Highlighting the Most Significant Work of Iraq’s Social, Political, and Military History: Volume IV of the Multivolume Collection of Dr. Ali al-Wardi

Foreword The late Dr. Ali al-Wardi’s multivolume, “Social Aspects of Modern Iraqi History,” is an indispensable work on the social, military, religious, and political history — from the early Ottoman era to the British-installed monarchy of Ki-danellesng Feisal I after World War I — of the lands that became Iraq. The relevance of Wardi’s study continues to present day, shedding light on the tribal nature of culture, politics, and power in Iraq, in addition to long-standing patterns of governance and insurgency. Through his work, America’s military and diplomatic practitioners and policy analysts can gain insight into the sociology and anthropology — or what has recently been called the “human terrain” — of Iraq, perhaps, most importantly, the ties that link tribe, religion, place, and social structure. The review essay that follows, by Commander Aboul-Enein, a valued advisor to leaders in the American national defense establishment, covers volume four in the Wardi series, delving into the period of 1914 to 1918, a time when the British and Ottoman empires fought on what we now know as Iraq. A tenet of Commander Aboul-Enein has long been the imperative for Americans to see translated Arab works of significance in U. S. military and diplomatic journals, and he has opened the door by providing us with this gift. He does so not only for the benefit of American servicemen and women and diplomats, but for all who wish to understand and act wisely in a country and region in which the United States has been profoundly engaged for more than a century, and will be inextricably bound for decades to come. — Dr. Jeffrey (Jeb) Nadaner Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations (2004-2008) Jamal Pasha surrounded by tribal leaders of the regions of South Baghdad.

Iraq’s Social, Political, and Military History: Collection of Dr. Ali al-Wardi Dr. Wardi begins this volume by discussing the state of political-military affairs of the Ottoman Empire before delving into Iraq specifically. He understands it is impossible to divorce the affairs of Istanbul from those of Baghdad and Basra. The Ottoman Empire was effectively run by a military junta that styled themselves the “Committee of Union and Progress,” generally known as the “Young Turks.” In 1914, the Germans and Austro-Hungarian Empires were fighting the British, French, and Russians. World War I began with the Ottomans maintaining neutrality, but leaning toward Germany. Due to war demands, the British refused to transfer two battleships to the Ottomans, but the Germans offered the light cruisers, Breslau and Goeben, to the Ottoman navy. As German Admiral Souchon was scheduled to deliver the two battle cruisers, crewed and officered by Germans, but flying an Ottoman flag, he began the bombardment of Russian ports along the Black Sea beginning with Odessa, then turning his guns on Sebastopol and Novransk. Ottoman Prime Minister Saeed Halim Pasha (honorific title equivalent to a British Lord) received word of these bombardments on 29 October 1914 while vacationing for the Eid holidays. Two days later, Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire. As German Admiral Souchon was bombarding Russian ports, General Liman von Sanders, head of the German military mission in Turkey and the senior officer in charge of training Ottoman forces, began the mobilization of Ottoman forces. For all purposes, the Ottomans were drawn into World War I by subterfuge and members of the Young Turks who wanted to ally themselves with the Germans. The Process of Announcing a Jihad W ardi’s book is unique because it focuses on details such as the method and process by which the Ottomans drew up the fatwa (religious edict) for jihad. It also includes, in latter parts of the book, details of the management of tribes by both Ottoman and British forces in Iraq. Khuri Effendi (lowest title of honor given to Ottoman bureaucrats, junior officers, and clerics), the Sheikh-ul-Islam of Constantinople, drew up a November fatwa, making jihad fard ayn (individual obligation) for all Muslims of the Ottoman domains, as well as Muslims residing in the British, French, and Russian Empires. That same month, the Ottoman Sultan announced jihad, as caliph of all Muslims, to liberate oppressed Muslims and defend the empire. The proclamation of jihad on 23 November 1914 was signed by notable clerics of the empire to protect Mecca, Medina, Karbala, Najaf, the capital of the Umayyad Caliphate Damascus, the capital of the Abbasid Caliphate of Baghdad, and Muslims who were oppressed and enslaved for centuries by European powers. The Ottomans circulated millions of copies of their proclamation and concentrated their jihad propaganda on Egypt, Sudan, India, Persia, and Afghanistan. This overarching climate of the Ottomans, framing their conflict with Britain, France, and Russia as a religious war, led to the production of books in Iraq, such as Muhammad Habeeb al-Mosuli’s The Rope of Unity and the Duty toward the Islamic Caliphate in 1916, and English Crimes against Humanity and Muslims in Particular, which makes the case that England is not only the enemy of Muslims, but as the book discusses, Asians, in general. It encourages the uprising and disobedience by a number of Muslims in hostile nations: 70 million in Great Britain; 16 million in the British Protectorate of Egypt and the Sudan; 20 million in French and British Africa; and 20 million in Russia. German Kaiser Wilhelm Plays Muslim Identity Politics The German Kaiser did not object to being called “Hajj” (a title given to Muslims who made the pilgrimage to Mecca) or even “Mohammad Wilhelm.” Like Napoleon Bonaparte, who, upon seizing Egypt in 1798, adopted Arab dress and claimed to have seen the Prophet Muhammad in his dreams, the Kaiser saw in these identity politics a means of undermining British and French influence in their Muslim colonies. The tactic predictably concerned the British and French and, in particular, British intelligence officers and military planners who expended great thought on how to counter this Ottoman call for jihad. Of note, the deposed Sultan Abdel-Hamid II wrote in his memoirs that his brother, Sultan Muhammad V, erred in calling a jihad. He felt that the Ottomans should have seized the initiative and attacked Russia instead of relying on the irregular mobilization of the Ummah (the worldwide Muslim community). Germany attempted to incite an Ottoman jihad against its common foes; however, one aspect of its propaganda had a negative impact — the touting of the new technology of the Zeppelin. Ottoman subjects and many Iraqis had only heard of the Zeppelin; they saw it as a wonder weapon and assumed that their participation in a jihad was not necessary as German leaflets touted the ability of the Zeppelin to bomb the warships of the British Royal Navy. German agents in Persia incited Persians against allied diplomats — their safety and the safety of their families were in jeopardy. Ottoman military thinking focused on the offense and “…the deposed Sultan Abdel-Hamid II wrote in his memoirs that his brother, Sultan Muhammad V, erred in calling a jihad. He felt that the Ottomans should have seized the initiative and attacked Russia instead of relying on the irregular mobilization of the Ummah (the worldwide Muslim community).” — 27 neglected the defense, which led to their neglect of shoring up defenses on the Dardanelles and in Iraq. The Ottomans focused on attacking the Caucasus and the Russian front, due partly to Ottoman delusions of past grandeur that focused on the offense, and the need to bring their war to a quick and decisive conclusion. Wardi discusses four Ottoman fronts during World War I: the Caucasus, the Dardanelles, Sinai (in Egypt), and Iraq. However, this article discusses only the Sinai Front, which so worried British military leaders. The Sinai Front Jamal (Djemal) Pasha commanded the 4th Ottoman army, which was stationed in the Levant. He was charged by the Ottoman general staff to conduct attacks on the Sinai and the British-controlled Suez Canal. He left Istanbul for Damascus to assume command of the 4th Army in November 1914. In Damascus, he was given the premature title of “liberator of Egypt.” Of note, the al-liwa al-sharief (prophet’s banner) was kept in Medina and was sent to Damascus, arriving a few days before the arrival of Djemal Pasha. The banner was taken by special train from Medina in Arabia, stopping in Jerusalem, and arriving in Damascus; all part of inciting morale for the jihad. The banner would be used to lead the Ottoman 4th Army in its conquest of British-controlled Egypt. Ottoman forces moved toward Palestine in November 1914 to enter the Sinai. Routes along the way were lined with Quranic verses from which the soldiers would march under. At some point, Djemal Pasha decided to move his entire army at night to conceal their intention and movements; however, all the fanfare made it difficult to conceal. The British knew the Ottomans were deploying toward the Suez Canal, but did not know when or where the attack would commence and how the Egyptian populace and its armed forces would react if they attempted to stop this invasion. Elements of the 4th Ottoman Army crossed the Suez Canal in wooden boats in February 1915. Dogs gave away the Ottomans and the British hurriedly brought machine gun units to the west bank of the canal, which was reinforced with a defensive infantry force from the town of Ismailiyah, where the main Ottoman effort was believed to be using steamships and transports. Before the assault, Djemal Pasha invoked the infamous Tarek ibn Ziyad speech, in which ibn Ziyad said, “before you is Iberia; we either conquer or perish.” This became the force that would conquer Spain in 711 CE. The Mountain of Tarek, or Jebel Tarek, is currently the island of Gibraltar. Only 600 Ottomans crossed the canal; many were killed or captured. To make matters worse, no thought was given to the logistics resupply for the Ottoman force. Ali Fuad Bey, an Ottoman officer present, wrote of the state of the demoralized forces when Djemal Pasha ordered a retreat. It is estimated 5,000 Ottomans were casualties, and Djemal couched his retreat as a victory, using some of the crossing boats in parades in the streets of Beirut and Damascus. Recollection of Saddam’s infamous “Baghdad Bob,” who maintained the fiction of Iraqi victory while U. S. forces were within sight, is not anew phenomenon in Middle East conflicts. The Arab Revolt On 10 June 1916, the Sherief of Mecca, Hussein ibn Ali, a descendant of Prophet Muhammad, declared an Arab revolt against the Ottomans, and with the aid of British intelligence, tied down 12,000 Ottoman troops in Mecca, Taif, Jeddah, and Medina. Wardi’s work exposes the mechanics of how the British worked the Arab leaders of this revolt; many of these were Arab military officers in the service of the Ottoman army and included a number of Iraqis. These Iraqi Arab military officers would form the cadre of leadership when the British set up the Iraqi monarchy after World War I. Sherief (Effendi) al-Farouki, from Mosul, fought in the Dardanelles campaign and deserted from the Ottoman army to the British. He was taken to Cairo, debriefed by British military intelligence, and used as an advisor to Sherief Hussein of Mecca to begin working toward declaring a revolt against the Ottomans. Al-Farouki would become Sherief Hussein’s representative in Cairo. Nuri Said deserted Ottoman forces and hid in Basra, and when the British invaded Basra, he was interned in British India. Upon hearing of the Arab revolt, he volunteered his services and was moved to Cairo. The British selected ten officers and 150 soldiers of Arab origins, who were captured Ottoman prisoners of war (POWs), and transferred them from India to Egypt, where Nuri Said met the “Ottoman subjects and many Iraqis had only heard of the Zeppelin; they saw it as a wonder weapon and assumed that their participation in a jihad was not necessary as German leaflets touted the ability of the Zeppelin to bomb the warships of the British Royal Navy. German agents in Persia incited Persians against allied diplomats — their safety and the safety of their families were in jeopardy.” “Ottoman military thinking focused on the offense and neglected the defense, which led to their neglect of shoring up defenses on the Dardanelles and in Iraq. The Ottomans focused on attacking the Caucasus and the Russian front, due partly to Ottoman delusions of past grandeur that focused on the offense, and the need to bring their war to a quick and decisive conclusion.” 28 — ship and briefed them on the Arab revolt and the need to fight toward Arab independence from the Ottomans, who treated their Arab subjects as second-class citizens. The Arab POWs were unconvinced and asked if they were to be officered by British officers, like the French, who officered North African contingents. The British and members advocating an Arab revolt among the Syrians and Iraqis agreed that this Arab unit would officer themselves and form their own Arab unit. There was concern among the Syrians and Iraqis, represented by such sentiments as, “Are we Egyptians or Indians to be colonized!” Of the ten officers and 150 soldiers that departed Indian POW camps for Egypt, four officers and 15 soldiers refused to join the Arab revolt. The remaining landed in the port of Jeddah in August 1916; however, once these Arab military personnel interacted with the local population, they found public opinion against the Arab revolt. The majority of townspeople in the Hejaz (the Red Sea coast of Arabia) saw in this revolt an allegiance with the infidel English. Roaming the streets of Jeddah, residents questioned these Syrians and Iraqis, asking how they could even conceive of fighting fellow Muslims. Nuri Said was appointed deputy commander in chief of the Arab revolt, and his first order of business was to isolate Arab military personnel selected to be part of the Arab revolt from the main population. The experiment to graft Arab POWs to the Arab revolt was an ultimate failure, resulting in only six officers joining Sherief Hussein. In November 1916, British military officials moved a few Arab POWs from India to Rabigh along the Red Sea coast. The plan was to have them rally around Prince Ali, son of Sherief Hussein of Mecca, appealing to their pan-Arab sentiments. This netted a few dozen Arab officers and soldiers, but not the hundreds needed to make a difference in the revolt. Many brought from India to Arabia, who refused to fight the Ottomans, were shipped to Egypt and then back to India. In Egypt, a lieutenant colonel, Jafar al-Askari, who was an ardent Arab nationalist of Iraqi origin, was used by the British to travel POW camps and convince Arab prisoners to join the revolt and achieve Arab self-determination. It was Askari who kept Sherief Hussein apprised of the disposition of the Arab POWs, as well as how many were recruited to the revolt. His reports led Sherief Hussein of Mecca to cease pursuing Arab-Ottoman military POWs for fear they would mount a coup against the Sherief of Mecca. Askari would be charged by Sherief Hussein to train a regular standing army in Hejaz in 1917. Fakhri Pasha was Ottoman commander of Medina when the Arab revolt occurred and viewed the actions of Sherief Hussein as treason, an alliance with infidels, and a conspiracy against Islam and Muslims. He was a committed Ottoman, steeped in returning the Ottoman Empire to its previous glory, and was a practicing Bektashi Sufi Muslim. He mounted the podium of the Grand Mosque in Medina, containing the tomb of Prophet Muhammad, and publicly cursed the Sherief of Mecca and all Arabs who joined him in waging warfare against Islam. Fakhri Pasha would continue to resist the Arab revolt and refused to surrender his post much like his peers in Jeddah, Mecca, and Taif. He would remain in a state of war even after the Turks and British concluded a truce in October 1918. Fakhri would refuse orders from Istanbul to surrender and he ignored the news of the November armistice from Ottoman officers in Medina, ordering that resistance continue. Two irregular armies of the Arab revolt attempted to dislodge Fakhri Pasha, but failed. Finally, in November 1918, he was overtaken inside the tomb of Muhammad and taken to the camp of Prince Abdullah. Fakhri turned to Ibrahim al-Rawi and asked, “Were you with us?” Rawi replied, “I was with you (in the Ottoman army) until his majesty (the Sherief of Mecca) declared independence and I went with my people.” Fakhri was given full military courtesies and a gold pocket watch with a Bektashi inscription. Iraq during the Start of World War I On the morning of August 1914, Iraqis awoke to the beat of drums and pamphlets ordering the mobilization of Iraqis to arm and prepare for travel. Iraqis were to be mobilized to fight on the Russian front; however, among the defenses that the Ottomans neglected in their obsession with the offense was Iraq. Ottoman minister of war Anwar Pasha entered World War I with the premise that Turkey would expand its holdings and not necessarily defend the realm. Iraq had only four regiments in Mosul, Kirkuk, Baghdad, and Basra. The Mosul and Kirkuk regiments were sent to Damascus to merge with the 4th Ottoman army for its push toward the Suez Canal. At best, the Ottoman general staff saw Iraq as a secondary front and sent a telegram to Ottoman leaders in Baghdad ordering the organization of tribal militia. Of note, the Ottoman general staff was even more ignorant of Iraq than the British and failed to study its defenses, conduct military exercises, and according to Muqbal Bey, a senior officer in the general staff, Istanbul possessed only one map of Iraq, which was a 1:1.5 million scale. In the years leading up to World War I, the Ottomans did nothing to respond to defensive shortfalls in and around Basra, the most likely area for any British landing on Iraq. Even when a large contingent left India and landed in Bahrain, the Ottomans did nothing. The British initially planned a small military expedition to protect the oil pipelines and refineries of Abadan in Persia, sending 4,500 troops. The British easily took Basra, taking southern Iraq in 34 days, and by 1915, stood at the outskirts of Baghdad. In volume IV, Wardi discusses the reasons why the Ottomans were weak in fighting the British in Iraq. These reasons include military recruitment being viewed by the Iraqis as a tax which the tribes hoped, and worked hard, to evade. Many hid to avoid conscription, leading Ottoman officials to incarcerate male members of a family and not release them until draft dodgers conceded. Anwar Pasha signed a decree ordering the execution of “On 10 June 1916, the Sherief of Mecca, Hussein ibn Ali, a descendant of Prophet Muhammad, declared an Arab revolt against the Ottomans, and with the aid of British intelligence, tied down 12,000 Ottoman troops in Mecca, Taif, Jeddah, and Medina. Wardi’s work exposes the mechanics of how the British worked the Arab leaders of this revolt; many of these were Arab military officers in the service of the Ottoman army and included a number of Iraqis.” — 29 one-half of the captive draft evaders and sent the other half to the front. Wealthy Iraqis bribed their way far from the front or out of conscription. Others attempted to secure citizenship outside Ottoman domains and many took Persian citizenship. Hospitals and logistics support was inadequate and other problems were apparent, including the Ottoman government apparatus in Iraq being very corrupt (away from direct Ottoman central control, it was deemed by visiting officials to be a place to make a tidy fortune); tribal loyalties superseding Ottoman loyalties; war in Iraq, from Basra to Mosul, central Iraq, commonly known as al-Anbar, being mired in tribal warfare; and most Iraqis resisting conscription. One reason thousands of Iraqis resisted the draft was because thousands of Ottoman conscripts died in the deserts of central Arabia, known as al-Najd, supporting the Ibn Rashids against the British-sponsored Ibn Sauds, the confederacy that would evolve into modern Saudi Arabia. The Ottomans, aside from attempting to pacify the Ibn Sauds, were troubled by their forcible spread of Wahabism (an austere and intolerant form of Sunni Islam) and the use of evangelizing Wahabism as an excuse to loot and pillage. Thousands of Ottoman conscripts died primarily as a result of disease, hunger, and thirst. Planes over Baghdad Before World War I, Baghdad residents had never seen a plane and many were astounded by the new invention; perhaps, like many who had never seen a plane, they wondered how wood and metal stayed aloft in the air. These planes were part of the British Expeditionary Forces, used primarily for reconnaissance. In October 1915, it is reported that tribes and residents on rooftops attempted to shoot down the contraption, not out of any military countermeasures, but out of sheer ignorance, thinking it perhaps a beast, or maybe the persons in the plane were spying on their family and women. These planes were stationed between Baghdad and Salman Pak. The British used their planes to cut Ottoman telegraph wires, flying from region to region to cut communications between Ottoman central government and its forces. During one of these operations, a British plane was intercepted by Iraqi tribesmen on horseback, providing the Ottomans an intact plane and its two pilots. The plane was displayed in Baghdad along with the British captives. The Ottomans used this to weave a propaganda campaign for the Iraqis, touting that this was a victory from God, complete with poems, sermons, and leaflets. Note: In the Middle East, public perception is viewed as a tool of warfare and the result was to create a more challenging and hostile environment for the British. Al-Qaeda uses religious symbols, fragments of Islam, conspiracy theories, and actual news to weave a hostile climate for American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. More British planes would appear in 1917 as General Maude attempted to take Baghdad. It was more a weapon of fear for Iraqis during this late period of the war. In January 1917, a squadron of British planes dropped seven bombs on Baghdad and during another operation three days before the fall of Baghdad, a British plane landed near the Dujailah-Baghdad rail line and packed it with dynamite. The Ottomans discovered and removed the explosives before they were detonated. The Ottomans in Iraq countered that the British Royal Air Force planes were an assault on the dignity of Iraqi women, as they could spy on them from the air, so women should remain covered inside their homes. This led to outrage and increased attempts to shoot down planes. Ottoman Iraq Talks with Ibn Saud of Arabia A rarely discussed aspect of World War I is the Ottoman and British cultivation of tribes to gain an edge on one another. In 1914, the Ottomans dispatched Mahmoud Shukri al-Alusi from Iraq to negotiate with Ibn Saud; a year later the Ottomans sent Moheiddine al-Naqib to Afghanistan. Both were to negotiate with tribes to undermine British influence in Arabia and Afghanistan respectively. In August 1914, the Ottomans sent a note to Ibn Saud stating that weapons and officers would be sent to organize his tribes against the British. Ibn Saud shared this correspondence with the British resident in the Gulf and British intelligence sent Indian agents, under the guise they wanted to join the jihad, to gather fresh intelligence on Ottoman defenses in southern Iraq, to include information on artillery dispositions. The discussions with the Afghans centered on sending advisors and troops not only to Afghan tribes, but Pashtun’sin North India to foment an insurgency. It was deemed by British authorities, that the only way to counter this call for jihad would be through supporting nationalism — the early seeds of the Arab revolt were born. However, the Arab revolt was to encompass not only the Red Sea coast, but the Persian Gulf, Iraq, and the Levant. It would center on strong tribal personalities such as Ibn Saud in Central Arabia, the Sherief of Mecca (the Hashemites) for the Red Sea coast, Sheikh Said Taleb Naqib of Muhammara, Sheikh Khazzal in Southern Iraq, and Sheikh Mubarak al-Sabah of Kuwait. When World War I broke out, the British consul in Basra relocated his offices in Muhammara tribal territory, the area where the port of Umm Qasr is today. Wardi discusses the details of World War I counterinsurgency using tribes, which needs to be rediscovered in light of U. S. “Fifteen days before the entrance of the Ottomans into World War I, the British dispatched an expeditionary force from India to protect oil interests in Abadan, Persia. If the Ottomans declared war, the tactical plan was to occupy Basra. It took 7 days to travel from Bombay to Bahrain — the force arrived in October 1914.” 30 — involvement in Iraq. Sheikh Said Taleb would be offered the general governorship of Basra with the right to dispense patronage through city appointments. Taleb responded that he wanted to see an end to Ottoman rule and anew independent Arab enclave in southern Iraq. He wanted to achieve this result with only material aid from the British and then the establishment of a protectorate over this new entity like that of Egypt. The British refused. Of note, the British had to balance the interests of Ibn Saud, the al-Sabah of Kuwait, Hashemites of Mecca, and the Muhammara confederacy of south Iraq. As talks with Taleb and the British broke down, the Sheikh received word of Ottoman intentions to place him under arrest. Taleb was given a cipher telegraph code to the Ottoman war ministry and proceeded to forge telegraphed orders from Anwar Pasha, making him envoy to negotiate with Ibn Saud in central Arabia. In October 1914, he arrived at al-Jahrah in Kuwait, a guest of Sheikh Mubarak al-Sabah, where the British consul made him a final offer — the governor generalship of Basra, with the right to pass on the governorship to his heirs. Sheikh Taleb was to land with Sir Percy Cox on the Faw Peninsula with a British force as Governor General Taleb, along with Cox, his majesty’s representative. He refused this final offer and Mubarak threatened to keep him in Kuwait until he accepted the British offers. Sheikh Taleb then said to Sheikh Mubarak that he had a pistol; one bullet was for the ruler of Kuwait and the other for himself, if he was not allowed to depart Kuwait immediately. In November, he arrived in the city of Buraydah and was visited by the Emir of Najd, Abdul-Aziz Ibn Saud, who, in 1932, would create modern Saudi Arabia. Taleb addressed the people of Buraydah, a Wahabi bastion, giving an anti-British speech, but both knew this was for public consumption as he despised the Ottomans, while working with British agents. They would ride together northward to respond to the jihad, but delaying their arrival in the hopes British and Ottoman forces would exhaust themselves. Arriving in al-Zulfi, word reached that the British had easily taken Basra and the decision was made to stop the expedition. Ibn Saud offered Taleb the governorship of the Eastern Province. Fifteen days before the entrance of the Ottomans into World War I, the British dispatched an expeditionary force from India to protect oil interests in Abadan, Persia. If the Ottomans declared war, the tactical plan was to occupy Basra. It took 7 days to travel from Bombay to Bahrain — the force arrived in October 1914. The tribes cultivated by the British would pay dividends when the Ottomans declared war as the general in charge of the British task force consulted with the Emir of Kuwait on how best to take the Fao Citadel (see Map 1). In early November 1914, HMS Odin silenced four artillery guns and took the citadel in one hour. The Ottomans received word from escaping residents and prepared a force of under 400 to repulse the landing. But it was too little too late. The British landed 17 boats carrying a regiment of infantry under the command of General Barrett. Seizing Fao, India sent orders to take Basra. The Ottomans would stand in a place called “Kut Zain,” across from Muhammara, building a hasty defensive line composed of 4,500 troops. These forces would face the British 6th (Indian) Poona Reinforced Infantry Division. A British tactic was to immediately set about cutting telegraph wires leading northward to deprive the Ottomans of instant intelligence on military maneuvers. The hastiness of the Ottoman defense and use of tribal levies mixed with regular forces led to a defeat at Kut Zain, which led to a collapse of morale, so Sobhi Bey ordered a withdrawal from Basra, ceding the city to advancing British forces. He scuttled three riverboats to delay the advance of British river forces up the Euphrates River. In Basra, looting commenced and elders of the city proceeded to British warships at anchor, pleading for assistance to restore order. The British responded by shelling the city, landing a force that immediately caught looters in the act and executed them by hanging on-site, as a lesson to others. General Barrett and Sir Percy Cox, his political advisor, landed in Basra with the rest of the Poona (British infantry) Division. Cox was fluent in Arabic and gave a speech in front of the Ottoman governor’s palace in the name of the commanding general. He indicated that Great Britain has occupied Basra in its war with the Ottoman Turks, saying, “We bear the people of Basra no ill will, harm, or retribution. The Turks have fled and in its place the Union Jack flies to which you all will enjoy its protection, freedom, and justice in your religious and worldly affairs.” Orders were issued to British troops to treat the populace with courtesy. The ceremony ended with the raising of the Union Jack, the playing of “God Save the King,” and the firing of the guns from warships and riverboats at anchor within the estuary in a dramatic show of British military power. Occupation of al-Kurna Sobhi Bey withdrew his forces from Basra to Kurna, located between the Euphrates and Tigris (Dijaila in Arabic) Rivers. General Barrett solicited permission from India to occupy Kurna. A — 31 Map 1 Department of Military Art and Engineering, U. S. Military Academy force under Colonel Fraizer was sent to take the village, Ma-zeerah, overlooking Kurna on the left bank of the Tigris. With little Ottoman resistance, the village was taken and used to set up a logistics base within sight of Kurna, but more importantly to set up artillery batteries that would, in conjunction with river gunboats, pound Turkish forces from the riverbank with roving fire, leading into Kurna. The overwhelming firepower led Ottoman soldiers and officers to flee; some flung themselves into the Tigris to swim away from the pounding of shells — among them was Wardi’s father, who served in the Ottoman army. British forces entered Kurna and felt deeply let down, as this was the alleged place where Adam and Eve landed when they were cast out from heaven. The city was in squalor and consisted of mud huts and hovels. It is after the taking of Basra and Kurna that new goods, such as chocolates, mass-produced soap, detergent, tinned meat, pasteurized milk, and shaving items, flooded Iraqi markets. With the presence of the British army, profiteering began and the price of regular staples, such as sugar and rice, shot up astronomically, adding further pressures on British forces. Ottomans Incite a Jihad American military professionals must look not only at the actual tactics of battle, but discuss the hidden aspects that shape the battlefield environment. We cannot neglect or be blind to behind-the-scenes discussions among clerics and other power centers of a society, who, in their own way, create a climate hostile to our forces. The following discussion focuses on how the Ottomans attempted to work with Iraq’s Shiites and Sunni religious leaders to incite a popular uprising against the British. Wardi’s work highlights the hidden aspects of World War I that today are apart of how our adversary shapes and influences perception to create a hostile environment for security forces. A telegram arrived from Ottoman officials in Baghdad to the leading Shiite hawza (clerical seminary) in Najaf. Shiite Clergy Convene a War Council One Ayatollah declaring a jihad does not necessarily connote a general Shiite uprising. In this case, only those thousands who considered Yazdi their Imam answered his call. This, however, pressured the other Shiite clergy to call a conference in Kazimiyah to reconcile Shiite differences on the issue of calling a jihad, and then reconcile Shiite and Sunni fatwas declaring a jihad and supporting the Ottomans. Some argued that this was exposing the Shiite flock to certain destruction, as the British had highly advanced weapons. Sheikh Mehdi al-Khalsi was among those who advocated jihad. He wrote epistles and fatwas in local newspapers, which can be compared to early 20th-century versions of internet fatwas, having printing presses at his disposal. The clerics strategized on methods of getting their tribal flock to insist that tribal leaders take on the jihad against the British. Tactics included Ayatollah Yazdi travelling on Ashoura (Shiite holy observance of the martyrdom of Prophet Muhammad’s grandson, Hussein) to recruit and generate momentum for jihad. The Germans and Ottomans expended much money for clerics to incite, recruit, and arm mujahideen (fighters). Some fabulously wealthy clerics, such as the Sunni, Muhammad Haboubi, gave his own money for the cause. It is after the Kazimiyah conference that the danger of a general uprising in Iraq would be very real, as the majority of the Shiite clergy endorsed the concept of declaring a joint jihad with the Ottomans. When Basra and Kurna fell, Javeed Pasha, the Ottoman vali (governor) of Baghdad was relieved and made a scapegoat for the indifference and neglect of Iraq’s defenses by the general staff. Wardi’s Volume IV highlights Ottoman blunders in the defense of Iraq. Javeed Pasha was commander in chief of Iraqi forces and vali. After 1915, the two posts of governor and military commander were split: Suleiman Nazif Bey was made governor; and Suleiman Askari Bey was made military commander based on his position as lead advisor on Iraq to the Ottoman general staff in Istanbul. He had served many years in Iraq and this assignment would be disastrous as he was stuck in the offensive mode of thinking that permeated the general staff. While in Istanbul, he would advocate for an assault on Britain’s Indian possessions by agitating the Muslim population in what is Afghanistan and Pakistan. Askari’s first order of business on arriving in Baghdad was to execute the deputy governor of Basra who ordered retreat. Battle of Rotawi (or al-Routah) Askari Bey collected a force of regulars and tribal levies, dividing them into three divisions along three fronts of Shuaybah, Kurna, and Arabistan. He hoped to press into three fronts, linking all three divisions into Muhamarrah to seek retribution on its Sheikh for his pro-British stance. The division of what amounted to an army corps into three divisions, attacking separate objectives, only served to weaken Ottoman plans to retake Kurna. The Kurna force met a British force along a Rotawi canal, located 15km from Kurna. Wardi does not discuss the details of this engagement, except that the battle took 4 hours with the British, who were hoping that river gunboats along the Tigris and artillery fire would be a force multiplier for its smaller infantry force meeting the Ottomans at Rotawi. Despite heavy Ottoman casualties, British defenses broke and a retreat commenced. The Ottoman force, unlike the defenders of Kurna and Basra, who retreated under heavy artillery fire, “Sobhi Bey withdrew his forces from Basra to Kurna, located between the Euphrates and Tigris (Dijaila in Arabic) Rivers. General Barrett solicited permission from India to occupy Kurna. A force under Colonel Fraizer was sent to take the village, Mazeerah, overlooking Kurna on the left bank of the Tigris.” 32 — stood and fought. For example, the commander of the division, Said Mahdy al-Haidary, remained with his force despite shells falling near and around his tent. The British faced several tactical problems in Iraq; the ease of their earlier victories led to overconfidence, dependence on technology, a need for a larger force, and detraction from their main mission of protecting British oil fields in Persia, which were now under attack from one of the three divisions allocated by Askari Bey. Battle of Arabistan The area of Arabistan, now Khuzestan, was an area of British national strategic interest; at the time, it was England’s chief source of oil and refined gasoline. British forces dispatched from India before the declaration of war were sent to protect these interests; however, the ease of conquest led to the taking of Basra and Kurna — a decision made not only by British commanders on the ground, but by officials in British India as well. It was in Arabistan that tribalism became a crucial component of the Iraqi campaign. A message (along with the joint religious edict) was sent by the Shiite clergy to Sheikh Khazzal, the chieftain in charge of the Persian side of Arabistan, advising him to take the side of the Muslims against the occupying British army. They said their edict from Najaf applied to Ottomans and Persians, Shiites and Sunnis alike. The edict was signed by five senior Shiite clerics, with a separate telegram from grand Shiite cleric, Sayyid al-Yazdi. In addition, Sheikh Khazzal was close to one member of the Shiite clergy, Sheikh Abdel-Karim al-Jazairi, and he asked the tribal leader to lend his assistance and pledge his allegiance to the Ottomans. Participating in a jihad was not without risks to Khazzal. There was frustration among the tribes within Khazzal’s confederation over taxes, therefore, this jihad could easily be turned against him; and a power shift from tribal to clerical might occur, in which Eissa Kamal-al-Din, the highest clerical authority in Arabistan, would take control of Khaz-zal’s fighters. In January 1915, an Ottoman force, under the command of Tew-fik (Bey) al-Khalidi, arrived in Amarah and encamped 20 miles from Ahvaz, along with tribal levies from the Bani Lam, Bani Taraf, Rabiah, and Zarqan. Upon arrival, the Bawiah tribe joined the jihad. These tribes raided British oil interests and sabotaged pipelines; more importantly, they turned against the Bani Kaab tribal confederation and its chief, Sheikh Khazzal, for his allegiance to the British. With the help of English forces, the Bani Kaab tribe defeated the Bawiah tribe and General Barrett sent forces from southern Iraq into Ahvaz to protect oil interests. While making its way to Ahvaz, the British contingent was set on by tribes, leading to a withdrawal of the British force back toward Basra. The tribes captured two British artillery guns. The tribal chief of the Bani Lam offered a gold piece for every British or Indian head brought to him, which led the Bedouin to give their British prisoners no quarters. The Impact of the Jihad on Kuwait Sheikh Mubarak al-Sabah was a close ally of Sheikh Khazzal and saw how the Ottomans, along with several tribes, threatened him, which encouraged him to aid his ally. However, a segment of Sheikh Mubarak’s tribal confederation found fighting for the British distasteful; whereas, two clerics within Mubarak’sinner circle considered fighting for the Ottomans a religious duty. With the momentum of Ottoman forces regrouping, tribes backing the Ottomans began to ascend, and tribal chieftains, such as Mubarak al-Sabah and Sheikh Khazzal, began to become precarious. The two clerics with al-Sabah’s confederacy began to draw away fighters, and Mubarak had to persuade clans that his alliance with the British provided autonomy from the Ottomans. However, this was to no avail and Mubarak al-Sabah had to fight Mohammad al-Shanqati as aside skirmish between British and Ottoman forces in the Battle of Shuaybah. Battle of Shuaybah Located nine miles southeast of Basra, Shuaybah was an old fortress reinforced by the British upon their landing in Basra. The British built extensive defensive works around Shuaybah. Askari Bey led a force of 6,000 Ottoman regulars and 20,000 tribal levies and opted for a direct frontal assault with the 6,000 regulars in the center and 10,000 tribal fighters on each flank, despite objections from tribal chiefs and even German military advisors, who recommended against a frontal assault. The proposal was to isolate Shuaybah from Basra and fight a harassing action combined with a siege of the fortress. This proposal was made easier by heavy flooding of the Tigris, which made Shuaybah accessible primarily by riverboat, while the Ottomans occupied the high ground. However, despite the odds favoring the Ottomans, the British barely etched out a victory using concentrated disciplined firepower and rumors that Askari Bey had been killed. The British firepower came in the form of sending several river gunboats to Shuaybah, along with land artillery to decimate the Ottoman frontal assaults. Askari, on hearing of the route and collapse of his forces, blamed Iraqi tribes and shot himself. The British buried him with full military honors. The Ottomans suffered 4,200 casualties and 700 men captured. The Battle of Shuaybah was the first battle in which Muslim Indian contingents within the British forces showed signs of demoralization fighting fellow Muslims. Sheikh Mubarak of Kuwait was able to rid himself of tribal threats, including contingents within his own confederacy that defected and fought alongside the Ottomans. Several factors contributed to the Ottoman defeat, including tribes impatiently seeking loot and then departing the battlefield once they obtained goods or when spoils were slim; antiquated weapons; inadequate supplies; and spies paid by the British to spread disinformation within the Ottoman camps — the most effective being the false report that Askari Bey had been killed. Add to this the personality of Askari Bey, a military commander applying 19th-century preindustrial-age tactics against the minds and technology of British commanders, who were steeped in the experiences of studying the Franco-Prussian and American Civil wars. The front in Arabistan was the scene of an interesting development; a collapse not due to any British intervention, but petty jealousies over the distribution of payment to different tribes. The events of Shuaybah led to an order from Ottoman officials in Baghdad to retreat northward. The British initially began its takeover of Basra with only the 6th Poona Division, under General Barrett, after the Battle of Shuaybah, in which they suffered 1,200 casualties. The British would also send another division, the 12th, under General Nixon. Nureiddine Bey Takes Command In April 1915, the British put together a 9,000 troop force that was transported by land and riverboat to protect Ahvaz. With no Ottoman threats, the British decided to take vengeance on the Bani Taraf tribe that raided a British infantry formation, killing four officers. The Ottomans would never again threaten British oil interests in Persia. With the eventual suicide of Askari Bey, the Ottoman general staff decided to recombine the positions of governor and commander in chief under Nureiddine Bey. What — 33 distinguished Nureiddine from Askari Bey was his studious military mind. Before taking his post in May 1915, he studied newspapers and reports about the Iraq front, gaining a sense of the battlefield he was about to take command over. As a result, his first order was to shut down Iraq’s press, leaving just one pro-Ottoman newspaper open. His rationale was to impose a news blackout due to the impact the press had on the morale of Iraqis and their willingness to side with the Turks. Nureiddine then turned his attention to Iraq’s Christians and Jews, viewing them as British fifth columns. Were it not for Sheikh Noman al-Aza-mi and Fuad Daftary Bey, Nureiddine would have conducted massacres of these communities. Both Iraqis convinced the Ottoman governor that these were loyal and hard-working communities; instead, Nureiddine relocated them from Baghdad to Mosul, hence the large Christian population now in the north. General Townshend and General Halim Bey Soon after the Battle of Shuaybah and the arrival of the extra division, General Barrett turned over command of the 6th (Poona) Infantry to Major General Townshend. These extra forces would be needed to accomplish the objective of securing British gains and reinforcing oil refineries in Abadan. Townshend was ambitious and coveted the rank of lieutenant general. He also was heavily influenced by Napoleonic tactics and attempted to mirror his deployments with those of Napoleon. The Ottomans had concentrated its forces north of Kurna, under the command of General Halim Bey, a vain man who thought he was sent to Iraq in exile, who focused on amassing wealth and neglected his command. Battle of the Riverboats Wardi’s book discusses how General Townshend used a combination of river gunboats, 500 local Iraqi canoes, and air support combined with ground infantry, to give him envelopment options for Ottoman forces and their tribal supporters. He began his expedition northward on 31 May 1915. Each Iraqi boat contained seven troops and this flotilla would be escorted by three large river gunboats and four smaller and faster riverine gunboats. The most demoralizing aspect for the Iraqis was the three biplanes strafing and bombing their forces. Many had not seen such a device and this lead to a retreat that escalated and included a route of the Ottoman forces. Townshend used this tactic to take Kurna and Amara; he had made his headquarters afloat in one of the larger river gunboats, which allowed him to survey the terrain and make amendments to his tactics. Part of his staff included the political officer, the future Sir Percy Cox, an Arabic linguist and Iraq expert, who interfaced with tribes and negotiated surrenders, as well as security arrangements for the tribes along the Tigris. The Ottomans were expecting a ground and river advance and could have fought a delaying action while swinging 2,000 regulars, withdrawn from Arabistan, to cut off this flotilla from the remaining 15,000 British troops bringing up the rear. But the heavy concentration of British firepower from canoes, river gunboats, and biplanes simply caused panic. It helped that Ottoman leadership was incompetent and corrupt. At the time the British attempted to take Nasiriyah, the Ottoman’s had a more professional soldier in command and had built dams on the Euphrates River, which caused the British flotilla delay. Although the British took Nasiriyah, inflicting 2,000 Ottoman casualties, they suffered 500 casualties. A tactical mistake for the British was dividing its forces on the way northward toward Baghdad between the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, instead of concentrating its ground, air, and river forces on the Tigris River, making for Kut and then Baghdad. Although the British did secure the Tigris to provide for the defense of oil interests across the border in Persia, which was its main mission, there seemed to be an overeagerness and overconfidence to drive to Baghdad. Despite the battles of Nasiriyah and Shuaybah, British generals were overconfident from the majority of battles that were easy victories and pressed forward. It was during these battles, between April and December 1915, that Iraqi officers in Ottoman service began splitting between loyalists and a yearning for Arab nationalist movements who would defect to the British. 34 — Map 2 Department of Military Art and Engineering, U. S. Military Academy

Kurna, Amara, and Kut Fall to General Townshend (1915) The combination of massive firepower from the canoes, the river gunboats, and planes led the Ottomans to surrender Kurna, Amara, and Kut. In taking Kut, Townshend applied the Napoleonic principle of exploiting the weakness of the Ottoman lines in an area called “al-Sin.” The Ottoman defenses of Kut were split between the left and right banks of the Tigris. Townshend used his river force to hold one bank and as a diversionary attack while his main effort of a division swung wide to envelop the other bank that was diverted, believing an attack would come from the river. The British were experiencing problems, despite heavy Ottoman and Iraqi casualties, and lost 1,200 men in taking Kut. In addition, they could not press their attack on fleeing Ottoman regulars for lack of adequate cavalry. The 1,200 losses were in addition to the 500 lost in the Battle of Shuaybah, plus hundreds lost to disease and dysentery. Power Vacuums As tribes observed the British winning battles, the technology of their weapons, the distribution of gold, and rumors cultivated and enhanced by the British, tribesmen began switching allegiances. Among the most creative instance of disinformation was using the 30th chapter of the Quran, “al-Rum” (the Byzantines), to spread rumor that the fall of the Turks, called “al-Rum” in Arabic, but really meaning “Byzantines,” would be defeated as ordained in the first verse of this chapter of the Quran, which is to say that God promised the Arabs victory over the Turks to stoke rebellion. The Ottoman and British empires struggled over Iraq, which left a power vacuum, causing the towns of Najaf, Karbala, Hilla, and the entire middle Euphrates villages and towns to rebel against Ottoman authority and attempt to gain autonomy. This upheaval caused struggles among townsfolk and tribes, as well as clerics and tribal elders, as to who would control the cities. Wardi’s book offers details of many internal engagements, such as the Bani Hassan tribe that fought the Najafi townsfolk over control of Kufa. Of note, Percy Cox was in contact with Sheikh Muhammad Ka-muna, one of the leaders of Karbala, and Hajj Atiah Qalal, who represented leaders of Najaf to cultivate their support of Britain in return for autonomy. The British understood the need to dis-aggregate tribes and Shiites from the Ottomans, to divide them and then support those seeking autonomy. Battle of Salman Pak This battle had an inauspicious beginning for the British, who started to make their way toward Salman Pak in October 1915, with Lord Asquith, British prime minister, declaring in November that British forces were on the outskirts of Baghdad. This particular battle is a case study in how political pressures have an adverse effect on the progress of a campaign. Throughout October, General Nixon and his political advisor, Percy Cox, were eager to take Baghdad after the multiple defeats of the Ottomans, believing that taking this city was as politically significant as taking Constantinople. General Townshend reconnoitered the defenses around Baghdad and Salman Pak and merged it with intelligence from Aziz-iyah, which revealed that the Ottomans were not only reinforcing this region, but were receiving reinforcements from Anatolia (Turkey proper). In addition, the logistics tail of the British would have to extend 400 miles from Basra; unfortunately, with the Tigris receding and water levels dropping, riverboat transport and resupply were problematic. Townshend insisted that two intact divisions were needed to take and secure Baghdad. In command, General Nixon’s historical role models were Nelson and Drake, and he deluded himself with the idea that a few sharp “The British were experiencing problems, despite heavy Ottoman and Iraqi casualties, and lost 1,200 men in taking Kut. In addition, they could not press their attack on fleeing Ottoman regulars for lack of adequate cavalry. The 1,200 losses were in addition to the 500 lost in the Battle of Shuaybah, plus hundreds lost to disease and dysentery.” — 35 blows would lead to an Ottoman evacuation of Baghdad; he did not have Townshend’s Napoleonic eye. The British government was eager for a quick victory in Baghdad to boost morale for the debacle in the Dardanelles and the static war in France. Salman Pak is located 20km south of Baghdad. The area, named after Prophet Muhammad’s companion, Salman al-Farisi (the Persian), who was reputed to be Muhammad’s barber, was nicknamed “Salman Pak” (the clean). Nureiddine made a defensive line south of Persian ruins, which were being used to house supplies that were easily transported by river and rail lines from Baghdad. Nureiddine learned from his previous encounters with the British, particularly the Battle of al-Sin, and carefully planned defenses with trenches laced with razor wire and kill zones for rifle, machine guns, and artillery. Joining Nureiddine Bey was General Khalil Bey, uncle to war minister Anwar Pasha. Since the Ottomans chose the place of battle, they printed leaflets in Hindi and Urdu, convincing Muslims in the British army to defect to their brothers in faith and remember they are fighting near the grave of Muhammad’s companion, Salman al-Fari-si. This had an impact as the 20th Punjabi Battalion, which had to be removed from the British formation because a Punjabi soldier killed a British soldier. Townshend had to forbid his troops from uttering the name “Salman Pak,” lest to rouse Muslim sentiments within the British ranks. They would refer to the area as “Ctesiphon,” site of the Persian ruins. The 3-day battle proved to be fierce; the first day going to the British, but the remaining 2 days, which included pockets of hand-to-hand combat, went to the Ottomans. Suffering 4,500 British casualties, Townshend retreated to Kut. The exhausted Ottomans lost 9,500 out of 35,000 troops. In Kut, the Ottomans reorganized their army into two corps and laid siege to Kut; from December 1915 to April 1916, Townshend and his army were surrounded and finally forced to surrender 8,000 troops. Tribes quickly switched sides and sought to gain from the siege of Kut. It would take the British nearly a year to recover from this humiliation, which echoes in the annals of Iraq’s tragic history to this day. Inside Kut, the British were forced to contend with the local population trapped with them, which sapped their supplies. The women of Kut were fired on when attempting to gather water; not a small number of them were killed. The Ottomans rained artillery fire on Kut, demoralizing soldiers and locals alike. T. E. Lawrence, then a junior intelligence officer, prior to his rise to Lawrence of Arabia fame, was dispatched on a special mission to bribe Khalil Pasha to lift the siege. He was authorized to offer one-million pounds sterling, an astronomical sum in 1916. He worked through the tribes to get word to Khalil Pasha, but the mission was unsuccessful. General Maude would replace General Nixon, as he and several other British flag officers were dismissed over the ongoing siege of Kut. Maude, who was armed with adequate troops and supplies, retook Kut and pushed into Baghdad in March 1917. By November 1918, Ottoman forces split into three defensive units or fronts along the Tigris, Euphrates, and Diyala rivers, each with a division. General Maude would not see the end of this campaign; he died of cholera in November 1918. Wardi’s book is very unique due to the details he provides on interactions between the Ottomans and British, including the clerics, tribal leaders, and intricacies of Iraqi societal structures. However, Wardi is less than generous on the tactical details, troop numbers, and detailed deployments of forces. Also, Volume IV contains virtually no maps to follow the battles. However, he more than makes up for any shortcomings with the details on how the Ottomans incited jihad, who they talked with to elicit a joint Shiite and Sunni fatwa, and the political and military affairs of the Ottoman Empire. Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein is a U. S. Navy Medical Service Corps Officer and Middle East foreign area officer. He currently serves as a senior counterterrorism advisor, warning officer, and instructor on militant Islamist ideology, Joint Task Force for Combating Terrorism, Washington, DC. He received a B. B. A. from the University of Mississippi (Ole Miss), an M. B. A. and M. A. from the University of Arkansas, and an M. S. from the National Defense Intelligence College. His military education includes the U. S. Naval War College, the U. S. Army War College Defense Strategy Course, the Marine Corps University Amphibious Warfare School, and advanced analytic courses at the Joint Military Intelligence College. His most recent assignments include country director for North Africa and Egypt, assistant country director for the Arabian Gulf, and special advisor on Islamist Militancy at the Office of the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Washington, DC. This work would not have been possible without the help of Captain Eugene Smallwood for his edits and valuable comments and with the help of the John T. Hughes Library in Washington, DC. “Maude, who was armed with adequate troops and supplies, retook Kut and pushed into Baghdad in March 1917. By November 1918, Ottoman forces split into three defensive units or fronts along the Tigris, Euphrates, and Diyala rivers, each with a division. General Maude would not see the end of this campaign; he died of cholera in November 1918.” 36 —