Improving Supply-Support-Activity Operations

Spring 2020 Vital BCT Logistics Readiness Link: Improving Supply-Support-Activity Operations by LTC Charles L. Montgomery The supply-support activity (SSA) rep resents the epicenter of logistics with in a brigade combat team (BCT) re gardless of tactical-formation compo sition. The SSA serves as the critical link be tween tactical- and national-level sup ply echelons; this link is vital to the overall level of unit readiness. This fact mandates comprehensive system ef fectiveness, combined with an indepth knowledge of Global Combat Support System-Army (GCSS-A), to navigate the supply architecture effec tively. ‘Strategic private’ The reference to “strategic private” does not solely apply to tactical oper ations. Strategic privates and special ists at the battalion-clerk level repre sent the origin of the supply/demand signal for the entire Army. If these Sol diers are not trained properly, the en tire supply-chain management system will be adversely affected over time. This creates enormous ramifications within BCTs, so these Soldiers’ level of proficiency truly makes them strategic during the execution of tactical and home-station operations. Organiza tions must wholeheartedly invest in data-entry clerks to ensure the right supplies are ordered and arrive at the right time to sustain operations. The SSA must operate at the highest level of efficiency from origin (supply clerks at the battalion), to brigade/di vision (“ZPARK” managers) and, finally, the supply entry/exit point (SSA). The SSA accountable officer (AO) is the linchpin during the execution of this entire operation. Leaders within a BCT must search for ways to maximize logistics platforms and Soldiers with the explicit intent of improving operations holistically. This article explores lessons-learned as 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT), 1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss, TX, developed multiple solutions to increase operational productivity. These solutions include implementing a “Touch It Once Campaign,” express-lane creation, daily forward-support-company (FSC) logistics packages (LOGPACs) and overaged, repairable-item listing (ORIL) management. ‘Touch It Once Campaign’ The “Touch It Once Campaign” Figure 1. 123rd Brigade Support Battalion’s SSA model. focuses on the arrival of supplies at the SSA. Military-occupation specialty (MOS) 92A, Automated Logistical Specialist, Soldiers process supplies and place them in supported-battalion lanes. MOS 92A Soldiers once touched the supplies a second and third time dur ing the outload process after placing them into specified unit lanes, and this meant the entire process required 2.5 manhours per document number. To alleviate strain on material-handling equipment (MHE) and SSA Soldiers, 3rd ABCT implemented a container roll-on/-off platform (CROP) exchange pro gram that reduced manhours by an ag gregated 1.3 hours. FSCs and the brigade-support battal ion (BSB) base companies were as signed specific geographical areas within the SSA. Each company was tasked to place three CROPs at the SSA, which were controlled by the SSA AO for property accountability and management purposes. This system al lows SSA personnel to load unit CROPs once with required MHE, increasing the SSA’s efficiency and overall unit throughput. Also, once FSCs transport CROPs back

Spring 2020 to their area of operations to facilitate supply downloading, ORIL items are backhauled to the SSA for processing on the same CROPs. The BSB distribu tion company is responsible for trans porting ORILs to the logistics-readi ness center (LRC) and for bringing empty CROPs back to the SSA to start the cycle over again. The “Touch It Once Campaign” has in creased efficiency tremendously with in 3rd ABCT, and it represents a meth od that can be replicated in field envi ronments to enable Soldiers to train as they will fight. Express-lane creation Categorically the SSA has two types of customers: those picking up bulk items from an external area, and those se curing smaller Class II and Class IX items from internally controlled areas. Securing those smaller items is based on the premise of potential pilferage. Third ABCT increased efficiency through the implementation of dedi cated battalion pickup timeframes to focus on detailed requirements for all customers, not just combined-arms battalions. Although this increased proficiency by 19 percent overall, es pecially in the area of time-on-station, there remained an opportunity to im prove operations. To make improvements, “express lanes” were created. Express lanes op erate daily with no specific battalion assigned to daily pickup windows. The only management mechanism at tached is that units can only use this lane if they have 10 documents or few er at the SSA. To use the express lane, units employ four distinct methods of coordination:

• Telephonic;

• Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT);

• Home station (HS); and

• Non-classified Internet protocol network (VSAT/HS). Each coordination measure has an as sociated tactical version to replicate the same sight picture during the ex ecution of tactical operations in field environments. Once the unit makes contact with the SSA, the 92As pull that specific unit’s 10 documents (or fewer) to expedite the process. The creation of this lane allows units to pick up supplies multiple times daily. The immediate impact of creat ing this lane was a decrease in customer wait time of 17 per c e nt , w h i c h placed supplies in the warfight ers’ possession faster, contribut ing to sustained high operational-readiness (OR) levels. Continu ous improve ments targeted to increase OR, directly contrib uting to greater lethality, remains the overarching goal of all 3rd ABCT leaders. Daily FSC

LOGPAC

The ultimate test of any tactical-level organiza tion is to have es tablished sys tems that trans fer with ease be tween HS and field environ ments. Figure 2. CPT Michael Hills (right), commander of FSC J, 4th Battalion, 6th Infantry Regiment, 3rd ABCT, uses the express lane to pick up Class II and IX supplies at the 3rd ABCT SSA. (U.S. Army photo) However, the comfort and conve nience of HS operations directly con tribute to atrophied field-craft skills that are required to defeat the enemy in severely degraded technological en vironments. The key mitigation mea sure is to train at home station as we fight; this type of training will transfer with tremendously less friction. Third ABCT implemented daily LOGPAC operations from unit motorpool areas to the SSA to replicate tactical opera tions. This also applied to all four com panies within the BSB. However, the BSB’s distribution com pany (Company A) assumed a dual role. Company A has the responsibility on a rotating schedule to deliver sup plies to supported battalions just like the company delivers supplies in field environments. The implementation of daily unit LOG PACs produced the following effects:

• Significantly decreased CWT;

• Increased FSC ability to execute convoy operations;

• Allowed more LOGPAC repetitions (which increased Soldier’s confidence in execution);

• Enhanced logistic-release-point o p e ra t i o n s t h ro u g h d a i l y coordination between the BSB and FSCs (which directly supports brigade-support-area execution); and

• Established a firm foundation for the execution of field-trains combat post and combat-trains command post operations.

Spring 2020 ORIL management Sustainers and warfighters have an un deniable obligation to increase ORIL management effectiveness, which di rectly impacts the Army enterprise and sustainable OR from a limited parts-production perspective. To this end, 3rd ABCT implemented a deliber ate process targeted at reaching the Army’s ORIL turn-in standard of 10 days (per Army Regulation 750-1, Army Materiel Maintenance Policy) while holistically improving the effi ciency of SSA operations. It’s our re sponsibility to get recoverable items back into the Army system to ensure the organization as a whole continues to operate at a high level of readiness. One improvement measure in the pro cess is aggressive attention to the De fense Working Capital Fund (DWCF). The DWCF – established under Title 10 of the U.S. Code, Section 2208 – allows the Army to repair and purchase re quirements for all supplies, mainte nance, transportation and the other financial needs required to operate a professional organization. The gener ated ORIL credit helps the DWCF and our organization remain fiscally re sponsible to American taxpayers. In addition to the financial revenue generated, critically required parts that may not be on the assembly pro duction line are repositioned into the Army system for refurbishment and re turned to the warfighter. A myopic ap proach to returning repairable parts into the system produces detrimental effects to readiness over time. Secondly, for a BCT, the return credit is essential to operate an armored for mation. To illustrate, an M1 Abrams engine costs $903,498 and the return credit is $361,781, representing a 40-percent return on investment of the entire cost. The final improvement measure con cerned sending our MOS 92A Soldiers directly to maneuver battalions to pro cess and approve recoverable items on-site. From that point, FSCs deliv ered the items to the SSA, and the transportation platoon delivered the items to the LRC. This entire process, with support from all leaders within the BCT, has im proved ORIL management immensely. The SSA within any organization rep resents the nucleus of sustaining and increasing OR to engage and destroy the enemy during a prolonged period of time. This endeavor demands en gaged leaders at all echelons to ensure our formations remain committed to the execution and overall effective ness of sustainment operations. The key is to design and implement systems that transfer without friction to field or austere environments and to replicate the environment where we will engage our enemies. Low-density training for all MOS 92A Soldiers within the BCT is essential; this investment will mitigate skill atro phy over time. Leader professional de velopment – combined with rotating the brigade maintenance meeting to the SSA footprint to increase the over all importance of the SSA among BCT leadership – represents another good technique to improve operations. The success or failure of an organiza tion lies within the will of its leaders. Engaged leaders must develop viable solutions within the system of record (GCSS-A) to keep our organization op erating at a high level of readiness postured to engage any enemy force within the world. LTC Charles Montgomery commands 123rd BSB, 3rd ABCT, Fort Bliss, TX. His previous assignments include assignments officer, Human Resources Command, Fort Knox, KY; support-op erations officer, 2nd Infantry BCT, 3rd In fantry Division, Fort Stewart, GA; bri gade S-4, 2nd Infantry BCT; and G-5 School of Advanced Military Studies Planner, 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stewart. LTC Montgomery’s military schools include Pathfinder and Air borne Schools, Joint Planner’s Course and Joint Firepower Course. He has a bachelor’s of arts degree in history from the University of Southern Mis sissippi, a master’s of science degree in human-resource management from Tarleton State University and a mas ter’s of military arts degree in military operational art and science from Com mand and General Staff College. LTC Montgomery’s awards include the Bronze Star Medal (one oak-leaf clus ter) and the Meritorious Service Med al (four oak-leaf clusters). Acronym Quick-Scan ABCT – armored brigade combat team AO – accountable officer BCT – brigade combat team BSB – brigade-support battalion CROP – container roll-on/-off platform CWT – customer wait time DWCF – Defense Working Capital Fund FSC – forward-support company GCSS-A – Global Combat Support System-Army HS – home station LOGPAC – logistics package LRC – logistics-readiness center MHE – material-handling equipment MOS – military-occupational specialty OR – operational readiness ORIL – overaged, repairable-Item listing SSA – supply-support activity VSAT – Very Small Aperture Terminal