“Checkmate on the Northern Front” The Deployment of TF 1-63 Armor in Support of Operation Iraqi Freedom

Safety First — 5 Our Army is better now than it has been in my 26 years of service. Today, we have the best equipment, the best training, and the finest soldiers, civilians, and families in its history. We can deploy in a moment’s notice to wherever we are needed and successfully meet mission requirements. Safety and mission accomplishment are two important parts of every soldier’s life. If we are serious about our Army’s readiness, leaders must be serious about safety. It our responsibility to ensure soldiers stay alive and uninjured while preparing for combat. Day in and day out, soldiers perform the Army’s mission; however, we cannot allow our mission to become routine. When the mission becomes so familiar that we begin to ignore safety procedures, disaster will strike. It is called complacency. Complacency is that feeling of security, while unaware of potential danger. It can happen to any one of us. Therefore, soldiers must make a conscious effort to perform every task with attention to detail, which means remaining aware of their surroundings and taking necessary precautions to reduce risks. This isn’t just a good idea — this is our job as leaders. We cannot lose sight of one very important thing — accidental death is unacceptable. We must not let down our guard when it comes to risk management. We cannot continue doing things that are injuring and killing our soldiers, such as trucks rolling over because drivers are not properly trained or soldiers being crushed by turrets because they fail to pay attention. Each soldier is an important member of the team and teammates do not let down their comrades. When leaders and soldiers exercise smart risk-management and make sound decisions, unit readiness increases and soldiers are not injured or killed. Track vehicle accidents continue to be a concern throughout the armor force. Soldiers are driving into other vehicles, roadside objects, such as trees and power poles, or into obstacles, such as ditches and rocks, while maneuvering cross-country. There are several reasons for accidents related to driving tracked vehicles. The most common include driving too fast for road conditions, improper use of night vision (or failure to use night vision devices all together), and failure to identify other vehicles or personnel in the area prior to moving. Track and heavy wheeled vehicles can be hard to control on slippery road surfaces. Drivers and vehicle commanders need to be familiar with slippery roads and must adjust their speeds to prevent accidents. Roads can become slick after a rainfall and when covered by snow, sand, or mud. A driver moving too quickly can lose control of the vehicle, striking whatever is in its path. Track vehicles are often much larger than other vehicles, and cause greater accidents resulting in serious injury or death. As part of their risk-management process, leaders need to consider these hazards when defining movement speeds. Drivers and vehicle commanders often have limited visibility. During night operations, some crews will fail to use night vision devices, or during “dust out” conditions fail to reduce vehicle speed and, as a result, they run into other vehicles or even dismounted soldiers. Leaders must en force the proper procedures regarding vehicle speed reduction and use of night vision devices during night operations. Safety is both a reality and a state of mind. Leaders must demonstrate safety in garrison as well as in the field environment. Prior to moving vehicles, leaders must train soldiers to ensure that the intended path is clear of other vehicles and personnel. During movement in congested areas, such as motor pools, assembly areas, or wash racks, ground guides must be used. In most military vehicle accidents, the operator was not trained, tested, selected, or licensed properly. Sometimes the failure is only in one of these areas; others times it is a combination of the four. We must identify high-risk individuals. The leading cause of accidental death is attributed to POVs. Most POV accidents occur relatively close to the soldier’s duty station, although long-distance driving does account for a small number of the accidents. Off-duty POV accidents remain the number one killer of soldiers. We must take every precaution while operating a vehicle. Buckle up! Seatbelts do save lives. While POV accidents account for the majority of our losses, they are not the only killers, use the commonsense approach and beware of dangerous situations and areas. Every summer, we lose soldiers to all types of hazards. In today’s complex world, safety is becoming a significant challenge. Our mission plates are full and we have fewer and fewer soldiers available to accomplish countless missions. Soldiers must be trained to follow correct procedures in every task. The present operational tempo and increased hazards mandate no shortcuts. Leaders at all levels must manage risk properly and maintain a vigil against complacency, shortcuts, and improper procedures. We cannot afford to continue to make the same mistakes. Remember, we are a standards-based organization, and when we violate a published standard, accidents happen. NCOs must always enforce our standards to safeguard our soldiers and equipment. Iron Discipline! CSM George DeSario Jr. Command Sergeant Major U. S. Army Armor Center

“Checkmate on the Northern Front” The Deployment of Task Force 1-63 Armor In Support of Operation Iraqi Freedom by Major Brian Maddox Strategic Chess Match Chess is a game of strategy where an indirect approach is often more valuable than overt strength. A skilled player deliberately maneuvers to eliminate his opponent’s options and then, at the right time, boldly moves toward the objective — checkmate. During March and April 2003, coalition and U. S. military planners crafted a strategy for Northern Iraq worthy of a gifted chess master. At stake in this “game” was the defeat of Iraqi forces north of Kirkuk and coalition control of the critically important Kir kuk oil fields. Diplomatic differences with anew ly elected Turkish government prevented the planned de ploy ment of a large coalition force to open a second “Northern Front” in Iraq. Military planners turned to a different option that relied more on finesse and flexibility to accomplish stated objectives. This strategy involved a di verse group of forces and organizations that included national intelligence agencies, conventional U. S. Army and Air Force units, Special Operations Forces, and Kurd ish Pesh Merga fighters. One of the conventional units involved in this campaign in Northern Iraq was the 1st Battalion, 63d (1-63) Armor, 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, Vilseck, Germany. The air deployment of Task Force (TF) 1-63 Armor to Iraq in April 2003 played an essential role in the success of the Northern Front. TF 1-63 Armor’s deployment demonstrated that the United States could project a viable heavy armor force anywhere in the world. The mere presence of U. S. armor in Northern Iraq weakened the resolve of defending Iraqi forces in the region and contributed to their rapid collapse north of Kir kuk. This article out lines TF 1-63 Armor’s unique organization, briefly describes the unit’s actions in Northern Iraq, and provides lessons learned from this historic deployment. Background and Organization of the Immediate Ready Task Force TF 1-63 Armor deployed to Northern Iraq as the U. S. Army Europe (USAREUR) Immediate Ready Task Force (IRTF). The IRTF is a unique organization with an unusual organizational structure. Born in the wake of Task Force Hawk, the USAREUR IRTF was designed and equipped to accomplish a wide range off short-notice missions. In 1998, USAREUR identified the requirement for an armor force capable of deploying rapidly anywhere in the European Command (EU COM) area of operations (AOR). Originally designed around a mechanized infantry or armor company team, the IRTF has since expanded to a battalion task force consisting of a medium ready company (MRC), a heavy ready company (HRC), and five force enhancement mod ules (FEM). The MRC consists of a com pany headquarters element and two mech anized infantry platoons 6 — equipped with M113A3s and four dismounted infantry squads. The HRC consists of one M1A1 Abrams platoon and one M2 Bradley pla toon with two dismounted infantry squads. An additional M1A1 or M2 serves as the HRC commander’s vehicle.1 In addition to the HRC and the MRC, five supporting FEMs provide the IRTF commander with the force multipliers need ed to accomplish various missions. For example, the com mand and control FEM consists of two modified M997 am bu lances equipped with an array of communications and computer equipment. These vehicles provide the IRTF commander a high ly mobile tactical operations center (TOC) capable of planning and tracking armor operations. The four remain ing FEMs consisting of combat service support assets, engineers, military police, and scouts complete the IRTF’s organization. Each FEM is air de ployable and capable of supporting task force-level operations or, with proper support, limited independent operations. The IRTF was not originally designed to deploy or operate independently. The IRTF was created to provide alight infantry organization with a viable armor capability. In the EUCOM AOR, units serving as the IRTF often trained with the 173d Airborne Brigade based in Vicenza, Italy. This brigade provides a lethal, high ly mo bile infantry force, but lacks a heavy armor punch. The IRTF is designed to provide that armor punch. A series of suc cessful training exercises con ducted at the Combat Maneuver Train ing Center, Hohenfels, Germany, and training deployments to Hungary and Po land in which various IRTF units trained with the 173d Brigade, cemented a successful working relationship in a training environment. In Northern Iraq, TF 1-63 Armor and the 173d Brigade validated this relationship during combat operations. Bashur Landing and Operations in Northern Iraq Early morning 8 April 2003, the first M1A1 Abrams tank drove off the back ramp of an Air Force C-17 at Bashur Air Field in Northern Iraq. This was the first time an M1A1 had air landed in support of a combat operation. The task force operations officer arrived on the ground with the first M1A1 and began to coordinate the arrival of the rest of the task force. The task force commander’s plan was to first deploy the HRC’s tank platoon, an M88 recovery vehicle, and small command and control elements to quickly get an organized force on the ground capable of conducting and sustaining combat operations. By 10 April, the situation in the vicinity of Kirkuk began to change rapidly. Kurdish Pesh Merga fighters continued to press their attacks against Iraqi forces defending north of the city. The 173d Brigade commander believed the time was ripe for a concerted move on Irbil. The task force commander arrived at Bashur at approximately 0300 hours on the morning of 10 April and immediately received a verbal warning order to be ready to move south in three hours. At that time, TF 1-63 Armor had five M1A1 tanks and two M2 Bradleys on the ground at Bashur. No recovery or maintenance assets had yet arrived. TF 1-63 Armor soldiers hurriedly finished off-loading the last of the vehicles to arrive and began to prepare for offensive operations. The task force commander decided to assume risk and prepare to move what force he had toward Irbil. The commander believed that the mere movement of an armored force south toward Irbil and Kirkuk would provide coalition forces an important psychological advantage. Intelligence reports indicated that Iraqi forces, dug in north of Kirkuk, did not expect to encounter American armor moving from the north. Even a small armored force moving from Bashur might convince the Iraqis to abandon their defenses. Likewise, Kurdish Pesh Merga fighters, energized by the presence of armored vehicles, could press home their attacks against Iraqi positions. “Early morning 8 April 2003, the first M1A1 Abrams tank drove off the back ramp of an Air Force C- 17 at Bashur Air Field in Northern Iraq. This was the first time an M1A1 had air landed in support of a combat operation. The task force operations officer arrived on the ground with the first M1A1 and began to coordinate the arrival of the rest of the task force.” — 7 Figure 1. IRTF Organization

“The task force commander decided to assume risk and prepare to move what force he had toward Irbil. The commander believed that the mere movement of an armored force south toward Irbil and Kirkuk would provide coalition forces an important psychological advantage. Intelligence reports indicated that Iraqi forces, dug in north of Kirkuk, did not expect to encounter American armor moving from the north.” For over a decade, Kurdish fighters struggled against Saddam Hussein’s regime with antiquated small arms and homemade artillery and explosives. The Kurds fought valiantly, but they lacked the heavy weapons to defeat Iraqi forces dug in and supported by artillery. For days, Kurds wondered when the tanks would arrive.2 Prior to the arrival of the main body of TF 1-63 Armor at Bashur, the task force operations officer and the liaison officer conducted leader’s reconnaissance of two possible routes to Irbil and Kirkuk. The liaison officer traveled the direct route down Highway 3 to a point just North of Irbil. Any forces traveling this route could secure the Irbil airfield and if necessary skirt the western edge of Irbil and continue south on Highway 2 toward Kirkuk. This route had two advantages: it was suitable for armored vehicle traffic, and it allowed coalition forces to use the Irbil airfield to stage future operations to the south. The disadvantage of the Irbil route was that it led right into the teeth of the Iraqi defenses north of Kirkuk. Forces moving south along this route must travel through a wide valley with steep rolling hills. The imposing Kani Domlan Ridgeline dominates the southern edge of this valley. Iraqi infantry and artillery positioned on this key terrain continued to hold this ground despite weeks of heavy bombing by coalition aircraft and attacks by Pesh Merga fighters and U. S. Special Operations Forces. Forces moving along this route would also have to cross the Little Zab River at the town of Altun Kupri. Local Pesh Merga reported that Iraqi infantry occupying a small stone castle on the east side of the river heavily defended Altun Kupri. Intelligence reports indicated that these troops would strongly resist any effort to dislodge them. The liaison officer and the task force operations officer also conducted reconnaissance on an eastern indirect approach route south toward Kirkuk. This route winds southeast of Bashur through small villages and numerous narrow mountain switchbacks to the town of Taqtaq located on the Little Zab River. The advantage of this route was that it avoided the strength of the Iraqi positions along the Kani Domlan Ridge. Approximately 10 kilometers north of Kirkuk, there is a gap in the ridgeline where a small tributary of the Little Zab 8 —

River flows into Kirkuk. The commander of the 173d Brigade referred to this gap as the “sweet spot.” He believed that if the route was trafficable for armored vehicles, he could use the gap in the Kani Domlan to envelop the Iraqi positions on the ridgeline to the northwest. The route south from Taqtaq was not suitable for armored vehicle traffic, unfortunately. Several of the bridges along the route were incapable of supporting Abrams tanks. Additionally, road conditions deteriorated significantly south of Taqtaq. Unimproved mountain roads and narrow village streets greatly restricted armored vehicle mobility. This route was, however, suitable for lighter vehicles and was used by the 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry (2-503d) during their attack on Kirkuk. The success of this operation validated the 173d brigade commander’s analysis of Iraqi defenses and his desire to exploit key terrain to defeat a potentially strong enemy position. At approximately 0600 hours on 10 April 2003, TF 1-63 Armor began its movement to Irbil. The brigade’s mission was to conduct a reconnaissance in force in the vicinity of Irbil to demonstrate coalition resolve in Northern Iraq.3 The brigade commander learned that Pesh Merga planned to attack Iraqi forces located in Altun Kupri. This accelerated the brigade’s movement timeline. The brigade commander assigned 1st Battalion, 508th Infantry (1-508th) the mission to move along Highway 3 to Irbil and support the Pesh Merga attack on Al tun Kupri. The 1-508th would also secure tactical assembly area (TAA) Boston located to the west of the Irbil Airfield. From TAA Boston, the 1-508th, if needed, could conduct reconnaissance to the west and determine the location and strength of any Iraqi forces moving east from Mosul. TF 1-63 Armor’s mission was to follow 1-508th to Irbil and occupy TAA Boston. The task force would then prepare for future combat op erations. During the movement to Irbil, the soldiers of TF 1-63 Armor experienced a mixture of emotions. The tension and wariness of moving south toward an enemy defending in unknown strength stood in sharp contrast to the overwhelmingly friend ly and joyous reception that greeted the task force as it moved toward Irbil. Elated Kurds greeted soldiers with flowers and embraces as they passed by. Large banners with “welcome to the liberation army” greeted the armored troops as the long column of vehicles snaked toward the south. When TF 1-63 Armor reached Irbil, the cost of conducting a 50-kilometer road march, without any heavy maintenance and logistics support, hit home with a vengeance. Two of the M1A1s had major problems that required considerable time to repair. The task force commander faced the difficult decision to push on with the limited combat power remaining or wait for the sustainment package, which was scheduled to arrive in the next 24 to 36 hours. The task force commander decided to see how the situation developed involving 1-508th operation near Altun Kupri. He was prepared to support the 508th with what combat power he had available, if necessary. If the 1-508th was successful in their mission without armored support, TF 1-63 Armor could build combat power and prepare for follow-on operations in Kirkuk. “TF 1-63 Armor entered Kirkuk with the combat power and sustainment needed to con duct stability operations. The task force successfully accomplished the strategic objective of providing an armor presence in Kirkuk to demonstrate coalition resolve and deter Iraq’s neighbors in the region from attempting to gain control of the Kirkuk oil fields.”

  

   
 
 



 

 




   
   

  



    
 

  
 


 






  


 
 

     



  







  






      
 
 







 
    
   




 


 

  


 

       

 






  
   



  






  

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 -  .  -+ , Figure 2. Actual Airflow of TF 1-63 Armor — 9