Tactical Resourcefulness: A Case Study

Pages from the Past: Tactical Resourcefulness: A Case Study by Captain Dave R. Palmer (Reprinted from the July-August 1966 issue of ARMOR) The Problem You are a newly assigned advisor to the commander of a South Vietnamese armored company. Equipped with M113s, the company is organized into three rifle platoons, a support platoon, and a company headquarters. Shortly after you join, the company is ordered to a district in the “gray” area — a locality controlled by neither the government nor the Viet Cong. The mission: provide local security in the district. On arrival at the district headquarters, you discover a rather bleak situation. Higher level considerations have dictated that your area of operations must be temporarily relegated to a low priority status. The entire military commitment to the district is just five platoon-sized outposts, the district headquarters, and the company of Armor which you advise. The Viet Cong have the capability of mounting assaults, in double company strength, against any of the outposts or against the district headquarters itself. The terrain does not allow rapid relief of all the outposts from a central position. Even if it did, you are quite aware that a favorite guerrilla gambit is to stage an attack on an outpost as bait for an ambush against the relieving force. You do not relish that prospect. A check with both the district chief and your own higher headquarters reveals that the number of outposts in the district has been reduced to the absolute minimum. Consolidation, therefore, is out of the question. As you ponder the unpromising factors, your counterpart approaches. After discussing the problem, he asks for your advice. How would you do it? Know Your Enemy Not surprisingly, a knowledge of guerrilla tactics provides the basis for the solution. Fighting with lighter weapons and saddled with a tenuous supply system, the insurgent must utilize surprise and precise planning to compensate for his inherently inferior combat strength. Rapidly massing to strike an isolated or unsuspecting garrison is his primary hope for success. His doctrine is to fight only when victory is assured; if the outcome is doubtful, he is obliged to refuse combat. Preparation for an attack is meticulous. The defensive system is analyzed completely and a mock-up of the objective is constructed in the guerrillas’ lair. Rehearsals are conducted until every man is letter-perfect in the execution of his specific task. Detailed intelligence is painstakingly gathered. The Viet Cong want to know the jobs, routines, and habits of all the defenders: What is Sergeant Thuan’s alert position? When is he on duty? Does Corporal Minh’s family live nearby? Does the commander get up in the night to relieve himself? Time is normally not a consideration. Should any element of the defense be altered, the insurgent band starts planning all over again. In one recorded instance, an attack that had been in preparation for over two months was cancelled when the sergeant commanding a small triangular fort was replaced by a new — and hence unknown — sergeant just a day prior to the scheduled assault. That single change upset the precise intelligence picture; the would-be attackers could no longer be sure of the exact plans of defense in the fort. The interjection of that element of the unknown made the proposed foray too risky for the poorly armed guerrillas. An unexpected alteration — or possible alteration — of its defenses had saved the fort. The Solution In the autumn of 1964, 4th Troop, 1st Armored Cavalry Squadron (ARVN), found itself in the perplexing situation described above. (It must be admitted that the commander, not the advisor, suggested the imaginative and successful solution.) The insurgent’s heavy dependence on preparation and his corresponding inability to adjust quickly to new situations were used against him. The company commander devised a system to alter continually the defensive status of the five mud forts and the district headquarters. On a completely random basis, he shuttled his platoons from outpost to outpost. The M113s might remain in any given site for an hour or a week. They could arrive at any time of the day or night. At a particular moment, an outpost could contain one, two, or even three platoons. Random reinforcement of a position with the appreciable firepower and manpower of an armored platoon constituted a major and unexpected alteration of the defenses. For any Communist unit anticipating an attack on such a position, the probability of sustaining unacceptable losses was increased while the chances for success were diminished. The very rules under which the guerrilla fights were used against him. Because he could never predict the ever-changing defenses, he was unable to launch an attack on any of the government forces in that district. An original and energetic application of several pertinent Armor characteristics — mobility, flexible communications, firepower, and an offensive spirit even in a defensive environment — resulted in a report of “mission accomplished.” The Moral of the Story This is but one example of the value of Armor in a counterinsurgency role. Armor, employed with ingenuity and imagination, has been doing yeoman service in Vietnam for some four years now. Moreover, in both quantity and quality, the commitment of Armor to that difficult war is increasing. Unfortunately, doubt persists, even in the minds of many thoughtful people, over the efficacy of using Armor in a counterinsurgency war. It is too easy to say “the terrain is not suitable for Armor.” How quickly we forget. We learned in WWII, and again in Korea, that terrain is an obstacle, not an absolute. The only real limits to the employment of Armor are mental and moral. The worst terrain can be overcome by intelligence and initiative; the best terrain is worthless when approached with stupidity and lethargy. We, who have long prided ourselves on being members of the Army’s most forward-thinking branch, need not be left out of the action in low-intensity wars. Indeed, we should not be omitted. Paced by mental mobility, Armor has special characteristics, which can offer much to the overall effort against Communist “wars of liberation.” Editor’s Note: Captain Palmer went on to attain the rank of lieutenant general culminating his career as Superintendent of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He is the author of Summons of the Trumpet: U.S.-Vietnam in Perspective and a recipent of the Gold Medallion, Order of St. George. September-October 2006 — 49