Troop-level ISR Planning and Execution

“Because of what we’ve learned in combat, we’re now putting people through training scenarios where there’s no solution. In the past, you were measured on how you complied with doctrine and used it to organize and accomplish your objective. …We want an adaptive organization full of problem solvers. We want them to know how to think, not just what to think.” — General Peter Schoomaker, Chief of Staff, Army As indicated by General Schoomaker’s statement above, today’s nonlinear operational environment requires multidimensional thinking, planning, and execution where leaders and soldiers alike must be prepared to fight the “three-block war.”1 Leaders at all levels require information in the form of intelligence to help solve problems, make decisions, and maintain situational awareness (SA). How we collect and manage information is critical. A key aspect of this dynamic is the ability of troop and company commanders to incorporate intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) into planning and execution for all operations and express their intent for ISR in the form of reconnaissance focus.2 Leaders must understand that reconnaissance is a continuous process conducted during all missions from raids and combat patrols to movement and contact. As defined by U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3.20-95, “reconnaissance is a focused collection effort. It is performed before, during, and after other operations to provide information used in the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process, and the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) for the commander and staff to formulate, confirm, or modify the concept, and to acquire and attack targets to support the targeting process.”3 For the troop or company commander, this all boils down to three basic questions:

• What information do we need to bring the fight to the enemy?

• What information does higher headquarters need for planning and targeting?

• How do we focus our eyes and ears on finding that information during the execution of all operations? The troop or company commander is the critical linchpin between soldiers on the ground executing operations and the headquarters planning future operations. The commander’s ability to answer the first two questions and express them in a clear and concise reconnaissance focus is essential. Not only will this help platoons maintain an offensive mindset, but it also ensures that all unit actions are focused on the higher headquarters’ endstate. Unfortunately, not all troop and company commanders have a strong grasp of the fundamentals of ISR planning and operations and how they impact mission execution. As a result, information collection, one of the five activities of information management as described in FM 3- 20.971, is not completely achieved.4 Fortunately, for the time-strapped commander, ISR planning does not need to be all consuming. Doctrine for ISR generally addresses the battalion/task force staff, as the troop or company is viewed as one of the resources to execute the ISR plan. As a result, most doctrine for the troop and company covers the fundamentals of reconnais-Troop-level ISR Planning and Execution by Major Jonathan Muenchow sance, security, and the critical tasks of each mission, but does not address the ‘how and why’ of ISR. The lack of clear doctrine should not stop the troop or company commander from developing his own ISR plan integrated with his higher headquarters. Essentially, there are six steps the commander takes to develop and execute an ISR plan:

• Establish common operating picture (COP)/situational awareness.

• Determine commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR)/information requirements (IR).

• Develop reconnaissance focus.

• Receive and pass reports.

• Modify/adjust reconnaissance focus.

• Gather feedback from higher. Overlaid on the collection management cycle, a systematic approach to ISR planning and execution may look like the following:5 Step 1: Develop requirements. The commander must develop a valid and integrated ISR plan to establish situational awareness throughout his area of operations (AO) and gain a solid understanding of his higher headquarters’ concept for future operations and lethal and nonlethal targeting. The two keys to this are: building the same COP as the higher headquarters’ tactical operations center (TOC); and getting boots on the ground. As much as possible, the unit’s command post must replicate the COP displayed in the higher headquarters’ TOC. This includes copies of the S2’s pattern analysis tools, the S3’s operational graphics, and outputs of the lethal and nonlethal targeting meetings. By having this information, the troop commander and platoon leaders are better able to plan for operations and “see” what higher is seeing. Even with an integrated COP, the commander cannot truly understand his AO unless he leaves the forward operating base (FOB) and explores his surroundings. He can accomplish this by accompanying subordinate units on missions and by meeting local leaders. Just getting out and seeing what his subordinates see will assist the commander in developing his information requirements. Once the commander has identified his AO and essential tasks during mission analysis, he can determine what CCIR/ IR he can expect his platoons to answer based on his understanding of the AO and what relevant information his higher headquarters is seeking. FM 3-20.971 describes relevant information as “all information of importance to the troop commander and to higher headquarters in the exercise of command and control.”6 What information does the S2 need to support his pattern analysis, which may lead to the S3 planning a mission to disrupt that pattern? What indicators are the squadron seeking that may trigger a decision to conduct a raid against suspected enemy forces within the troop AO? What intelligence gaps exist in the targeting process? The commander pulls this information from the squadron CCIR and IR, the lethal and nonlethal targeting lists, and his own information requirements. Once the commander has determined the IR, he can develop his reconnaissance focus. Step 2: Develop collection plan. Reconnaissance focus is how the commander prioritizes the information required to bring the fight to the enemy and the information higher headquarters requires for planning and targeting. Doctrine characterizes this information by threat, society, infrastructure, and terrain, and how it relates to the higher headquarters’ information requirements.7 The amount of time units have been in the AO, the types of missions being considered, and the targeting process all effect the focus. As a minimum, reconnaissance focus should: address key reconnaissance or security tasks to be executed in the form of threat, society, infrastructure, and terrain; and translate how the commander envisions taking the fight to the enemy in the form of purpose/intent. Coupled with the commander’s CCIR and higher headquarters’ CCIR, this provides platoon leaders with a clear understanding and picture of what relevant information to look for and how it affects the fight. Step 3 and 4: Task or request collection and disseminate. Reconnaissance focus can come in the form of the commander’s reconnaissance guidance, which covers focus, tempo, and engagement criteria, or may simply be a subsection of paragraph three to the operations order (OPORD) or fragmentary order (FRAGO).8 Regardless of the format used, the key is that it can be clearly understood and supports both the unit’s and higher headquarters’ information requirements. To ensure subordinates understand the reconnaissance focus and ISR plan, the commander must integrate them into his rehearsal. Subordinates should backbrief the reconnaissance focus and CCIR and the commander should involve at least one action during the rehearsal that either answers a CCIR or relates to the reconnaissance focus. Step 5: Evaluate reporting. During and after mission execution, the commander must have a plan or system in “Based on the commander’s reconnaissance focus, the platoon on combat patrol questions locals about suspicious or unusual activity near each of the three NAIs and develops detailed overlays of possible counterattack routes and ambush points around TAIs 1-3. They report that a local shopkeeper, whose store is near NAI 2, has seen a white van stop along the roadside every night between 2300 hours and 0100 hours, just prior to an IED explosion.” 42 — September-October 2005 place for how he will gather information from platoons and how he adjusts recon focus. Reporting and information flow is always a focus for scouts and should be standard operating procedure within any unit. However, if the commander has not built a thorough ISR plan, he probably has not thought about how or what to shift his platoon’s reconnaissance focus to during operations. If his platoons answer a CCIR or an IR, the commander and command post must know whether the information was passed higher, to whom the information was passed and how the information was passed — the information effects the reconnaissance focus. If the commander has visibility of the squadron’s planning process, he can anticipate how different answers to CCIR effect his own reconnaissance focus. With a general knowledge of this information, the commander is prepared to shift his recon focus rapidly during execution. The commander also needs to address how the troop collects and passes information after the unit returns to the FOB; prepare a standard format for a patrol debrief; monitor who conducts the patrol debrief and where; observe how well the command post understands the ISR plan; and decide how to handle CCIR/IR and how that information is passed to higher headquarters. These procedures may seem simple, but they are not something cavalry and armor units routinely train. Step 6: Update collection plan. The commander must be ready to adjust his reconnaissance focus as the situation changes or develops. Changes to his recon focus may be driven by external events, internal events, or by feedback from higher about the information his unit is collecting. Regardless of the source, the commander must be prepared to adjust his focus as required to ensure he is collecting the most relevant data in the fluid contemporary operating environment. The commander must remain actively involved in focusing his units to gather valuable information that he can use to conduct enemy attacks and his higher headquarters can use in their planning and targeting processes. A commander can establish measures of effectiveness (MOE) to help him determine whether or not he needs to adjust his reconnaissance focus. MOE is quantifiable data that indicate the effectiveness of actions in achieving MOE/supporting tasks.9 Basically, MOE are the indicators that aid the commander in assessing whether or not his operation is having the desired effect. If the intent of an operation, or series of operations, is to disrupt or defeat insurgent activity in a certain AO, then supporting MOE may include decreased ambushes, decreased IED events, an increase in human intelligence (HUMINT), and a friendly or more receptive population. MOE help the commander evaluate and adjust his reconnaissance focus over an extended period of time as he works toward achieving his endstate. The commander also updates his collection plan through feedback from higher headquarters, which is based on reports his unit submits and pattern analysis changes. Feedback is important for two reasons. First, it allows the commander to show cause and effect to his soldiers. If the higher headquarters executes a raid based on information reported, the commander can use that to reinforce to his soldiers the importance of their mission and the value of continuous reconnaissance. Second, the commander can evaluate his own ability to develop and infer relevant information. Through interaction with the commander, S2, and S3, the troop commander can determine if he is providing the right information, and if not, why. The commander uses this information to adjust his future ISR planning and reporting processes. Changes made to the S2’s pattern analysis also effect the troop or company commander’s reconnaissance focus. As the enemy adjusts his operations to counter our actions, we must then adjust our recon focus to look for and identify new patterns, subsequently attacking those patterns. At the completion of this step, the commander is then prepared to continue the collection management cycle while keeping his soldiers focused on finding relevant information to support both the troop and higher headquarters. The following vignette shows the process for a troop or company commander executing an ISR plan in the field: Alpha Troop conducted a transfer of authority three months ago and has been executing daily convoy escort missions throughout the squadron AO, as well as combat patrols in the troop AO to deter/ defeat insurgents. In the past two weeks, there has been a steady increase in the number of IED attacks against U.S. patrols throughout the squadron AO. Based on pattern analysis, the S2 developed a series of named areas of interest (NAIs) across the squadron sector. Three of these NAIs are in the troop AO. Having traveled with several patrols by the identified locations, the commander knows that each one has at least two egress points for insurgents to use after detonating an IED. The troop commander has discussed these locations with the S3, and the squadron has established targets on each route and integrated them into the targeting process. The troop commander determines that based on his missions, the following is relevant information for his counter-IED efforts:

• IED/insurgent activity that supports the S2s pattern analysis.

• IED/insurgent activity that indicates a new pattern. “After several weeks of successful operations, IED and small arms ambushes decrease and the unit can focus more resources on rebuilding the local infrastructure, thereby gaining support from the population. Based on MOE (decreased attacks, decreased IEDs, increased information volunteered by the population), the commander once again adjusts his reconnaissance focus adding infrastructure and society components to support the rebuilding effort.” September-October 2005 — 43

• Locations of potential hide sites for command detonation of IEDs and location of ingress/egress routes.

• IED emplacement times and patterns (supports lethal targeting by giving window for observers). From his list of relevant information, he develops the following priority intelligence requirements (PIR) to support the IED NAIs:

• IED or insurgent activity vicinity NAIs 1-3.

• Any activity vicinity target area of interest (TAI) 1-3.

• Newly dug holes or disturbed earth on any MSR. The commander then issues the following reconnaissance focus in his OPORD: “Confirm TAIs 1-3 as possible ambush locations overwatching NAIs 1-3 and identify counterattack routes into those positions in order to (IOT) set the conditions for counter-IED ambushes. Determine IED emplacement times/methods through HUMINT and observation of IED placement indicators (insurgent recon/rehearsal, newly dug holes or disturbed earth, components emplaced/not armed) IOT allow the squadron to refine its lethal targeting plan.” In conjunction with the PIR, this provides platoon leaders a focus outside of their assigned convoy escort and combat patrol missions that keeps them working toward taking the fight to the enemy. During execution of operations the following day, the convoy escort platoon identifies three four-feet by two-feet holes spaced approximately 50 meters apart along the MSR in an adjacent troop’s sector. Because this is a PIR for the troop commander and part of his reconnaissance focus, the platoon leader immediately reports the incident. Identifying this as an indicator of IED preparation, the commander relays this information to the adjacent troop and to the squadron. The S3 and fire support officer (FSO) use this information to refine their lethal effects plan and adjust unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) coverage to overwatch the location. As a result, the squadron is able to destroy four insurgents as they attempt to emplace three 152mm IEDs during the night. The commander relays this information to the platoon as a job well done and reinforces the importance of continuous reconnaissance/observation during all operations. Based on the commander’s reconnaissance focus, the platoon on combat patrol questions locals about suspicious or unusual activity near each of the three NAIs and develops detailed overlays of possible counterattack routes and ambush points around TAIs 1-3. They report that a local shopkeeper, whose store is near NAI 2, has seen a white van stop along the roadside every night between 2300 hours and 0100 hours, just prior to an IED explosion. The commander adds identification and search of any white van to his reconnaissance focus and directs his third platoon to conduct snap traffic control points (TCPs) from 2200 hours to 0200 hours. During one such TCP, 3d Platoon stops a white van heading toward NAI 2. While searching the vehicle, they find several IEDs hidden in the floorboards and detain the occupants. Several days later, the commander follows-up on the detainees and is informed that they were paid to bury the explosives in holes that had already been dug and they would mark the site with two pickets spaced 50 meters apart on either side of the IED ambush. However, they had no information on who carried out the actual ambush. The commander adjusts his reconnaissance focus and PIR to include this information and works with the S2 to update the pattern analysis and IED placement indicators. A week later, during combat patrol debriefs, the troop XO discovers that there is a newly emplaced pile of rocks near NAI 1 and several pickets were placed about 50 meters apart on either side of the rock pile. It was not reported because the platoon was focused on a vehicle that was moving erratically and attempting to pass their convoy at the time they crossed NAI

1. Based on this information, the troop commander coordinates with the S3 to conduct a counter-IED ambush on TAI 1. Using the squadron UAV and two platoons, the troop establishes overwatch on the ingress and egress routes of the suspected ambush initiation point. Several hours later, UAV and scouts identify five personnel moving by foot into the area. Through observation with long-range advanced scout surveillance system (LRAS) and UAV, they identify rocket propelled grenades and small arms. The engagement is brief but lethal. As the scouts clear the objective, they discover a remote initiation device and the explosive ordnance disposal team detonates four 152mm IEDs located in the rockpile. “Although reconnaissance and security operations are not key tasks for most operations executed on today’s battlefield, a troop or company commander cannot ignore the importance of ISR integration. A clear and concise ISR plan supports the collection of relevant information and keeps soldiers in an offensive mindset, hunting for the enemy and for information.” 44 — September-October 2005 the FOO team. However, the vendor again becomes vulnerable to observation by insurgents. Using a vendor who lives outside of the city or neighborhood in which the FOO operates can alleviate the problem. Using periods of darkness or early morning hours can also limit observation. Every effort must be made with the unit guarding the gate to conceal the vendor and rapidly move him inside the compound. An agreed-on location is another excellent form of meeting. The vendor may be wary of meeting the FOO at his base camp but amenable to meeting at another camp. The vendor may desire a roadside meeting. By coordinating with combat forces, the FOO can conduct a meeting at a checkpoint under the ruse of a vehicle inspection. The same dangers exist as the house meet. The vendor’s awareness of the team’s location and movement time leave the team vulnerable to ambush or improvised explosive device (IED) attack. During all FOO operations, maintaining a level of unpredictability is key to avoiding deliberate ambushes. Some other methods for conducting purchases involve a number of unforeseen fac ets. Iraqis have been businessmen and traders since the Silk Road. Bartering is part of every deal and everything is negotiable. Expect vendors who have an established relationship with a FOO to offer gifts and money as a “cut” of the deal. This is customary in Iraqi business and should not be seen as a blight on the character of the vendor. The FOO must make it clear from the beginning that he is not permitted to accept gifts and money. Do not use the Iraqi dinar; if vendors want to make money, they will find a way to work in U.S. dollars. The speed and stress level under which transactions are completed can lead to confusing math and tracking problems. A system for managing the money must be used. A checkbook-style ledger or money management software program is a crucial asset for a FOO team. The FOO is a powerful tool for a battalion operating in Iraq. With limited supply lines open, the FOO often is the only supply source. Effective planning and train-Field Ordering Officer continued from Page 40 ing prior to deployment pays big dividends to a FOO team. An effective FOO can boost morale, improve quality of life, improve the Iraqi economy, build positive working relationships with Iraqis, and provide the supplies necessary for conducting operations. By manipulating the staggeringly complex bureaucracy, finding the supplies, and safely conducting combat operations, the FOO can be a powerful combat multiplier. Captain Michael Burgoyne is currently serving as commander, C Troop, 3d Squadron, 7th U.S. Cavalry (3-7 Cav), 3d Infantry Division, Baghdad, Iraq. He received a B.A. from the University of Arizona. His military education includes the Armor Officers Basic Course, Armor Captains Career Course, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, Scout Platoon Leaders Course, Cavalry Leaders Course, Airborne School, and Air Assault School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include assistant S3, 3-7 Cav, Fort Stewart, GA; S4, 1st Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (1/3 ACR), Al Anbar, Iraq; tank platoon leader, scout platoon leader, and troop XO, A Troop, 1/3 ACR, Fort Carson, CO. September-October 2005 — 45 After several weeks of successful operations, IED and small arms ambushes decrease and the unit can focus more resources on rebuilding the local infrastructure, thereby gaining support from the population. Based on MOE (decreased attacks, decreased IEDs, increased information volunteered by the population), the commander once again adjusts his reconnaissance focus adding infrastructure and society components to support the rebuilding effort. Even though the troop did not have a reconnaissance mission, the troop commander took the time to develop an ISR plan, issue reconnaissance focus, and update/adjust his plan and focus as the situation changed. As a result, his leaders and soldiers remained offensively focused and were able to identify several IED sites and destroy insurgents. This generalized and simple vignette hopefully captured how easy it is for a commander to develop, issue, and refine an ISR plan that supports the needs of higher headquarters and keeps subordinates focused on bringing the fight to the enemy. Although reconnaissance and security operations are not key tasks for most operations executed on today’s battlefield, a troop or company commander cannot ignore the importance of ISR integration. A clear and concise ISR plan supports the collection of relevant information and keeps soldiers in an offensive mindset, hunting for the enemy and for information. The commander accomplishes ISR integration by maintaining a similar COP to his higher headquarters and understanding how CCIR effect mission planning and execution, and what branches and sequels the higher headquarters has planned around those CCIR. All of this information is expressed in the commander’s reconnaissance focus, which is tied to CCIR, targeting, and relevant information requirements. Finally, the unit must have a method for identifying and reporting relevant information and adjusting focus during execution. By integrating ISR into all troop- and company-level operations, commanders ensure units remain offensively focused and support the higher headquarters’ planning and targeting processes. Simply stated, good units do the mission; great units do the mission and gather relevant information to take the fight to the enemy in support of the higher headquarters. Notes 1General Charles C. Krulak, “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War,” MARINES, January 1999; “the three block war — contingencies in which Marines may be confronted by the entire spectrum of tactical challenges in the span of a few hours and within the space of three contiguous city blocks.” 2U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-20.971, Reconnaissance Troop, Recce Troop, and Brigade Recon Troop, U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, DC., 2 December 2002, Chapter 3, para 3-36. 3FM 3-17.95, Cavalry Operations, GPO, Washington, DC, 24 December 1996. 4FM 3-20.971, Chapter 2, para 2-16. 5FM 3-90.2, The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force, GPO, Washington, DC, 11 June 2003, Chapter 4. 6FM 3-20.971, Chapter 2, para 2-18. 7FM 3-20.971. 8FM 3-20.971, Chapter 3, para 3-34 thru 3-38. 9Effect Based Operations Video Teleconference presentation, Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana, and National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California, 17 March 2004. Major Jonathan Muenchow is currently serving as the brigade reconnaissance troop trainer, Bronco Team, Operations Group, National Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA. He received a B.A. from the University of Maine. His military education includes Armor Officers Basic Course, Armor Captains Career Course, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, Cavalry Leaders Course, Scout Platoon Leaders Course, and Airborne School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include company commander, C Company, 3d Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2d Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, WA; assistant S3, 1st Battalion, 72d Armor, Camp Casey, Korea; and XO, Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 1st Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Polk, LA.