Ruminations on Modular Cavalry

Ruminations on Modular Cavalry by Major Andrew D. Goldin The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the Department of Defense. Although plenty of today’s Army units bear the moniker “cavalry,” increasingly fewer perform cavalry missions. Dictionary.com defines cavalry as, “A highly mobile army unit using vehicular transport, such as light armor and helicopters,” and for historical purposes as, “troops trained to fight on horseback.” The fact I had to use the internet, rather than current or emerging doctrine, to find a definition of cavalry is revealing in and of itself. No current field manual defines the term “cavalry,” or uses it beyond a historical context. Meanwhile, the 1996 version of U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 17-95, Cavalry Operations, describes cavalry by its roles.1 Specifically, “the fundamental purpose of cavalry is to perform reconnaissance and provide security for close operations… Cavalry is, by its role, an economy of force.” The field manual goes on to say, “Cavalry has historically served as a flexible multipurpose force. Capitalizing on a significant mobility advantage over infantry, cavalry performed long-range reconnaissance and security for commanders.”2 For the purpose of this article, cavalry will be defined as “a highly mobile force, capable of operating independently to per form reconnaissance, security, and economy-of-force missions,” which is defined in FM 1-02, Operational Terms and Graphics, as: “Reconnaissance: A mission undertaken to obtain … information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data … of a particular area. “Security: Measures taken by a military unit… to protect itself against all acts … which may impair its effectiveness, and One of the nine principles of war: never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage. “Economy of Force: The allocation of minimum essential combat capability to supporting efforts, with attendant degree of risk, so that combat power may be concentrated on the main effort. One of the nine principles of war: Allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.”3 With these definitions in mind, we will discuss doctrinal cavalry missions. Today, as in earlier days, reconnaissance missions include zone, area, and route reconnaissance. These missions focus on gathering information about enemy forces, terrain, and civilian considerations such as attitude of the population, infrastructure, and culture. The amount of detail delivered to the commander varies on the reconnaissance focus and tempo September-October 2006 — 13 of the operation, all of which are driven by mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time, and civilians (METT-TC). These elements differ primarily on the amount of ground that needs to be covered, with an area recon generally being the smallest amount of ground and zone recon being the largest and most comprehensive effort. FM 17-95 also discusses the “reconnaissance in force,” which has more of the characteristics of a movement to contact rather than reconnaissance.4 For example, a “thunder run” would be considered a reconnaissance in force. Typical cavalry security missions consist of screen, guard, and cover. In these missions, cavalry provides reaction time and maneuver space for the commander of the main body; that is, the element being secured. On the continuum of security missions, one may think of screen as providing the least security, while cover provides the most. In a screen, the cavalry “observes, identifies, and reports information… while fighting only for self protection.”5 Meanwhile, a cover mission “protects the main body by fighting to gain time… reports information … and prevents enemy observation of and direct fire against the main body.”6 Significantly, a covering force can also act independently of the main body. A robust cavalry force can also perform hasty attack, movement to contact, defend a battle position, defend in sector, and delay missions. Before force modularity, the Army was fairly well organized and equipped to accomplish these missions. Each tactical echelon (corps, division, and brigade) had a dedicated formation, which could accomplish all or most of these missions within the environment it was intended to fight. Corps had armored cavalry regiments (ACRs), divisions had divisional cavalry squadrons, and brigades had brigade recon troops. Heavy and light cavalry formations existed to perform similar roles in the environment for which they were intended; heavy forces for a high-intensity environment and light forces for low-intensity conflict. This provided the commander of each echelon, heavy or light, a dedicated force to accomplish a variety of reconnaissance and security tasks in support of his mission, without necessarily having to divert maneuver forces. As a practical matter, it was often necessary to beef up a brigade recon troop or a light cavalry squadron with tanks or other additional assets based on METT-TC. Although these organizations were not perfect for every situation, at least commanders had an existing organization for task organizing when required. After modularity, a fully functional cavalry force effectively no longer exists. That is, we no longer have units capable of performing all of the enduring cavalry functions. Modular force capabilities are limited to the surveillance and reconnaissance pieces of the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) paradigm. The only echelon that maintains a cavalry-like organization is the brigade combat team (BCT). These organizations, called “reconnaissance squadrons,” are aptly named. The final draft of FM 3- 20.96, Reconnaissance Squadron, provides tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for reconnaissance squadrons in heavy, Stryker, and infantry BCTs.7 Regardless of BCT organization, the reconnaissance squadron is responsible for “find ing and tracking the enemy throughout the BCT AO [area of operations]” and “providing targeting data.”8 According to the FM, each squadron has limitations. The reconnaissance squadron is not organized, equipped, or trained to conduct a reconnaissance in force; should only be used in a security role when unavoidable; and will use fires as a primary weapon — inherent firepower is mainly for self protection.9 Doctrinally, the reconnaissance squadron can accomplish the same reconnaissance missions — zone, area, and route — as its organizational predecessors, as well as limited security missions such as screen, area security, and local security. As in earlier organizations, the reconnaissance squadron’s significant capabilities include the ability to perform continuous, all-weather reconnaissance and security missions in support of the commander’s objectives. It is capable of rapid movement and deployment, close reconnaissance, and gathering information on various threats, conditions, and civilian considerations. The reconnaissance squadron is characterized by a new emphasis on stealthy reconnaissance and surveillance operations and integration into the joint battlespace by “analog and digital information linkages horizontally within the squadron and vertically to the BCT and subordinate command nodes.”10 I assume this means that when scouts send a spot report via an onboard electronic information system, everyone in the BCT knows about it and we can count on joint fires — the U.S. Air Force — to save our skins. I hope that works. “The reconnaissance squadron is characterized by a new emphasis on stealthy reconnaissance and surveillance operations and integration into the joint battlespace by “analog and digital information linkages horizontally within the squadron and vertically to the BCT and subordinate command nodes.” I assume this means that when scouts send a spot report via an onboard electronic information system, everyone in the BCT knows about it and we can count on joint fires — the U.S. Air Force — to save our skins. I hope that works.” 14 — September-October 2006

In contrast, FM 3-20.96 is very clear in the reconnaissance squadron’s limitations. Specifically, “it lacks direct fire standoff, lethality, and survivability in open and rolling terrain and needs aug mentation when a heavy armor threat is anticipated; it requires augmentation to perform offensive and defensive operations as an economy of force; and it has limited sustainment assets that must frequently operate over extended distances.”11 A review of the task organizations of the three types of reconnaissance squad rons shows why the manual states this. The reconnaissance squadron’s task organization for the heavy BCT is shown in Figure 1.12 Compared to the future force brigade reconnaissance troop (BRT), the heavy brigade combat team (HBCT) reconnaissance squadron is significantly more capable, consisting of near ly three times the amount of personnel and equipment as its predecessor. It appears to be fully capable of sustained reconnaissance operations for the BCT in many likely scenarios. How ever, the BRT (much like its parent brigade) was designed and intended to operate in the context of a division organization where the division cavalry had a mix of Bradleys and M1-series Abrams tanks. Since the BCT is intended to operate independently, HBCT reconnaissance squad rons must operate without the additional layer of divisional cavalry (the divisional cavalry squadron) ahead of them. Thus, the counterreconnaissance fight will fall entirely on the reconnaissance squadron’s 23 M3 Bradleys, 30 M1114 long-range ad vanced scout surveillance system (LRAS3)-equipped HMMWVs, and whatever fires they can call in with the aid of the fire support team (FIST) or the combat observation and lasing team (COLT). The absence of tanks from the squadron’s task organization in the heavy fight means the squadron can likely conduct the missions for which it was intended, but no more. While the reconnaissance squadron is more capable, the absence of the divisional cavalry squadron means it also has a lot more work to do, resulting in a zero-sum gain. The infantry brigade combat team (IBCT) reconnaissance squadron, shown in Figure 2, has some similarities to the light cavalry squadron of the divisional cavalry, as well as the light brigade cavalry troop because it is a HMMWV-centric organization.13 Adding another ground troop is a wel come improvement and will be of great use in the light-fighter environment. Less clear, however, is how to make best use of the dismounted troop. FM 3-20.96 provides little guidance on the subject. Lack of inherent high-speed transportation is problematic and denies the troop the advantage of mobility typically associated with cavalry. In theory, based on METT-TC, the dismounted troop could be inserted by helicopter near its reconnaissance objectives or infiltrate along dismounted avenues of approach. The most obvious solution would be to motorize the troop, September-October 2006 — 15 IBCT Reconnaissance Squadron Figure 2 HBCT Reconnaissance Squadron Figure 1 sance missions and limited security missions (screen) only. The other enduring cavalry missions — guard, cover, and economy of force — are left unanswered by the modular cavalry force. The rationale for this omission appears to be twofold. First, in network centric warfare, planners declare that “information dominance, when achieved, is security.”15 Unfortunately, this assumption remains untested in the real world. While knowledge is power, it doesn’t translate into the boots, tires, or treads on the ground needed to react to physical threats that don’t respond as planned. After all, the enemy does get a vote. The second reason — if you can call it that — is a post-fact rationalization of the merits and pitfalls of the future force cavalry squadrons. As FM 3-20.96 states, “In our nation’s history, reconnaissance and cavalry units that were impressively armed (possessing organic armor, aviation, and artillery, for example) routinely proved too much of a temptation for commanders to employ in direct combat roles. When reconnaissance units engage in direct combat missions, one thing has proved certain — reconnaissance ceases. When reconnaissance ceases, the potential for achieving and capitalizing upon information dominance is lost.”16 Therefore, to gain information dominance, we must remove the cavalry’s ability to fight for information and perform security missions. Apparently, removing combat power will prevent reconnaissance squadrons from being misused. Unfortunately, history suggests the opposite. Captain William Nance draws a number of compelling parallels between the modular cavalry force and the mechanized cavalry groups of World War II in his article, “The Armored Reconnaissance Squadron and the Mechanized Cavalry Group,” in the January-February issue of ARMOR.17 Nance discusses historical examples where our predecessors were used doctrinally, and just as often nondoctrinally, with unfortunate results. Therefore, removing combat power from the cavalry will not necessarily prevent cavalry from being misused. If occasional misuse is the price for having the inherent capability to perform all the enduring cavalry missions organi- “Lack of inherent high-speed transportation is problematic and denies the troop the advantage of mobility typically associated with cavalry. In theory, based on METT-TC, the dismounted troop could be inserted by helicopter near its reconnaissance objectives or infiltrate along dismounted avenues of approach. The most obvious solution would be to motorize the troop, providing it with the same capabilities as the other two troops in the squadron.” 16 — September-October 2006 SBCT Reconnaissance Squadron Figure 3 providing it with the same capabilities as the other two troops in the squadron. Meanwhile, the Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT) has a dedicated reconnaissance squadron that has some unique capabilities, shown in Figure 3.14 The Stryker reconnaissance squadron is unique for two reasons: use of the Stryker vehicle as the standard platform and the addition of an unmanned aerial system (UAS) unit. The Stryker was built with digital integration in mind and connects scouts with the SBCT by digital data, as well as voice. Meanwhile, under favorable environmental and operational conditions, the UAS can provide a significant surveillance capability unique to the Stryker squadron in the form of direct video feeds to ground-based units or headquarters. The multisensor platoon offers a capability typically associated with military intelligence battalions. Adding these specialties to the task organization significantly enhances the SBCT reconnaissance squadron’s capabilities. The remainder of the squadron is conventionally organized around three troops of three platoons each, along with a mortar section for each troop. The implications of the modular force effect not only reconnaissance squadrons, but the BCT commanders who use them. Reconnaissance squadrons of all types are organized to accomplish reconnaiscally, I would rather pay that price than beg, borrow, and steal the additional combat power needed to accomplish the commander’s security or economy-of-force objectives. Network-centric warfare or not, somebody on the battlefield has to accomplish reconnaissance, security, and economy-of-force missions. Taking required combat power from reconnaissance squadrons does not solve the problem. Instead, the conduct of security missions will be tasked to units that have the combat power to conduct them — elements of the two maneuver battalions. Therefore, taking combat power away from the cavalry simply shifts the burden of these enduring missions to the very people who are supposed to gain from them — the main line battalions. Is this progress? Throughout history, commanders have relied on cavalry to perform reconnaissance, security, and economy-of-force missions on the battlefield; and cavalrymen — regardless of their mounts — have delivered. Currently, the technology required to deliver the siren-song promise of network-centric warfare does not exist, and it certainly isn’t in the hands of soldiers of the modular force. Currently, future force reconnaissance squadrons can accomplish their very narrowly defined missions as they are. More worrisome, however, is the cavalry missions the “cavalry” is not doing — security and economy-of-force missions. Network-centric warfare or not, the need for units on the battlefield to perform cavalry’s enduring missions continues. Removing the cavalry’s ability to fight simply means that “someone else” will have to do it, or it may mean that the reconnaissance squadrons will be tasked with security missions beyond their capability. In either case, this will likely yield results that are as unfortunate as they are predictable. Scouts out! Notes 1U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 17-95, Cavalry Operations, U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, D.C., 24 December 1996. 2Ibid. 3FM 1-02, Operational Terms and Graphics, GPO, Washington, D.C., 21 September 2004. 4FM 17-95, Cavalry Operations. 5FM 3.0, Operations, GPO, Washington, D.C., 14 June 2001. 6Ibid. 7FM 3-20.96, Reconnaissance Squadron, GPO, Washington,

D.C., TBP.

8Ibid. 9Ibid. 10Ibid. 11Ibid. 12Ibid. 13Ibid. 14Ibid. 15Ibid. 16Ibid. 17Captain William Nance, “The Armored Reconnaissance Squadron and the Mechanized Cavalry Group, ARMOR, January-February 2006, pp. 7-11. Major Andrew Goldin is the state marksmanship coordinator for Joint Forces Headquarters, Maryland Army National Guard, Reisterstown, MD. He received a B.A. from the College of William and Mary and an M.S. from George Mason University. His military education includes the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, Armor Officer Advanced Course, Armor Officer Basic Course, Airborne School, Air Assault School, Scout Platoon Leaders Course, and Cavalry Leaders Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include platoon leader, troop XO, troop commander, and assistant S3, 1st Squadron, 158th Cavalry Regiment, Maryland Army National Guard, Annapolis, MD. He was mobilized in support of Operation Joint Forge where he served as the G3 Operations Battle Captain for MND-North (SFOR 10), Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina. “The Stryker reconnaissance squadron is unique for two reasons: use of the Stryker vehicle as the standard platform and the addition of an unmanned aerial system (UAS) unit. The Stryker was built with digital integration in mind and connects scouts with the SBCT by digital data, as well as voice.” September-October 2006 — 17