The Future of Tank Gunnery

by Major Herbert L. Skinner and Sergeant First Class Michael D. Dunfee Sergeant First Class (SFC) Cooley and his tank platoon have been defending checkpoint (CP) 10 for more than four hours. His platoon was tasked with establishing a blocking position at the intersection of routes Jackson and Grant. Oriented north toward the small town of Limbo, he meticulously fights off the slow drift to complacency within his platoon. After all, alight infantry company is moving to interdict enemy forces along route Grant, north of Limbo, and the brigade unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) platoon reported no contact when it flew over the town two hours ago. “Blue, this is Demon 6; Killer company is in contact with paramilitary forces on the northern edge of Limbo, and scouts report three paramilitary technical trucks moving east along route Jackson to your position. Move a section north along Grant to reinforce Killer; keep the second section at CP 10 to destroy the technical trucks on Jackson. Killer company hop-set is…” “Blue one, this is Blue four; I’m oriented on Limbo and prepared to move Bravo section north.” “Slow day. Air Force will probably get the tech trucks anyhow,” thinks SFC Cooley. “Roger, Blue Four; reinforce Killer at CP 11.” With that, Bravo section moves north to the town of Limbo. “Killer 6, this is Demon Blue Four, moving to CP 11; what is your SITREP, over.” “Roger, positioned east of CP 11, in contact with paramilitary infantry. Move to CP 11 and establish ABF oriented north.” “Roger, Killer 6.” SFC Cooley and his Bravo section hastily move into the town of Limbo in staggered column. As they approach CP 11, Limbo seems empty; all of the blinds are closed in the one- and two-story structures. SFC Cooley sees movement out of the corner of his right eye — two tiger fatigued para-militaries prepare to fire a recoilless rifle from the first floor of an adjacent building. He swings the M2 to the right, and orders, “Caliber fifty.” Private Scanson, the loader, scanning over the left flank of the tank simultaneously yells, “Troops, left flank, 240, on the way!” Sergeant Smith, the gunner, announces, “Identify troops front! Friendly, friendly! Identify RPG, second story, 11 o’clock!” PV1 Scanson announces, “Loader complete.” SFC Cooley states, “TC complete. Gunner, troops, fire!” “On the way!” shouts the gunner. “Killer 6, this is Demon Blue Four; engaged and destroyed seven dismounts and AT team vicinity CP 11. Identify your southern platoon, moving to establish ABF at CP 11.” “Demon Blue Four, this is Killer 6; contact BMPs north, out.” As Blue 3 moves to a position north of Limbo behind some rubble and signals Killer Company’s southern platoon, SFC Cooley spots three BMP-3s through his commander’s independent thermal viewer, rounding the side of a hill three kilometers to the north. “Bravo, contact, PCs, north, cross fire! Gunner, MPAT, three PCs, right PC! Up! Fire!” “On the way!” “Target, left PC!” SFC Cooley scans the horizon; three burning hulks billow black smoke into the sky. “Blue Four, this is Blue Three; engaged and destroyed two PCs north of CP 11.” SFC Cooley chuckles to himself, “I guess you can’t expect to kill them all.”

The Abrams gunnery strategy is a tried-and-true method of training and evaluating tank crews in their ability to acquire, engage, and destroy targets under multiple conditions. However, the strategy, its base rooted during the Cold War environment, fails to adequately prepare tank crews, sections, and platoons to fight in the complexities presented in the contemporary operational environment (COE). As the vignette above describes, tank crewmen like SFC Cooley need to be trained and evaluated in gunnery tasks derived from conditions prevalent in the COE. The change in current and foreseeable conditions under which tanks will be employed in combat necessitates a change in the Abrams gunnery strategy. The Gunnery Branch of the Directorate of Training, Doctrine, and Combat Development (DTDCD) at the United States Ar my Armor Center is responsible for developing, validating, and publishing armor and cavalry gunnery doctrine. Gunnery Branch’s subject matter experts and tank master gunners author U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-20.12, Tank Gunnery (Abrams); FM 17-12-7, Tank Gunnery Training Devices and Usage Strategies; and Student Text (ST) 3-20.12, Tank Crew Evaluator Exportable Packet.1 All of these publications are being revised and will be published early Fiscal Year (FY) 05. During the revision process for each of these publications, Gunnery Branch has incorporated lessons learned during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), developed and tested Abrams urban tactics, techniques, and procedures during two urban combined arms live-fire exercises, and analyzed the likely threat capabilities and tactics faced within the COE. As a result of this analysis, Gunnery Branch is fundamentally changing the Abrams gunnery training and evaluation strategy. Those changes will be published in this year’s revision of FM 3-20.12. Some might wonder why we are changing the old gunnery strategy, which was good enough for OIF and should be good enough for any other contingency. The COE is not only the environment in which we fight today, but it is also the potential environment in which we may fight in the foreseeable future. As we all know, threat forces are not likely to face U. S. forces in open terrain where our long-range precision fires dominate, and U. S. armor and cavalry units are unlikely to face Soviet-style echelons of forces attacking across high-speed avenues of approach or open, rolling terrain. Threat forces are more likely to be positioned in close, restricted, and urban terrain to negate U. S. long-range precision fires; increase the effects of cheap short-range antiarmor systems; and limit the mobility, agility, and speed of armor forces. Operation Iraqi Freedom did, however, revalidate the baseline fundamentals of the Abrams gunnery training methodology. Our crawl-walk-run gunnery table-based system is tried and true. In the adaptation and revision of our current strategy, Gunnery Branch is ensuring that we are careful not to “throw the baby out with the bath water,” or change the strategy just for the sake of change. The essentials of our current system are sound and will be maintained within the new COE-compliant Abrams gunnery strategy. The proposed COE-compliant Abrams gunnery strategy, which will be included in the new FM 3-20.12, changes the current strategy in eight key aspects. Six of the changes are focused on converting existing engagements within the current tables to reflect conditions existing in the COE. The remaining changes are designed to increase section gunnery proficiency and increase the unit master gunner’s ability to design advanced table scenarios to fit their commander’s assessment and overall training goals. Loader’s M240 The first change to the Abrams gunnery tables and training strategy is introducing the loader’s M240 engagements into Tank Tables (TT) V through XII. Feedback from tank units fighting in OIF has revealed that the lack of loader’s machine gun training and qualification is a glaring deficiency in the current gunnery training strategy. The machine gun familiarization training given to tank loaders during TT V in the current strategy failed to prepare loaders for conditions they would face in Iraq. In fact, since TT Vis not a prerequisite for executing TT VIII, many units fail to require loader’s machine gun training and instead conduct a combined TT V and TT VI. Many view the loader’s machine gun as spare parts for the coax M240 and do not envision its use during tank qualification. The proposed COE-compliant Abrams gunnery strategy requires a tank loader to engage and hit targets with his M240 machine gun. The loader will improve in proficiency as the difficulty of the requirement increases for TT V through TT VIII. To elevate the importance of the loader’s machine gun skills, the proposed strategy requires the loader to hit his targets within the prescribed time for the tank crew to achieve a “distinguished” TT VIII qualification. The COE-compliant TT VIII gunnery requires the loader to engage and hit targets during the A1 and A4 engagements at a range of 100 to 300 meters. Degraded-Mode Gunnery The second change that Gunnery Branch made to the existing Abrams gunnery strategy is to increase the difficulty of the TT VIII gunner’s auxiliary sight (GAS) engagement. Observations gained from crews fighting in OIF illustrate that failure of the gunner’s primary sight (GPS) caused a number of tanks to fight for lengthy periods in degraded mode. These GPS failures were due to battle damage and a high tempo of operations that restricted maintenance and repairs. In the current strategy, tank crews are required to engage and hit a moving armored personnel carrier (APC) with high-explosive antitank ammunition (HEAT) in TT VII, and a moving tank with sabot in TT VIII, while using the GAS. The proposed COE-compliant strategy requires tank crews to engage and hit a moving tank through the GAS using sabot during TT VII. It also requires tank crews to complete the more complex tasks of engaging a moving APC and stationary troops through the GAS during TT VIII. The COE contains a higher proportion of threats requiring coax and HEAT ammunition than the old tank-heavy Cold War environment. For that reason, the proposed strategy includes the more difficult tasks of using the GAS and the GAS stadia reticle to acquire, estimate range, and engage targets using HEAT and coax ammunition. This change, while reflecting the COE, also requires increased proficiency from tank crews. Simultaneous Tank Commander, Gunner, and Loader Engagements The third change to the Abrams gunnery strategy is including near-simultaneous target presentations for the tank commander (TC), gunner, and loader within a single engagement. The current Cold War-based strategy fails to require the tank crew to use and manage the full complement of the tank’s weapons systems simultaneously. As OIF demonstrated, the COE requires tank crews to be agile and adept at exploiting the full capabilities of the Abrams tank. Threat forces will continue to present tank crews with multiple forms of contact, from multiple directions, simultane- — 21

“Armor and cavalry forces fighting in OIF have reinforced the relevance of using mechanized forces in urban environments. The current Cold War-based gunnery strategy does not train and evaluate tank crews in their ability to acquire and engage targets in an urban environment. The new Abrams gunnery tables include urban engagements in TT IV, TT V, TT VII, and TT VIII. The urban engagements will be fired against three-dimensional facades that appear as buildings from the prospective of the firing crew.” ously, in an attempt to overwhelm the crew’s ability to react. In the new COE-compliant gunnery tables, the tank crew is required to engage and hit targets with all of its weapons systems within 78 seconds. The new TT VII and VIII each contain two engagements, requiring TCs, load ers, and gunners to engage and hit targets concurrently. This increase in complexity results in improved crew coordination and lethality, while more adequately preparing the crew to defeat the myriad of targets presented within the COE. Canister Engagement The XM1028 120mm canister is currently undergoing testing at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland. Although originally procured for use against North Korean infantry wave tactics, recent situations in OIF demonstrate its utility in other locations within the COE. The operational requirements document (ORD) for the XM1028 requires the production of 16,000 rounds for the Korean theater and another 16,000 rounds for other contingencies. Because of this, Gunnery Branch has included a canister familiarization engagement in the new TT VII. Adding canister ammunition to the strategy has tentatively been approved. However, we believe canister live-fire engagements are also appropriate for TT VIII and the advanced tables, although budgetary constraints will be a hurdle. Nonetheless, even a familiarization engagement in TT VII will prevent tank crews from having their first experience with the ammunition during or just prior to combat. Realistic Targetry The COE presents tank crews with a variety of conditions. The nonlinear, noncontiguous aspects of the modern battlefield, coupled with conduct of operations in populated areas, have increased the complexity of combat. In the COE, friendly forces and civilians are increasingly intermixed on the battlefield. Target discrimination is a skill that the old Cold War gunnery methodology does not adequately address. The new COE-compliant gunnery strategy requires random presentation of friendly and civilian targets throughout TT VII and TT VIII during four separate engagements. Of the four friendly and civilian target presentations, one must be at night, two must depict friendly forces, two must depict civilians, and one must depict a friendly vehicle using the unit’s combat identification standard operating procedure (SOP), such as a VS17 or combat identification panels. Tank crews that engage friendly or civilian target arrays will receive zero points for the entire engagement. This additional requirement will better prepare our tank crews to discriminate among targets and increase realism within the tables. The Cold War-based gunnery TT VII and TT VIII present tank crews with only three types of vehicle targets: tanks, APCs, and personnel carriers (BRDM). In the COE reflected in Somalia and Iraq, the threat is using low-cost civilian trucks equipped with antiaircraft artillery or heavy machine guns mounted in the truck bed. These vehicles have been designated as technical trucks (tech trucks). The 22 — new gunnery tables include presentations of technical truck targets. These targets will be engaged by the commander’s weapons station (CWS).50-caliber and coax machine guns during the day, and main gun HEAT at night. Introducing tech-truck targets not only increases realism, but also more adequately trains tank crews to use the appropriate weapons system against the appropriate target. The increase in infantry-type targets versus tank targets within the COE also caused a change to troop-target presentations within the tables. Previously, troop targets were only presented as rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) teams and stationary squads. In the proposed tables, engagement techniques for engaging moving infantry from a moving tank, which are different than engaging stationary troops, will be incorporated. In the COE-compliant gunnery strategy, tank crews are required to exhibit this skill. Urban Engagements Current and projected threat forces will continue to be positioned within urban areas to decrease U. S. armor and cavalry advantages in long-range precision engagements. Enemy forces in the COE will also be positioned within urban areas to maintain contact with logistics supplies (from a friendly populace), use civilians on the battlefield as shields, and manipulate U. S. rules of engagement to their advantage. Armor and cavalry forces fighting in OIF have reinforced the relevance of using mechanized forces in urban environments. The current Cold War-based gunnery strategy does not train and evaluate tank crews in their ability to acquire and engage targets in an urban environment. The new Abrams gunnery tables include urban engagements in TT IV, TT V, TT VII, and TT VIII. The urban engagements will be fired against three-dimensional facades that appear as buildings from the perspective of the firing crew. No floors or internal walls will exist within the facades. Troop targets will be presented in various floors and rooftops to replicate urban conditions and train and evaluate crews in urban target question and engagement. Adding urban facades on our current ranges will also increase realism in a different respect. Our current ranges are too pristine and do no reflect reality; they mirror the rolling plains of Europe or the flat sand of Southwest Asia. Current ranges do not depict the debris and obstacle-ridden battlefields on which tank crews and cavalrymen are fighting today or will likely fight in the near future. Adding the facades will cause tank crewmen to anticipate when the obstacles will obscure their view and interrupt their gun-target line. The skills developed by forcing tank crews to identify and hit targets on a semi-dirty battlefield will make them more lethal in the COE. Current ranges do not support urban engagements; however, making this capability a requirement will induce the Army Training Support Command (ATSC) to find and procure a materiel solution that fits the needs of the armor and cavalry forces. Meanwhile, alternate engagements are included for each urban engagement. Units are also encouraged to use local range maintenance funds to create conditions required in gunnery tables. COE-Compliant TT X Through TT XII, Advanced Gunnery Observations from OIF have shown an increase in using tank sections as individual maneuver elements. Tank sections are frequently attached to light infantry companies, task organized with M2 Bradley sections, or positioned as a section at checkpoints and blocking positions. This trend will likely continue in the COE. Because of this, section gunnery is being re-emphasized in the new gunnery strategy. Full-caliber live-fire TT X, “Section Gunnery,” will be a prerequisite qualification to executing TT XII, “Platoon Gunnery.” This requirement will increase the tank section’s proficiency in direct fire control, distribution, and maneuver. The conduct of TT X through TT XII will also change to reflect the COE. Master gunners and unit commanders will have increased latitude in designing their unit’s advanced table scenarios. The aim of the COE-compliant advanced table strategy is to completely divest from the Soviet echelon or banded target presentation. The new strategy requires target presentations that align with the COE. The scenario does not need to adhere strict ly to offensive and defensive engagements. Commanders can include a variety of tasks such as convoy escort. Target presentations must include friendly and civilian target presentations, as well as tech trucks and RPG teams in building facades. Master gunners and commanders are required to emplace targetry that induces tank crew men to use the loader’s M240. They are also encouraged to add battlefield clutter and debris to increase realism. The end result of implementing the COE-compliant advanced gunnery tables will be more lethal tank crews and platoons prepared to fight in the conditions prevalent in the COE. Abrams Urban Gunnery The current FM 3-20.12 fails to adequately address the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for proper urban target acquisition and engagement methods for the Abrams tank.2 Many urban TTPs have been collected from OIF observations and two combined-arms urban gunnery demonstrations conducted at Fort Knox, Kentucky. Because of this, Chapter 16, “Tank Tactical Tables,” FM 3-20.12 will be replaced with a chapter totally dedicated to Abrams urban gunnery. The current Chapter 16 is redundant with the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) 17-237-10-MTP, Tank Platoon Mission Training Plan, and is therefore unnecessary.3 Combined Arms Live-Fire Exercises In the Cold War-based strategy Combined Arms Live-Fire Exercises (CALFEX) were designed to train company teams and battalions in direct-fire control, distribution, and maneuver under live-fire conditions. CALFEXs were focused solely on offensive and defensive operations. Although company team and task force CALFEXs are still encouraged, in the new strategy, commanders are not limited in the unit size and mission type they can choose to execute. For example, mixed platoons containing Bradleys, tanks, and engineers have proven to be a suitable task organization for operating in restricted or complex terrain. Commanders can now use allocated ammunition to conduct platoon-sized combined arms live-fire exercises. What We Are Not Changing Gunnery Branch is not changing the underlying foundations to the demonstra-tively successful Abrams gunnery strategy. We are being careful to not create OIF-specific gunnery. The new Abrams gunnery strategy encompasses all of the relevant tasks that will make tank crews successful and lethal in the entire COE. The new gunnery strategy preserves long-range gunnery proficiency in tank crews by maintaining long-range engagements in TT VII and TT VIII. While some tech truck and infantry targets are presented within 500 meters, tank targets mainly remain in a band between 1,400 to 2,400 meters. The methodology used in establishing engagement standards in the revised gunnery tables remains threat-based. The con- — 23 version of hit times to points continues to be calculated using estimated worldwide average capabilities of threat weapons systems for specific task and conditions, such as moving tanks, target range, and nuclear, biological, and chemical conditions. For performance above the standard (70-points), points are calculated based on expected or demonstrated performance for the U. S. tank weapons system. Even in COE, it is still imperative to hit before being hit. Digital communications will continue to be emphasized during gunnery. We recognize that a crew’s ability to properly use digital communications equipment is a highly perishable skill. Abrams tank crews equipped with Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) or Blue Force Tracker will continue to be required to receive digital prompts and send digital situational reports throughout TT VII, TT VIII, and the advanced tables. The fundamental crawl-walk-run tank table methodology is not changing. Crews will still be required to demonstrate proficiency as they proceed from the basic to the advanced tables. Crew certification in the Tank Crew Gunnery Skills Test (TCGST), TT IV, and TT VIII remain prerequisites for crews to proceed to follow-on tables. Virtual and remedial training remain embedded within the new gunnery strategy. Validating the New Gunnery Strategy Gunnery Branch is required to validate any changes to the gunnery strategy by observing units conducting gunnery under the new methodology. During the new strategy validation, participating units will use their current Standards and Training Commission (STRAC) allocation to complete the gunnery density. After validation, which will be completed in September 2004, all units equipped with Abrams tanks can qualify under the new strategy. During preparation for implementing the new Abrams gunnery strategy, Gunnery Branch presented a change to the Abrams STRAC ammunition allocation to the STRAC Council of Colonels in March 2004. This changes the HEAT to sa bot ratio, increases.50-caliber and 7.62 - mm ammunition, and redistributes the ammunition across the tables to meet the requirements in the new tables. This change was approved, however, that ammunition allocation cannot be drawn by units until FY07. The current STRAC ammunition allocation, which is in effect through FY06, will support the new gunnery strategy with some adaptation. Harvesting ammunition remains important, and master gunners and commanders must manage ammunition to ensure enough rounds are available to complete the gunnery density. Units firing on ranges that do not support the urban engagements will fire the prescribed alternate engagements. Once the FY04 FM 3-20.12 is published, all tank units will be required to qualify under the new COE-compliant gunnery standards. Impacts of New Standards Similar to the late 1990s, when engagement time standards increased in difficulty and multiple targets were added to the tank tables, average crew scores will decrease with the implementation of this new gunnery strategy. The crew’s ability to anticipate the next engagement will decrease, and it will take some time for the armor community to become familiar “Observations from OIF have shown an increase in using tank sections as individual maneuver elements. Tank sections are frequently attached to light infantry companies, task organized with M2 Bradley sections, or positioned as a section at checkpoints and blocking positions. This trend will likely continue in the COE.” 24 —

“Gunnery Branch is not changing the underlying foundations to the demonstratively successful Abrams gunnery strategy. We are being careful to not create OIF-specific gunnery. The new Abrams gunnery strategy encompasses all of the relevant tasks that will make tank crews successful and lethal in the entire COE.” with the new standards. In the end, the new standards will produce tank crews, sections, and platoons more capable of fighting and winning in the COE than contemporary crews. The new gunnery standards must be validated by Gunnery Branch master gunners, as representatives of the Chief of Armor, who observe and evaluate a unit’s conduct of a gunnery density under the new strategy. This will be completed no later than September 2004. An armor and cavalry council of colonels must then review the strategy and validation results and make a recommendation to the Chief of Armor prior to its implementation. This step will be completed no later than October 2004. Following this step, the Chief of Armor must approve or disapprove the new COE-compliant gunnery strategy, which should be completed no later than November 2004. Finally, Gunnery Branch will publish the revised FM 3-20.12, after which the new gunnery standards will be in effect. Gunnery Branch anticipates publication as early as December 2004 with full implementation of the new standard no later than January 2005. The old Cold War-based Abrams gunnery strategy has stood the test of time, but its time has passed. The new COE-compliant Abrams gunnery strategy will present our crews with a variety of engagements under conditions most prevalent in the COE. We must change to ensure tankers like SFC Cooley and his crew are prepared to fight and win, despite the complex scenarios they are likely to face now and in the future. The Gunnery Branch has developed this new strategy after consulting with many tank master gunners and leaders across the armor community. However, we are still open to sug gestions and assistance from any tanker or cavalryman who wants to make a contribution toward improving the Abrams gunnery strategy. Gunnery Branch points of contact are Herbert. Skinner@us.army.mil or (502) 624-7323, or Michael. Dunfee@knox.army.mil or (502) 624-5765. Notes 1U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-20.12, Tank Gunnery (Abrams), U. S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, D. C., 5 May 1998; FM 17-12-7, Tank Gunnery Training Devices and Usage Strategies, GPO, Washington, D. C., 1 May 2000; and Student Text (ST) 3-20.12, Tank Crew Evaluator Exportable Packet (TCEEP), Headquarters, U. S. Army Armor Center, Fort Knox, KY, 11 March 2002. 2FM 3-20.12, Tank Gunnery (Abrams). 3Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) 17-237- 10-MTP, Tank Platoon Mission Training Plan, Headquarters, Department of the Army, GPO, Washington, D. C., 23 December 2002. Major Herbert L. Skinner III is the current chief, Directorate of Training, Doctrine, and Combat Development, Gunnery Branch, Fort Knox, KY. He received a B. A. from Hampton University, VA. His military education includes Airborne School, Armor Officer Basic Course, Armor Officer Advanced Course, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, and U. S. Army Command and General Staff College. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include tank platoon leader and company XO, D Company, 1st Battalion 12th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX; command er, G Troop and Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 2d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Irwin, CA; and deputy S3, 1st Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, Camp Casey, Korea. Sergeant First Class Michael D. Dunfee is the noncommissioned officer in charge, Crew Gunnery Branch, Directorate of Training, Doctrine, and Combat Development, Fort Knox, KY. His military education includes Primary Leadership Development Course, Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course, Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course, and M1A1 Master Gunner Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include platoon sergeant, company master gunner, and tank commander, B Company, 1st Battalion, 64th Armor Regiment, 3d Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, GA; tank section sergeant, D Company, 1st Battalion, 34th Armor Regiment, 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, KS; and tank gunner, C Company, 2d Battalion, 32d Armor Regiment, 3d Armored Division, Germany. — 25