Volume VI, Supplemental: Prince Feisal ibn Hussein From King of Syria to King of Iraq (1918-1921), of the Multivolume Collection of Dr. Ali al-Wardi

Part 9 of the ARMOR Series: Highlighting the Most Significant Work of Foreword The 21st-century national security challenges facing the United States require anew way of educating, teaching, and shaping our combat forces. Increasingly, we require soldiers to possess significant knowledge of a region, and its history, tribes, sociological, and religious characteristics. This knowledge, sometimes referred to as “human terrain,” is emerging as an important tool that is as critical to understanding foreign lands as physical terrain and topography. Knowing the human terrain gives our military units insights into the population and its culture; it enhances operational effectiveness, bolsters force protection, and helps reduce conflict. It is key to executing counterinsurgency strategy. Commander Aboul-Enein has worked tirelessly to educate our deploying units on the nuances of Middle East history, Islam and the diverse viewpoints of 1.3 billion Muslims, and the intricacies of militant Islamist ideology. This series, which introduces the father of Iraqi sociology, Dr. Ali al-Wardi, is a valuable contribution to our understanding of Iraq and its neighboring countries. Commander Aboul-Enein’s review of Wardi’s supplement to Volume Six of his social aspects of Iraqi modern society focuses on the rise and fall of Prince Feisal ibn Hussein as King of Syria from 1918-1920. His forcible eviction from Syria by French forces would leave a scar not only on Feisal, who later would become King of Iraq from 1921 to 1933, but also a scar on the collective political psychology of the Levant. Understanding the origins and ongoing historical narratives of this scar tissue, from an Iraqi point of view, is an example of studying Iraq’s human terrain. Such empathy is necessary for a military unit to operate effectively in a very complex battlespace. I applaud ARMOR for devoting significant space in several editions of its journal to highlight this important multivolume work. As part of the Defense Intelligence Agency’s Joint Intelligence Task Force-Combating Terrorism, we intend to use the entire set of ARMOR’s collection to educate our analysts deploying to Iraq so they may benefit from the service Commander Aboul-Enein and ARMOR have rendered in translating, analyzing, and highlighting this Arabic work of military significance. Mr. Ed Mornston, Director, Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism This is the ninth essay in this collection of review essays highlighting the multivolume work of the father of Iraqi sociology, Dr. Ali al-Wardi (hereafter referred to as Wardi). The last essay discussed Wardi’s views on the decline of Hussein ibn Ali, the Sherief of Mecca, and the political capital he amassed in the aftermath of the 1916 Arab Revolt, making himself king of the Hejaz (the region in which the holy cities Mecca and Medina are located). This led to the rise of Ibn Saud, and the seeds of the creation of modern Saudi Arabia. This essay focuses on Hussein ibn Ali’s son, Feisal ibn Hussein, who eventually would become king of Iraq (see the seventh essay in this series for details on the ascension of Feisal ibn Hussein as king of Iraq), during his time as king of Syria from 1918 to 1920. His eviction as king of Syria by French forces in the Battle of Maysalun would impact the political psychology of Feisal, and would leave a deep internal mark on the region when he ascended to the throne of Iraq. Dynamics of the Arab Revolt Changes from Ally to Challenger The collapse of the Ottoman 7th and 8th Armies in the Battle of Megiddo was the death knell of Ottoman power in the Middle East. This laid open the British forces advancement to the Levant and Damascus. The Arab Revolt, under Prince Feisal ibn Hussein, aided in the envelopment in the Jezreel Valley. In a twist of historic irony, this is also the sight of the Battle of Armageddon mentioned in the Book of Revelations. This history was not lost to British forces as they dismantled Ottoman mili-Volume VI, Supplemental: Prince Feisal ibn Hussein From King of Syria to King of Iraq (1918-1921), of the Multivolume Collection of Dr. Ali al-Wardi by Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein, U. S. Navy 26

Iraq’s Social, Political, and Military History tary might in the Levant. Wardi is extremely light on the actual tactics of the Battle of Megiddo and other military campaigns, but does a marvelous job discussing the political and social impact of wars fought in the Levant, Iraq, and Arabia. For those interested in the tactical intricacies of the Ottoman battles with British forces during World War I, consult the works of the late Lieutenant General Sir George MacMunn and Captain Cyril B. Falls, who wrote an official two-volume history titled, Military Operations: Egypt and Palestine published in 1928.1 A delightful 2005 paper, “Armageddon’s Lost Lessons,” published by the Air University Press and written by U. S. Army Major Gregory Daddis, is also a recommended read.2 As Damascus lay open, and the Ottomans were no longer a threat, anew phase in the relationship between the British and the Arab Revolt developed. General Edmund Allenby wanted to enter Damascus with Prince Feisal and his irregular Arab army in a quest to be portrayed as an ally of the Arabs, not a conqueror. This was not to be, as a race between British divisions and the Arab Revolt ensued, with both forces arriving within hours of each other in October 1918. Technically, the tribes representing Prince Feisal, the Howeitat, the Ruwailah, and the Druze, entered Damascus from the south, while Australian cavalry scouts entered the city from the west. Along with the forces of the Arab Revolt were former Ottoman officers of Iraqi origin: Nuri al-Said, T. E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia), Nuri Shaalan of the Ruwailah, Auda Abu Tayi of the Howeitat, and finally Sultan al-Atrash of the Druze. They claimed Damascus for Prince Feisal and his father, Hussein ibn Ali of Mecca. Feisal would be declared king of Syria that month. Wardi reveals an unexpected power center in Damascus that supported the Arab claim of Damascus, as they were the grandsons of the famous Algerian resistance leader, Abdel-Kader, who The French Army marches through Syria. 27 tenaciously fought the French occupation of Algeria in 1832 and lost. By 1918, his descendants had hundreds of North African followers who brought law and order to Damascus. T. E. Lawrence despised these North Africans; in return, they attempted to incite his murder. Looting was rampant and it would only be controlled when regular officers of the Arab Revolt opened fire on looters with heavy machine guns. These killings usually would have led to tribal vendettas, but because this was done in the name of order and adl (justice), it was viewed as execution and thereby no shame was attached to killing looters. Although Wardi does not discuss this, it is likely that Arab-on-Arab violence was more palatable than British-on-Arab violence. British General Allenby Arrives in Damascus British Commander, General Allenby, arrived in Damascus on 3 October and arranged for a meeting with Prince Feisal at the Hotel Victoria, where he outlined the details of the Sykes-Picot agreement. According to this agreement, Syria, to include Damascus, was allocated as a French sphere of influence. Allenby explained that Feisal could rule Syria temporarily, on behalf of the French, and that it would include only Greater Syria, not Lebanon or Palestine. In Wardi’s account, General Allenby turned to T. E. Lawrence and asked if he had informed Feisal of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Lawrence responded in the negative, and added that he did not know of the agreement. Feisal, who was visibly upset, objected to this imposed agreement. In response, General Allenby decided to take a military approach, ending the meeting by saying to Feisal that he (Allenby) was commander in chief and Feisal was a general under his command and was to obey orders until this matter was sorted out. As a result, T. E. Lawrence asked to resign from military service and return to England. He had spent 2 years among the Arabs and an even longer time traveling throughout pre-World War I, World War I, and post-World War I Middle East. Lawrence of Arabia, before departing Syria, had become a household word thanks to American journalist Lowell Thomas, who spent 2 days with him and created the Lawrence myth. After his resignation, Lawrence devoted himself to advising Prince Feisal at the peace conference in Versailles, sending a cable to the Sherief of Mecca, Feisal’s father, recommending that Feisal represent Arab interests in Versailles. Feisal in France: Intrigues of the Versailles Conference (1919) Feisal, Lawrence, and Nuri Said departed from Beirut for Paris in late October 1918. Arriving in Marseille 5 days later, Feisal was received by French Colonel Bremond. The French military officer, who served in pacifying North Africa and had a thorough grasp of Arabic, told Feisal that while France welcomed him as an honored guest, it did not recognize Feisal in any diplomatic capacity. Bremond then turned to Lawrence and told him that he welcomed him as a serving British officer, but could not continue to extend the welcome if he did not wear his appropriate uniform and discard his Arab robes. Lawrence grew angry, returned the high French decorations awarded him, and left for England. In January 1919, Feisal departed France for England. During his time in England, he met King George V and was awarded the Victoria Cross. He also met with Chaim Weizmann and discussed prospects of a Jewish presence in Palestine. The meeting between Weizmann and Feisal is the subject of much mythology, but Wardi provides a scholarly Arabic perspective. According to Wardi, Feisal agreed to the integration of Jews in Palestine only if the Arabs were given their self-determination and independence in Arabia and the Levant, to include Lebanon and Palestine. However, these were impossible requests to meet in light of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Feisal returned to Paris in preparation for the Versailles Conference in December 1919. After Feisal’s formal request to attend the conference was rebuffed, he was assigned two seats by British Prime Minister Lloyd George. The British and the Arabs both wanted to renegotiate the terms of Sykes-Picot Agreement. The British were eyeing parts of what is now Mosul to merge it with Iraq, instead of Syria. It was deemed that Mosul would provide a more economically viable British mandate as part of Iraq. The presence of the Arabs under Feisal could provide an opportunity for the British to play the Arabs against the French and possibly gain Mosul. Prince Feisal, although marginalized in the actual conference, did get a chance to address the conference and amplify the Arab contribution to the war effort. Feisal’s remarks on Arab sacrifices made the difference in de- “Along with the forces of the Arab Revolt were former Ottoman officers of Iraqi origin: Nuri al-Said, T. E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia), Nuri Shaalan of the Ruwailah, Auda Abu Tayi of the Howeitat, and finally Sultan al-Atrash of the Druze. They claimed Damascus for Prince Feisal and his father, Hussein ibn Ali of Mecca. Feisal would be declared king of Syria that month.” “In January 1919, Feisal departed France for England. During his time in England, he met King George V and was awarded the Victoria Cross. He also met with Chaim Weizmann (left) and discussed prospects of a Jewish presence in Palestine. The meeting between Weizmann and Feisal is the subject of much mythology, but Wardi provides a scholarly Arabic perspective.” 28 laying France’s plan to annex Syria. Instead, the conference attendees assigned a commission, known as the “Crane Commission,” to look into the desires of the local populace. During the conference, Feisal additionally made many influential friends, to include Woodrow Wilson’s wife, Edith Wilson (formerly Galt), and French author, Anatole France. These new friends also advocated for Arab self-determination. Feisal did not linger in France; he made his way rapidly back to Syria to prepare the populace for the arrival of the Crane Commission. The Commission affirmed Feisal to be monarch of Greater Syria only and asserted the independence of Lebanon from Syria. The Crane Commission’s findings meant nothing; France simply swapped Mosul to Britain for British support for France’s right to assume the mandate over the rest of Syria and Lebanon. Feisal’s days were numbered as the self-proclaimed king of Syria. As hard-liners and pro-colonialists took power in France, assigning the hawkish General Henri Gouraud as commissioner-general of Beirut, Georges Clemenceau was voted out of office in favor of Alexandre Millerand, a socialist who leaned toward the conservatives to balance a tenuous governing coalition. Feisal’s Ministers in Syria: Challenges and Ultimatums In Syria, King Feisal’s first cabinet was preoccupied with an imminent French invasion. They also dealt with sectarian violence between Lebanon’s Christians and Shiites, stimulated by the French arming Christians and Sunnis, and members supportive of King Feisal arming Shiites. French forces intervened in these sectarian massacres in Lebanon and demanded from Feisal that all railways in Syria and Lebanon be placed under France’s disposal; the Compulsory draft be abolished; the French mandate over Syria and Lebanon be accepted; those stoking sectarian violence be punished; and French currency in the Levant be imposed. Feisal, feeling he had no choice, accepted the ultimatum, which led to rioting in Damascus and other parts of Syria. A Syrian cleric, Rashid Rida, incited religious opposition to the French and Feisal. Rida would later be exiled to Egypt, where he stimulated a young Hassan al-Banna, who would later go on to establish the Muslim Brotherhood, the first Islamist political party in 1928. The rioting hardened Feisal’s resolve against the French. Wardi reports that Feisal concluded that he arrived as the conqueror of Damascus and would leave only if forcibly evicted. Another debate among Feisal’s ministers in Syria was regarding the successful push of French forces from Asia Minor by Kemal Ataturk as he established the Republic of Turkey. The debate centered on whether or not to aid the Turks; however, with only 4,000 troops and 12 cannons, it was decided unfeasible. In addition, concerns arose as to whether Ataturk’s forces would push deep into Syria, which might exploit the French retreat. This victory by Ataturk led to the redirection of retreating French forces toward the preservation of Syria. The objectives of the French were to show that Feisal’s ministers, as well as the king himself, were incapable of restoring order. On July 1920, a robust French force arrived and defeated an Arab army at Khan Maysalun. King Feisal headed toward the Umayyad Mosque, which was perhaps among Islam’s earliest mosques and an architectural gem, built in the late 7th century in the center of Damascus. There, he called on the populace to defend Syria, raising and arming 10,000 volunteers. But this was no match for French artillery, armored units, tanks, cavalry, and infantry, supported by biplanes. Youssef Uzma, the defense minister, along with thousands of other Arabs, died in the Battle of Maysalun in late July 1920. King Feisal Evicted from Syria: Examining His Failures (1920) Feisal had 48 hours to depart from Syria. He first went to Der’aa, and then Haifa. From Haifa, he traveled on to Switzerland, and from there, Italy. Feisal spent 3 months in Italy, where he paid 100 gold liras to the editor of Il Popolo d’Italia, a young Benito Mussolini, to publish pro-Arab and anti-French columns. In Italy, he also established contact with Turkish officials to conspire against the French. Feisal would end up in London, at the invitation of Lord Curzon, who offered him the throne of Iraq. Wardi compiles assessments from several advisors to Feisal, while he was briefly king of Syria, as to why he failed. They include:  Resistance by the Syrians to conscription, much like their resistance to Ottoman conscription.  Feisal’s nepotism; he assigned those close to him in the Arab Revolt to positions of authority and marginalized Syria’s elite tribes and families.  Feisal’s style of running Syria like an Arabian tribal fiefdom and not recognizing the proud urban and civil nature of governing an ancient metropolis like Damascus. The Bedouin and urban styles of governance were widely different. “Feisal’s days were numbered as the self-proclaimed king of Syria. As hard-liners and pro-colonialists took power in France, assigning the hawkish General Henri Gouraud (shown at left) as commissioner-general of Beirut, Georges Clemenceau was voted out of office in favor of Alexandre Millerand, a socialist who leaned toward the conservatives to balance a tenuous governing coalition.” 29

 His minister of education, Sateh Hussari, attempted to secularize Syria’s education system, which quickly led to friction between the populace and King Feisal’s cabinet.  Feisal used scarce forces to pacify sectarian tensions and he was a political amateur in the hands of more experienced British policymakers and advisors.  When Feisal proclaimed himself king of Syria in 1918, he had no agenda, platform, or plan for the country beyond Arab nationalist slogans. Some of his advisors, after the fact, questioned if he should have negotiated with the French a timetable for the mandate to end.  Why did Feisal accept the French ultimatum, only to fight them weeks later at Khan?  Maysalun? This particular question haunts many Arab historians to this day. The events that led to Feisal’s rise and fall in Syria, coupled with his experiences in London and Versailles, and his temporary exile, would shape his political education. He learned valuable lessons that would be employed when he assumed the throne of the newly created nation-state of Iraq. America’s military planners and those operating in the region will find this history relevant, as it has shaped the regional narrative and colonial victimization felt by the Iraqi people. Because the United States has been labeled as “imperialist, occupier, and colonialist,” to name a few, we should be more aware that these slogans are tied to the collective history of the region. Any counters to the propaganda that the United States is anew colonial master in the Middle East need to include an understanding, grounding, and immersion into the history that has led to the political insecurities of this region. Therefore, it is vital that we immerse America’s combat forces in the history of the region using Arabic sources to provide deploying units information dominance that encompasses the historic, cultural, sociological, and religious perspectives of the Middle East. The tenth essay in the series will review Wardi’s chapters on the rivalry between Hussein ibn Ali, the Sherief of Mecca, and Abdul-Aziz ibn Saud, then emir of the Nejd (Central Arabia) for control of the Arabian Peninsula. This time period would see the rise of Ibn Saud, and the eventual creation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Hussein, in whose name the Arab Revolt was conducted, evolved into a major liability for his sons, Abdullah and Feisal, as they assumed the thrones of the newly created mandates of Jordan and Iraq, respectively. Notes 1Great Britain, Committee of Imperial Defence, Historical Section, Military Operations: Egypt and Palestine, Compiled by Lieutenant General Sir George MacMunn and Captain Cyril Falls, London, 1928. 2Major Gregory A. Daddis, U. S. Army, “Armageddon’s Lost Lessons, Combined Arms Operations in Allenby’s Palestine Campaign,” Air Command and Staff College, Wright Flyer Paper No. 20, Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, February 2005. Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein is a U. S. Navy Medical Service Corps Officer and Middle East foreign area officer. He currently serves as a senior counterterrorism advisor, warning officer, and instructor on militant Islamist ideology, Joint Task Force for Combating Terrorism, Washington, DC. He received a B. B. A. from the University of Mississippi (Ole Miss), an M. B. A. and M. A. from the University of Arkansas, and an M. S. from the National Defense Intelligence College. His military education includes the U. S. Naval War College, the U. S. Army War College Defense Strategy Course, the Marine Corps University Amphibious Warfare School, and advanced analytic courses at the Joint Military Intelligence College. His most recent assignments include country director for North Africa and Egypt, assistant country director for the Arabian Gulf, and special advisor on Islamist Militancy at the Office of the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Washington, DC. “On July 1920, a robust French force arrived and defeated an Arab army at Khan Maysalun. King Feisal headed toward the Umayyad Mosque, which was perhaps among Islam’s earliest mosques and an architectural gem, built in the late 7th century in the center of Damascus. There, he called on the populace to defend Syria, raising and arming 10,000 volunteers. But this was no match for French artillery, armored units, tanks, cavalry, and infantry, supported by biplanes. Youssef Uzma, the defense minister, along with thousands of other Arabs, died in the Battle of Maysalun in late July 1920.” 30