“Operation Active Harvest”

“Operation Active Harvest” by Captain Daniel Tschida In most developed nations, illegal or unwanted weapons and ordnance collection and destruction is traditionally a local government and police function with select support from national government agencies such as the military. Since the conclusion of the Bosnian war in 1995, such a system failed to evolve with any sort of consistency in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Failing to disarm the civilian population presented a constant threat to a fragile peace agreement outlined by the Dayton Peace Accords of 1995. In May and June 2002, stabilization forces (SFOR) conducted Operation Active Harvest to demonstrate to local government and police officials of the three ethnic groups (Serb, Croat, and Bosnian) a successful model for weapons collection and make a nationwide impact on collecting and destroying illegal military weapons and ordnance. During Active Harvest, our unit, Echo Troop, 238th Cavalry, was attached to 1st Battalion, 151st Infantry, 76th Separate Infantry Brigade, Indiana Army National Guard. Our troop’s deployment to Bosnia-Herzegovina was part of a larger deployment that placed us and our higher infantry battalion under the U.S. Army’s, 25th Infantry Division (Light), which commanded the Multi-National Division-North (MND-N) SFOR in Bosnia. Our troop was based out of Forward Operating Base Morgan and our area of operations was a 60 by 40 kilometer area about 20 kilometers north of the Bosnian city of Brcko, located near the international border with Croatia, and covered from east to west the cities of Oraje (B- Croat), Samac (B-Serb), Modrica (B- Serb), and Odzak (B-Croat). Preparing for the Operation My responsibilities as troop executive officer during the operation focused on logistics, records documentation (chain-of-custody forms), transportation requirements, and small-unit coordination to execute my troop commander’s taskings and intent. Our troop’s mission was to organize and execute a weapons collection program over a 6-week period during May and June 2002 by using an extensive information operations campaign and developing a working relationship with local host-nation government officials, local police, and coalition partners. Our mission was intended to show local civilians that Americans and Bosnians could work together, and have the Bosnians take the lead whenever possible. The end state of the operation was to reduce the amount of weapons and ordnance available to the civilian population, all weapons and explosive munitions collected were to be publicly destroyed, and a working model of a weapons-collection program was to be presented to local Bosnian leaders so they could execute future missions with minimal or no support from SFOR. This effort was particularly important because 2002 was thought to be the last year that SFOR would have enough soldiers in Bosnia-Herzegovina, due to political and military cutbacks, to effectively make a nationwide impact on collecting and destroying illegal military weapons. At about this time, the U.S. Congress was pushing hard to minimize the U.S. September-October 2007 — 17 military’s footprint in Bosnia and transfer more of the responsibility to NATO and other European partners. Overcoming the Obstacles From my personal experiences as an Indiana state police officer, I realized just how much we were asking Bosnian civilians to give up. Only 7 years prior, the Bosnians were in the middle of a civil war that included genocide, ethnic cleansing, and high-intensity combat in the very same areas that we were to go house to house with local police officers asking citizens to turn over their weapons. Tensions between ethnic groups, city officials, and police could still be seen and felt in how they related and spoke, or didn’t speak, with one another. Displaced civilians were still living in displaced civilian houses from when evacuations occurred due to fighting, or when homes thought to be abandoned during the civil war were occupied by homeless persons and families. Here, the Bosnians were being asked to give up a piece of security in their lives and trust the U.S. Army and the Bosnian government to protect them. In looking back at this situation, such a program would not have worked in the United States. For example, imagine U.S. Army soldiers and the Los Angles police department going house to house asking civilians to voluntarily turn over their weapons shortly after the Los Angeles riots in the mid 1990s — probably would have been a disaster. The awkward position my unit was already in was complicated by the fact that many local leaders and police felt resentment toward SFOR forces because they stopped the Bosnian civil war and were given the authority to usurp local leaders, if they were proven obstructionists. All of these negative feelings, and the impression of some Bosnians that SFOR was really an occupation force, were the perceptions we had to overcome to successfully complete our mission. Based on these considerations, our troop commander determined that an aggressive information operations campaign was critical to the success of our operation; he sent out platoon leaders and platoon sergeants to deliver advertising material to local newspapers, and asked the local radio station to air a live show about Active Harvest. The information operations campaign was important because within just a few weeks, soldiers and police were scheduled to visit civilian homes and ask the occupants to voluntarily give up their weapons. Our troop commander also wanted to address any fears the local populace may have had about SFOR soldiers and local police forcefully entering their homes. Publishing the rules of engagement on this subject in advance helped prevent counter-information operations from occurring. To add a personal touch, our troop commander often visited with local officials and explained the details of the operation. I often assisted the commander with these visits, as many were often scheduled for the same day. The most important of my meetings was with one of the local chiefs of police from a B-Croat-dominated city. Relying on my experiences as a police officer, I felt confident in talking with another police official. I also knew that if I failed to win the support of the police chief, he was in a position to effectively prevent all meaningful support for the operation. In an effort to build a good working relationship with the chief, I requested the assistance of the local international police task force (IPTF) magistrate who was a German police officer, and one of the police chief’s own officers who had assisted Echo Troop as a Bosnian explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) technician. We had worked with and built a good relationship with both of these men and they would be a positive influence in gaining the police chief’s support. During the meeting, the chief of police was concerned that Active Harvest was an unnecessary operation and that it was a waste of time. I explained that our troop was given an order from higher headquarters to conduct Active Harvest as a cooperative operation with his police officers, and that the SFOR would not be giving his officers any direct orders. This clarification of the command relationships and the mission’s intent was what the police chief needed to hear from an American military officer to help ease his concerns. After my short speech and a lengthy endorsement from the German IPTF officer regarding the opportunities the operation would provide for the local police in terms of training and public relations, the chief of police agreed to support the operation. Conducting the Operation FOB Morgan was not equipped with an ammunition holding area (AHA) or an unexploded ordnance (UXO) pit. Assets had to be sent from Eagle Base and the 25th Infantry Division G4 shop supported this effort. These assets were in the form of two 20-foot conexes in which to hold munitions in one and collected weapons in the other. Having this hasty AHA on FOB Morgan required special authorization from the division commander to store the large amount of land mines, grenades, and rocket-propelled gre nade (RPG) rounds the scout platoons would bring back each evening. Any material that was potentially a problem was given to the EOD teams, which operated at a very high operating tempo (OPTEMPO). For example, our task organization had five scout platoons, each with four uparmored M1114 HMMWVs that were available for weapons collecting. However, only two EOD teams at any one time were available due to their high OPTEMPO and requirements to destroy stockpiles of ordnance at the demolition pit at Eagle Base in Tuzla. Having the EOD “Displaced civilians were still living in displaced civilian houses from when evacuations occurred due to fighting, or when homes thought to be abandoned during the civil war were occupied by homeless persons and families. Here, the Bosnians were being asked to give up a piece of security in their lives and trust the U.S. Army and the Bosnian government to protect them.” 18 — September-October 2007 teams with the collection teams proved highly valuable many times over for their technical abilities and advice on how to package and store unused military munitions. I recall one particular incident where having the EOD team assigned as a counterpart to the collection team paid off. We were conducting a collections operation when a young Bosnian male, who resided at the home we were visiting, advised us he had a Russian PMN-2 mine in his bedroom that he would like to get rid of. This mine turned out to be armed and inverted in the young man’s closet on a top shelf. After the mine was carefully removed by an EOD technician, taken to the backyard, and detonated under controlled circumstances, the mother of the young man made her appreciation known, as she was unaware of the land mine’s presence in her home. After this, she immediately had a discussion with her son on her expectations about not bringing UXO material into the house again. After about 4 weeks of collecting UXO materials and weapons, it was time to destroy the collected weapons during a public event using a Bradley fighting vehicle and several large 8x8 wooden beams. Echo Troop’s commander invited all the local mayors, police chiefs, police officers, and local news media to FOB Morgan. The public event was a dramatic weapons destruction with weapons propped on 8x8 wooden beams while Bradley fighting vehicles ran them over. As the executive officer, my job was not finished until all the chain-of-custody forms were completed, confirming the destruction of each weapon by serial number, and forwarded to the battalion S3 operations shop for archiving. Together, with the EOD teams, we had to ship the remaining unused military ordnance to the demolition pit at Eagle Base. In the 4 weeks of collecting material, Echo Troop filled its 20-foot conexes with antitank/ antipersonnel land mines, grenades, RPG rounds, and all calibers of bullets, ranging from 5.45mm to 20mm. It took two civilian 5-ton trucks, which had been modified to contain sand-filled boxes, to move the entire unused military ordnance from FOB Morgan to the demolition pit at Eagle Base. Lessons Learned After-action reviews and discussions following Operation Active Harvest revealed: EOD support from other battle groups and task forces were essential to our troop’s success; media saturation and high-profile weapons destruction events are high payoff events that make good news; and meetings with local authorities at platoon and company levels are effective in convincing local authorities to work with SFOR. If correctly executed, operations, such as Active Harvest, are a springboard for greater community interaction and lead to positive relationships between local populaces and military forces. There were two noted areas that caused our work to be incredibly restrictive — UXO handling restrictions and lack of EOD resources. To streamline mission requirements, the government should train EOD teams to handle all UXO — this should be a Bosnian government-led effort. Also, speed and flexibility of information operations and psychological operations will go a long way toward making your operation successful; ensure they are well funded and staffed. Successful weapons collection programs that integrate local forces, such as law enforcement and military forces, will eventually allow peacekeeping forces to leave the country after training and establishing a credible government force to take its place. The overall outcome of this operation was successful — Echo Troop collected and destroyed enough machine guns, assault rifles, mortars, antitank rockets, and munitions to outfit a light infantry company with a full unit basic load of ammunition. This operation significantly changed the Bosnians’ perception of the soldiers of Echo Troop and SFOR from a neutral/ hostile opinion to a more favorable one. This change of perception was first noticed by our interpreters and then by our soldiers. Following Active Harvest, noticeably fewer and fewer obscene gestures were made toward soldiers on patrol, and communications with local leaders and police officers became more comfortable. During Active Harvest, Bosnians saw firsthand that American soldiers would take risks and support them while performing the potentially dangerous work of unused munitions and weapons collection. Working together on a difficult task changed the way both sides saw each other and paved the way for better relationships. Captain Daniel Tschida is currently serving as commander, E Troop, 238th Cavalry, 76th Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), Bluffton, IN, and is a state trooper on the Indiana State Police force. He received a B.S. from Purdue University. His military education includes Armor Officer Basic Course, Maneuver Captains Career Course, Scout Leaders Course, and Airborne School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include commander, D Company, 1st Battalion, 151st Infantry, 76th IBCT, Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan; executive officer, E Troop, 238th Cavalry, 76th IBCT, Bosnia-Herzegovina; and platoon leader, E Troop, 238th Cavalry, 76th IBCT, Bluffton. “FOB Morgan was not equipped with an ammunition holding area (AHA) or an unexploded ordnance (UXO) pit. Assets had to be sent from Eagle Base and the 25th Infantry Division G4 shop supported this effort. These assets were in the form of two 20-foot conexes in which to hold munitions in one and collected weapons in the other. Having this hasty AHA on FOB Morgan required special authorization from the division commander to store the large amount of land mines, grenades, and rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) rounds the scout platoons would bring back each evening.” September-October 2007 — 19