A Technique for Preparing the M1 Series Tank for MOUT Operations

Technique for Preparing the M1 Series Tank for MOUT Operations by Major Richard Rouleau and First Sergeant Carl A. Pope

In an environment of combat teams, task forces, and expeditionary forces, the need for understanding combined arms operations continues to be a challenge during real world contingency missions and at the Joint Readiness Training Center. Preparing the M1-series tank for MOUT with units that rarely train together continues to challenge tank crews and their supported infantry. There are some simple tips on TTPs for preparing the M1 and its supported infantry for MOUT operations. Using existing stocked supply items, off-the-shelf items, as well as locally manufactured materials, you can prepare the M1 for MOUT operations. There is no current system on the M1 that allows the tank commander to communicate with supported dismounts without using radios or hand and arm signals. Communications with the dismounts remain a challenge, but can be accomplished by mounting a C-2296 vehicle radio communications intercom control unit on the back of the tank. Procedures for attaching this system can be found in the Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter 98-10, “Fighting Light/Heavy in Restricted Terrain.”

Protecting tanks from the enemy can be accomplished by attaching concertina wire and chicken wire around the tanks’ skirts, including the rear. This protects the tank without risking severe injury.

A modified ski boat recovery ladder attached to the bustle rack will allow friendly dismounts as well as the tank crew to access the tank when the turret is traversed over the side. This system can be initiated by the loader who folds out the ladder and retrieves it as necessary.

One of the M1 crew’s top priorities is protecting the company/team dismounts. Current configuration of the M1 does not allow for dismounts to follow behind it because of the exhaust system. Dismounts are forced to follow on the flanks of the tank, blocking their view of the opposite side. Using an engine exhaust deflector, such as the one currently used to support M1s towing M1s, is a possible solution that would permit the infantry dismounts to follow behind the tank. The heat is either forced straight up or straight down, which allows dismounts to stack behind for maximum protection. The September 1999 PS magazine has the information necessary to accomplish this. It is also available in Appendix D–20-1-5 of the technical manual. The combined M1 and dismounted infantry team is a lethal force to be reckoned with in a MOUT environment. Using some good old-fashioned American ingenuity, the M1 can easily be configured to overcome shortcomings in current operational requirements. The U.S. Marine Corps is the Department of Defense proponent for MOUT operations and their publications and TTPs offer excellent sources for armor soldiers. vehicles in the 3d Interim Brigade Combat Team to be air deployable. Presently, the MGS platoon can accomplish four missions independently — attack by fire, support by fire, ambush, and convoy escort. With support from an infantry platoon or section, the MGS platoon can operate traffic control points or perform hasty route reconnaissance.

Obviously, the MGS platoon is very different from the traditional tank platoon, especially technically. Until the MGS Stryker variant is fielded, 19Ks do not belong in the MGS platoon. While assigned to an MGS platoon, a 19K misses required training, therefore the chance to improve technically and tactically. Although attack by fire and support by fire are important armor platoon tasks, they are not conducted in the same way due to the survivability of the different vehicles and the tracking and reloading capabilities of the TOW system. This contradictory mission training from an armor platoon is especially important for younger soldiers. In three platoons, there are six soldiers who will have served with MGS for a minimum of three years before a permanent change of station. They will arrive at their next duty station (most likely a conventional armor unit) as sergeants or senior specialists without having shot a Table VIII gunnery, or served only as a loader on one Table VIII gunnery. They have no experience in performing maintenance on an M1 platform, and they do not know how to break track. Although platoon leaders and platoon sergeants have a responsibility to maintain traditional 19K skills, the primary focus is to train personnel to accomplish the tasks of an MGS platoon. By placing these soldiers in the MGS platoon, platoon leaders and platoon sergeants have been put in the contradictory position of training what is necessary to accomplish the platoon’s mission, while also training what is important for the individual soldier to succeed in his next unit. This is not an issue that traditional armor platoon leaders and platoon sergeants have had to face.

Not only does this contradictory mission affect a soldier’s professional skills after he leaves an MGS platoon, but it also affects retention. By no means are we saying that 19Ks cannot meet the standard in an infantry company. On average, our platoons are the best disciplined in the company. Our NCOs know more about maintenance and motor pool operations than most infantry NCOs. But, 19Ks — especially those who are coming to these platoons from other units — have different ideas of combat: they stay mounted, they do not see much use in ruck marching, and they like to shoot big guns. Is it important that soldiers enjoy what they do? Not necessarily. But, if you ask an armor or cavalry officer to take command of the brigade laundry platoon, he will perform to the best of his abilities; after a year or two he might rethink his interest in the Army. As MGS platoon leaders, we feel that 19Ks are not needed in the MGS platoons, and to keep them there is doing them and the armor community a disservice. Our first recommendation is to replace 19Ks with 11-series soldiers or 19Ds. Without need for much explanation, 11-series soldiers are more at home in the infantry company than 19Ks and, like those in the brigade antitank company, are able to perform all the same tasks as the MGS platoons. Also, 11-series soldiers can train in areas that 19K soldiers cannot, such as the expert infantry badge.

Another option we feel is viable for manning the MGS platoon is the 19D. Two of the three of us spent time as platoon leaders of a RECCE scout platoon, and our opinion is that 19Ds are better suited for the day-to-day operations of an infantry company. They are more accustomed to dismounted operations. The traditional 19D tasks do not differ much from those of the MGS soldiers, especially in the route reconnaissance missions. Many 19Ds understand the TOW system and how to fight from a HMMWV, training they may have received in past units, and training that may prove valuable in their next units. Especially for those 19Ds serving in a reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition squadron, their working knowledge of MOUT operations further enhances the effectiveness of a platoon that is designed to support a company that fights in this environment. Eventually, 19Ks will have a place in infantry companies. When the MGS platoon can train for precision gunnery (MOUT or non-MOUT) on a biannual schedule and can effectively support the infantry with the proper equipment, no soldier will fulfill this role like a tanker.

Another recommendation that will maintain the effectiveness of the MGS platoon is to have armor officers, rather than infantry officers, as platoon leaders. Based on training received at the Officer Basic Course, armor lieutenants have a better understanding of the mounted mission than infantry lieutenants. This is not true of infantry officers as a whole — armor officers do not have the market on maneuver warfare. The recommendations we have made are based only on our personal experiences. We feel that at present, 11-series soldiers or 19Ds better meet the mission requirements of the MGS platoon. Once the platform and equipment allow the MGS platoon to support the infantry according to its original design, 19Ks will have a place. Until then, placing 19Ks in this role negatively affects the armor community. Future MGS and RECCE officers will be the final decisionmakers as the IBCT proves its effectiveness during real-world deployment. Armor branch has an important role in the success of these units, and as armor officers, we can make it more successful.

1LT JOSH JONES,

1LT WALT REED,

and 1LT JOHN WHEELER Fort Lewis, WA Memories of the Huertgen Forest Dear Sir: Captain Sullivan’s article in the May-June 2002 issue of ARMOR on Huertgen Forest brought back many unhappy memories for me.

At that time, I had just turned 20 and was a member of CCR of the 5th Armored Division, which was the first U.S. unit to breach the Siegfried Line at the Our River, between Luxemburg and Wallendorf, Germany, between the 15th and 25th of September, 1944. This is where I earned a Purple Heart from a shrapnel wound.

In Huertgen, CCR was given the mission to attack, seize, and hold the towns of Huertgen and Kleinhau, then Brandenburg and Bergstein. CCR lead elements consisted of: 10th Tank Battalion, minus B Company and plus A and C Companies from 47th Armored Infantry Battalion, plus Company C, 628 Tank Destroyer Battalion; and 47th Armored Infantry Battalion plus B Company, 10th Tank Battalion, plus 1 platoon, Company C, 22d Armored Engineer Battalion, minus the A and C Companies from above.

The weather was miserable with rain, sleet, snow, and freezing cold, causing many non-operational casualties such as trench foot and pneumonia. The roads went from bad to worse, and tracks either slipped off the side, hit a mine, or were hit by enemy direct or indirect fire.

The attack started on 29 November 1944, and from CCR’s after action report at the end of the day on 6 December 1944, the married 10th Tank Battalion Task Force had 10 operational tanks, 70 infantrymen and 1 tank destroyer. CCR achieved its objective, but at a big cost. So much for armor in Huertgen Forest!

I personally was a crewman on a tank de-stoyer of Company “C,” 628 TD Battalion and was one of the lucky ones, since we only were disabled after hitting a mine. When we were relieved, I went to a hospital for 10 days with trench foot. When I was released, I went back to my company, which had been reconstituted and was attached to a parachute regiment of the 82d Airborne Division on the north side of the Bulge. After the Bulge, we reverted to CCR control and ended up on the Elbe River, the closest U.S. unit to Berlin. There we were stopped because of the Yalta Agreement. Armor proved to be highly effective in winning World War II, despite the problems encountered in the Huertgen Forest. CCR received a Presidential Unit Citation for the Huertgen Forest action and a French Croix de Guerre for action at Walendorf, Germany. I am proud to have been a member of CCR, 5th Armored Division, and a small of our country’s proud military history. ROBERT W. HERMAN

LTC, Armor, Ret.

Folsom, CA

ARMOR — September-October 2002 49