Armor Task Force to Khe Sanh

Armor Task Force to Khe Sanh by Lieutenant Colonel Carmelo P. Milia (Reprinted from May-June 1970) Few armor units in Vietnam have received a more exciting or challenging mission than “get through to Khe Sanh and conduct a reconnaissance-in-force to the Laotian Border.” This was the as sign ment given on 14 March 1969 to 1st Battalion, 77th (1/77) Armor, by the XXIV Corps Commander, Lieu tenant General Richard G. Stilwell. Necessary armor assets were to be provided from 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), the largest and most versatile armor command in Southeast Asia. Highway 9, the only road to Khe Sanh, had last been used in early July 1968 when the last vehicles of the 3d Marine Division traversed it after the siege had been lifted in the spring of

1968. The road was 26 kilometers of deteriorating asphalt laid along a twisting mountain defile. Every bridge and culvert had been destroyed; numerous landslides had cut the one-way surface. The first 10 kilometers from the fire support base at Calu was a relatively flat road, but the next 8 kilometers of road contained many hairpin turns as it climbed the 45-percent slope to the Khe Sanh Plateau. Along most stretches, the road was so narrow that the tank turret could not be rotated and the tank gun could not be elevated to cover the ridge lines on either side of the gorge. Before the main body of the task force could move, it was necessary to reconnoiter and recon struct the road while simultaneously providing security and continual fire support for the lead elements of the force. As commanding officer of the task force (since named Task Force Remagen), I was given complete freedom in selecting the task organization needed to accomplish the mission. In addition to 1/77 Armor’s organic assets, I requested and received a mechanized infantry company (Company B, 1st Battalion, 61st Infantry), a 105mm self-propelled (SP) artillery battery (Battery C, 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery), a reinforced platoon of armored en gineers (Company A, 7th Engi neers), and a section of 40mm “dusters” (Battery C, 1st Battalion, 44th Artillery). Although gunships and command and control ships were requested, they were not available from the 3d Marine Division, the senior headquarters controlling the operation. The concept of the operation was to scout, clear, and rebuild the road through to Checkpoint Golf before any heavy combat vehicles would be allowed on the narrow road. Checkpoint Golf was critical because it was the first point on the road where one vehicle could pass another and was, in fact, a clearing large enough for the artillery battery and 4.2 mortar platoon to occupy firing positions. September-October 2008 — 71

The mission was a classic for an armored force; the execution was “out of the book.” The first unit to run the gauntlet was the battalion scout platoon mounted in M113 armored cavalry assault vehicles (ACAVs). This platoon reconnoitered by fire every potential ambush site, swept the road for mines, and provided security to the armored en gineer platoon that followed. The engineer platoon leader used every technique in his engineer bag of tricks. Every gap was quickly spanned by the armored vehicle launcher bridge (AVLB), which per mitted passage of an engineer squad and a bulldozer to the next obstacle that might require construc tion of a bypass or culvert or the reduction of a roadblock or landslide. By leapfrogging two AVLBs, it was always possible to work on at least two obstacles simultaneously. When a bypass around the AVLB site had been constructed, the scissors bridge was picked up on the far side and carried to the next gap. The feats of the engineer platoon were prodigious; working nearly 18 hours a day for 2 days, the platoon mineswept 26 kilometers of road, constructed 13 bypasses capable of carrying class-60 loads, launched and recovered the AVLB six times, and reduced 10 obstructions. Two enemy antitank mines were detected and destroyed. Progressing faster than the most optimistic fore cast, the scout/ engineer team reached a night laager position at Checkpoint Golf by twilight of the first day, 17 March 1969. The bivouac position was ringed by artillery defensive concentrations fired from the main body assembly area at Calu, which was 10 kilometers away. At dawn of the second day, the mechanized infantry company and the 105th SP artil lery battery began their displacement forward to Checkpoint Golf. At this point, the infantry dismounted and quickly secured the high ground while the artillery made available fire support neces sary for the continued trailblazing of the scout en gineer team. Checkpoint Golf was the last check point on the valley floor. From here, the road ascended steeply to the Khe Sanh Plateau, a rise of 1,250 feet. The scouts were now starting up “Am bush Alley,” where a year earlier the NVA easily severed the ground lines of communications to the besieged Marines at Khe Sanh. One extremely critical obstacle remained. Check point Hotel, a high-level truss bridge, had been destroyed and the bypass pontoon bridge had been washed away. The raging river at this point was far too deep for fording. If the gap were too wide for the 60-foot AVLB, the require ment for major bridge construction would grind Task Force Remagen to a halt. Because the bridge abutments had also been destroyed, aerial photos could not be used to accurately measure the gap. When the AVLB opened its scissors bridge, all fingers were crossed. A hearty cheer went up as the bridge touched the far side with 3 feet to spare. Task Force Remagen was almost ready to roll. By darkness of the second day, the scout/engineer team was on the plateau at attack position Hawk. The engineer platoon leader radioed that he was looking down at the most beautiful valley in Viet nam; the scout platoon leader radioed that he was looking ahead at the eeriest battlefield in the world. The ground, honeycombed by B52 strikes, looked much like the surface of the moon — mines, duds, fortifications, barbed wire, and rotting parachutes were every where. With the artillery and mortars in position at Checkpoint Golf, and the high ground between Golf and Hotel secured by the mechanized infantry, we were ready to pass the armor through. In spite of the engineers’ effort expended to im prove the road, it had been decided that only track-laying vehicles would go on Task Force Remagen. Any type of wheeled vehicle was prohibited. The force consisted of 86 track-laying vehicles including tanks, armored personnel carriers (APCs), armored mortar carriers, bulldozers, M88 track recovery vehicles, M577 command post (CP) vehicles, and a combat engineer vehicle. While wheeled vehicles may have simplified the control and logistics challenges, the terrain was such that they would not have made the trek. Company C, 1/77 Armor jumped off at 0800 hours on the third day, and was followed by the task force command group and combat trains. In anticipation of ambush and mechanical breakdown, the order of march was ar ranged so that similar weight class vehicles traveled as buddies. This order of march ensured that disabled vehicles would always have an adjacent vehicle that could push or pull them off the road and into the chasm below. 72 — September-October 2008

The march went without incident. By 1100 hours, the scouts had reached Khe Sanh City. All task force elements had closed on the plateau within 5 hours. By noon on 19 March, Task Force Headquarters at Khe Sanh City was visited by the XXIV Corps com mander. Within minutes, U.S. Army armor was racing for the Lang Vei Special Forces camp and the Lao tian border. With the removal of the AVLB at Hotel, the ground lines of communications were once again cut. The 1/77 Armor was an independent task force operating deep in enemy territory and being supplied completely by helicopter. After reaching Khe Sanh, the task force was given a new mission — to turn southward to cut Highway 926, which was an enemy road lead ing from the Laotian border. For the new mission, the task organization was restructured to form one tank heavy team and one mechanized heavy team. The battalion’s 4.2 mortar platoon was attached to the leading tank team so it would be in firing position during the displacement forward of the artil lery battery. Two factors were to have a heavy bearing on our modus operandi after reaching the Khe Sanh Pla teau: the Co Roc and a purported north-south road on the RVN side of the border. The Co Roc was a ridge of mountains, which completely dominated the intended axis of advance. The Co Roc lies in Laos, parallel to the border and the Xe Pon River. From this dominant ridge, the enemy could observe every vehicle; in fact, it was September-October 2008 — 73 the caves of the Co Roc that sheltered the long-range 130mm field guns, which pounded the Khe Sanh airfield dur ing the historic siege. Enemy possession of this criti cal terrain demanded that the task force move con tinuously before enemy direct and indirect fire could be brought to bear. The second factor stemmed from an intelligence report, which indicated that a road existed along the Xe Pon River and the intended route of advance. If true, such a road would materially assist progress and allow the leading tank heavy team to cut High way 926 in a few hours. As it developed, the re ported highway did not exist; the search for this road committed the tank team to blaze a trail within a few hundred meters of the Laotian border and the Co Roc. The new pioneer road thus exposed the entire task force as it displaced southward. If the road had been built further to the east, the task force would have been less vulnerable to enemy dispositions on the Co Roc. As the task force pushed on closer to the Laotian Border, its lead elements passed through the abandoned Lang Vei Special Forces Camp. The tankers took the opportunity to inspect four PT76 tanks, all of which had been destroyed. Also found was an abundance of old munitions and destroyed equipment of both NVA and friendly forces. It took an additional 5 days of scouting, trailblazing, and road-building to reach and cut Highway 926, the enemy road from Laos. From 26 to 30 March, both teams conducted extensive search-and-destroy operations north and south of Route 926. Approxi mately 100 square kilometers were searched with only small enemy contacts. It would have been desirable if Task Force Remagen could have simply kept going west into Laos or southeast back into the A Shau Valley. Political considerations prevented the first course of action; an impassible mountain ridge discouraged serious consideration of the latter. Accordingly, the task force had to with draw over the same route on which it had advanced. The enemy knew this; he could permit the advance in the full knowledge that sooner or later the task force would have to run the Xe Pon gauntlet again. For the next month, Task Force Remagen reconnoitered at will all over the Khe Sanh Plateau. Fire support bases that had heretofore been accessible only by helicopter were assaulted and occupied by tank/in fantry companies. During this phase, elements of 1/77 Armor were relieved in place by the 1st Battalion, 61st In fantry (Mech) and an ARVN armored cavalry troop. At one time, five armored companies (2 tank, 2 mech, and 1 cavalry) and two SP artillery batteries were operational in a 200 square kilometer area. During this period, one large ammunition cache was found, and two major engagements were fought in which 73 NVA were killed. Because the bridges behind Task Force Remagen were removed, the operation was a test of the ability to resupply and maintain armored forces without ground lines of communications. The brigade estab lished a forward support element at Vander griff Combat Base where supplies and repair parts were staged for shipment by helicopter. Combat trains consisted of tracked medical, maintenance, and resupply vehicles; the majority of the mechanics; and a portion of the battalion support platoon. Field trains were located at Vandergriff. Not once was the commander’s operational con cept restricted because of logistics. This logistics achievement can be credited to the S4 and Company D commander. It should be noted that 1/77 Armor is organized with a separate support company (Company D), which has the effect of split ting the old headquarters and service company. With the S4 operating from the field trains area and Company D commander operating with the combat trains, every logistics requirement was fulfilled. The operation proved the wisdom of the separate support company concept. An average of 15 Chinook loads per day was re quired for resupply. The following is a summary of the major supplies required to support the task force:

• 93 pallets of rations.

• 76,000 gallons of Mogas and diesel.

• 2,000 gallons of assorted POL.

• 18,000 rounds of major caliber ammunition.

• 225,000 rounds of small arms ammunition.

• 50 major component repair parts, such as en gines, transmissions, track, final drives, and starters. Vehicle maintenance and organizational and direct support repair were continuous. With the tactical need to move almost daily, crews and mechan ics worked around the clock, and often under enemy fire, to repair and evacuate damaged vehicles. During a 3-day period, mechanics of 1/77 Armor pulled 13 power packs for maintenance. The M48A3 power packs were flown in by CH47 Chinook and direct exchanged with monotonous regularity. Five vehicles (one M48A3 tank, one M88 VTR, one M113 APC, one M548, and one bulldozer) were combat losses and solemnly buried near the Khe Sanh airstrip. Task Force Remagen withdrew from Khe Sanh Plateau on 28 April after having proved its value. For 47 days, a conventional armor/mechanized force had operated in the northwestern mountains of South Vietnam along the Laotian border. One large cache was found; and numerous small skirmishes and two significant engagements were fought. The 1st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Me chanized) had proven again that armor can operate over extended distances without ground lines of communications. In moving at will from Khe Sanh to Route 926 and along the Laotian border, Task Force Remagen has given the enemy cause for concern; his lines of communications in Laos are vulnerable. A tank/infantry/artillery force, which is totally sup plied by air and therefore severed from its logistics tail, could enter Laos, turn south, and strike along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Lieutenant Colonel Carmen P. Milia, General Staff (Armor), is a 1950 graduate of the United States Military Academy and holds a Master of Science in Aeronautical Engineering from the Georgia Institute of Technology. He served in the 64th Tank Battalion, 3d Infantry Division during the Korean War. He has served in seven tank battalions; in USATCA, as an instructor at the Armor School; and with the CDC Armor Agency. Prior to commanding the 1st Battalion, 77th Armor in Vietnam, he was the DA Systems Staff Officer for the Sheridan/Shillelagh, and an ACSFOR project officer for air cushion vehicles. He is now assigned to the Office of the Chief of Research and Development. “Task Force Remagen withdrew from Khe Sanh Plateau on 28 April after having proved its value. For 47 days, a conventional armor/mechanized force had operated in the northwestern mountains of South Vietnam along the Laotian border. One large cache was found; and numerous small skirmishes and two significant engagements were fought. The 1st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Me chanized) had proven again that armor can operate over extended distances without ground lines of communications.” 74 — September-October 2008