportunities and sustain VCE proficiency, 1-68 Armor adopted a quarterly VCE recertification model. The battalion’s VCE certification and recertification process was maintained at the battalion level in which the bat talion master gunners executed the program. All gunners and vehicle com manders were required to be VCE cer tified on their respective craft; tanks, IFVs, and mounted machine guns. The program of instruction was held and maintained at the battalion level, exe cuted by the battalion master gunner team. The program of instruction matched the VCEEP and candidates were held to the VCEEP passing stan dards; there was no check the block. In addition to the practical exercises pro vided with the VCEEP, additional scor ing practical exercises using actual range footage from previous battalion gunneries were included to increase the rigor of the course. To improve the value of the feedback provided by our VCEs, the battalion master gunner team also built a unique after-action review (AAR) slide deck for use in every AAR for gunnery tables III through VI. The deck was built to out line overall tasks, conditions, and stan dards for each engagement and clearly state the targetry, ranges and modifi ers for each engagement of the table. Each engagement’s video was embed ded to allow viewing on projector or

Winter-Spring 2024 television before showing a digital ver sion of the engagement score sheet. Hyperlinked throughout the slide deck were links to a directory of reference slides that provided details on various elements of gunnery. They included scanning techniques, methods of tar get engagement, processes and penal ties, and master gunner tips for each crew position. Having this library equipped the VCEs and the crews with immediate access to references to fa cilitate discussion and provide solu tions to solving problems in the vehi cle. By executing a challenging program of instruction every quarter and building our own AAR slide deck, we found that our VCEs were more confident and competent in the feedback they pro vided on gunnery tables III through V. We also noticed better performance within crews as they progressed from table to table, and that performance was reflected on our Table VI scores and distribution. In terms of preparing the crews them selves for training, GST (Gunnery Table

I) is non-negotiable. All personnel on the crew, regardless of rank and expe rience, must execute GST to standard and execute all tasks within GST to standard with no tasks omitted due to time or convenience. To ensure this happened in 1-68 Armor, we made GST a battalion-level training and certifica tion event. The S-3, supported by the master gunners, planned, and re sourced GST as a full training event. Lane evaluators were selected, trained, evaluated, and certified weeks prior to the main GST event. The battalion commander, command sergeant major, and S-3 personally validated each in structor and the setup of the testing to ensure all stations and evaluators were prepared and certified for testing. In terms of the execution of GST, three days were allocated for training and two days were allocated for testing. To ensure throughput, we scoped the number of vehicles to be higher for tasks that tend to take longer, allocat ing three platforms for dropping breach on the M1 and M242 disassem bly/reassembly on the Bradley. All ma chinegun tasks were executed on the vehicle platforms, not on folding ta bles. Finally, two tanks and two Brad leys were set aside as retraining sta tions as crewmembers cycled through testing. The result of this deliberate effort was evident on the gunline. On the Bradley ranges crews were expected and able to remedy gun malfunctions on their own without having to pull master gunners from the tower to assist. On the tank ranges we saw the near elim ination of range downtime due to pro longed machinegun malfunctions and misfires. Simulator usage “There is an epidemic failure within the game to understand what is really hap pening … People who run ballclubs think in terms of buying players. Your goal should not be to buy players, your goal should be to buy wins. And to buy wins, you need to buy runs … what I see is an imperfect understanding of where runs come from … Baseball thinking is medieval, and they are asking all the wrong questions…,” said Peter Brand, “Moneyball” (2011).3 While in Europe, the battalion took a hard look at the use of BATS/COFT-SA and AGTS and how we provided feed back to crews. The BATS/COFT-SA and AGTS are a finite resource and are even more finite and constrained in de ployed environments such as Europe. Currently, the 7th Army Training Com mand does not have enough simula tors to provide the same level of cov erage as home station for multiple ABCTs in theater. In practice, this means that some units may have to “commute” to send Soldiers to execute Gunnery Table II, and others must share a single simulator with other or ganizations. Simulation time becomes a precious commodity. Effective use of the AGTS and BATS/ COFT-SA will result in better perfor mance in combat and on the range. The Army standard for simulation uti lization is four hours per crew per month. While this metric is a good start point, it neglects the relative val ue of each hour spent in the simulator. Conventional wisdom suggests that more time spent in the simulator yields better performance, however time is a limited an irreplaceable resource. This is particularly true in Europe as previ ously discussed, so generating more time in the simulator outside of mini mum requirements may not be a fea sible course of action. Therefore, the question we sought to answer was “How do we increase the value of the time spent in the simulator by crews?” Our hypothesis was that while time spent in the simulator grows expertise, professional and in-depth feedback will amplify the value of that time. In essence, provide better feedback so Figure 3. Raw Data Set of Gunnery Performance. (U.S. Army graphic by LTC Chuck Bies and CSM Gary John Kurtzhals)

Winter-Spring 2024 that four hours in the simulator has the effect of six or more hours in the sim ulator. Looking at how 1-68 Armor was executing AGTS and BATS/COFT-SA in August 2021, we found the current standard of training to be deficient. While our crews were spending the re quired four hours in the simulator ev ery month, the quality of feedback var ied greatly. Some crews had seasoned platoon sergeants and master gunners working as instructor operators, while others had young Soldiers (drivers, loaders, etc.) with limited platform ex perience running the simulator. These younger Soldiers were generally inca pable of providing detailed feedback and did little more than run scenarios and move the vehicle in and out of bat tle positions; we immediately elevated the requirement for instructor opera tors to experienced vehicle command ers only, while we delved into the chal lenge of certifying instructor operators through the MCoE. Unfortunately, the Simulation Instruc tor Operator (SI/O) Course for the Abrams platform is no longer a pro gram of record at Fort Moore, GA. The Army National Guard (ARNG) main tains an Instructor Operator Course at Fort Moore but that course is limited to the Bradley platform only. With the sunset of the Abrams course, propo nency for instruction and certification was moved to the divisions, however not every division has a program in place at this time. To remedy this shortcoming the battal ion master gunners developed an SI/O Course to train and certify AGTS and BATS/COFT-SA instructor operators at the battalion level. We modeled the course after the ARNG Instructor Op erator Course at Fort Moore, with the program of instruction extended to cover AGTS as well. The battalion SI/O course provides detail on the structure of the AGTS and BATS/COFT-SA matrix progression system, baselined stan dards for AARs following exercises in the simulators, and provided instruc tion on how to better coach vehicle crews and gunners to improve perfor mance. Next, we sought to understand what skills to focus on while in the AGTS and BATS/COFT-SA. On the battlefield, first round targets underwrite a CAB’s suc cess. At the crew level, a first round target coupled with low target identi fication and time to fire ensure that the enemy platform is destroyed be fore the U.S. crew can be identified. A first round target reduces the time of the Detect, Identify, Decide, Engage, and Assess (DIDEA) cycle, and the abil ity to execute multiple DIDEA cycles faster than the enemy allows U.S. crews to fight outnumbered and win. Failure to hit a target on the first round increases the time of the DIDEA cycle and exposes the U.S. crew to enemy fires. At the collective level, more first round targets decrease the number of enemy guns pointed at you, increasing your formation’s survivability. To better understand the correlation between engagement times and per formance, we turned to statistical analysis of main gun performance data in AGTS for tank main gun. We as sessed the performance of 15 tank crews in AGTS GTVI by taking a mix of six crews who scored below 800 on GTVI (Live) and nine who scored above 900 on GTVI (Live), and specifically looked at average times to identify a target and average times to fire in

AGTS.

We identified that the crews that shot over 900 had an average time between identification and firing of .98 seconds with an average main gun engagement score of 93. Crews that shot below 800 had an average time of 3.33 seconds and an average engagement score of

81. The difference in time to kill from identification for both categories re spectively was 6.97 seconds and 10 seconds. Statistically, there was a strong correlation coefficient of -0.84 between the crew’s average time to fire and the AGTS Gate score within AGTS. In short, the better gunners are the ones who can quickly achieve a proper center mass reticle lay and quickly establish a good track before quickly squeezing the trigger. When it comes to gunnery, success is rooted in the number of qualified ver sus unqualified crews. Scores do mat ter, as do distinguished and superior ratings, however the benchmark of success is first time qualification. This is tied to how the standard for qualifi cation of seven of 10 qualified engage ments and 700/1000 points is devel oped. The goal should be to have no crews Q2 as opposed to having several Figure 4. Correlation Matrix of Data Set. Values approaching denote no statistical correlation; values approaching -1 or 1 denote perfect correlation; values approaching -0.5 or 0.5 denote moderate correlation. (U.S. Army graphic by LTC Chuck Bies and CSM Gary John Kurtzhals)

Winter-Spring 2024 Q2s alongside crews with higher scores. The 7/10 engagement and 700/1000 is derived from combat analysis. Gunnery assumes the U.S. force is fighting against an enemy force at 70 percent manning, 70 percent readiness and 70 percent morale. An unqualified en gagement, or an engagement with a score less than 70 points, means that the U.S. tank was destroyed by the en emy during that engagement. A Q2 crew isn’t just a crew that had to fire additional engagements to get over the 700-point threshold, in real terms it is a dead crew. A Q1 crew is a crew that most likely survived. A 10/10 crew is a crew that survived to fight again another day: a land ace. In summary when looking at a distin guished rating, it is more important to be 10/10 qualified with a score of 901 than it is to be 9/10 with a score of

969. Similarly, it is more meaningful for a combat formation to have 0/29 Q2 crews and 1/29 distinguished crew than it is for a formation to have 12 distinguished crews and 1/29 Q2 crews. The first formation will likely have no dead crews, whereas the sec ond will have one. Therefore, a gunnery training program must attack development as a progres sion. Step one is to train to eliminate all the incidences of Q2. Once that foundation has been achieved, step two is to train to get all crews to 10/10 qualified engagements. It is only once you have reached 10/10 that the end score is worth talking about. We identified another correlation that drove training focus after looking at training and gunnery scores. When main gun performance is assessed against GTVI scores, there is only a moderate correlation of 0.61. The abil ity to hit with main gun isn’t a great predictor of success on the range; the complication that causes this, and is also difficult to measure, is proficiency with the coaxial machinegun. The dif ference between a distinguished crew and a merely qualified crew is the gun ner’s ability to hit targets with the ma chinegun, which introduces consider ably more variables for consideration. Does the crew have the gas port on the correct setting? Is there any play with the mounting with the machinegun? How old are the barrels? Is the coaxial port perfectly straight? Is the ammuni tion belt cleaned, lubricated, and fed properly? Whether or not machinegun engagements count for too much in scores on a platform with the mission to destroy enemy armored vehicles is a separate and philosophical discus sion. Rather there are two important takeaways about machineguns. First, machinegun engagements are more dependent on crew maintenance and equipment preparation than main gun engagements; this is something that cannot be assessed in AGTS. Second, given an FMC coaxial machinegun, the gunner’s fine motor control of the power control handles is essential in engaging small troop targets; some thing that can be developed and as sessed in AGTS. Therefore, while training in the AGTS, SI/Os must focus their coaching on im proving the gunner and tank com mander’s ability to perform fine ma nipulation of the controls to achieve center mass lay and track. That’s fine for the AGTS, but with limited simula tor time, how can crewmembers devel op those motor kills outside of the sim ulator? Moreover, live performance in troduces multiple variables such as machinegun maintenance and vehicle maintenance status that frustrate sta tistical analysis. The path to improve ment depends on practice and muscle control on the actual platform, and the best way to practice that muscle con trol is through use of worm/snake boards. 1-68 Armor also identified that the “worm boards” or “snake boards,” that used to be commonplace are largely absent from gunnery ranges and mo tor pools (see figure below). These boards should be procured and used more than crews have become accus tomed to in recent years. In terms of Abrams statistics, there is a moderate correlation between first round target performance in AGTS and live Table VI performance.4 Many installations’ Training Support Centers only carry very rudimentary tracking boards, if at all. However, we found that the Train ing Support Center at Fort Knox, KY, is Figure 5: Photos of worm boards located at Range 132, Grafenwohr Training Area. (U.S. Army graphic by LTC Chuck Bies and CSM Gary John Kurtzhals)

Winter-Spring 2024 still capable of producing field deploy able canvas worm boards. Units may purchase them by request. Until these boards become permanent fixtures in motor pools and at gunnery ranges, we recommend units procure sets of worm boards for each company to use at home station, in the field or while deployed. Master gunner development Master gunners are the keepers of le thality in the ABCT community … peri od! The true success of a gunnery training program hinges on buy-in and the hard work of our NCO Corps, and those NCOs depend on the leadership and knowledge of our master gunners to guide their efforts. Moreover, offi cers require their expert counsel in planning and executing training and managing crews. In the fall of 2021, 1-68 Armor was not in a good place with its master gunner population. The guidance from IIIC was for units to reach a 100 percent fill rate of master gunners; for tank (K8) that meant three master gunners and for Bradley (J3) six master gunners for a total of nine in the battalion. The Silver Lions had two K8s, one being a first sergeant and the other being the new command sergeant major, and one J3, who was serving as the battalion mas ter gunner, with one NCO in school for J3. In short, we had less than half of what we needed. We had a problem. Exacerbating the problem was that many NCOs within the formation were reluctant to attend Master Gunner School. What they saw were good NCOs being sent up to battalion to be the battalion “Mike Golf,” where they were relegated to the menial tasks of requesting land and ammo. At gun nery, they saw one NCO who spent days without sleep, bouncing between running the radio in the tower and fix ing deficiencies (particularly with the Bushmaster) out on the line. Soldiers saw the Mike Golf as a competent but overworked NCO who hated his/her thankless job. Who in their right mind would want to leave their platoon and go to a notoriously difficult school for such a “reward?” The culture had to change, and fast. We had to generate a lot of master gunners quickly. In the Airborne com munity, the analog to the master gun ner is the jumpmaster, and I witnessed several similarities. When a unit didn’t have a robust jumpmaster population, the few that it did have become over tasked; paratroopers saw that and be came reluctant to attend that challeng ing school. When units had an excess of jumpmasters, duties were easily shared and none of them had to put in too much extra work. Finally, there was the mindset that if you had to be a jumpmaster to be a leader, otherwise you were “just another jumper.” Our task was to create the culture where to be a mechanized leader, you had to be a master gunner, otherwise you were just another crewmember. We did so through three efforts.

• We incentivized the position. Any NCO who passed “gun school” but was not a vehicle commander would be immediately moved into a vehicle commander position. For platoon sergeant billets, master gunners to include promotable staff sergeants would jump the queue and be slotted in platoon sergeant billets ahead of other sergeants first class. All master gunners would receive unfettered a c c e s s a n d n o - k n o c k / n o - appointment/walk-in privileges to both the command sergeant major and battalion commander at any time and for any reason. Within the battalion headquarters we established a lounge area, off limits to all personnel except for master gunner and Ranger qualified personnel.

• We removed some of the onerous tasks associated with being a master gunner. The battalion master gunners would no longer be the land and ammo NCO. Land requests and Range Facility Management Support System would be managed by an assistant S-3 officer, with the master gunners retaining access. Master gunners would assist with identifying ammunition requirements, but the burdensome task of ammunition requests and documentation would be handled by an assistant S-3 officer. Instead of performing menial administrative tasks, the master gunners were broadly empowered to prepare NCOs for Gun School and to plan and build maneuver live fire training scenarios given training objectives issued by the battalion commander.

• We established policy and targets. Every quarter, each company was required to have at least one NCO in Master Gunner School. Companies were required to look at their population, project their four candidates for the year, and allow the battalion master gunners to start their preparation. The scout platoon and each tank and infantry platoon were to have at least one master gunner. Each company was to have a company master gunner serving in the headquarters, and there would be both a tank and Bradley master gunner at battalion. Our efforts bore fruit, not just for the battalion but for the armor community and the Army. Between fall 2021 and the summer of 2023 the Silver Lions created 11 master gunner graduates. Exceeding the standard of nine, the Sil ver Lions had 7/3 K8 and 7/5 J3 master gunners. On the range, the effects of a healthy master gunner population were readily apparent beyond the im provement in gunnery scores. The bat talion master gunners were able to as sume a supervisory and mentorship role for crews and VCEs rather than be wedded to the radio. Instead of com mon delays during Bradley gunnery where crews wait for a master gunner to diagnose gun faults, we were able to post a master gunner at the ready line to quickly assess gun malfunctions. On tank ranges, we had sufficient mas ter gunners to run the tower as well as run Live-Fire Accuracy Screening Test, oversee VCE operations, and spot check equipment. In short, life for the master gunners became a lot easier, and the rest of the formation was able to gain more benefit from their exper tise and counsel. At the time of this writing, the Army doesn’t have enough master gunners in the force to man both the school house and U.S. Army Forces Command deploying units. Our advice to the force is to continue to send quality NCOs to Master Gunner School, and when the time comes to pay the bill to the generating force, send them to Fort Moore to run the Gun School and

Winter-Spring 2024 continue to build the bench across the force. Conclusion The 1-68 Armor Silver Lions experi enced a 12-percent improvement in crew gunnery performance in less than a year through the execution of funda mentals and education. While we had many talented crewmembers in the battalion, the battalion’s systems and training were not correctly oriented to prepare platforms and train fundamen tal skills. Once in Europe, units that do little more than “shoot the range the Army gives them” will find their train ing to lack rigor. For our precision systems to deliver precision results, it is imperative that our vehicle commanders understand the connection between AACs/PtFCs and lethality. Regardless of how good a boresight is, if a crew does not regu larly execute AACs and PtFCs, that crew will struggle to live up to its po tential. Similarly, crews need quality coaching to improve and develop; that quality coaching requires VCEs and SI/ Os who have the training and in-depth knowledge to provide expert feedback. Lethality is central to what a CAB is and does. Given this importance, com manders need to assess their forma tion and take steps to ensure that cer tifications are held at the level com mensurate with that importance. 1-68 Armor experienced success in holding GST certification at the battalion level and executing VCE certification on a quarterly basis. With limited AGTS and BATS/COFT-SA resourcing in Europe, certifying SI/Os to maximize value of simulator time is key. Commanders, command sergeants major, S-3s, and master gunners must push hard to gain the most value from training prior to movement to the range. Nothing that the 1-68 Armor Silver Li ons did to prepare for gunnery or turn their gunnery training program around in Europe was revolutionary. Com manders will find that they can main tain an effective gunnery training pro gram through exercising fundamentals and holding the line on standards. LTC Chuck Bies is the Task Force Senior Observer/Coach/Trainer (O/C/T), Panther Team, Operations Group, Na tional Training Center, Fort Irwin CA. His previous assignments include bat talion commander, 1-68 Armor, 3/4 In fantry Division, Fort Carson, CO; Senior Military Advisor, Army Science Board, The Pentagon, Washington D.C.; bri gade S-3, 3/4 Infantry Division, Fort Carson; battalion executive officer, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry Regiment, 3/4 In fantry Division; and G-3 Chief of Train ing, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson. LTC Bies military schools include Com mand and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS; Red Team Member Course, Fort Leavenworth; Bradley Commander and Gunner’s Course, Fort Moore, GA; Maneuver Captain’s Career Course, Fort Knox, KY; and Jumpmaster Course, Fort Liberty, NC. He has a bach elor’s of science in engineering degree in mechanical engineering and materi als science from Duke University and a master’s of arts degree in diplomacy and military studies from Hawaii Pacif ic University. LTC Bies awards include Patton Award – Command and General Staff College; Legion of Merit; Bronze Star Medal with V device and two oak leaf clusters, and the Purple Heart with

Winter-Spring 2024 one oak leaf cluster. CSM Gary J. Kurtzhals is the brigade command sergeant major, 3rd ABCT “Greywolf,” 1st Cavalry Division, III Ar mored Corps, Fort Cavazos, TX. His pre vious assignments include battalion command sergeant major, 1-68 Armor, 3rd ABCT, 4th Infantry Division; squadron operations sergeant major, 5th Squad ron, 7th Cavalry Regiment, 1st ABCT, 3rd Infantry Division; NTC live fire NCO in charge “Dragon 40,” Operations Group, NTC; first sergeant, Company D, 2nd Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment, 1st ABCT; and brigade master gunner, 4th ABCT, 1st Armored Division. CSM Kurtz hals’ military education includes the Warrior Leaders Course, Advanced Leaders Course, Unit Antiterrorism Ad visor, Force XXI Force Battle Command Brigade and Below/Blue Force Tracking instructor, Combatives Level 1, Senior Leaders Course, Hazmat Family and Safety, Total Army Instructor, Drill Ser geant School, Commanders Safety Course, M1A2 Master Gunner Course, UCOF Senior Instructor Course, First Sergeant Course, Combat Lifesaver, Observer Controller Academy, Joint Firepower Course, Cavalry Leaders Course, and the Sergeants Majors Academy Class 70. CSM Kurtzhals en listed in the army in August 2001 as a Acronym Quick-Scan AAC – armament accuracy checks AAR – after-action review ABCT – Armored Brigade Combat Team AGTS – Advanced Gunnery Training System BATS – Bradley Advanced Training System CAB – combined arms battalion COFT – conduct of fire trainers DIDEA – Detect, Identify, Decide, Engage and Assess FM – Field Manual FMC – full mission capable GST – Gunnery Skills Testing GT – Gunnery Table MCoE – Maneuver Center of Excellence PtFCs – prep to fire checks SI/O – simulation instructor operator VCE – Vehicle Crew Evaluator VCEEP – VCE Exportable Package military occupational specialty 19K, M1 Armor Crewman. He attended One Station Unit Training at Fort Knox, KY. CSM Kurtzhals holds a master’s of sci ence degree in management from Ex celsior College, a bachelor’s degree in leadership and workforce development from CGSC, and a bachelor’s of profes sional studies degree in business and management from Excelsior College. His awards and decorations include the Meritorious Service Medal (5th award), NATO Medal, Master Gunner Identifi cation Badge, Drill Sergeant Badge, Combat Action Badge, and the Drivers Badge for track and wheeled. He also holds the German Schützenschnur (Gold) and the German Armed Forces Proficiency Badge (Gold). CSM Kurtz hals deployed to Iraq three times and Afghanistan once for combat opera tions, and he completed four regional ly aligned forces rotations to Europe and one to Korea. He has served in ev ery leadership position from tank gun ner through battalion command ser geant major. Notes Lewis Sorley, “Creighton Abrams and Lev els of Leadership,” Military Review, Au gust 1992. 2 Deming, W. Edwards, Out of the Crisis, Cambridge: MIT Press. 1982. 3 Jonah Hill, Moneyball, Directed by Ben nett Miller. Sept. 23, 2011. 4 We found that the correlation coeffi cient between AGTS Table VI and Live Ta ble VI is weak, only 0.20 on a scale of -1 to 1. While AGTS is essential to develop ing proficiency with the conduct of fire and the platform, building confidence, and developing individual skills, the scores in AGTS in themselves are not good predictors of actual gunnery perfor mance.