Learning and Transformation

Learning and Transformation by Major David Culkin Colonel Naughton enjoyed being with his exuberant, young staff: the young chemical corps officer straight out of Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC); the experienced XO who had seen time in the Gulf; and the aviation assault company commander who was thinking of getting flight time instead of further wargaming, were all dedicated professionals who, despite varied levels of tactical experience and backgrounds, had a working knowledge of the military decision making process (MDMP). Why then, in the con temporary environment, did they consistently resort to abbreviating the planning process? Why did planning products lack substance, such as the analysis needed for a commander to make a decision? The commander, having served as an observer at a training center had seen units of all experience levels and types, from National Guard and active duty divisional brigades to brigade combat teams, turned to shortcuts to meet mission time lines. He was acutely aware of how little time the unit had before deploying to its area of operations (AO), where the staff would be expected to plan full-spectrum operations that were flexibly responsive in a joint and multinational environment. While they were able to accomplish the current mission, the commander soon realized he had more questions than answers about how leaders make decisions, for example: could the unit perform the mission better than the staff had planned; if the staff routinely condenses the MDMP, is there a flaw in the “standard” format; is the MDMP so detailed that it is cumbersome to all but experienced staff planners; does iterative experience with the MDMP, as doctrinally outlined, enhance staff planning and battlefield performance; how much of a role does staff experience and cohesion play in military decisionmaking; are we asking the right questions in the mission analysis process; and is a change required to doctrine or just to tactics, techniques, procedures (TTP) that may offer a new way of looking at the same process? The Issue of Leader Development The characteristics of the modern battlespace are increasingly challenging. Tomorrow’s military leaders must be prepared to think and act flexibly to respond to fluid scenarios, ambiguous problems, and scarce resources. The U.S. Army has come a long way in transformation. While Army leaders have implemented several superficial reforms in the past decade, such as the black beret, the Stryker program, and personnel stabilization, an underlying thread that links such changes together is absent. Some maintain the result has been “buzzword politics,” rather than true transformation. External actors in an increasingly lethal world have forced the United States’ premier land forces to address tough, introspective concerns — in particular, the Army’s ability to improve its existing doctrine, structure, and culture to create an Army that is more flexibly responsive to an ever dynamic security environment. Army doctrine provides a comprehensive overview of leader development. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 22-100, Army Leadership, defines leadership as a process of influencing people in a way that improves an organization, “Leadership is influencing people — by providing purpose, direction, and motivation — while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization.”1 Leader development is a process by which an organization produces leaders who can solve its current and future problems. The doctrinal manual describes the process of developing leaders with certain personal values by providing them a breadth of experiences through institutional learning and field assignments.2 Training and education — building blocks of learning — constitute the forum with which the Army can most effectively mold leaders along standard expectations and requirements (see Figure 1). To determine the necessary attributes for future leaders, the Army must first analyze the contemporary environment. There is little doubt the world is a dangerous place — ambiguity grows every day in international relations. With more fluid environs, how can a staff adapt to respond more flexibly to contemporary 12 — September-October 2005 challenges? There is a need for institutional change in military leadership education that starts with how we grow leaders and teach them to think critically. As Figure 1 illustrates, the Army’s future leaders require skills in critical and creative thinking, self-reliance, and competence to confront the dynamics of the contemporary battlespace. If innovative, self-reliant, and agile leaders are what this nation expects, how do current leaders identify obstacles to that development, determine the end product, and encourage new ways of thinking? There are three factors that address this introspective process: expectations and the modern security environment; the Army as a learning organization; and institutional learning that provides a necessary link between personal field experience and leader development. Learning is the nexus where the U.S. military can most effectively influence how future leaders think and therefore act. This tenet has significant implications for institutional reform. Expectations and the Modern Security Environment The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has expended tremendous amounts of energy in developing theories to explain the characteristics of the battlespace not only of today, but of tomorrow as well. The result is a conglomeration of observations and recommendations from disparate disciplines and agencies. While the effort, largely energized by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), continues, current publications clearly indicate trends for future developments. Future military operations will tend to require a military that operates jointly, collaborates with other agencies and nations, and flexibly exploits capabilities through agile thinking. The context in which nation-states have conducted affairs has become a very fluid environment. Michael Evans discusses how the international arena has dramatically changed from the traditional Westphalian nation-state system to one with far more non-state and trans-state actors than ever before. In this highly charged environment, he believes future forces must employ adaptive strategy, analyze vulnerabilities and consequences, use “diplomatic cooperation,” and apply “new norms of international law” that would allow preemptive operations.3 He observes, “To meet the challenges of tomorrow’s wars, Western countries will need highly mobile, well equipped, and versatile forces capable of multidimensional coalition missions and ‘mastery of violence’ across a complex spectrum of conflict.”4 A military operating in this highly charged environment will need to be increasingly flexible, able to respond to various situations — sometimes simultaneously. Organizations, such as the joint staff, have considered how military forces must morph in response to this dynamism. In An Evolving Joint Perspective: U.S. Joint Warfare and Crisis Resolution in the 21st Century, the joint staff and DoD have tried to better understand the skill sets that the contemporary military must possess. This publication highlights key characteristics and capabilities that the U.S. military will require to face challenges in the security environment. It initially outlines the characteristics and capabilities of the joint force in the 21st century, which include: synergistic employment of all services from both Reserve and Active Components; key employment of forces at the operational level; leaders leveraging service capabilities for a unified effort; “incorporating necessary capability redundancy with minimal duplication;” synchronizing with interagency and integrating with multinational partners.5 Specifically, joint teams will have

TRAINING & EDUCATION:

• Rational & intuitive decisionmaking

• Simulations

• Scenario training

• Critical thinking

• Focus on problem definition & causality

• Analyze complex systems

• Broad database

FUTURE LEADERS:

• Innovative operators

• Self-reliant

• Agile, critical thinkers

EXPERIENCE:

• Training

• Jobs

• Combat

PERSONAL

ATTRIBUTES

Focus of this article Figure 1 “The U.S. Army has come a long way in transformation. While Army leaders have implemented several superficial reforms in the past decade, such as the black beret, the Stryker program, and personnel stabilization, an underlying thread that links such changes together is absent. Some maintain the result has been “buzzword politics,” rather than true transformation.” September-October 2005 — 13 to respond to crises and conduct forcible entry, global projection sustainment for extended periods, synchronized operations in which different units employ unity of effort, and continuous command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR).6 An Evolving Joint Perspective notes that cultural change is required to effect the “‘expeditionary and joint team mindset:’ this mindset must permeate all aspects of future joint and Service force design, doctrine, capabilities, organization, training, equipment, deployment, employment, and sustainment.”7 As a result of tailored forces with more dynamic commitments, future joint forces may increasingly rely on the resources of sister services to accomplish missions. The U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) has developed a theory that considers the various threats the U.S. will face and the capabilities it needs to neutralize them. The document, The Joint Operational Environment—Into the Future, outlines the joint staff’s theory of the future security environment and its expected challenges. The analysis coherently summarizes key characteristics of future military operations in the joint environment, which include increased operations in complex terrain, maritime operations in the littorals, amplified information operations and warfare, widespread space operations, vulnerabilities of air power to widely proliferated surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, intense struggle for access to areas of operation, continued political limitations on force employment, increasingly fractious coalitions and alliances, difficulty in match ing rules of engagement to varied areas of responsibility, diverse and global media interaction, and asymmetric threats to friendly vulnerabilities.8 These characteristics help provide a framework on which national security policy can build. The 9/11 Commission attempted to make recommendations that would aid this process. The 9/11 Commission recently had to contend with some of the persistent issues of bureaucratic consolidation. While centralized planning and authority may result in a more flexible structure, it also may result in “too much power in one place.”9 The commission concludes that institutional reforms will not eliminate interagency conflict or the continued need for collaboration. Perhaps this is a good thing in that friction — the very thing consolidation would attempt to mitigate — tends to guarantee checks and balances. Reforms that result in consolidation, while not erasing department identities, may allow the government to respond to contemporary challenges with adequate levels of efficiency. The commission recognizes the difficulty of implementing such reform, but it acknowledges that the United States has conducted significant transformation before and during wars, much like the defense reforms at the end of World War II and during the Korean Conflict. “Countering transnational Islamist terrorism will test whether the U.S. Government can fashion more flexible models of management needed to deal with the twenty-first century world.”10 In short, there are costs and benefits to institutional reform that must be assessed prior to implementation. Only open-minded dialogue and a critical thought process can produce flexible leaders who can confront future challenges. The Army as a Learning Organization The Army must face these challenges today by developing a unified, strategic vision for future leader development. Two elements that will foster progress are vision and leadership. Conversely, perhaps the greatest obstacle will be sociocen-trism — the tendency to perceive and assess issues in an Army-only view, without regard for other worldviews. The danger comes when an organization deceives itself with the rightness of its agenda, unable to reform before irreparable damage occurs. The question then becomes: “How can an institution fight sociocentrism?” One way is through adopting a policy that encourages constructive reform and self-awareness. Vision and leadership help define the environment of conflict among actors, whether they are states, coalitions, or nongovernment organizations. Vision links strategic policy to tactical actions; leadership relates to training the next generation of military personnel. The less vision and leadership are honed, the longer the conflict, which increases the chance for negative consequences. Personal traits of character, free will, and initiative all factor into the quality of individual troops. Disciplined training — fostered by esprit de corps — provided by motivated leaders translates into professional and effective units. As du Picq argues, the individual soldier — the product of quality leadership, training, and discipline — is the most valuable weapon on the battlefield.11 Thus, any reform the Army pursues will be ineffective if it does not develop better soldiers and leaders, which is the key to this process. The Army has learned several hard lessons through organizational change, to include:

• Change is neutral; individuals decide to attach positive or negative meanings to change.

• Good change is good — the reform complies with common sense and socially accepted moral codes.

• Change for the sake of change is not a sufficient reason to implement reform. Using change as a rationale often becomes a battle cry for the self-serving re-former; change is not a need.

• Learn from past experiences, most institutions have some form of systemic ar- “An Evolving Joint Perspective notes that cultural change is required to effect the “‘expeditionary and joint team mindset:’ this mindset must permeate all aspects of future joint and Service force design, doctrine, capabilities, organization, training, equipment, deployment, employment, and sustainment.” As a result of tailored forces with more dynamic commitments, future joint forces may increasingly rely on the resources of sister services to accomplish missions.” 14 — September-October 2005 chiving. After-action reviews (AARs) are designed to capture event objectives, participants, actions, and recommendations for improvement and sustainment. This process is culturally ingrained at all levels of leadership. It really works, if members are disciplined and actually do it, and provides planners useful feedback for future operations.

• Finally, leaders of change must respect themselves and the organization. Let people do their jobs; demonstrate trust in their abilities and an aversion to smothery micromanagement. When leaders take reasonable time to implement reforms, they recognize there may be a good reason for current procedures. By questioning causal links and anticipating consequences of decisions taken, leaders can make a significant and positive impact on an organization. Subordinates who see a humble leader who makes rational decisions will tend to respect more fully the “new regime.” If military organizations and leaders are to adapt to changing environments, they must elect to learn. While the classroom may vary from a sterile room to a blood-soaked muddy hole, the lessons of practical experience can be actively applied to learning. Eliot Cohen and John Gooch, in Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War, argue that military organizations and their leaders need to be learners, “some things can be learned in peacetime, and others only in war, and … if the military are to make the most of their opportunities when war comes they must be organizationally prepared to learn. …Military organizations should inculcate in their members a relentless empiricism, a disdain for a priori theorizing if they are to succeed.”12 The Army, already in motion during transformation, will self derail if it fails to learn. Training and Education Linkages in Leader Development How can a learning organization, such as the Army, transform for the future? The answer may lie in a cultural shift that prioritizes the learning process as an investment in leader development. As previously discussed, training and education help link experience and personal attributes to form future leaders. Education and training are different, yet critical, aspects of learning. James Schneider describes learn ing as a process in which students must apply both their education and training to develop, “learning takes place along a spectrum: at one end is the kind of learning that occurs through training; this learn ing is largely reflexive and rote in nature. At the other extreme is education, which is mostly reflective and self-reinforcing. Together, the trained mind and the educated mind embrace new professionally relevant experiences to produce wisdom.”13 Institutional schooling is a part of the learning process. For example, the U.S. Army’s Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP) at Fort Leavenworth, Kanasas, espouses critical thinking in complex problemsolving. For more than two decades, the program has produced leaders, grounded in history, theory, and doctrine, who are recognized as critical thinkers, possessing unparalleled complex problemsolving skills. Increased integration of professional education is paramount. This implies introducing officers and battle staff noncommissioned officers (NCOs), from both Active and Reserve Components, who will work together in capstone exercises similar to how they will work together in command posts. Additionally, integration refers to greater inclusion of multinational and interagency action officers during planning processes. Only in this manner will the U.S. Army begin to train as it fights at operational and strategic levels. The reform of training begins with changes in how an organization’s members perceive inherent problems. A major challenge confronting the Army is shifting its mental model from being focused on the mission (what to do) to Learning Education Training
How to Think
Reflective
Anticipative
Educate for the Future
Execution
What to Think
Reflexive
Adaptive
Train for the Present
Planning Source: Schneider Class, JAN ’05 Figure 2 “Disciplined training — fostered by esprit de corps — provided by motivated leaders translates into professional and effective units. As du Picq argues, the individual soldier — the product of quality leadership, training, and discipline — is the most valuable weapon on the battlefield. Thus, any reform the Army pursues will be ineffective if it does not develop better soldiers and leaders, which is the key to this process.” September-October 2005 — 15 first defining the problem (what is the issue). Define the problem before the mission. A fundamental skill in military decisionmaking is, ironically, often overlooked. The second step in the military decisionmaking process (MDMP), mission analysis, may be more aptly labeled, “problem analysis,” because adequately defining the bounds of a problem is essential for developing a unit mission that addresses the problem. In fact, defining the problem for subordinates in time-constrained circumstances may be more important than deducing a mission. Subordinate leaders are generally closer to tactical problems and are often in better positions to know more about a situation and how to respond to a given situation. Research into operational planning during World War II indicates that, as the war progressed and staffs became more experienced, the “degree of detail in the written plans decreased.”14 In determining why British Cold War planning documents for NATO missions were “onethird the length of those issued by U.S. NATO commanders in equivalent commands,” observers found that British staffs focused on problem-bounding: “the mission(s) were offered to subordinates as problems, but much less detail was offered about how they would be solved.”15 U.S. staff officers should “bound” the problem set before they decide what to do about it. Flexible planning in complex environments requires deductive reasoning to derive mission statements from ambiguity. The rationalistic decisionmaking models currently in use leave little room for creative and intuitive problemsolving. The MDMP, for example, presents a linear and sequential approach to problemsolving. Mistakenly used as a checklist, it analyzes problems by reducing them to components, sometimes neglecting key relationships among them. The exigencies of small-unit combat, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan, against irregular forces evoke the individual leadership values of initiative, self-reliance, and mental agility. In combat scenarios, it is through trial and error that leaders come to know the particular properties of the various actors. Learning institutions can apply this knowledge to future operations and thereby enhance an organization’s understanding and experience. Military history, education, experience, and personal judgment help fill the gaps which are left by institutional learning. Theory helps provide the insight into future experimentation to learn more lessons. The application of lessons learned, often during real-world missions, links formal education to experience. This synthesis is critical in leader development and more important than creativity. Gary Klein, in Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions, claims that problem definition remains the key skill in planning, “In most domains, we need not off-the-wall creative options but a clear understanding of the goals.”16 Maintaining this sense of purpose, derived from analyzing lessons learned, then becomes the primary focus of a successful military organization. Unfortunately, this task is easier said than done. Bureaucrats have found that it is easier to fix technology than reform people and patterns of thought and behavior. Perhaps it is human nature to reach for what is readily available to address poignant issues, but throwing money at defense problems has not resulted in long-term solutions. While new technology can enhance soldiers’ lives and assist in mission accomplishment, only air-breathing individuals can decide what and how that technology will be employed. Human thought and behavior, however, do not formulate along the lines of product life cycles and budget projections. They are developed over time through formal (institutional schooling) and informal (mentorship, lessons learned, field experience) learning. Dietrich Dorner, a noted psychologist, explains that simulations can provide a valuable medium to train people to learn from their mistakes in complex situations, “what is often called ‘systemic thinking’ cannot be regarded as a single unit. …It is instead a bundle of capabilities, and at the heart of it is the ability to apply our normal thought processes, our common sense, to the circumstances of a given situation. The circumstances are always different! At one time this component will be crucial, at another time that component. But we can learn to deal with different situations that place different demands on us. And we can teach this skill, too — by putting people into one situation, then into another, and discussing with them their behavior and, most important, their mistakes. The real world gives us no chance to do this.”17 Through repeated exposure to situations of varying intensity, context, and decisions, professionals can evolve to become flexible leaders. Decision TTP — An Example Dorner invites us to ponder a fundamental issue in military education: is it what future leaders learn or how they learn? Is it both? If the MDMP, a linear, rational decisionmaking model, is too complicated to facilitate problemsolving in the contemporary operational environment, then does it need to change? Conversely, if there is a questionable pedagogy in military education, can leaders update it? While this issue merits continued debate, tomorrow’s military leaders require adequate training and education now. Changing the doctrine of planning and decisionmaking would be an involved and lengthy process. The process would take too long to effectively influence contemporary leader development — altering how lead- 16 — September-October 2005 “While new technology can enhance soldiers’ lives and assist in mission accomplishment, only air-breathing individuals can decide what and how that technology will be employed. Human thought and behavior, however, do not formulate along the lines of product life cycles and budget projections. They are developed over time through formal (institutional schooling) and informal (mentorship, lessons learned, field experience) learning.”

ers currently regard the process of subordinate development may have purpose. Staff organizations that foster open-minded environments and creative problemsolving help develop innovative leaders. Junior leaders can effectively learn through repeated exposure to ambiguous scenarios that challenge their knowledge of doctrine, their assessment of current capabilities, and their ability to develop and communicate coherent plans. The staff training exercise is an example of a self-directed staff exercise that, based on individual abilities, would require minimal resources other than time and mental energy (see Figure 3). The long-term payback, if integrated into a long-range, self-assessed training program, would be immeasurable — agile thinkers who can effectively lead military forces to counter any challenge. The necessary end state of transformation is developing joint leaders who are critical thinkers and agile problemsolv-ers. Their learning will entail exposure to rational decisionmaking models, such as the MDMP, as well as to scenario-driven, intuitive training with simulations and contingency planning. The collective experience and learning will naturally transmit to generations of adaptive leaders. Current leaders can help develop innovative, mentally agile, and self-reliant leaders of the future through professional learning. Transformation must occur in the way the institution’s personnel think and behave — that is, more open-mindedly and innovatively. In a world of increasingly scarce resources and greater demands on the U.S. military, developing expert learners is critical. Three factors were identified that address this introspective process: expectations and the modern security environment; the Army as a learning organization; and institutional education providing a necessary link between personal experience and leader development. Learning is the nexus where the U.S. military can most effectively influence how leaders think, decide, and act. This has significant implications for institutional reform:  Critical thinking is a key skill set. Critical thinking, a process of rationally applying the logical analysis of facts, effectively links creativity to realistic lessons learned to develop innovative leaders. The military education system must nurture this skill along with a problem-bounding approach in future leaders.  A joint education system must emphasize service capabilities rather than separate roles. The integration of representatives from Active and Reserve components, officer and noncommissioned corps, and from other agencies is essential for realistic education and training to occur. The resultant interaction would serve as an operational model for allied and coalition participation.  Increase the emphasis on transforming patterns of thought rather than technology. Once the former is accomplished, the latter can follow; the reverse poses a more difficult path.  Do not forget common sense! It applies a layer of perspective on problems. One result of service transformation has been the widely advertised expansion of technological development and its doctrinal implications. Another, more difficult, and slowly gestating reform will incorporate that of human behavior and patterns of thought. In that realm, the U.S. Army would best invest in learning, a means to an essential end. Notes 1U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 22-100, Army Leadership, U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, DC, August 1999, p. 1-4. 2 Ibid., p. 5-14, paragraphs 5-75 and 5-76. Figure 1 also reflects Figure 5-4 in the manual. September-October 2005 — 17 Staff Training Exercise: Purpose: To help assigned officers/NCOs develop critical thinking skills while practicing military planning for upper-echelon staff work. Concept: This exercise provides young staff officers and NCOs (working together) an opportunity to practice military planning, decisionmaking, and critical thinking in an historical context. The exercise takes no longer than 10 hours and involves no formal products. The emphasis is on the critical thinking process — what staff personnel get paid to do. The exercise agenda, outlined below, can take place over 1 or up to 3 days, depending on time available. References: Attached articles and scenario. Attach an article or extract that describes a realistic problem that needs to be solved at the appropriate level. Examples could be river crossings, humanitarian assistance, moral dilemmas, and ambushes. There are several situations that junior leaders today face in Iraq and Afghanistan that challenge their courage, knowledge, and limited materiel. For Army MDMP, use FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production; and FM 3-0, Operations. For Joint Operations Planning Execution System (JOPES) crisis action planning, use Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Doctrine for Planning and Joint Operations; and JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations.18 For further development, see Richard Paul and Linda Elder’s Critical Thinking.19 Agenda: Day 1 (2 hours). Issue practical exercise to immediate staff. Have them read the scenario and answer critical questions, such as what went wrong with leaders’ situational understanding; what were the leaders’ expectations and why; did the enemy change their initial plan, if so, why; and what was the status of other available resources? Discuss results. Discuss situational awareness, branches, and sequels. Discuss MDMP/crisis action plan ning (CAP). Assign a participant to get basic history of the subject campaign. Day 2 (4 hours). Give the staff a sample order from higher headquarters (unclassified). Conduct MDMP/CAP, as appropriate, to give an oral brief — no slides, but butcher block is fine — during the last hour. The object is to limit the planning and briefing time to focus on the process, not products, and avoid getting mired in details. Encourage the group to consider branches. The instructor will remain with the group to answer requests for information and to elicit lessons learned from experience. Day 3 (3 hours). Makeup training; one-hour tactical problem. Assign a student leader and observer; do not constrain with a specific planning process. The task is to solve the problem in a time-constrained environment. In what additional ways can staff leaders get the guidance they need from higher headquarters? Lesson learned: thinking under pressure in a team is a key skill. AAR-type feedback, disseminate to participants, and file in continuity book. Figure 3 Continued on Page 49

Six-Day War continued from Page 25 September-October 2005 — 49 3Michael Evans, “From Kadesh to Kandahar: Military Theory and the Future of War,” accessed on line at http://www.nwc. Navy.mil/press/Review/2003/Summer/art6-su3.htm, issued during School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) curriculum, Fort Leavenworth, KS, p. 11. 4Ibid. 5Joint Staff, J-7, An Evolving Joint Perspective: U.S. Joint Warfare and Crisis Resolution in the 21st Century, GPO, Washington, DC, 28 January 2003, p. 4. 6Ibid., p. 11. 7Ibid. 8United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), The Joint Operational Environment—Into the Future, Coordinating Draft, USJFCOM, 5 March 2004, pp. 86-99. This theoretical concept was further developed during seminar discussion with Dr. Schneider. 9The 9/11 Commission, Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (Official Government Edition), GPO, Washington, DC, 2004, p. 406. 10Ibid. 11David T. Culkin, A699 Paper, “Personal Theory of Warfare,” U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2004, p. 2. 12Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War, The Free Press, New York, 1990, p. 236. 13James J. Schneider, “Transforming Advanced Military Education for the 21st Century,” Army, January 2005, p. 17. Dr. Schneider, Professor of Military Theory at SAMS, also allowed use of his class notes and slides (Figure 2) from his Advanced Military Studies Program elective on T.E. Lawrence, January 2005. 14David S. Alberts and Richard E. Hayes, Power to the Edge: Command, Control in the Information Age, CCRP Publications Distribution Center, June 2003, p. 24. Issued during AMSP doctrine instruction, 2005. 15Ibid., pp. 23-24. 16Gary Klein, Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions, The MIT Press, Cambridge, 1998, p. 143. 17Dietrich Dorner, The Logic of Failure: Recognizing and Avoiding Error in Complex Situations, Basic Books, New York, 1996, p. 199. 18FM 3-0, Operations, GPO, Washington, DC, 14 June 2001; FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production, GPO, Washington, DC, 20 January 2005; Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, GPO, Washington, DC, 13 April 1995; and JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, GPO, Washington, DC, 10 September 2001. 19Richard Paul and Linda Elder, Critical Thinking, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 2001. Major David Culkin is currently a planner, Eighth U.S. Army, Seoul, Korea. He received a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy, an M.S.A. from Central Michigan University, and an M.M.A.S. from School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS. His military education includes the Aviation Basic and Advanced Courses, and U.S. Army Command and Staff College. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include OPFOR commander, C Team, Battle Command Training Program, Fort Leavenworth; S3, 1st Battalion, 14th Aviation Regiment, Fort Rucker, AL; commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion (Attack), 25th Aviation Regiment, Wheeler Army Air Field (WAAF), Hawaii; XO, C Company, 1st Battalion (AVIM), 25th Aviation Regiment, WAAF, Hawaii; and S2, 1st Battalion (At tack), 1st Aviation Regiment, Fort Riley, KS. Learning and Transformation Continued from Page 17