The Information Revolution in Military Affairs Major Jason T. Craft

evolved from the computer revolution did the emerging demands of information dominance have a tool that could maximize information acquisition and denial, information strikes, information-based pro tection, and information-based movement. At this point, it is critical to understand that with regards to the information revolution the underlying change is not a result of the computer revolution or the advent of the internet or any other esoteric technological advances, but rather a change in Army thinking that “emphasizes the importance of information, and especially of information dominance over an opponent.”2 Therein lies the revolution, information and gathering it fundamentally changes how wars are fought. No longer is it simply enough to have more tanks with thicker armor than the enemy or more planes that carry more bombs than the enemy, but now military forces must have information dominance, complete battlefield awareness, and the ability to see and know the enemy’s intentions well in advance of his ability to see us and learn ours. But how do we know the worldwide information revolution is also a true RMA? First and foremost, information operations represent a major discontinuity in military affairs. General John M. Keane, Vice Chief of Staff, U. S. Army said, “We believe we can move away from the paradigm upon which the M1 tank is built. Which is, survive first-round hit and continue to overmatch an adversary. To, avoid being hit... because we’re going to fight at a time and place of our choosing, our situational awareness is going to be considerably better.”3 This paradigm shift from surviving direct fire and overmatching your opponent to avoiding being hit altogether through situational awareness is fundamentally and radically different to prior military theory. Much in the same vein as the introduction of the machine gun during the Crimean War (1854-56), the Civil War (1861-65), and its first true widespread use in World War I served to destabilize military theory in favor of the defense over the offense, the information RMA serves to destabilize our 20th-century reliance on mass formations to achieve tactical and strategic victory by instead forcing us to rely on situational awareness to achieve mass in fires and effects. The second criterion of identifying RMA is: they are brought about by changes in military-relevant technologies, which is the most recognizable aspect of the information revolution as RMA. Information-gathering systems have proliferated worldwide and have unheard-of accessibility. As changes in Army doctrine call for the ability of soldiers and weapons systems to avoid detection or direct fire, technologies, such as the internet, email, video-teleconferences, total asset and in-transit visibility, and other such commercially developed business solutions, become immediately applicable to military applications. Satellites that ordinarily track cargo on trucks, ships, or other cargo transports can now capture every aspect of the battlefield and distribute that information to anyone requiring it virtually instantaneously. This total asset battlefield visibility, if you will, can be distributed on secure internets, via email, or many other data distribution methods. Once again, technological innovation highlights the trend away from mass formations massing fires to dispersed formations massing fires and effects. Introducing the submarine in World War II as an RMA is similar to the information RMA. With the submarine, the longstanding naval strategy of close blockades of enemy ports had to be abandoned. Even more important, the “hierarchy of power” in naval warfare, which had been established with the advent of the capital ship more than three centuries earlier, had been severely undermined.4 In as much as the submarine practically negated the naval juggernaut based on capitol and dreadnought-type battleships, information technology is bringing the heavy, ponderous, steel juggernaut of armored formations to a grinding halt. The technologies that have been introduced into combat zones, as leaders demand more and more situational awareness and control of assets, have forced an evolutionary change in how battles are fought. Quantity is not enough; complete control of the battlefield requires complete control of the information on the battlefield. Though how we control, distribute, and mass the effects of combat systems has evolved since the telegraph, the revolution in information operations is a reflection of the speed by which information systems are introduced to the military, the speed by which these systems capabilities are capitalized on, and how they continue to influence the changing doctrine on how to fight wars. Lastly, we can perceive we are in the middle of an RMA by comparing the broader political, social, and economic impacts of information technologies in today’s society with similar impacts within the military. Ten years ago, company commanders did not need email to command or control their organizations, nor did their battalion commanders need email to command and control their company commanders; however, email is a standard information-gathering system used by most military leaders. Battle- “…information and gathering it fundamentally changes how wars are fought. No longer is it simply enough to have more tanks with thicker armor than the enemy or more planes that carry more bombs than the enemy, but now military forces must have information dominance, complete battlefield awareness, and the ability to see and know the enemy’s intentions well in advance of his ability to see us and learn ours.” — 49 hardened generals and even the most cynical senior noncommissioned officers practically expire if the email server is down for more than a few hours. The fact that government supplies, repair parts, and almost anything else military organizations might need, can be found, priced, and purchased via the internet, is truly astounding. The days of a battalion support operations officer spending hours on the telephone trying to scrounge much needed wheeled-vehicle parts are fast disappearing now that any conceivable part can be found online and delivered next day by express mail services. Truly, every aspect of how we did business within DoD has changed as a result of information technologies, or is approaching change. Not one of us can escape the presence and impact of information systems in the hallowed halls of military establishments, so why be concerned with one more RMA or transformation of military affairs? Our predecessors survived similar events and clearly we will as well. Just as RMA of the nuclear revolution fundamentally changed the world and how we interact with allies and adversaries, so will the information

RMA.

Our changing doctrine reflects our dependence on recently emerging capabilities, and, as such, presents hidden vulnerabilities of which our adversaries can take advantage. For every advantage of information gathering as a combat tool, information weapons exist that could effectively destroy our military. Computer viruses that attack our dependence on off-the-shelf products, computer hackers that target our resources through the computerized systems that control their distribution, and information terrorism are but a few examples of how our adversaries will take advantage of our dependence on these systems. Civil and military leaders must be fully cognizant of how dependent we are on information systems and what can be done to mitigate the impact of a systems failure. Failure to grasp, move with, and take advantage of this revolution, without fully exploring or understanding where these trends lead, may assure America’s place in the history books as the latest victim of the changing face of warfare. Notes 1Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2000, http://www.csbaonline.org/2Strategic_Studies/1Revolution_ in_Military_Affairs/Revolution_Military_Affairs.htm, accessed 3/10/03. 2Paul Bracken and Raoul Henri Alcala, Whither the RMA: Two Perspectives on Tomorrow’s Army, U. S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1994, p. 4 333d IFPA-Fletcher Conference, 2002, online at http://www. ifpafletcherconference.com/marines2002/keane.htm, accessed 3/10/03. 4Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. MAJ Jason T. Craft is serving as an assistant program manager for personnel airdrop systems, PEO Soldier, Fort Belvoir, VA. He received a B. A. from Longwood University and an M. S. from Florida Institute of Technology. His military education includes the Infantry Officer Basic Course, Quartermaster Advanced School, Rigger School, Jumpmaster School, and U. S. Army Command and General Staff College. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include program manager, Defense Message Service, Headquarters, U. S. Army Europe, Germany; commander, 612th Parachute Rigger Company, Fort Bragg, NC; S3 Air, 530th Battalion, Fort Bragg; and platoon leader, 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry Regiment, 3d Infantry Division, Vilseck, Germany. “Information-gathering systems have proliferated worldwide and have unheard-of accessibility. As changes in Army doctrine call for the ability of soldiers and weapons systems to avoid detection or direct fire, technologies, such as the internet, email, video-teleconferences, total asset and in-transit visibility, and other such commercially developed business solutions, become immediately applicable to military applications.” “Computer viruses that attack our dependence on off-the-shelf products, computer hackers that target our resources through the computerized systems that control their distribution, and information terrorism are but a few examples of how our adversaries will take advantage of our dependence on these systems. Civil and military leaders must be fully cognizant of how dependent we are on information systems and what can be done to mitigate the impact of a systems failure.” 50 —

Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People’s Army of Vietnam, 1954–1975 by The Military History Institute of Vietnam, translated by Merle L. Pribbenow, University Press of Kansas, 2002, 512 pp., $49.95 The historiography of the Vietnam War has anew and significant addition. Victory in Vietnam is the story of the war from the communist perspective. The Military History Institute of Vietnam, Vietnam’s equivalent to Center of Military History, has produced a two-volume history of Vietnam’s wars against the French and Americans. This, the second volume, begins in 1954 when the defeated French left Vietnam divided into the noncommunist south and communist north. Merle L. Pribbenow, a 27-year Central Intelligence Agency officer with Vietnam experience, painstakingly translated this history. He stumbled onto the project almost by accident. He was given a copy of the book in Vietnamese and began translating parts of it for articles at the request of friends. Eventually, he realized that he had translated the entire document and this project was born. William J. Duiker, author of Ho Chi Minh: A Life, penned an insightful foreword. The University Press of Kansas has published this book as an addition to its Modern War Studies series, a leading collection of military history. The importance of this book is that it provides the viewpoint of our enemy during our longest and probably most controversial war. Students of warfare will recognize the doctrinal primer on how to defeat a stronger power. Readers will learn that the insurgent movement in South Vietnam was not an internal civil war. Far from being a naturally occurring opposition movement, as many have claimed, the Viet Cong was created and controlled by the communists of the North. This book fully documents that North Vietnamese doctrine included the insurgency as an integral element of their planning. Included are the plans behind such major operations as the Tet Offensive and the Easter Offensive. Additionally, there are admissions that North Vietnam had no intention of adhering to the Paris Peace Accords, detailing how the final offensive was a northern operation. Victory in Vietnam is not for the casual reader; only serious students need to attempt reading it. It is not military history in the standard sense, as it lacks any semblance of objectivity. It is a study conducted by a communist regime for internal consumption. As such, it is stocked with all the bias that comes with a work of this nature. The entire book is a tedious lecture on the virtue of communism with claims of moral superiority to the puppet governments of an imperialistic United States. The results notwithstanding, such preaching is laughable and irritating. Gullible readers may still believe in the purity of the communist motives, but most will be more discriminating. Rather than a significant source of military history, this book’s value is in its roots from within the closed system that is any communist regime. The very fact that the communists have published their account, flawed as it may be, is significant. It gives students a source of explanations for longstanding questions. The veracity of the answers can only be determined through a critical examination of many sources of information along with a strict standard equally applied to all.

CSM, U. S. Army Matthew B. Ridgway: Soldier, Statesman, Scholar, Citizen by George C. Mitchell, Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, 2002, 240 pp., $15.95 Ridgway is another biography that will entertain and enlighten those who read this tale of a man who spent over 40 years serving his country. A masterful leader, often remembered for his inspiring turnaround of the Army during the Korean War, Ridgway also served as a supreme allied commander in two areas of the world and chief of staff during the late 1940s and early 1950s. Rather than follow the traditional biographical format, Mitchell instead divides his book into four parts that he describes as, “depicting a complex part that came together to make up this extraordinary man whose story should be told.” Using Ridgway’s personal papers, along with a multitude of other primary and secondary sources, Mitchell succeeds in his quest to tell the story of a man whose determination and resolution made him one of America’s great est heroes. The son of a career Army officer, Ridgway grew up not wanting to be a soldier. But he decided to go to West Point to please his father. Joining the class of 1912, Ridgway embarked on a career that would take him around the world, from South America to Europe, and to Southeast Asia. Ridgway was an outstanding soldier who showed incredible leadership on the battlefield during two major wars. While other books have touched on this aspect of Ridgway, most notably Clay Blair’s The Forgotten War: America in Korea 1950-1953 and Ridgway’s Paratroopers, Mitchell’s experience as a diplomat and international consultant enables him to write about Ridgway’s ability to shape and create coalitions in the post-World War II world. The most interesting part of the book is Mitchell’s engrossing account of Ridgway following Douglas MacArthur and Dwight Eisenhower in two consecutive assignments. Taking over as supreme commander, Far East, from MacArthur showed the true mettle of Ridgway. Not concerned with being as flashy as his predecessor, Ridgway immersed himself in learning about the Japanese culture and working with them in rebuilding the island nation. He was very successful and was chosen to replace Eisenhower in Europe following Eisenhower’s run for president. Ridgway’s fight in the early fifties to keep the Army a viable entity amid budget and personnel cuts is another great passage in the book. Meticulously researched and footnoted, Ridgway is an outstanding book that is concise and can be read in one or two sittings. Mitchell’s book should be mandatory reading for any officer, and I highly recommend this book to any soldier, particularly now since the nation finds itself once again trying to work within the coalition framework that Ridgway helped to establish over 50 years ago.

CPT, U. S. Army Modern U. S. Tanks and AFVs by Michael Green and Greg Stewart, MBI Publishing Company, St. Paul, MN, 2003, 95 pp., $14.95 Part of the “Enthusiast Color Series,” Modern U. S. Tanks and AFVs is a copiously illustrated primer on various armored vehicles, both wheeled and tracked, in use by the Army and Marine Corps. At 95 pages with more than 80 color photographs, it is written for the high school library market and so, while it may not be an authoritative resource for the armor professional, it is an excellent basic primer on armored vehicles for the military modeling buff, military machinery enthusiasts, and family members. The book is divided into four simple chapters: “Tanks,” “Armored Infantry Vehicles,” “Wheeled Armored Firepower,” and “Indirect Armored Firepower Support.” The tank chapter includes succinct descriptions, accompanied by color photos, of the M1, IPM1, M1A1, M1A1HA, M1A1D, M1A2, and M1A2SEP. The chapter on armored infantry vehicles covers the M113, the M113A3, the Bradley from prototype to A3 stage (including the Linebacker air defense artillery variant), the Stryker, and concludes with the U. S. Marine Corps (USMC) landing vehicles from LVTP7 to AAVP7A1. The chapter on wheeled armored firepower takes the reader through the high mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) family (including some less well-known variants, such as the evolution of the armored M1114 and the USAF armored version M1116), and on to the M1117 armored security vehicle, the family of USMC light armored vehicles (LAV), and the Stryker combat variants, including the mobile gun system and the antitank guided missile version. The final chapter, “Armored Indirect Fire Support,” covers the M109A6 Paladin, the M270 multiple-launch rocket system (including the Army tactical missile system variant) and concludes with mortar carriers from the M1064A3 to the USMC LAV-M and the new Stryker mortar carrier. The book is simple, enjoyable, and well laid out. The information is sufficiently detailed to satisfy both an educated amateur, and serve to fill in the gaps in the knowledge of military personnel as well. Buy it for your kids, your parents, or just to browse through the excellent photography.

CPT, U. S. Army — 51

With the German Guns: Four Years on the Western Front by Herbert Sulzbach, Pen and Sword Military Classics, United Kingdom, 2003, 256 pp., $11.99 The 28 June 1914 assassination of Austro-Hungarian Archduke Francis Ferdinand by Serbian Nationalists in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, set off a series of cataclysmic events, whose aftershocks continue to rumble across the ages. Ferdinand’s death ignited a firestorm in Europe and placed in motion war plans that were more lethal and efficient than previous European campaigns and conflicts. Combined with the emerging technologies and developments of the day, the mobilizing European armies were now able to wage war on an unprecedented scale along broad fronts, on land, at sea, and in the air. With these new developments, the German military could truly be characterized as morphing into a seemingly unstoppable war machine, but this machine was eventually ground to a halt and reversed based on a number of internal and external causes that have historically dogged the Germans. These factors eventually resulted in the abdication of Kaiser Wilhelm, to be followed by the installment of an unstable civilian government, leaving the German Imperial Army in the lurch and in retreat. With The German Guns: Four Years on the Western Front is a vivid, well-written, first-hand account from one soldier’s perspective of these events. The author, Herbert Sulzbach, was the son of a wealthy Jewish family from Frankfurt-am-Main who diligently committed his thoughts and experiences to paper during his four years of military service as a volunteer artilleryman with the German army during World War I. Considering that Sulzbach wrote these diaries for his family back home to read, the book follows a conversational tone that assists the reader in visualizing the events of which the author writes. On 2 September 1914, Herbert Sulzbach was a 20-year-old war volunteer with four weeks of training, who entrained with the 63d Artillery Regiment from Frankfurt to join a victorious German field army that, at the time, was only about 40 kilometers from Paris. He returned four years later, a seasoned war veteran with service on both the Western and, to a lesser extent, Eastern Fronts, having been promoted to second lieutenant and awarded the Iron Cross, second and first class, along with the Frontline Cross of Merit. During the course of his service, Sulzbach not only discusses his activities in the German army, but also commits many entries concerning his interests in the technical innovations of the day. One such interesting example is his understanding of the importance of sea power to the success of the German war effort. His entries concerning the employment of merchant u-boats to obtain critical war material are particularly fascinating, as this is a relatively obscure aspect of the war. This sort of innovation is one example of the many types of developments that Sulzbach records; others include emerging developments in antitank warfare, artillery and artillery firing tables, chemical war fare, communications, and the employment of zeppelins and other aircraft, which when combined with accounts of his daily life and activities, make for extremely interesting reading. In the end though, he finds himself recording the activities of a retreating army, which in spite of political turmoil at home and some internal dissension within the ranks, demobilized almost as efficiently as it had mobilized. His entries continue right up until his arrival home following his discharge on 4 December 1918. Ironically, Sulzbach’s book was first published in Germany in 1935 under the title of Two Living Walls and was highly acclaimed, without any allusion to Sulzbach’s Jewish ancestry. Sulzbach eventually left Germany due to a published letter, which he had previously written, that criticized the Nazi Party. Fleeing to Britain, Sulzbach pursued business interests until the outbreak of World War II. With the outbreak of war, he eventually enlisted in the British army and was later commissioned, attaining the rank of captain. He contributed to the war effort by using his knowledge of the German mindset and culture to assist in the de-nazification of captured German military personnel held in British prisoner of war camps. Rarely is there available a first-hand account on the level that is provided by Sulzbach’s diaries. I highly recommend this book to those ARMOR readers who are interested in studying World War I, as it is a compelling first-hand account that provides the reader with a window in time to the life and events surrounding a German soldier at this point in history.

MAJ, U. S. Army Draftee Division: The 88th Infantry Division in World War II by John Sloan Brown, Presidio Press, Novato, CA, 1998, 224 pp., $15.95 In these interesting times, the issue of how we mobilize, train, and deploy a large group of men so quickly is being addressed. U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 100-17, Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, and Demobilization, the “train the force” series of FMs, and a slew of combined arms training strategies cover technical aspects of mobilization and training, but without really addressing how we fill existing units or form new ones. This book illustrates one solution to that problem. The author, currently the director of the Army’s Center for Military History, describes the activation, training, and deployment of the 88th Blue Devil Division from its inconspicuous origins at Camp Gruber, Oklahoma, to its bloody drive up the Italian “boot,” and carries through to the war’s conclusion in the Alps. Throughout its fighting, the division acquitted itself admirably, earning the respect of friend and foe alike. Men who were typically average Americans, draftees, called to defend the nation in time of war, manned the division. How did a division that, by most indicators, average in every way, produce above average results? The author begins with a discussion of mobilization experiences in the nation’s prior wars and resulting mobilization theories. During the war, the Army filled existing regular Army and National Guard divisions with draftees (the Up-tonian model), and as the nation moved toward full mobilization, created new divisions around cadres of relatively more experienced officers and noncommissioned officers (the “egalitarian” model). Although the discussion seems rather esoteric, it provides a theoretical basis for the two-track manning approach taken by the Army during World War II. This approach remains essentially the same today, and can be observed in the distinctions between the regular Army, tiered readiness in the National Guard, and cadre/institutional training divisions in the Army Reserve. According to the author, there were six factors key to the success of the division in combat: personnel stability (only by chance were the quality cadre and fresh draftees that comprised the 88th spared personnel turbulence by having to provide replacements to other division to make up for their combat losses overseas); logistics (the division had most of what it needed both for its train-up at home as well as fighting in Italy); the Army training program (centrally planned and locally executed, this intuitive training plan resulted in implementing Armywide standards of performance prior to deployment); overseas training (shortly after arriving in the Mediterranean area and claiming its equipment, the division enjoyed a two-week exercise, which helped it brush up on skills that stagnated during its transit to Europe); the division’s first combat assignment was to a relatively quiet sector (where the division tested and revised its standard operating procedures to deal with a real enemy); and periodic rest and retraining (the division rotated its battalions and regiments off the line as often as feasible, during which time the unit absorbed replacements and retrained its soldiers and officers on both the basics of warfare, as well as in lessons learned in combat). Most informative is the final chapter, where the author contrasts techniques and happen-stances that made the 88th successful to less effective techniques employed in Korea and Vietnam. I highly recommend this book to anyone who plans collective training at any level. I hope the smart people at places like Fort Monroe and Fort Leavenworth heed the wisdom in Draftee Division.

CPT, U. S. Army 52 —

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1. Robert A. Doughty, et al., Warfare in the Western World: Volume II, D. C. Heath and Company, Lexington, MA, 1996, p. 913.

2. Ibid., pp. 969-70.

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