Reorganizing the Recon Squadron to Enhance Heavy Brigade Combat Team Capabilities

With the U. S. Army’s transformation of the modular brigade combat team (BCT) into two combined-arms battalions (CABs) and a reconnaissance squadron, there has been much debate about the proper organization of the reconnaissance squadron in light of its doctrinal role. U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-20.96, Reconnaissance Squadron, states the reconnaissance squadron shapes successful modular brigade operations in several ways:

• It provides the BCT with a significant dismounted, mounted, and aerial reconnaissance force.

• It enables the brigade commander to decisively employ his maneuver battalions and joint fires and choose times and places of contact to his advantage.

• It maximizes security of the BCT by providing timely, accurate, and relevant combat information. It helps the BCT achieve an important tenet of modern warfare — information dominance, when achieved, is security.1 Due to large urban populations or the size of the terrain that encompasses a BCT’s area of operation (AO) in Iraq, the reconnaissance squadron is serving as a third maneuver battalion in an economy-of-force role for the BCT, typically conducting the same operations as the two CABs. During stability and reconstruction operations (SRO), the squadron must be capable of developing actionable intelligence and creating opportunities to seize the initiative and defeat the enemy through offensive actions internally, as opposed to developing the situation for the CABs to destroy the enemy. The squadron must be able to conduct SRO, which requires additional dismounts, enabling the squadron to focus its operations on engaging the population to deny insurgents sanctuary and isolate them from the population. During battle in a major combat environment, the recon squadron does not have enough combat power to conduct reconnaissance missions forward of the BCT. This will likely force one of the CABs to fulfill that role. Regardless of the operating environment, which will constantly change just like the terrain, the reconnaissance squadron can achieve both desired methods of employment with two additions to the reconnaissance squadron. The first is a modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) change to increase the number of dismounts in each scout platoon (platoon strength from 30 to 42 troopers) to conduct multidimensional reconnaissance in any environment. The second change is to assign a tank company to the squadron to conduct reconnaissance forward of the BCT (see Figure 1). We must constantly take into account urban terrain factors and the requirement to interact with the civilian population, which requires more dismounts to collect actionable intelligence. Adding additional observers gives the squadron the ability to conduct dismounted reconnaissance while still providing local vehicle security. It also blends dismounted patrolling techniques and vehicle capabilities that prove to lead to the most suc- — 37 cessful reconnaissance methods. Currently, the scout platoon has 30 men and is equipped with five high-mobility, multipurpose, wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) and three cavalry fighting vehicles (CFV) at the platoon level, giving the platoon a 6-man dismount capability, leaving 24 men to man the positions of truck commander/Bradley commander, gunner, and drivers for the 8 vehicles. The current structure does not allow all vehicles to adequately provide local security as two vehicles have only three-man crews. Six men are clearly insufficient where collecting multidimensional information is required. In the current fight, the reconnaissance objective ranges from threat, society, and infrastructure, to terrain, making it necessary to provide the recon squadron the additional dismounted capability to engage the local population and still provide local security. Adding 12 scouts to each platoon gives a dismounted capability of 16 scouts, each vehicle with a 5- man crew, and 2 CFV vehicles, each with a 6-man crew, which provides two 9-man dismounted squads. The extra observers provide adequate local security while allowing the platoon to conduct dismounted reconnaissance operations simultaneously. It also provides each platoon with enough security to conduct infantry battle drill number six (enter and clear a room), by allowing the platoon to establish a secure foothold then continue their reconnaissance operation. The added dismount capability also allows each platoon to clear possible ambush sites in restrictive terrain, including urban areas, and look for indicators of these types of enemy actions outside the vehicle. In a major combat environment or in rural terrain, the troop can be reorganized into three platoons to maximize command and control; enhance making contact through sensors and additional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets; and provide an overwatch force capable of destroying an armored or mobile threat. The reorganization also maximizes vehicles to cover more terrain and interdict a mobile threat during security operations. The ideal structure for reorganizing each line troop using current vehicle platforms within each scout “During stability and reconstruction operations (SRO) the squadron must be capable of developing actionable intelligence and creating opportunities to seize the initiative and defeat the enemy through offensive actions internally, as op posed to developing the situation for the CABs to destroy the enemy. The squadron must be able to conduct SRO, which requires additional dismounts, enabling the squadron to focus its operations on engaging the population to deny insurgents sanctuary and isolate them from the population.” Proposed Reorganized HBCT Recon SQDN Structure

FSC command relationship remains “attached.”

platoon is two scout platoons of three HMMWVs and three CFVs to conduct traditional reconnaissance and security operations, (see Figure 2). The third platoon is called the surveillance, acquisition, and weapons (SAW) platoon, which is a four-vehicle HMMWV-based platoon where the vehicles (two each) are taken from each of the scout platoons. The SAW platoon provides depth to the recon or security operation and allows freedom of maneuver by providing an overwatch element for the lead scout platoons. The SAW platoon also operates the troop’s Raven unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) from an overwatch position to provide the lead platoons early warning and free up the lead scout platoons to focus on information collection. Integrating and maximizing the long-range scout surveillance system (LRAS3) and Javelin systems in each platoon allows the SAW pla toon to reduce the lead platoons’ vulnerability to enemy direct fire contact by maximizing the range of the Javelin and optic capabilities of the command launch unit (CLU). With the additional observers in each platoon, the two scout platoons can still conduct local security and limited dismounted operations as they collect intelligence. This organization also allows the troop commander to have an element serve as a positional reserve capable of reacting to direct fire contact with the forward scout platoons or react quickly enough to exploit success. Another change to the reconnaissance squadron that will enhance the BCT’s warfighting capability is adding a tank company. This modification gives the squadron the capability to fight for information. Adding a tank company solves the constant problem of never having enough time to conduct reconnaissance operations because the enemy has a vote, and fighting for intelligence has been, and will always be, a factor we must plan to execute. It also allows the BCT commander to truly shape his AO with a forward ground element that can provide accurate information over the width of the BCT’s frontage while still employing the two CABs along multiple avenues of approach. This does not add additional tanks to the BCT, which leaves two possible courses of action (COA). The first COA is to take a tank company from one of the CABs, which has the added advantages Proposed Reorganized Cavalry Troop Structure Using Additional Dismounted Capability and Internally Organized SAW Platoon 1st Platoon 2d Platoon 3d Platoon (SAW) Troop 120mm Mortar Section Troop Commander and FSO

HMMWVs come from each scout platoon (two each) 20 troopers within the platoon Consolidate the four Javelins in the troop 32 troopers per platoon 18 crewmen 14-man dismount capability Figure 2 of the company having an established command and control element and a sustainment package easily provided by the current for ward support company (FSC). (See Figure 3.) The second COA is to take one tank platoon from each CAB and — 39

• • •

• • • ••• ••• • • •• •• •• COA1: BCT Structure with Tank Company Assigned to the Recon Squadron E E Figure 3 Note: Graphic is not intended to show task organization within each CAB, only to show combat power available.

form another platoon by combining the four XO tanks, one from each of the tank companies within the BCT. (See Figure 4.) The advantage of the second COA is that both CABs still remain balanced. The tanks also reduce the risk to the squadron by providing direct fire standoff and lethality in open and rolling terrain when a heavy armor threat is anticipated. The BCT and squadron can still make contact through sensors and additional ISR assets, but now the squadron has the capability to conduct counterreconnaissance and truly independent economy-of-force operations. Intelligence can be collected and quickly acted on when weather conditions hinder ISR assets and systems (fixed and rotary wing aircraft) that might be employed to achieve the desired effect on the enemy. Each CAB still has the ability to task organize internally using its scout platoon and lead company as an advanced guard traditionally used to provide layered reconnaissance between the recon squadron and the CABs. This internal change within the BCT also provides the BCT commander an organization other than the CAB to conduct reconnaissance in force. This type of reconnaissance mission is not what the squadron is currently designed for, but it now allows the BCT commander to avoid overtasking a CAB to find, fix, and destroy the enemy. Depending on the threat array, the BCT does not have to lose momentum by conducting a battle handover between two battalion-sized units to destroy the enemy’s reconnaissance assets, or run the risk of the enemy mixing into the population because the reconnaissance squadron did not have enough combat power to isolate and destroy the enemy in an urban environment. The tanks enhance the squadron’s survivability by providing a direct fire platform capable of destroying armored threats offensively if contact is made unexpectedly. It also provides the squadron commander a force that can serve as a squadron reserve capable of reacting to contact quickly within the squadron’s AO to support a troop or rapidly exploit success. The BCT and squadron will always employ the fundamentals of reconnaissance in all planning and execution of reconnaissance operations regardless of the structure of the reconnaissance force. The tanks give the squadron an enhanced capability to develop the situation and retain freedom of maneuver by preventing the scouts from becoming decisively engaged. Granted, technology allows more of our initial contact to be made through acquisition assets, rather than by a chance meeting, but most sensors are not “all-weather capable” nor can you land a UAV to interact with the local population. Without an offensive heavy armor destroying capability, we greatly increase the risk of becoming decisively engaged and will suffer the inevitable decline in survivability of our ground reconnaissance soldiers and platforms. Establishing a permanent command relationship and assigning tank crews to the squadron, instead of just making a task organization change based on mission requirements, is key because it allows interaction and training between tankers and scouts, enabling them to operate together in any environment. It also allows the squadron to train and prepare to conduct continuous operations as a third maneuver element in an economy-of-force role for the BCT by providing the squadron additional platoon combat power. The per manent command relationship also reduces the complexity of deployment planning. Logistically, as mentioned earlier, assigning a pure tank company with its normal logistics slice from the donating bat- “We must constantly take into account urban terrain factors and the requirement to interact with the civilian population, which requires more dismounts to collect actionable intelligence. Adding additional observers gives the squadron the ability to conduct dismounted reconnaissance while still providing local vehicle security. It also blends dismounted patrolling techniques and vehicle capabilities that prove to lead to the most successful reconnaissance methods.”

talion’s habitually attached FSC is the easiest way to support the tank company, but it reduces the capability of one of the CABs in the BCT. Organizing the three separate tank platoons and assigning one tank platoon to each cavalry troop accomplishes the same task and purpose, but requires the squadron’s tank logistics resources to centrally locate or have the ability to distribute to the three line troops. At a minimum, the tanks should have nine tank mechanics (three of them noncommissioned officers), one additional M88, three M978 fuelers, one M977 cargo heavy expanded mobility tactical truck (HE MTT), and two palletized load systems with drivers assigned to the squadron’s FSC to accomplish its mission. Special tools, such as ground hop kits, will be a problem with the second COA because they are tank company assets. Working through these challenges is a topic for another article, but is achievable without greatly reducing the capability of the two CABs. The U. S. Army will conduct future and current operations in a continuously evolving environment, which requires us to quickly counter enemy efforts and emerging tactics, techniques, and procedures. The reconnaissance squadron must maintain its flexibility to gain information dominance for the BCTs — we must understand that to gain that dominance we must be organized and prepared to quickly fight for intelligence in any terrain or environment. Notes 1U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-20.96, Reconnaissance Squadron, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, September 2006, p. 1-1. Lieutenant Colonel Jeff Broadwater is currently serving as commander, 3d Squadron, 7th U. S. Cavalry, 2d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division, Iraq. He received a B. S. from the University of Kentucky and a M. S. from the Naval Post Graduate School. His military education includes U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Armor Officer Basic Course, Armor Officer Advanced Course, Ranger School, and Airborne School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include XO and S3, 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division (ID), Fort Riley, KS; XO, 2d Battalion, 34th Armor, 1st ID, Fort Riley; commander, B Company, 3d Battalion, 73d Armor (Airborne), 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC; and scout platoon leader, G Troop, 2d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Germany. II II l l l l COA 2: BCT Structure with Three Tank Platoons Assigned to the Recon Squadron E 10 platoons and a mortar section available INSTEAD OF 7 platoons available for continuous operations platoons and a sniper section available INSTEAD OF 14 platoons available (not including engineer companies) E Figure 4 Note: Graphic is not intended to show task organization within each CAB, only to show combat power available. — 41 METL must change to reflect that mission. The brigade’s directed METL may be composed of the core METL with other tasks added, or it could be a complete departure from the brigade’s normal requirements, depending on the assigned operation. This is where we address the ever-important question: “So what? Why is it important for us to standardize our brigade METLs?” Well, as any of our high-speed cavalry troopers will tell you, always watch for indicators. The Army’s decision to require core METLs is an indicator that the Army acknowledges the force’s concern about the atrophy of core competencies, and that they want to have an accepted set of metrics to measure unit readiness in terms of those competencies. Developing a core METL should also allow our units to better focus their training during these demanding times. Of course, this is not anew problem; company and battalion commanders have always had the challenge of too many tasks to train and not enough time. I realize the problem will not entirely go away with new METL delineations; however, we will have the ability to better predict what needs to be trained instead of using the ever-growing laundry list to which we have grown accustomed. While we are still faced with the difficulty of training for missions outside of our traditional roles, codifying the METL with respect to our core competencies will keep our training and reset focus on those skills for which the armor force was created. As always, we can use your thoughts and ideas to help us solve what will certainly be a significant challenge for years to come. I look forward to reading your responses. Forge the Thunderbolt! Heavy METL from Page 4