Enablers at Echelon: Scouts and Mortars Task-Organized to a Maneuver Company

Spring 2020 Enablers at Echelon: Scouts and Mortars Task-Organized to Maneuver Company by CPT Stephen J. Cumby The following recommendations are based on personal experiences from National Training Center (NTC) Rota tion 19-06, during which I commanded Company C (Tank), 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment. The “Black Knights” are part of the infantry combined-arms battalion (CAB) for 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) “Black Jack,” 1st Cavalry Division. This was our first “no order” rotation. We (at echelon) received two base op erations orders: one prior to our start point from the rotational-unit bivouac area and one prior to the live-fire. The rest of the orders came as frag mentary orders (FRAGOs) at varying degrees of “flash to bang” within the execution timeline. Throughout the rotation, 1-5 Cav exe cuted most of its operations in NTC’s Northern Corridor. The battalion con ducted several movements-to-contact due to the consistent reapplication of combat power by the opposing force (OPFOR), allocation of collection as sets to other brigade priorities and un certainty of the enemy situation. Initially my company found itself exe cuting Black Jack 6’s (call sign for the battalion commander) intent as a bri gade reserve in the defense, commit ting in and around the Matterhorn. Following, we resumed our role with 1-5 Cav, leading four offensive opera tions through the Northern Corridor with varied degrees of success. However, by task-organizing the bat talion scouts and mortars to my com pany, the battalion found success with our rapid ability to identify the ene my’s location, composition and dispo sition; to develop the situation; and to defeat the formation with maneuver and fire. For brevity, I’ll address the first and second operations only (the third and fourth operations’ task-organization was highly similar to their predeces sors). What doctrine says Our doctrine currently defines move ments-to-contact, their successful at tributes and general tactical formation but overlooks potential task-organiza tion (with the exception of combat en gineers) to conduct the mission effec tively. The definitive purpose of establishing contact and developing the situation while maintaining freedom of action is highlighted by the executing unit’s ability to quickly react to the enemy situation. While tempo is not men tioned in the movement-to-contact section of Army Techniques Publica tion (ATP) 3-90.5, Combined-Arms Battalion, some form of speed is ref erenced several times in the discus sion. For example, ATP 3-90.5 says that doctrine requires executing units to “quickly determine the size and activ ity of the enemy force” and place “fires on lead enemy forces. Speed of decision and execution is critical.” Also, the advance-guard “commander maintains pressure on the enemy by fire and maneuver. He (or she) probes and conducts a vigorous reconnais sance … to determine the enemy’s ex act location, composition and disposi tion. The advance guard immediately transmits this information to the CAB commander.” The security force’s mission, similarly, focuses its reconnaissance on the en emy, the named areas of interest (NAIs), routes and terrain, while re taining priority of fires, to gain and maintain contact without becoming decisively engaged. However, while not specified, it’s generally assumed the security force’s analysis and re ports (as well as requests for fires, sus tainment, evacuation and commit ment of more combat power) are strictly reported to the battalion (in a CAB movement-to-contact). This task-organization faces the prob lems of communication equipment failure or degradation, time for a staff to process and disseminate informa tion, and time to deconflict organic fires with the advance guard and ad jacent units. This can slow the CAB’s reaction to and development of the situation. The following missions ex plore our refinement of the move ment-to-contact task-organization to address those problems and best em ploy doctrine. First mission The first operation was an attack from Sadajan through Killer Escarpment and Echo Valley to establish a support-by-fire (SBF) oriented on Alpha and Bravo Passes, and then to pass an infantry company forward to seize key terrain. Ahead of the battalion was one troop from the cavalry squadron oriented on the objective and on Granite Pass; the battalion scouts were in the vicinity of Observation Post (OP) Hill to screen Refrigerator Gap. The company was “pure,” with the battalion mortar pla toon following to preset mortar firing points (MFPs) to provide coverage. We had two priority 155mm howitzer tar gets on anticipated enemy defensive positions in and around both Alpha and Bravo Passes. During this mission, the forward cav alry troop suffered heavy losses from actions with emplaced anti-tank (AT) teams and boyevaya mashina pekho tys – Russian-made infantry fighting vehicles – in defensive postures. The cavalry troop identified more AT loca tions but could not influence them with direct fire. The troop did not re tain the combat power to reconnoiter enemy on our objective. Upon crossing Killer Escarpment, I re quested that the mortars establish an unplanned MFP to cover our move ment to Echo Valley due to the troop’s limited capability to influence forward enemy positions. We took contact from AT teams, losing one tank, but eliminated the teams with the estab lished mortars. Following that success, and with communication problems with battalion fires, the mortar pla toon dropped to our net. In effect, the mortar platoon fell under us until we’d passed the infantry forward.

Spring 2020 We confirmed the locations of the re maining cavalry troop and adjacent units. Then, we requested notification of assets entering our area of opera tions to deconflict fires. We then be gan a movement-to-contact toward our objective to re-establish contact with the enemy. The company got very comfortable bounding platoons into overwatch po sitions and leading with a single pla toon, covered within mortar range, then pulling forward the mortars into a new MFP and continuing the maneu ver toward key terrain. As we ap proached Bravo Pass, we made con tact with a mechanized-infantry com pany in the defense and suffered two casualties. Having previously decon flicted fires, our mortars fired smoke and high-explosive rounds within min utes, shaping my lead platoon’s and 3rd Platoon’s establishment of an SBF, and the subsequent maneuver by myself and my 2nd Platoon. We eliminated the OPFOR company, triggering enemy Figure 1. An M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle provides security for 2nd ABCT, 1st Cav’s tactical-operations center during the brigade’s 19-06 decisive-action rotation at NTC, Fort Irwin, CA. (U.S. Army photo by MAJ Carson Petry, 2nd ABCT, 1st Cav alry Division Public Affairs) commitment of tanks and attack avia tion to reinforce the pass. Unable to identify the OPFOR tanks’ positions, we awaited resupply of mortar ammunition while we kept busy shooting down helicopters. We also awaited our priority 155m howit zer targets to shape our maneuver against the tanks. The lull cost us tem po as the OPFOR’s tanks established an SBF and the 155 missions were re allocated to another battalion. Despite destroying a few tanks and he licopters, we took significant losses and were unable to successfully pass the infantry onto the objective. The takeaways during this operation were

1) our limitations with no element for ward to establish contact with the en emy and 2) shaping maneuver with fires at the company without having to deconflict through battalion and bri gade (timely and personal). Extending security Immediately following reconstitution of my company, we received a FRAGO to extend the battalion’s security pos ture by 10 kilometers to OP Hill to hold gains made in previous operations while the battalion executed a hasty-planning cycle. Again we were tasked to lead the operation, which I briefed to my leaders as a movement-to-con tact given the uncertain enemy situa tion. Given the operational tempo and bat talion planning cycle, the scouts weren’t currently employed following displacement from OP Hill due to en emy counteractions. Knight 6 and Knight 3 agreed to let me “borrow” the scout platoon for our mission, and we were also task-organized with the mortars after our success employing them in the previous operation. Following aggressive troop-leading procedures, we departed as a robust company team of a scout platoon (still

Spring 2020 5x3 with Long-Range Acquisition Sys tem trucks and M2s), three degraded armor platoons (Slant 11 during this fight due to maintenance and our ex ecutive officer’s absence to meet oth er requirements) and a mortar pla toon. The scouts’ reconnaissance guid ance for this mission was enemy-fo cused, rapid and forceful, and oriented on NAIs in which I presumed the ene my had hastily emplaced weapon sys tems and platforms during our recon stitution. Our scheme of maneuver was simple. The mortars immediately established an MFP to cover the scouts in their ini tial five kilometers of reconnaissance. (The scouts would set in OPs oriented on my NAIs.) We then bounded our platoons by fightable terrain features and pulled forward the mortars to the next MFP to deploy the scouts and re peat the process. This task-organization allowed us to organically identify enemy positions and maintain contact with them, and to deploy my tanks under the cover of mortar fires and obscuration to elimi nate the enemy formation. It was sim ple, quick-reacting, synchronized and extremely effective. Further, it gave us the capability to seize and exploit the initiative. After eliminating the enemy security element and owning OP Hill, we continued the same maneuvers through Refrigerator Gap down to the east side of Alpha and Bravo Passes. We destroyed another mechanized company that was holding the terrain, and we passed our infantry forward to clear the passes, ultimately meeting our commander’s intent of owning the passes to prevent envelopment as we extended our lines of communication through Refrigerator Gap. Second mission The task-organization of the second mission allowed our company team to meet all requirements of both the se curity force and the advance guard in a movement-to-contact while rapidly leveraging fires, deploying the forma tion and developing the situation. Our scout platoon in later missions proved capable of still answering bat talion’s priority information require ments while task-organized under us. Further, the task-organization let the scouts gain, maintain and hand over contact at an accelerated rate directly to the advance guard it impacted. We in turn provided the scouts with re sponsive mortar fires, sustainment, communication relay and security. Similarly, by cutting out the multiple-echelon coordination for and decon fliction of the battalion mortars, our fire missions impacted the fight within minutes or shifted within seconds. The significant reduction in processing times for fires missions facilitated an aggressive tempo well suited to the movement-to-contact. Also, it syn chronized sustainment efforts with mission timeframes since we owned their operational reach, as we did our tanks. The net architecture admittedly was cluttered at times. The company com mand net became home to scouts passing targets directly to platoon leaders, platoons calling for mortar fires and myself issuing orders to two more elements. However, simple radio etiquette and discipline prevented clutter on all but a couple of occa sions. Generally, scouts would lose frequen cy-modulation communications with battalion quickly into the mission. In response, the scout-platoon leader monitored our company command and his platoon nets, but provided his analysis to battalion through Joint Ca pabilities Release or relayed through me if the message required articula tion. Our mortars also monitored the com pany command and platoon nets, and, when necessary, the mortar crews processed missions digitally or through relay with our Bradley Fire-Support Team (BFIST) given the dis tance from battalion fires. Despite the additional mission-com mand requirements, owning the as sets allowed us to own the tempo of the fight and apply combat power at the right place and at the right time. The result was evident in the second mission, when we faced nearly the same enemy situation but only suf fered a single casualty (the BFIST got too excited observing fires). Future CABs conducting a movement-to-contact and leading with a single company should consider a similar task-organization. Providing the lead company the organ ic ability to aggressively gain contact, Figure 2. U.S. Army Soldiers assigned to 2nd ABCT, 1st Cav Division, patrol an area beside a mountain during Decisive-Action Rotation 19-06 at NTC April 6,

2019. (U.S. Army photo by SPC Carlos Cameron, Operations Group, NTC)

Spring 2020 Acronym Quick-Scan deploy its formation, develop the situ ation and rapidly cover maneuver with swift and accurate fires offers the CAB potential to quickly win the initial con tact, maintain combat power and ex ploit the initiative. The follow-on phases of the operation after the meeting engagement will likely require adjustment of the task-organization to support follow-on op erations. As Knight 6, LTC Timothy P. Meadors, stated, “Getting the task-org right is a simple solution to a complex problem.” CPT Stephen Cumby commands Head quarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd ABCT, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX. His other assignments include commander, Company C (Tank), 1-5 Cav, 2nd ABCT, 1st Cav Division; execu tive officer, Headquarters and Head quarters Troop, 2nd Squadron, 13th Cav alry, 3rd ABCT, 1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss, TX; scout-platoon leader, Troop B, 2-13 Cav, 4th ABCT, 1st Ar mored Division, Fort Bliss; and assis tant S-3, 2-13 Cav, 4th ABCT, 1st Ar mored Division. CPT Cumby’s military schools include Officer Candidate School, Armor Basic Officer Leader’s Course, Airborne School, Army Recon naissance Course, Maneuver Captain’s Career Course and Cavalry Leader’s Course. He holds a bachelor’s of sci ence degree in history from Hardin-Simmons University, Abilene, TX. ABCT – armored brigade combat team AT – anti-tank ATP – Army techniques publication BFIST – Bradley Fire-Support Team CAB – combined-arms battalion FRAGO – fragmentary order MFP – mortar firing point NAI – named area of interest NTC – National Training Center OP – observation post OPFOR – opposing force SBF – support-by-fire