The Eternal Foundation: Reorganizing the Regimental System’s Operational Framework to a Combined Arms Regimental System

“Regimental spirit and tradition can be a powerful factor in making for good morale and must be constantly encouraged. Because in the crisis of battle, a man will not derive encouragement from the glories of the past; he will seek aid from his leaders and comrades of the present. Most men do not fight well because their ancestors fought well at the battle of Minden two centuries ago, but because their particular platoon or unit has good leaders, is well disciplined, and has developed the feelings of comradeship and self-respect among all ranks and on all levels.” — Field Marshal Montgomery

This article is predicated on the belief that the highest level echelon that can foster unit cohesion in small wars, as well as big ones, is the battalion. The echelon between the battalion and the division is the brigade, and it does not work as a combat multiplier for a variety of reasons that this article intends to address. The Army can be improved significantly by reorganizing its operational framework to a combined arms regimental system. The Army’s brigade modular cohort system will be a negative drain on the quality of battalions and companies for generations to come. This is because the brigade diminishes the esprit de corps of its subordinate units and misrepresents itself as the only capable system that can coordinate combat power. The good news is that it is continually evolving. Chapter 1 of U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-90.6, The Brigade Combat Team (BCT), explains that the current system, which consists of the heavy brigade and infantry brigade will continue to be transformed until 2020.1 What’s driving this is the assumption that the Army has to customize different types of brigades and special detachments for “eleven critical variables that define the operational environment.”2 This FM goes on to proclaim that “Existing military capabilities are the most critical variable for BCT military operations.”3 This shows that the focus behind the modern brigade system is directed toward capabilities and not on the human element of an Army, which is esprit de corps and cohesiveness. What the brigade inevitably fails to recognize is that the most important military capability is the soldier, whose capabilities are maximized by serving in a unit with esprit de corps. Guiding this perspective is what one of the first British proponents of maneuver warfare, B. H. Liddell Hart wrote: “In war the chief incalculable is the human will.”4 This article makes the case that it is a fruitless effort to change the Army’s structure to adapt to “eleven critical variables.” It is the esprit de corps of our professional soldiers that makes a unit adaptive, regardless of the system. Instead of the brigade, it is the regiment that is the most adaptable formation in our order of battle because it is the most conducive to esprit de corps. Without esprit de corps, a unit cannot adapt, regardless of its label or how many assets it has. This article will also disprove the notion that the current brigade system is ideally suited to coordinate operations in any environment. It also shows the brigade system to be a convenience to higher planners, but a hindrance to building and employing combat units. The final conclusion reinforces that the brigade system diminishes the esprit de corps, which is essential to effective military organizations. The Industrialization of the American Army To gain a clear perspective on how our brigade system works, it is necessary to know how the Army evolved from an effective regimental organization to the industrial Army of today. The adaptation to the attrition warfare of the Second World War led to the eroding of a military culture that stood the test of operational requirements as taxing as the Indian wars and as devastating as the Civil War. The eroding began after the Second World War, where mass national conscription expanded the Army from a single corps into multiple armies numbering ten million men. To accommodate the expansion, many division headquarters were stood up and soldiers were sent to basic training en masse and shipped to forward units as part of a replacement system. This methodology was based on a system of scientific management called “Taylorism.” This means of management was invented by the industrialist Frederic Winslow Taylor. “His model was the machine with its cheap, interchangeable parts, each of which does one specific function. Taylor attempted to do to complex organizations what engineers had done to machines and this involved making individuals into the equivalent of machine parts.”5 This “What the brigade inevitably fails to recognize is that the most important military capability is the soldier, whose capabilities are maximized by serving in a unit with esprit de corps. Guiding this perspective is what one of the first British proponents of maneuver warfare, B. H. Liddell Hart wrote: ‘In war the chief incalculable is the human will.’ ” 7 method, which has great results in manufacturing, was used by the Army in the Second World War to maintain attrition against the German army. It did not focus on proficiency of the tactical unit because the strategy was about outlasting the Germans.6 After the war, the Army was depleted; huge numbers of conscripted soldiers left and the Army became an occupation force. Few units maintained a regimental lineage and made esprit de corps and proficiency their modus operandi. Units, such as the 101st and 82d Airborne, kept their regimental lineage by grouping all their battle-proven regiments under one brigade, which is how they kept cohesion. However, the other infantry units did not and were further degraded by the establishment of the “pentomic army.” This was a bizarre order of battle, which attempted to customize the Army to fight a war after massive nuclear holocaust, and planned to use nuclear weapons to support the units on the ground. They fought in an area contaminated by radioactive waste, as if such an area would still be key terrain after nuclear contamination.7 In this structure, units were called “battle groups” and were oriented based on missile units that would launch tactical nuclear weapons. This was also a conscript Army, whose personnel were rotated like interchangeable machine parts. According to John McGrath’s recent publication, The Brigade: A History, the pentomic structure was flawed in several ways.8 The main flaw, as it pertains to this article, was the detriment to regimental cohesion. “The battle groups, and later, the ROAD [Reorganization of the Army] brigades, combined infantry battalions from different regiments in a chaotic fashion that eliminated regimental cohesion.”9 The brigade combat team remains remarkably similar to this structure. The Army attempted to solve the issue by applying the ultimate all-purpose medication in the form of U. S. Army Regulation (AR) 600-82, The U. S. Army Regimental System, which was intended to create a regimental culture within the brigade command structure and foster esprit de corps, as intended in 1981 when the Army Regimental System replaced the Combat Arms Regimental System.10 This would be accomplished by maintaining a consistent cadre and ethos that leaders at battalion level and below could rely on. The current brigade system neutralizes this approach by mar-ginalizing the charisma and abilities of its subordinate leaders, smothering them with Armywide regulations and policies, which may not even be applicable but yet are blindly enforced. This reduces fighting units to bureaucracies weakened to the point of being compatible with garrison life. Materializing from the brigade system is a level of command more synchronized with higher-level politics than the operational needs and character of its units and soldiers. Many brigade-level leaders have great difficulty keeping their finger on “The eroding began after the Second World War, where mass national conscription expanded the Army from a single corps into multiple armies numbering ten million men. To accommodate the expansion, many division headquarters were stood up and soldiers were sent to basic training en masse and shipped to forward units as part of a replacement system.” “Opinions within the Army maintain that the regiment is meant to be anon-modular force that does not employ combined arms and does not have the capacity to synchronize assets. These opinions are incorrect; in fact, the combined arms regiment is the most effective force at employing combined arms and synchronization, as proven under the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment’s (ACR’s) order of battle, which includes both maneuver and supporting arms, and trains as one cohesive force.” 8 the pulse of subordinate battalions, thus allowing their formation to be overregulated. The current Army brigade organization also resembles the European divisional system of the Napoleonic era in which methodology was used to monopolize esprit de corps on broad levels and marginalize junior officers, whose initiatives and creativity threatened its systematic and attrition-minded approach to war. It also degraded its battalions and junior leaders by using an assembly-line approach to task organization. This was all accomplished under the auspices of facilitating effective combined-arms warfare when, in reality, it was a method of funneling its leadership dynamic from a centralized source. This mentality was destructive to both Napoleon and the German army of both world wars. Both of these armies were in fact defeated by armies with regimental systems. From these examples we can see that Tayloristic approaches to structuring our Army’s order of battle, such as AR 600-82, are anathema to training effective tactical units.11 Planting the Seeds that Sprout Esprit de Corps The regimental system is meant to foster esprit de corps by maintaining a professional cadre that takes personal and professional ownership of the unit. This, in itself, will allow synchronization of units and assets. Opinions within the Army maintain that the regiment is meant to be anon-modular force that does not employ combined arms and does not have the capacity to synchronize assets. These opinions are incorrect; in fact, the combined arms regiment is the most effective force at employing combined arms and synchronization, as proven under the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment’s (ACR’s) order of battle, which includes both maneuver and supporting arms, and trains as one cohesive force. What makes this work is an intense level of esprit de corps: the regiment’s esprit de corps leads to a high level of tactical proficiency, which, in turn, enables the regiment to employ its combined arms. The 3d ACR’s esprit de corps contributed directly to its storied history of high performance. To use another example, the 75th Ranger Regiment is alight infantry unit considered by many to be the best in the world. It also has a regimental headquarters capable of synchronizing combined arms assets. Most notable, however, is the fact that soldiers from both units never mention they were in a particular battalion; instead, they claim “the regiment.” Both units have a reputation that speaks for itself and does not need to be exemplified with footnotes or quotes. Most importantly, both units have a steady cadre of soldiers who spend most of their careers in these units, which proves the Army already has regimental systems in place that are not only functioning, but are also the elite among their orders of battle. There is more to an effective regiment than just its common headquarters and regimental lineage — personnel continuity is critical to ensuring a regiment remains a nurturing infrastructure for esprit de corps. When soldiers are loyal to their regiment and professionally fulfilled, they will initiate efforts to increase the unit’s overall performance. This is becoming common practice at well-led small units Armywide, but is not optimal because these levels of loyalty are relative to echelons with the strongest leaders. For example, a company performs very well during a company-led operation, but when part of a battalion operation, it sometimes becomes desynchronized or may not be as productive. In others instances, soldiers go the limit for their team or squad leader, but become introverted in the presence of their sergeant major or battalion commander, who they may not trust. The regiment sets the tone for effective leadership by promoting an environment of trust. Regardless of how bad a situation may be, individual soldiers and their immediate chains of command have a consistent sense of military identity, a bond. This bond is very comparable to a loving family; it is a constant source of strength that enables soldiers to adapt in any role or operational environment. This is because no matter what the role, each soldier is a member of the regiment, which is enough. This collective military identity has never been fully explored by psychologists; however, students of history realize that the strongest units have always had an incredible sense of belonging on the part of the individual soldier. Other advantages to the regiment include its instinct to regenerate through self-recruitment and train soldiers to a greater level of effectiveness than external schools. Though self-recruiting may not be applicable today, the regiment can still recruit from basic training centers and specialty schools. The Ranger regiment and Special Forces commonly give briefings at the Airborne School to “recruit” motivated volunteers. This is correctly predicated on the notion that a soldier who volunteers for a unit is likely to be a better performer than one who is indifferent. A functional regimental system in the Army would send recruiters to basic training installations to recruit volunteers, portraying their regiment as being optimal based on its lineage, training, esprit de corps, valor, etc. This negates the subsequent negativity that occurs when the Army enlists soldiers who are motivated by things other than soldiering, and assigns them to units based on their superficial desires. When soldiers are assigned to “…the 75th Ranger Regiment is alight infantry unit considered by many to be the best in the world. It also has a regimental headquarters capable of synchronizing combined arms assets. Most notable, however, is the fact that soldiers from both units never mention they were in a particular battalion; instead, they claim ‘the regiment.’ ” 9 a unit that has little or no esprit de corps, they realize that soldiering is a rugged, demanding life and tend to shut down from disappointment and count the days until their enlistment ends. Having a regiment whose cadre actively takes initiative to preserve its legacy and strengthen its character increases the professionalism of its soldiers. The regiment is generally admired for its martial culture, and its accomplishments are heralded throughout the Army. The Army will become more self-aware when populated with a network of regiments with unique identities. For example, members of a ranger regiment train new soldiers on military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) tactics strictly in accordance with their stand operating procedure (SOP). The SOP has immediate credibility based on the fact that the regiment had actually developed the tactics. Another example is the 3d ACR’s counterinsurgency mission in Tal Afar, Iraq. In this case, the regimental commander brilliantly grasped the reality on the ground and successfully drove a wedge between the enemy and the tribal population. From this example, the Army formulated a campaign plan to better operate in Iraq. Indeed, many units in the Army have developed tactics and SOPs and many units are equally adept at counterinsurgency. However, these units were not heralded like the 75th and 3d ACR because the brigade system brands them as “generic” and creates an expectation of mediocrity from the elite-minded Army hierarchy. For example, a brigade headquarters may not be part of the same regiment as a particular battalion and therefore not share the battalion’s credit for a successful mission. As a result, the brigade may downplay the battalion’s success or take credit for it. On the other hand, the regiment is proud of its subordinate units’ success, which is based on a vested interest in its soldiers, who are the continuity of its long-standing heritage. Leaders above the regimental level will have the ability to visualize an individual regiment’s capabilities based on its own merits. The evidence of a regiment’s command climate is indicated by the quality of soldiers seeking membership. Because a career track is centered on service in a particular regiment, officers spend a lot more time with troops and test on actual operations, as opposed to using sanitized training environments. Career tracking provides division commanders, and above, an advantage in evaluating senior officers, which is influenced by a regimental commander’s time within the unit and his personal relationship with his soldiers. Truly selfless leaders, who dedicate their lives to making units stronger, will rise to higher command in contrast to the careerists who spend their careers seeking sycophantic assignments. This reinforces a better standard of what shapes competitive officers and capable fighting units. Misconceptions from the Brigade’s Byzantine Atmosphere Lead to a Softened Military Culture The brigade does not add to the cohesion and capability of battalions as it so acknowledges; in fact, the brigade pretends to be a ubiquitous headquarters that can sanitize the friction of war for higher level planners and overlooks establishing cohesive units. Another misconception is that the brigade system can synchronize various maneuver assets, which makes it necessary to put them all under one such command. This may make sense in theory, but the reality is most units in a brigade never operate to- “Many brigade headquarters have allowed their disconnected nature to darken their vision of their subordinates, and their staff officers are conditioned to sycophancy, casting aspersion on subordinate units. This leads the brigade to condemn and stifle initiative. For example, battalions and companies have accomplished amazing things in Iraq and Afghanistan and will continue to do so, yet their actions were not recognized; instead, they were marginalized by the jealous character of the brigade culture.”

gether until they train at a combined arms training center. Even after this training, the brigade headquarters remains a foreign entity to subordinate battalions, all of which have different regimental lineages. To forge a brigade combat “team,” as it is called, operations must be standardized across the brigade, which marginalizes the customs of the regiments. This effect is anathema to esprit de corps. Many successful battalion and company operations have been undermined beneath the umbrella of the brigade. Many brigade headquarters have allowed their disconnected nature to darken their vision of their subordinates, and their staff officers are conditioned to sycophancy, casting aspersion on subordinate units. This leads the brigade to condemn and stifle initiative. For example, battalions and companies have accomplished amazing things in Iraq and Afghanistan and will continue to do so, yet their actions were not recognized; instead, they were marginalized by the jealous character of the brigade culture. This is because the brigade, unlike the regiment, fails to marshal the cohesiveness of its subordinates to accomplish what it sets out to do. Instead, the brigade is forced into a highly decentralized operational tempo because it cannot truly be ingrained with the battalions, who all become their own entities. The brigade then becomes frustrated and injects “guidance,” which will either take the form of an order or perhaps be disregarded — all at the convenience of the brigade and the expense of lower echelons. Field Manual 3-90.6, The Brigade Combat Team, defines the brigade by what it is meant to accomplish: “as a combined arms maneuver unit, the BCT closes with and destroys the enemy by combining reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition, long-range fires, maneuver, and the support of joint and other Army units.”12 This doctrine is flawed based on the brigade’slack of intangible ethos that make it a unit. Rather, it is a supervisor for subordinate battalions and does not offer anything but control and the allocation of resources. This disconnect negates the advantage of brigade’s other intended capability, which is the fact that it is the lowest level echelon in the Army that can be deployed without a higher headquarters. Ultimately, the brigade ends up under the command of an outside division headquarters, further isolating it and lending to its frustration. Lacking lineage, the fulfillment of actual soldiering and being the least accountable echelon in the Army, the brigade headquarters becomes an entity that damages the soul of the Army by killing the esprit de corps that nourishes it. The Army’s current attempt at implementing a regimental system, which was designed in 1981, is not working. It is ceremonial at best. It was meant “to provide each soldier with continuous identification with a single regiment and to support that concept with a personnel system that would increase a soldier’s probability of serving recurring assignments with his or her regiment.”13 In this system, the benefits of granting a lineage are made irrelevant by the adjustment the Army has made to accommodate its current wartime tempo. Currently units, from division to battalion level, are reflagged erroneously to accommodate the Army’s manning needs. They are also manned with the goal of pushing a unit into a deployment cycle, breaking it apart, and reconstituting it within months, just to deploy again. Soldiers reenlist for the sake of duty station preferences and deployment cycle. One Army unit looks the same as another, regardless of its mission or lineage. The intangible rewards of regimental lineage will not pay off, as they should, as long as the brigade and divisional system remains synonymous throughout the Army. The awkward mixture of brigade headquarters and battalions that pretend to assume a regimental lineage creates a confusing and opportunistic bureaucracy, which is accommodating to the nuances of various divisions and garrison cultures, using an assembly-line approach toward task organizing. Not only is the regimental lineage confusing, but battalion commanders constantly mix-match platoons and brigade commanders mix-match companies to task organize according to mission demands. This clearly indicates that the Army culture believes material capability is more important than unit cohesion, which would not be necessary if the Army had a durable and flexible regimental structure from the beginning. The Army’s brigade cohort system is flawed in four primary areas:  It is a hindrance to adaptive and dynamic leaders at the battalion level and below due to its synchronization with higher echelons instead of subordinate units.  Its command climate has become negative in all aspects because it is too far removed from reality to make operational decisions or understand realism beyond a slide presentation.  It is an entity separate from the units that actually maneuver, and instead of employing cohesively, they compete for resources and create a forum for quarreling over superfluous tasks. This mentality becomes contagious and contaminates the battalions in their dealings with subordinate commands, which stems from a softened military culture that loses its esprit de corps as a result of the brigade headquarters being an independent entity that resembles a Byzantine hierarchy.  Through the misconception of discipline and jaded regard for its soldiers, the brigade maliciously saps the esprit de corps from battalions. The battalions, in turn, lose long-term dedication by denying soldiers a climate in which to make personal and lasting contributions to the organization. The brigade headquarters resorts to marginalizing cultures that give soldiers a true sense of belonging and ownership of their profession, and further subjects them to mundane regulations that numb their passions for soldiering. These four flaws prove that battalions require a regimental headquarters ingrained with the lineage and history of the battalions, intimately familiar with its soldiers and culture, and leaders who righteously depend on the unit’s consistently good reputation to sustain their careers beyond that of individual achievements. Instead of being a facilitator, the current regimental system merely becomes a funnel for the bureaucratic Army’s mis-perceived need to regulate every occasion and limit the span of leader authority. The Illusion of Discipline and Cohesion The brigade’s cultural and bureaucratic distance from its battalions lead it to misconstrue the definition of effective discipline and cohesion. The brigade system marginalizes its lower level units in the Army. As it is more connected with division headquarters, the brigade creates a misguided impression that discipline takes the form of a regulation. It goes on further to regard a regulation as equal to a standard, which is incorrect because regulations simply attempt to control human behavior by controls or restrictions. The brigade believes that a regulated unit is a better unit and blind enforcement of regulations against all personnel defines discipline, which results in leaders not leading. Instead, they enforce regulations or, even worse, become subjected to outsiders who enforce regulations for them. Regardless of designation, leaders make units effective. It is much easier for leaders to hone their skills throughout the Army if a credible military culture exists which allows effective leaders to predominate. To do this, leaders need a climate of discipline to foster cohesiveness. “Discipline,” as defined for the purposes of this article, is “the instant and willing obedience to orders and respect for authority.” The key point in this definition is the word “willing.” Without discipline, cohesiveness cannot exist. “Cohesiveness,” for the purposes of this article, is defined as “working together for a common purpose.” There cannot be 11 true cohesiveness unless discipline preexists; without discipline, orders will be confused, command relationships become dysfunctional, and sense of purpose is lost, which saps the morale out of even the most eager soldiers. Every soldier, from the very young inexperienced soldier to the tough experienced warfighter, requires esprit de corps to perform better than mediocre. Regulations do not produce discipline because the letter of the regulation becomes the leverage outside agencies use to manipulate commanders. This disrupts cohesiveness because the purpose of the organization becomes subject to the regulation it is meant to follow. Regulations are established by individuals who have long since departed the unit and are no longer accountable for its performance. The regimental system solves this schism of regulation-versus-discipline issue by relying on command authority to interpret regulations to achieve higher standards of performance. The Brigade Enables a Culture of Misconceptions As a result of the Army’s misconceptions on the subject of creating an adaptable unit, it marginalizes its regimental lineage, sacrificing unit cohesion and adaptability on the battlefield. Continually shifting and restructuring task organization to fit specific missions is completely unnecessary because the regimental structure is solid and flexible enough to support any type of operation. This is compared to the brigade model, whose overemphasis on flexibility serves to make it inflexible. The Army has heavy brigade combat “teams” that possess a robust personnel authorization, but binds them to vehicle platforms so that they cannot penetrate restricted terrain. The non-heavy brigade combat “teams” (which cannot be described as light because they are bound to armored trucks) lack the personnel to maintain sufficient combat power during high-intensity combat. The current management of the Army brigade “cohorts” or “teams” (Army doctrinal terminology has been inconsistent from 2004-2009) is suited for strategic-level planners, but not conducive to battalion-and company-level echelons, which need consistent military structure, a hierarchy from which to draw inspiration and institutional knowledge, and the ability to adapt to all aspects of full-spectrum operations. This culture of mixing pseudo regimental lineage with brigade command and control, coupled with constantly juggling task organization, is a mistake. This mix-match has caused a large number of soldiers from various professional backgrounds to work together toward ambiguous end states, which has led to a facade of discipline and cohesiveness that will not stand the test of incessant and even harsher operational demands. It would be more efficient to train and deploy units that have the same type of personnel and task organization. To return to the regimental system and restart the Army toward an effective combined arms regimental system, the Department of Defense will be required to support a required framework such as: Year one. Reflag each battalion in every brigade under the same regiment. This includes the reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) squadron, which should be reconstituted as an infantry battalion. The Army handpicks noncommissioned officers and officers to be stationed at a regiment for a 6-year period. These soldiers are given incentives, such as bonuses and guaranteed duty stations of choice, after a 6-year commitment. Also, each regiment stands up a regimental direct-action/recon unit that can project combat power for the regimental headquarters, which leads to facilitating higher headquarters’ ability to affect the deeper fight. Year two. Life cycle is 2 years home, 1 year deployed, which must be maintained. Perhaps deployed units can be given significantly less operational requirements to support additional leave and reset periods when training can be conducted. Also, regional recruiting offices can recruit locally on behalf of division commanders. Soldiers are immediately assigned sponsors and enter into a regimental indoctrination program (determined based on the regiment of assignment), and then prepare to successfully complete basic training. Year three. Reflag every brigade headquarters as a combined arms regiment. Assign an organic attack aviation battalion to each regiment, as well as fires cell, which can deconflict air and indirect fire by space at both regiment and battalion levels. Each regiment should have its own training area on every post, as well as its own personnel support system. Regiments should also establish their own regulations and provide input for their own modified tables of organization and equipment (MTOEs). The final result is a better Army, whose soldiers are connected to a unit for life, which builds away of life with families and communities that will support the Army for generations to come. The most effective way to improve any organization is to improve on what is already established, not change it! To prevent the Army from further degradation brought on by the demands of current operations, a pure military culture is needed, which will enable the U. S. Army’s proven character to withstand the test of time. The Army must rebuild and reinforce the one military structure that fosters adaptive and dynamic leaders rather than forces them to constantly conform to a rigid garrison life and ubiquitous regulations. For this to happen, the battalion must be empowered by a level of command focused on enabling battalions and companies and growing leaders rather than being consumed with the tedium of overregulating and nonmission-related issues. Notes 1Headquarters, Department of the Army, U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-90.6, The Brigade Combat Team, U. S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, DC, 2006, Chapter 1. 2Ibid., p. 1-1. 3Ibid., p. 1-3. 4Quote by B. H. Liddell Hart, English soldier, historian, and leading interwar theorist. 5Edward G. Wertheim, “Historical Background of Organizational Behavior,” Essay, College of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Boston, 2007. 6Louis Morton, U. S. Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific, Strategy and Command: The First Two Years, Foreword by James A. Norell, U. S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC, 1961. 7Office of the Chief of Military History, The U. S. Army Historical Series, “The Army and the New Look,” U. S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC, Chapter 26, 1967. 8John J. McGrath, The Brigade: A History, Combat Studies Institute Press, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2004. 9Ibid. 10Headquarters, Department of the Army, U. S. Army Regulation (AR) 600-82, The U. S. Army Regimental System, GPO, Washington, DC, 1 May 1986 (superseded by AR 600-82, 5 June 1990). 11Ibid. 12FM 3-90.6, The Brigade Combat Team. 13AR 600-82, The U. S. Army Regimental System. Major Joseph D. Labarbera is currently serving as a mentor, G2, 303d Afghan National Police Corps, 1st Brigade, 10th Mountain Division Transition Team, Afghanistan. He received a B. A. from the City University of New York and is pursuing an M. A. at the American Military University. His military education includes the Infantry Captain Career Course, Field Artillery Officer Basic Course, Marine Corps Basic Officer Course, and Marine Corps Officer Candidate School. He has served in various command and staff positions, which include recon company trainer, Operations Group, National Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA; advisor to the brigade S3, 4th Battalion, 6th Iraqi Army, and the commander, Brigade Direct Action Company, Machmudia, Iraq; rifle company commander, 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry, 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, Yusifiya, Iraq, and Fort Drum, NY; and civil military operations officer, 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry, 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, Baghdad, Iraq. 12