The Secret Testing of Israeli M111 “Hetz” Ammunition: A Model of Failed Commander’s Responsibility

On 10 June 1982, during Operation Peace for Galilee, Israeli forces launched an attack against Syrian forces believed to be preparing for a counterattack along a strategic highway. As elements of the Israeli 362d Tank Battalion entered the Lebanese town of Sultan Yakoub, Syrian and Palestinian forces heavily engaged the advancing Israeli Magach-4 main battle tanks (MBTs). The incoming fire was so intense that the lead elements of the Israeli battalion were cut-off and effectively surrounded by Syrian and Palestinian forces. Fighting continued throughout the night with the cut-off Israeli forces being pounded by effective and coordinated direct and indirect fires, as well as close air support. Additionally, the Syrians employed several antitank teams that used both rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and Milan antitank guided missiles (ATGMs). Finally, on the morning of 11 June, after intense fighting, the Israelis saw their chance to disengage from the battle and made their move. Moving as quickly as possible, the remnants of the 362d Battalion managed to break contact and return to Israeli lines. Reportedly, when the smoke and dust cleared, the Israelis left at least eight Magach-4s (either captured or destroyed) on the battlefield. Several hours after the battle, Western reporters covering Peace for Galilee from Syria, reported that “something interesting could be seen in Damascus.” Wasting no time, the Syrians had moved at least one of the captured Magach-4s to the capital and paraded it, along with its captured crew, through the center of Damascus, flying both Syrian and Palestinian flags. Although rarely seen, photographs of this tank being paraded through the streets have appeared on the internet. While the whereabouts and final disposition of the majority of the captured Magach-4s from Sultan Yakoub are unknown, three of the tanks have been accounted for; and this is where the story truly begins. This article does not intend to second-guess actions or decisions made by a commander under enemy fire; it is clear that a commander’s responsibility to secure and safeguard his classified and high-priority equipment is steadfast and ongoing — even after the battle. Failure to do so can have a massive impact far beyond the battle at hand. As mentioned above, three of these captured Israeli Magach-4s have been accounted for: one is on public display at the Teshren Panorama Museum in Damascus; another is publicly displayed at the Russian Military Historical Museum of Armored Vehicles and Weaponry at Kubinka; and the third tank, actually delivered to the Soviets as part of a set of two in 1982-1983, was reportedly destroyed during secret live-fire testing by the Soviets. This live-fire testing was standard procedure for captured equipment and the Soviets had been testing at Kubinka since 1936. While interesting to be sure, the Magach-4s were not the most modern tanks available at the time and were not even the most modern Israeli tanks used during Peace for Galilee. Far more important than the tanks, the intelligence windfall for the Soviets (and equally the disaster for many others around the world), was the Israeli ammunition on-board when they arrived at Kubinka. The Soviets must have been literally thrilled to Above, a captured Israeli Magach-4 on display at the Teshren Panorama Museum, Damascus, Syria. (Photo: Tom Cooper) discover that the delivery from Syria included an unconfirmed quantity of the new 105mm M111 (“Hetz” or “arrow”) armor-piercing fin-stabilized discarding sabot (APFSDS) ammunition. In 1982, it would have been difficult to overestimate the importance of the exploitation and testing of this new cutting-edge tank ammunition to the Soviets. Their own propaganda machine was already providing dramatic claims of victorious Syrian tank crews hugging the glacis armor of their new Soviet-designed T-72 MBTs that had reportedly survived the fire of the new Israeli Merkava Mk 1 MBTs, using the new M111 ammunition. The Israelis, on the other hand, were trying to convince as large an audience as possible of the exact opposite; in fact, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin added his own comments during a television interview on 15 June 1982. According to Begin, the Israelis destroyed nine T-72s with the Merkava; “while NATO claimed that the T-72 is undefeated in one respect — it cannot be hit (penetrated) from the front — NATO now knows this is not so. This is also a myth.” The unexpected opportunity to exploit what was perhaps the best 105mm tank round in existence at the time would not only allow the Soviets to confirm the performance of the Hetz round against their own tanks, but also determine its effectiveness against the armor of the tanks it was actively exporting to many of its allies around the world, including those in the Middle East. The secret live-fire testing of the Hetz reportedly took place at Kubinka in 1982 and involved firing the round at a Soviet T-72A MBT. In 1982, the T-72A was a very new development for the Soviets; in fact, it had only been identified by NATO the previous year and given the NATO reporting name of M1981/3. According to reliable Russian sources, this live-fire testing confirmed that the M111 Hetz round was able to penetrate the T-72A’s glacis armor, but not the tank’s turret frontal armor. This superior performance shocked the Soviets; up until these tests, they had been confident that the frontal armor of the T-72A (both turret and glacis), was immune to 105mm ammunition. The Israeli Hetz had proven them wrong. The Soviets knew they had to act and act quickly; if word of the true capabilities of the M111 Hetz round got out to their allies, especially those countries arrayed against Israel, the significance and export potential of the T-72 (and all of its variants), would be in jeopardy. Following these tests, the Soviets “attacked” this problem and very quickly developed and fielded a solution that would have an impact far beyond their efforts at Kubinka and the battle of Sultan Yakoub. In addition to testing the Israeli M111 Hetz, there are unconfirmed reports that the Soviets managed to acquire an unknown number of brand-new U. S. 105- mm M735 APFSDS rounds as well. This was very unlikely, since M735 ammunition had just started to reach U. S. tank battalions in Germany in 1981; however, if true, it could well have provided additional incentive to the Soviets to deal with the threat of new 105mm tank ammunition. Finally, a few photos believed to show the tanks involved in the Kubinka live-fire tests recently appeared on the internet. While still unconfirmed, the photos do clearly show holes punched into the armor of a T-72 to include the small gouges cut into the tank’s armor by the small fins of a penetrating APFSDS round. After observing similar results on knocked-out Syrian tanks left on the battlefields of Peace for Galilee in 1982, the arrangement and shape of these tell-tale gouges prompted the press to label them “Stars of David.” The Soviet solution to the surprising Israeli M111 Hetz round was not only important to the Soviets, but would also have a very significant impact in countries ranging from Europe to the Middle East, and as far away as the People’s Republic of China. The Soviets decided that the best solution was to redesign the glacis of the T-72A MBT specifically to defeat Hetz ammunition. Up until the testing at Kubinka, the T-72 series tanks were protected by a three-layer laminate glacis with an outer layer of high-carbon steel, 80mm thick, a middle layer of “steklotekstolit” or glass-reinforced plastic (GRP), 100mm thick, and an inner layer of high-carbon steel, 20mm thick, for a total thickness of 200mm. The Soviets decided to maintain this alternating steel-GRP-steel laminate design, but increased the number of layers from three to five. The new five-layer glacis design had two outer layers of high-carbon steel, two middle layers of GRP, and one inner layer of high-carbon steel. Additionally, the Soviets added a very hard 16mm thick steel faceplate to the outer layer of the glacis. The faceplate is easily identifiable by the two “cookie-cutout” holes cut into the plate to allow it to be placed over the tank’s two tow hooks, and welded directly to the outer layer of the glacis. For vehicle identification purposes, the faceplate became the defining feature of tanks fitted with this redesigned glacis armor. In effect, the Soviets had very quickly developed anew variant of the T-72, designated the

T-72M1 MBT.

Since the Soviets had learned all they needed to know about the Hetz, and they realized that a significant portion of the military threat directed against the Soviet Union was actually directed at their allies (from NATO in Europe and from Israel in the Middle East), the T-72M1 would be intended solely for the export market. In addition to rushing as many of the tanks to their allies as possible, the Soviets also provided the design plans to several of their allies to allow those countries to produce the T-72M1, which included Czechoslovakia, Poland, India, and Yugoslavia (as the M84A). The production of this new tank outside the Soviet Union not only allowed the At left, an Israeli Magach-4 on display at the Kubinka Museum in Russia. (Photo: Roman Bazalevsky) 24 — non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries to produce and field a large number of these tanks, it also allowed those same producing countries to export the tanks produced in Eastern Europe to the Middle East. In fact, the majority of the T-72M1s that the United States and coalition forces fought during Desert Storm and during Operation Iraqi Freedom were produced in Poland and Czechoslovakia. Interestingly enough, photographic evidence confirmed that the need for the 16- mm glacis faceplate fitted to the T-72M1 (if not redesigning the complete glacis armor array) was identified by the People’s Republic of China. At least one example of a prototype of the new Chinese Type 98 MBT included the same 16mm glacis faceplate. In addition to forcing the Soviets to develop an armor solution and anew tank to deal with the threat of the Israeli M111 Hetz, the exploitation of that ammunition also led to the international proliferation of that same tank. The T-72M1 quickly became the tank of choice for the armored forces of Soviet allies. It was deployed by several countries, including Syria, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Czechoslovakia, Poland, East Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, and India. At the end of hostilities in 1982, the Israelis celebrated the success of the M111 Hetz round and decided to market it internationally as the proven T-72 killer. While still relatively unknown, prior to the Peace for Galilee Operation in 1982, the Hetz may have already had a following in Europe. Reportedly, the German military showed interest in the new Israeli round during its development in the late 1970s, and may have agreed to purchase the round for its own 105mm-armed tanks. The Hetz finally made it to Germany and was adopted by the German army in 1983, as the DM-23. In addition to Germany, the Hetz was adopted by other countries as well, which included South Africa and the People’s Republic of China. Interest in the Hetz was growing and the Israeli marketing efforts appeared to be paying off. Unfortunately for the Israelis and other countries that used the Hetz, the years that followed the success of the new round in 1982 included the proliferation of the T-72M1. Unknown to the rest of the world, the Soviet tank, protected by armor designed specifically to defeat the Israeli Hetz round, had given much of the armored forces opposing NATO and Israel a significant advantage. Ultimately, the window of opportunity provided by the T-72M1’s capabilities, like so many other weapons systems developed on both sides of the Cold War, did not last long. NATO and Israel would continue to develop and field new and improved 105mm tank ammunition, while concurrently fielding much better protected and significantly more powerful 120mm gun armed tanks. While the glory days of the T-72M1 were short, and any lingering assessments concerning the capabilities of its armor were left burning on the battlefields of Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom, the consequences resulting from the Soviet testing of the M111 Hetz, made possible by failed commander’s responsibility, cannot be overlooked. During the battle of Sultan Yakoub, Israeli commanders failed to complete the fundamental requirements of securing, safeguarding, recovering, or destroying their abandoned tanks. The fighting in Iraq over the past few years has confirmed that these same requirements have become a challenge for U. S. forces as well. Photographic evidence has confirmed that some U. S. 120mm APFSDS and HEAT ammunition has been discovered in captured Iraqi insurgent ammunition caches. Additionally, international press reports have confirmed the existence of a few isolated cases of U. S. M1s being temporarily abandoned without being secured or safeguarded. In one case, the attempted total destruction of an abandoned M1A1 by U. S. forces proved to be a significant challenge. This now-famous tank was abandoned during the “thunder run” into Baghdad, due to a persistent engine fire. In spite of the use of thermite grenades, two 120mm HEAT rounds fired by another M1A1, two U. S. Air Force-delivered Maverick missiles, and one U. S. J- DAM bomb, the stricken tank remained intact. Clearly, it is the commander’s responsibility to secure, safeguard, recover, and if necessary, completely destroy any abandoned M1 tank. These requirements, perhaps now more than ever, not only run chronologically (before, during, and after the battle), but also geographically, throughout the entire depth of the battlefield. Failure to do so could cause irreparable damage impacting not only our current operations in Iraq, but the operations of U. S. forces well into the future. James Warford, U. S. Army, Retired, is a trainer/ training coordinator, Training and Education Division, Cubic Defense Applications, Leavenworth, KS. He received a B. A. from the University of Santa Clara, CA, an M. M. A. S. from the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, and an M. A. from Webster University. His military education includes the Armor Officer Basic Course, the Armor Officer Advanced Course, and the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College. During his career, he served in various command and staff positions, to include commander, D Company, 1st Battalion, 66th Armor, 2d Armored Division (2AD), Fort Hood, TX; commander, A Company and Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2d Battalion, 66th Armor, 2AD, Garlstedt, Germany; tactics instructor, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth; S3, 2d Squadron, 4th Cavalry, 24th Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, GA; and S3, 2d Brigade, 24th Infantry Division, Fort Stewart. At right, a captured Iraqi T-72M1 with add-on glacis faceplate on display at Fort Stewart, Georgia. (Photo: James M. Warford) — 25