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ARMOR · Spring 2020

Fire and Maneuver in the Cyberspace Domain

COL Michael D. Schoenfeldt, CPT Matthew L. Tyree and
pp. 18–25Features2020

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Spring 2020 Fire and Maneuver in the Cyberspace Domain by COL Michael D. Schoenfeldt, CPT Matthew L. Tyree and CPT William Malcolm The armored brigade combat team (ABCT) is the most lethal formation the world has ever seen; no other force can match the firepower and maneuverability an ABCT can bring to bear on the decisive-action battlefield. However, where our adversaries lack in attributes inherent to an ABCT, they are gaining the edge in areas that in clude cyber, signals intelligence (SI GINT) and electronic warfare (EW). With that in mind, a dynamic strike by our adversaries to our communica tions and intelligence systems, digital and frequency modulation (FM), can be a catastrophic blow to ABCT opera tions. Protecting our communications, exploiting those of our adversaries and supplying maneuver commanders with real-time and actionable intelli gence will determine the difference between victory and defeat. Army EW and tactical SIGINT are pro gressing through significant updates and restructuring in an effort to meet this threat. In the past, troop and com pany commanders had been assigned Prophet (a 24-hour, all-weather, near-real-time, ground-based, tactical SI GINT/EW capability organic to the BCT) and EW teams that, due to lack of necessity, planning or understand ing, had been a shackle rather than an enabler to their operations. The Army had all but abandoned EW in 1993 af ter the end of the Cold War. During the height of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in 2009, the EW branch was finally reinstated for counter-im provised-explosive-device jamming. The only contact many maneuver lead ers had with EW during that time was with the bulky “dukes” that sat in the back of our vehicles. Current global events have shown an emergence of both state and nonstate actors who are not only capable of waging war on land but also of com peting in the electromagnetic spec trum (EMS). To meet these new and complex threats, the Army is rapidly replicating the same environments to test leaders at the combat-training centers. Every echelon of our Army must be ready to meet the rapidly changing world and be confident in their ability to “fire and maneuver” in the EMS. ‘A way’ to compete in EMS During the past year, the Ironhorse ABCT of 1st Cavalry Division has re called forgotten skills of the pre-Gulf War years, including a platoon called combat EW and intelligence (CEWI). CEWI was once one answer to compet ing in and gaining an advantage in the EMS of the Cold War. Some in the SI GINT and EW circles will tell you the two capabilities are like oil and water. Ironhorse views the two as sides of the same coin called information. Information is the medium that links the purpose and direction of leaders to maximize the warfighting functions’ capabilities. Information is a living en vironment, and it needs to be ana lyzed much the same way as the phys ical one we are used to maneuvering in. There is key terrain in this environ ment such as radios and computer sys tems, as well as obstacles and avenues of approach that allow or prohibit ac cess into the network. By fully access ing the information landscape, maneu ver units can find new ways to exploit our adversaries to mass and concen trate “informational fires.” To gain the edge in the information battlefield and show that EW and SI GINT are better together than apart, Ironhorse founded the “Wild Bill” CEWI platoon to be a true organic fire-and-maneuver unit in the cyberspace domain. Since its inception, Wild Bill has sensed, collected, found, jammed, destroyed and disrupted enemy infor mation networks in tough and realistic environments. The line of effort that Wild Bill has created is now tied to cy ber-electromagnetic activities (CEMA), which is in turn tied to the intelligence section (S-2) collection assets. This chain of information will leave our ad versaries exposed and helpless in the Figure 1. Current manning.

Spring 2020 EMS. Wild Bill is not a one-size-fits all solution to mastering the cyberspace domain, but it does provide Ironhorse the ability to shape it. Creating Wild Bill Wild Bill was not created overnight, nor is it complete. The platoon has grown through trial and error during complex training events. It was decid ed early that Wild Bill would primarily serve as the electronic reconnaissance platoon and the commander’s eyes and ears in the EMS. It was tasked with sensing and direction-finding (DF) enemy communications, answering priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and, when able, destroying or degrading enemy emitters with either lethal or non-lethal fires. An experienced infantry lieutenant was chosen and instructed to lead, equip and train the organization. Wild Bill was provided a Bradley Fires-Sup port Team (BFIST) Fighting Vehicle to allow the platoon to rapidly prosecute unobserved fire missions. This distinct inclusion is what makes the Ironhorse CEWI platoon different from other EW or CEWI platoons of the past. It is organically able of gathering targeting information from its sensors, rapidly clearing ground and digitally process ing fire missions. The fires section makes Wild Bill a true fire-and-maneu ver element rather than a simple col lection asset. To cover the electronics side of the formation, Ironhorse funneled all available military-occupation specialty (MOS) 17Es (EW specialists) and MOS 35P/Ns (cryptologic linguists/SIGINT analysts) to fill the ranks. These troop ers operate host EW and SIGINT sys tems ranging from legacy and Table 1. Wild Bill METL. Figure 2. Training glidepath.

Spring 2020 developing Army technologies to com mercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) systems. The current arsenal includes Prophet, Sabre Fury (a modified version of the Duke V4/V5 EW system), EW Tactical Vehicle (EWTV), Versatile Radio Obser vation and Direction (VROD) system and the Herrick Pack. With the combi nation of systems and personnel from EW and SIGINT, the platoon also needs to delineate the legal and specialty dif ferences between its troopers and equipment. Wild Bill was initially assigned to the Ironhorse Military Intelligence Compa ny, where a dedicated and informed SIGINT technician provided oversight and ensured the platoon remained in compliance with National Security Agency directives and procedures. With an organizational structure and equipment assigned, Wild Bill’s next task was to establish a modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) and mission-essential task list (METL) to carry its troopers through individu al, section and platoon training to meet their unique task and purpose. While training with a common under standing and nested purpose, the EW and SIGINT troopers began to inte grate. Before long they were able to sense, find and report as a single unit. The platoon applied these skills during the Wild Bill Gunnery Table XII platoon live-fire exercise and added the ability to shoot, move, communicate and ac curately call for indirect fire. Following successful completion of their pla toon-level gates, Ironhorse felt confi dent that Wild Bill could operate on the forward-line-of-own-troops (FLOT) and enable maneuver, intelligence and targeting. Integrating Wild Bill with ABCT operations With the concept proofed, Wild Bill was ready to operate with maneuver units, but it was not yet fully under stood how much the platoon could provide to commanders and the bri gade. Due to its nature as electronic reconnaissance, Wild Bill was natural ly attached to support the Ironhorse Reconnaissance Squadron, 1-7 Cav. Therefore, Wild Bill was tested during both the Ironhorse company-level combined-arms live-fire exercise (CALFEX) operations and the brigade-level home-station decisive-action val idation, Pegasus Forge V. During these complex operations, Wild Bill troopers revealed their unique capabilities and limitations as they were tasked to find, fix and destroy multiple emitters in the form of live and static opposing forces (OPFORs). The Wild Bill leadership assisted ma neuver commanders in planning dur ing the orders process and during ex ecution. The platoon semi-indepen dently operated no more than one phase line behind the FLOT. The mis sion during these exercises was to pro vide the maneuver units with over watch as they executed combat tasks; relay important combat information; and ultimately enable targeting and intelligence for leaders at echelon. During the training events, the pla toon proved its ability to integrate with maneuver units while also reveal ing its unique capabilities and limita tions. Wild Bill’s main combat multiplier is its ability to conduct electronic-support (ES) operations, namely DF. Though this ability is limited on the move, when established in tactically and technically sound collection sites (hasty or deliberate) the platoon is able to sense, fix and destroy the en emy with speed and accuracy. Con ducting CEWI requires understanding of how sensors receive signals from the EMS and how each sensor can mu tually support the others through proper geometry. Much like an am bush, there are different formations that can be used to achieve the great est geometry for an electromagnetic kill zone. In general, a concave shape yields the greatest chance to fix a tar get, while a linear or convex shape yields a greater area to detect but lim its the chance to establish a fix. With a proper collection site set, the sensors of Wild Bill received specific EMS bands to observe known as “spec trum sectors of fire.” These sectors of fire were prepared in advance and co incided with the enemy electronic or der of battle the S-2 prepares that lays out both the enemy equipment and frequency sets that may appear to Wild Bill operators. Once an enemy emitter is detected, the operator develops the echelon, potential location and activity of the source. Throughout six weeks of CAL FEX iterations, Wild Bill sensed more than 50 emitters. These emitters are a combination of OPFOR push-to-talk ra dios and Stratomists. The Stratomist is a signal emitter that is capable of rep licating a myriad of single-channel plain text (SC/PT) and frequency-agile (such as frequency hop) communica tions. Also sensed and reported were helicopter navigation systems and doz ens of other “out of play” frequencies. Active emitters present a general azi muth to their location, known as a line of bearing (LoB). Just like a resection in land navigation, multiple LoBs from multiple sensors will achieve a cut or a triangulated fix on an emitter. These cuts and fixes are then reported and actioned by the platoon or other ech elons. Wild Bill developed a reporting scheme that allowed free passage of both time-sensitive combat intelli gence and detailed intelligence that directly supported targeting. Many Figure 3. Collection-site formations.

Spring 2020 found emitters answered PIRs such as the location of high-value targets; chemical, biological, radioactive, nu clear and high-yield explosives target ing (commonly known as CBRNE); and obstacles. Once the maneuver commander had this intel in hand, Wild Bill’s troopers would action their modified size, ac tivity, location, time (SALT) report, which detailed the information gath ered and the way-ahead to leaders at echelon. Fires: lethal and non-lethal Wild Bill is free to prosecute the emit ters with the lethal and non-lethal means available to it. Out of more than 15 digitally processed fire mis sions (both live and simulated), only one landed more than 100 meters from the target. Wild Bill even sensed and destroyed a live emitter with 120mm mortars from more than two kilometers away. While not as accu rate as observed fires, Wild Bill was still able to achieve effects on the en emy and disrupt their operations. Also available to Wild Bill is its non-le thal fires asset, electronic attack (EA). EA, “jamming,” against an adversary’s communications comes with an inher ent risk to the jammer because of its EMS signature; essentially, it becomes like a flashlight in the dark to enemy sensors. Wild Bill had limited practice jamming, but when it did go “buzzer on,” it achieved effects on Stratomist and live targets during the CALFEX. Due to the risk to the force, Ironhorse uses this capability deliberately and in conjunction with other CEMA effects at a decisive point. Stacking effects like these on top of one another cre ates an electromagnetic dilemma. During one portion of Exercise Pega sus Forge, after the enemy tactical-op erations center was destroyed, Wild Bill conducted EA against enemy FM communications, furthering the OP FOR’s confusion and achieving domi nance in the EMS. Capabilities and limitations Wild Bill has carved a niche for itself by being able to search, find and de stroy emitters in parts of the EMS. Overall, the platoon can see almost ev ery signal in the very-high-frequency and ultra-high-frequency ranges. Within these frequency ranges, Wild Bill is very capable of searching, find ing and destroying SC/PT emitters at ranges up to 10 kilometers. With more Table 2. SALT report. Figure 4. An M-ATV Prophet established in a collection site.

Spring 2020 open terrain than the Fort Hood Train ing Area, it is expected that the pla toon can see and affect results much further. For signals that Wild Bill is unable to prosecute directly, it has been able to “tip” to more Ironhorse assets such as the Shadow unmanned-aerial-systems (UAS) platoon or the brigade intelli gence-support element. Wild Bill’s greatest strength is its ability to use these skills while operating on the FLOT. Unlike other EW and CEWI pla toons, Wild Bill can conduct CEWI that directly enables maneuver, intelli gence and targeting. However, Wild Bill still remains limited in its ability to find and fix frequency agile communications, Joint Capabili ties Release’s (JCR) signatures and emitters in the super-high-frequency range. While Wild Bill and its assets are not wholly at fault, it should be noted that their Darkhorse and for eign-adversary counterparts can do this with lethal accuracy. Jamming communications is as much a capability as it is a limitation because it is largely untested at the BCT level. As stated, it comes with a risk to the force that would need to be mitigated. Wild Bill will strive to find innovative ways around these complicated prob lems because its troopers understand that the lives of all Ironhorse troopers could depend on their ability to see and shoot first in EMS. Improving Wild Bill As stated, Wild Bill is not a complete product yet, and Ironhorse will contin ue to seek upgrades to its equipment, manning and vehicles to give it the edge in the electromagnetic and on the real-world battlefield. The current arsenal of sensing and jamming equip ment is plagued with three major is sues that need to be addressed if oth er CEWI or EW platoons are to be suc cessful. The first issue is the antennas at tached to the Wild Bill sensors. The sensors housed in Wild Bill are some of the best available to any BCT. How ever, the antennas lack the sensitivity to detect emitters at ranges necessary to support large-scale combat opera tions (LSCO). An ABCT like Ironhorse is capable of affecting up to 30 kilometers with both organic and at tached fires assets, and it has a lineof-sight of 20 kilometers with a BFIST’s Fire-Support Sensor System A3. With more sensitive antennas and systems, Wild Bill will be able to sense enemy reconnaissance and main-body ele ments up to 30 kilometers and to pro vide early warning before the enemy moves into line-of-sight. The second issue is the limited jam ming capability of the jammers Wild Bill has at its disposal. The EWTV and Saber Fury jammers are the very same bulky dukes used during COIN that were not meant to defeat near-peer communications. Fielding new equip ment with more sensitive receivers and stronger power outputs will be crucial in providing BCTs with a reli able system. The third issue is the lack of a common graphical user interface (GUI). The multiple Wild Bill sensors do not have the ability to digitally share found fre quencies, LoBs or enemy intelligence. To do this, operators must use anoth er method, FM or JCR, to share infor mation and fix the emitter with a map and protractor. With a common GUI and a meshed network, operators can put the protractors aside and more ac curately fix a hostile emitter. Wild Bill and CEMA have access to the EW Plan ning-Management Tool (EWPMT), which is capable of linking the Defense Digital Service and sharing information with other battle-command common-services systems. However, many of the Wild Bill sensors use COTS systems that are not compatible with EWPMT. To be successful with future equip ment fielding, the Army must adopt a common planning tool and GUI for all equipment before becoming a pro gram of record. As maneuver begins to adapt EW and SIGINT, EW and SIGINT must adapt to maneuver. The current platforms that Wild Bill is assigned – mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) all-terrain vehicles and MaxxPro MRAPs – are not capable of maintaining the rapid and forceful nature of an ABCT. CEWI pla toons of the future need to reflect the mobility of the unit they support, and in the case of Ironhorse, they will need tracks. As it stands now, Wild Bill is 18 troop ers strong, with only 14 of them EW or Figure 5. A BFIST provides security for the EWTV.

Spring 2020 SIGINT MOSs. Combine that with the dozen sensors and five vehicles they operate, and one can picture the phys ical problems that can arise while op erating in a contested and continuous-operations environment. Updating the modified table of organization and equipment to task-organize cavalry-scout Bradley Fighting Vehicles and crews will allow the platoon to be self-sufficient at both security and maneu ver while also operating continuously. These vehicles, both Bradley and Ar mored Multi-Purpose Vehicle variants, will need to be outfitted with EW and SIGINT equipment and systems to en sure that CEWI remains fully mission-capable. Answer to dilemma Platoons like Wild Bill are combat mul tipliers, shaping efforts within the cy berspace domain. As with any other shaping operation, their task and pur pose must be nested to support the main effort. This begins with planning, in depth and in advance. Wild Bill cannot be the only EW and SIGINT asset out there. By stacking the knowledge and effects that CEMA and the S-2 can bring to bear, we can un doubtedly create an inescapable elec tromagnetic dilemma for our adver saries. For example, an ABCT can bet ter ensure the success of a combined-arms breach or the seizure of a city if it is able to simultaneously deny ene my air-defense artillery with an EA- 18G Growler (jamming-capable air craft), deny FM signals with an EC- 130H Compass call, deny JCR with a cyberattack, and deny recon or third-party communications with Wild Bill. If a BCT like Ironhorse is the primary battlespace owner in an LSCO environ ment, it must also extend its influence throughout the cyberspace domain on a scale greater than Wild Bill. Iron horse foresees the creation of an en tire EW company to better shape cy berspace at the BCT level. Under the command of a cyber and EW officer (Functional Area 17B), this company will be tasked to conduct information dominance within its brigade’s area of operations (AO). Its primary tasks would include mapping the electro magnetic environment, locating key command-and-control (C2) nodes and denying, degrading or deceiving enemy tactical-information systems. The company would be fully nested with CEMA and the S-2 to accomplish cyberspace echelons of fire that are desperately needed in the decisive-ac tion environments of the future. Accomplishing these tasks would re quire expansion of the current CEWI structure into three platoons as well as more capabilities task-organized to the company. The primary ES platoon would operate in tandem with a SI GINT section much like the current Figure 6. VROD mounted on the Wild Bill BFIST in a collection site. Figure 7. “A way” to update Wild Bill.

Spring 2020 Wild Bill structure. It would be tasked to conduct ES to find, fix and destroy enemy emitters and C2 nodes through DF. The second platoon would focus on conducting EA to degrade and de ceive enemy information systems. Fi nally, the third platoon would conduct ES with organic unmanned aerial ve hicles (UAV) armed with EMS sensors. The two ground platoons can be field ed by acquiring more program-of-re cord systems to the BCTs, with the ad dition of more EW personnel who are projected in the current force-design update. The third aviation platoon will require fielding an ES-capable UAV platform and more operators. Fielding this third platoon would be decisive in shaping the cyberspace domain within a BCT’s AO. This platoon will allow the sensors to get above terrain and see the EMS past the close fight and into the deep zone. The late LTG Hal Moore said, “There is always one more thing you can do to increase your odds of success”; the Ironhorse ABCT is investing time and energy into one of those things. The progress accomplished in the Iron horse ABCT is a step in the right direc tion toward competing in an increas ingly disconnected, intermittent and limited environment. With initiatives like the Wild Bill CEWI platoon, Iron horse will continue to fire and maneu ver in the cyberspace domain. COL Michael Schoenfeldt commands 1st ABCT “Ironhorse,” 1st Cavalry Divi sion, Fort Hood, TX. His previous as signments include commander, 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, 1st ABCT, 1st Cav Division; commanding general’s executive officer, 1st Cav Di vision; squadron executive officer, 1st BCT, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, CO; and secretary general staff, 4th In fantry Division. COL Schoenfeldt’s mil itary schools include the Eisenhower School (Fort Lesley J. McNair), interme diate-level education, Armor Maneu ver Captain’s Career Course and the Armor Basic Officer Leader Course. He holds a bachelor’s of arts degree in history from the University of Kansas, a master’s of arts degree in adult education from Kansas State Universi ty and a master’s of arts degree in na tional security strategy and resourc ing, with a concentration in supply-chain management, from the Eisen hower School. COL Schoenfeldt’s awards include the Bronze Star Medal and Meritorious Service Medal. He also earned a Combat Action Badge. CPT Matthew Tyree is the brigade EW officer, 1st ABCT “Ironhorse,” 1st Caval ry Division. His previous assignments include small-group leader at the Sig nal Captain’s Career Course; weapons-company executive officer, Company D, Task Force 1st Battalion, 28th Infan try, 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Benning; assistant plans officer, Task Force 1-28 Infantry, 3rd Infantry Division; weap ons-platoon leader, Company D, Task Force 1-28 Infantry; and rifle-platoon leader, Company B, 2nd Battalion, 69th Armor Regiment, 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infan try Division. CPT Tyree’s military schools include the Infantry Officer Ba sic Course and the Signal Captain’s Ca reer Course. He has a bachelor’s of sci ence degree in physics from the Figure 8. Projected information-dominance company.

Spring 2020 University of North Georgia. CPT Tyree also earned the Basic Army Instructor Badge. CPT Bill Malcolm is the Wild Bill CEWI platoon leader, 1st ABCT “Ironhorse,” 1st Cavalry Division. His previous as signments include scout-platoon lead er, 2-5 Cav, 1st ABCT, 1st Cav Division; platoon leader, Company A, 2-5 Cav, 1st ABCT “Ironhorse,” 1st Cav Division; and plans officer, 2-5 Cav, 1st ABCT “Ironhorse.” CPT Malcolm’s military schools include University of Connect icut Army Reserve Officer Training Corps (distinguished military gradu ate), Infantry Basic Officer Leader Course, Ranger School, Airborne School and the Bradley Leader Course. He has a bachelor’s of arts degree in history with a concentration in Ameri can studies from Eastern Connecticut State University. CPT Malcolm also earned an Expert Infantryman Badge, Ranger Tab and Parachutist Badge. Figure 9. The EWTV takes the high ground. For more information Field Manual (FM) 3-12, Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare Operations, Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2017. FM 3-13, Information Operations, Washing ton, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2016. FM 34-20, Military Intelligence Group (CEWI) (Corps), Washington, DC: Headquar ters Department of the Army, 1983. Army Techniques Publication 3-12.3, Electronic Warfare Techniques, Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2019. Army Technical Control and Analysis Element (ATCAE) Publication 1-1, United States Army SI GINT Organization and Structure, Fort George

G. Meade, MD: 742nd Military Battalion, 2019. ATCAE Pub 2-0, Leader’s Handbook (Signals In telligence), Fort George G. Meade, MD: 742nd Military Battalion, 2018. ATCAE Pub 2-1, Mission Handbook (Signals In telligence), Fort George G. Meade, MD: 742nd Military Battalion, 2018. ATCAE Pub 3-3, SIGINT/EW Synchronization, Fort George G. Meade, MD: 742nd Military Battalion, 2019. U.S. Army Electronic Warfare Strategy for Unified Land Operations 2025, Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2018. Officer Foundation Standards Manual Sig nals Intelligence Analysis Technician (MOS 353N), Washington, DC: Headquarters De partment of the Army, 2017. Acronym Quick-Scan ABCT – armored brigade combat team AO – area of operations ATCAE – Army Technical Control and Analysis Element BCT – brigade combat team BFIST – Bradley Fires Support Team Fighting Vehicle C2 – command and control CALFEX – combined-arms live-fire exercise CEMA – cyber-electromagnetic activities CEWI – combat electronic warfare and intelligence COIN – counterinsurgency COTS – commercial-off-the-shelf DF – direction-finding EA – electronic attack EMS – electromagnetic spectrum ES – electronic support EW – electronic warfare EWPMT – Electronic Warfare Planning Management Tool EWTV – Electronic Warfare Tactical Vehicle FLOT – forward-line-of-own-troops FM – frequency modulation FM – field manual GUI – graphical user interface JCR – Joint Capabilities Release LoB – line of bearing LSCO – large-scale combat operations METL – mission-essential task list MOS – military-occupation specialty MRAP – mine-resistant ambush-protected MTOE – modified table of organization and equipment NAI – named area of interest OPFOR – opposing force PIR – priority intelligence requirement SALT – size, activity, location, time SC/PT – single-channel plain text SIGINT – signals intelligence UAS – unmanned aerial system UAV – unmanned aerial vehicle VROD – Versatile Radio Observation and Direction (system)

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Citation

COL Michael D. Schoenfeldt, CPT Matthew L. Tyree and. “Fire and Maneuver in the Cyberspace Domain.” ARMOR, Spring 2020, pp. 18-25.

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