The Adventures of a Liaison Officer at the NTC

FM 71-2 describes the duties of a liaison officer as follows, Liaison officers (LO or LNO) are commissioned and noncommissioned officers who represent their commander at other headquarters. Through personal contact, they promote cooperation and coordination, and facilitate the exchange of information. LOs are tasked with general coordination instructions in the task force SOP and with specific coordination instructions each time they are dispatched to another headquarters. Their role as task force commander representative requires LOs to know all task force plans and dispositions. LOs ensure that critical information is passed between the task force headquarters and the headquarters to which they are dispatched. When operating in the main CP, LOs are supervised by the shift OIC. This was the guidance I received in May of 1999. I had recently finished a stint as a company executive officer in Charlie Company (Cobras) 1-64 Armor at Fort Stewart, Georgia, and was told I would finish my time in the unit in the S3 shop before leaving for the Captain’s Career Course. The S3 was deployed, and his assistant (CPT Dan Peck) told me I was going to be the LNO, and that there was not a lot of information on what an LNO does, but that I could look in FM 71-2 for some guidance. After reading the above guidance, the crusty master gunner said, “the LNO is a Lieutenant with Nothing to Offer.”

Non-deterred, I searched for more information. In FM 100-5, I found my answer, “The Army provides specialized training (for example, language) to liaison officers.” Now I was getting excited; after all, I was going to language school. A year and a half later, as I sat in the three shop with the Ironhorse Brigade in the 1st Cav, I realized that I should have written down everything I learned as an LNO, and captured it for future LNOs. That way, the next time I am at NTC executing my duties in the brigade CP, the LNOs for the battalions will have some TTPs to work with.

The first question you need to discuss prior to an NTC rotation is, who should be your LNO? Some might say the LNO should be a newly assigned captain; but for several reasons, I believe that a senior first lieutenant would be preferable. A senior first lieutenant — one who’s been an XO or on staff for awhile — knows just about everyone in the brigade. He knows who he can trust, who he can’t, and who the “go-to” guys in the units are. While the newly assigned captain might have more book knowledge, he probably won’t have the contacts that the senior lieutenant has developed. Instead, let the new captain wow the staff with his OPORD skills, battle captain prowess, and CAS3isms.

Just as with any task in the Army, you cannot just show up at the NTC and expect to be a great LNO. The skills you will learn during your train-up will serve you well. During this train-up, you will quickly learn what equipment you will need. I could probably write an entire article on what equipment you will need as the LNO; the next couple of paragraphs are just a synopsis. Wheels – The first thing you’ve got to have as the LNO is a set of wheels — your own set of wheels. One thing you will quickly learn is that the LNO is not an MTOE position that comes with driver, vehicle, weapon, etc. You have to scrounge. During our NTC train-up, I shared a HMMWV with the OPS SGM. This worked out great until the OPS SGM went to get chow. While he was gone, the brigade called saying there was a FRAGO to pick up. Since the 1/3-2/3 rule requires you to get information to and from higher in a timely manner, you’ll need a set of wheels! If that means you commandeer the OPS SGM’s HMMWV, leaving the HHC 1SG to deliver chow to the TOC, then so be it. In my case, I failed to learn this rule. I let the master gunner take back LOGPAC the second night in the box, but he got lost, the OPS SGM’s HMMWV broke down, and a FRAGO, which drastically changed the mission, was not picked up. From about 1700 ’til 2300, the FRAGO sat in the TOC, waiting for someone to get it. Field grades, for some reason, don’t like to loan lieutenants their wheels, but it doesn’t hurt to ask. The bottom-line is, keep your own wheels. At NTC, you can request to draw an extra HMMWV; just work it out with your S4 ahead of time.

Equipment – As LNO, you will need a pack full of good staff officer equipment. You will need: acetate, pens, computer disks, folders, zip-lock bags for waterproofing orders, and 100 mph tape, to name a few. Twice, the diazo machine broke during our rotation, once at brigade and once at battalion. When this happens at brigade, you can either wait until someone makes you a copy of the graphics, or spring into action, copy your own (neatly), and run it back to your unit. The brigade will normally put in the timeline when sub-unit graphics are due, so that the brigade can produce consolidated graphics. If your diazo breaks, take out the markers and start copying. Here’s another TTP: if your diazo breaks, and you are in good with the copy boys at brigade, run a copy up there and use their machine for your battalion. You will be a hero. You’ll also need a compass (the TOC only had one GPS), map, weapon, etc.

Commo – Along with some wheels, you need some way to talk. At home station, it may be difficult to find an extra radio, but at NTC you can draw one. This is important, so you can relay information to the TOC. Also, get on the SIGO, and make sure the DNVT or MSRT (I don’t know the difference, it’s a phone) in the TOC works. The one at brigade will work, trust me. This is a quick way to relay information back and forth, without actually driving all the way back to your TOC, to simply pass on the timeline or an answer to an RFI (Request for Information). If you can scrounge an OE 254, and a couple of poles, you can also quickly throw that up, to help improve your range, which can be a challenge at NTC given some of the distances. Driver – If your TOC is short on personnel, your unit may not want to give you a full-time driver. They might simply give you one as needed, and put him to work as RTO the rest of the time. This is hogwash. You need a full-time driver, who can do maintenance on his own, knows how to copy graphics, and has excellent night driving skills. My old driver was the best. SPC Hill kept everything tight, and often spent every night driving back and forth from the brigade headquarters. If he had to pull RTO all day, he would have been a safety hazard for all the night driving we did. Let him sleep, make him pull maintenance, and you will be all right.

With the basics established, I will now cover some of the duties and some of the TTPs I learned concerning mission analysis. As the LNO, your home must be the brigade or higher headquarters. This is where you will develop a rapport with the planners, and pick up tidbits of information, which will help your unit’s planners. Our sister battalion used their LNO as a battle captain and TOC OIC. This worked great, until he got lost going to brigade one night. The reason he got lost was that he was so strung out from doing everything else, that he had not realized the brigade TOC had jumped. Also, by remaining at brigade, you can get what I call a “bootleg” copy of orders. The planner for the brigade would often give me copies on disk of the OPORDs, and FRAGOs before their approval, and I would run it back to our battalion planner. That way, he could begin writing our own order and save valuable time. Once the order was approved, I would then run the “real” copy down, and the battalion staff could begin the mission analysis, most of which was hastily done with the “bootleg” copy. You also should be at brigade to participate in their mission analysis and wargame, and speak on behalf of your battalion if asked for information. You must also learn to read personalities and know when to quit annoying everyone. There will be times when the planners need some quiet time to write the order, without some lieutenant bothering them.

Another thing you will need as the LNO is information. Every time you leave a TOC, write down every bit of information you might need to know. Every time I set foot in the brigade TOC, the battle captain would ask, “Hey 1-64, where are all your scouts at?” Every time I left my TOC, I had a standard list of information I would write down. These were: slant and location of all our companies, location of each scout section, our battalion timeline, copies of our latest orders and graphics, and any RFIs that our staff needed answered. You also will need a good idea of your battalion’s scheme of maneuver, because you will probably be asked by the brigade 3 or commander. Not a time to start tap-dancing. Likewise, when you leave brigade, you will need to be armed with the latest orders, graphics, timeline, answers to RFIs, and any guidance that your unit will need. The first thing you will be asked upon arrival at your unit is, “What time is the rehearsal?” You must know. Sometimes your unit will ask, “What are they smoking at brigade?” This is the time for you to share the brigade’s logic for the tasks they assigned your unit. You understand the brigade’s logic, because you sat in on the wargame. Timely information is the most important thing you provide as an LNO. Along with providing information, you are also the link between the slice elements and their higher headquarters. In the brigade TOC, you will find combat engineer, ADA, fire support, and other assets. These folks write orders, but often have no way of getting them to their subordinate units that are attached to maneuver battalions. Every time I left the brigade TOC, I would simply stop by each cell, and ask if they had anything for the FSO, engineer, or ADA platoon leader. They normally will have an order, or a copy of their annex to give you far in advance of the issuing of the actual brigade order. This will help your attachments out immensely. You will normally get engineer, A2C2, and fire support graphics to pass along to your attachments as well.

This works both ways, because you will need to run your attachment’s orders/graphics back up to their higher HQ as well. Too many times after a battle at the NTC, I would go into the TOC and find unit orders and graphics that were never picked up. It is not only a waste of time and effort to copy these orders, but important information that could synchronize a battle could be missed and lives could be lost. The final area I want to discuss is the personality of the LNO, what FM 71-2 calls the “human dimension” of combat power. You have to be outgoing and capable of finding who to go to. You must be a diligent listener, and be able to tell what is important and what is not. You must have the ability to know what your commander would say, if the brigade commander asks you a question. You have to be able to scrounge parts, POL, Class I, and anything else you might need. You have to be independent. There is no wingman to follow to the BDE CP, through Indian country, at night, in the cold, as you find out that the CP jumped since the last time you were there. (Hint: use your PVS-7s, and look for all the lights. I always wondered how the OPFOR found us.)

In closing, when I was given the job of LNO, I was not thrilled. I thought I’d get some sexy job like the mortars or scouts. However, the information I learned as the LNO thoroughly prepared me for the Captain’s Career Course and for my next job as a brigade assistant S3. Although I lost a lot of sleep, was miserably cold, and didn’t get to fight the OPFOR like when I was a platoon leader, I learned more as the LNO and got to watch some fine senior officers at work.

On the future battlefield, orders may be passed by leveraging technology over a tactical internet. However, you will never be able to replace that “human dimension” that an LNO provides. A tactical internet will never be able to answer those questions like, “What’s brigade saying about us,” or “How’s MAJ So-and-so holding up,” or “What are they smoking at brigade?” So do your job well, young LNO. Others are depending on the timely distribution of your information. As one old friend used to say, “Getting the battalions a 70 percent solution on time is better than giving them the 90 percent solution too late.”

I’m still waiting; however, on the language school slot.

CPT Clinton Alexander is a 1996 Distinguished Military Graduate from the Citadel. He was a tank platoon leader in Charlie Company, 1-64 Armor at Fort Stewart, Ga. and served as executive officer of C/1-64, and then as the LNO/assistant S3 in 1-64 AR. After leaving Fort Stewart, he attended the Armor Captain’s Career Course, followed by CAS3 at Fort Leavenworth. He returned to Fort Knox to attend the Cavalry Leaders Course and the M1A2 Tank Commander Certification Course. Currently, he is assigned to the 1st Cavalry Division, where he serves as an assistant S3 in 1st Brigade (Ironhorse). into service. The T-90S is only a slightly improved T-72BM (renamed for overseas sales after the disastrous performance of the T-72 in Iraq, and a desire to disassociate the much different T-72B from the T-72s and T-72M/M1 tanks destroyed by the Coalition), and not a quantum leap forward. “Black Eagle” is also of a similar concept — still optimized for sweeping tank battles in Europe, not infantry support in the mountains. The much ballyhooed “T-95” has been promised to appear at two arms shows but is still missing, so the jury remains out on what it brings to the problem of city combat. For those readers who also read Russian, there are two good books which cover much of the change in Russian thinking since 1992 and the whys behind it. They are Russia (USSR) in Local Wars and Regional Conflicts During the Second Half of the 20th Century and The History of Russian Military Strategy, both edited by Major General Vladimir A. Zolotarev, Academic of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences and head of the Military History Institute (IVI). They are published by “Kuchkovo Polye” Publishing Company, Moscow, and are available from East View Publications for $39.95 each plus $6.50 shipping and handling. Les Grau and I have agreed to translate them, as all U. S. Army officers need to read these two excellent omnibus works on the past and present of the Russian Army, but thus far we have not received either permission from the Russians or found a publisher. CPT Geibel means well, but too often the “shotgun” presentation of anecdotes without context can cause serious problems to become myths. Once the myths are embedded in commanders’ minds, it is very hard to chase them out with the truth. STEPHEN L. “COOKIE” SEWELL

CW2 (Ret.), AUS Aberdeen, Md.

CPT Geibel Responds

Fellow ARMOR readers: I'll keep this short. I congratulate Stephen Sewell on stepping up to the plate and sharing his information with ARMOR’s readers. While I acknowledge Sewell’s years of experience and his current access to information, I stand by every word I wrote. My sources “are what they are” — the open-source words of Russian tankers and journalists, as printed. I presented diverse accounts to the ARMOR community in a logical, readable manner.... “Cookie” misinterpreted some items, so I’ll address his problems in sequence. * All of the “anecdotes on failings” are about Chechnya-2. Don’t know where one could think they apply to Chechnya-1. * On dismantling different kinds of ERA blocks — never underestimate criminal intent. In Footnote 2, third paragraph, I direct you to the verb “may be” — the issue is pilferage, which is NOT technology-specific. “Cookie” and I could argue for hours whether an ingenious, thirsty Russian tanker could remove the explosives from a Kontakt-5 block and sell it on the black market, but I’ve got $20.00 that says Ivan could. * As for the strength of units deployed during Chechnya-2, that’s why I gave readers tank counts — anyone slightly familiar with Russian TO&E will take one look at them and see the units aren’t up to strength. Why be verbose and insult readers’ intelligence? * Regarding my ‘glossing over Command Detonated Mines,’ the issue was addressed earlier. (See ARMOR, Nov-Dec 2000, Page 24, 1st column, last paragraph, and Page 26, 1st column, last paragraph.) “Cookie’s” misinterpretations aside, the bottom line is that Russia’s armor fleet is in a place where we, as American armor/cavalry crewmen, do not want to be. Space in ARMOR magazine is at a premium, so if “Cookie” Sewell — or others — wish to discuss this topic further, they can always feel free to contact me at ACARLG@AOL. COM. ADAM GEIBEL

Some Cavalry Problems Stem from 1986 Reorganization

Dear Sir: I wish to comment on CPT Benson’s article, “The Cavalry Paradigm,” in the July-August issue. The author has done a fair crosswalk and identified various disconnects, but I suggest an adjustment of focus is needed to more clearly identify the problems and to assign responsibility for correction. The bottom line is that Armor Center and TRADOC need to reestablish the Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization (DOES), but more on that at the end.

DOCTRINE. Cavalry doctrine is not broken. It is generally adequate as stated in FM 17-95. It addresses in broad terms the role of cavalry organizations. Doctrine is not intended to be all-inclusive, since that would be too voluminous and restrictive, stifling all initiative.

Economy of force is a role and not a mission. Nobody is ordered, “conduct an economy of force.” The mission order is something like “attack and seize” or “defend in sector,” etc. Cavalry organizations are suited for “economy of force” operations because they are already organized as highly mobile combined arms units. Instead of having to cross attach and task organize tank, infantry, and supporting units into an ad hoc company team or battalion task force, the brigade or division commander can simply assign a complicated mission to his organic cavalry squadron or troop.

The mission profile chart in FM 17-95, Fig. 1-4, is a guide. Cavalry missions can be assigned to tank and infantry units. If needed, supporting units like military police, engineers, chemical, and any other unit that can move, communicate, and shoot can be pressed into service. The lack of cavalry units does not excuse the commander from assigning recon and security missions. Conversely, tank, aviation scouts, and other platoons and companies need not be included in detailed mission profiles since they are already collectively included within their parent cavalry troops, squadrons, and regiments. When reinforcing cavalry units, regular tank and infantry units are not retrained and reorganized, but are employed in their existing roles in support of the cavalry’s mission. The term “reconnaissance in force” is significant in that it denotes at least a battalion-size operation (FM 17-95, Chapter 3, Section V). The participating squadrons and troops are actually conducting zone recon and/or movement to contact, while the platoons are likely conducting travelling and bounding overwatch or fire and maneuver. FM 17-95, Chapter 5, is very clear on deliberate and hasty attacks. The former is generally avoided but the latter is performed often to disrupt the enemy and seize the initiative. It is a mistake to suggest that cavalry must avoid attacking. Instead, cavalry must avoid becoming decisively engaged and losing its ability to maneuver. If there is disagreement between FM 17-95 and the cavalry MTP and ARTEP manuals, the latter need to be corrected (the responsible agency is the Directorate of Training and Doctrine Development). The FM is the primary document on which the others are based, and not the other way around. EQUIPMENT. The author hits the nail on the head concerning a dedicated pure recon vehicle. No such system has ever existed, nor is one likely in the future. The role of cavalry is far too diverse, and combined arms operations are the norm. TRAINING. Here, the author misses the mark. Company and field grade officers are, generally, not the problem. If the divisional cavalry squadron is poorly trained and misused, it is the fault of the division commander. If brigade commanders misuse divisional cavalry troops OPCONed to them, it is the division commander’s responsibility to correct them. If brigade recon troops are assigned inappropriate tasks, it is the brigade commander’s fault. Establishing an O-6 “Chief of Cavalry” at Fort Knox to tell brigade and division commanders that they are making mistakes in the field will do nothing. Instead, Armor Center, TRADOC, and FORSCOM need to examine “Leader Development” for senior leaders. Professional development does not end once stars are pinned on.

However, I must back up and emphasize that the author’s concerns are anecdotal and I have no way of judging their true validity and scope. Are these really Army-wide problems, or just one or two training exercises that went a bit wrong? Well, that sort of issue used to be covered at each proponent school by the Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization (DOES). The true purpose LETTERS from Page 4 of DOES was to keep an eye on the state of the branch as it operates in the field. Unfortunately, under TRADOC’s “School Model –86” reorganization, DOES was denigrated to little more than monitoring of institutional training and was subsequently disbanded altogether in the early 1990s. With that decision, TRADOC proponent schools severed their linkage with the field and have never been adequately resourced to stay in touch. Bringing back DOES should be the highest priority for all TRADOC proponent centers. Until then, nobody will understand the scope of the problems, let alone develop timely solutions.

LTC, AR, USAR (Ret.)

Armor Junior Officer Says He’s Right Where He Wants to Be

Dear Sir: Having just read LTC Jim Pasquarette’s article, “Some Thoughts for Junior Officers on Making a Career Decision,” I must say that I agree with everything he wrote with one exception. I do not believe that LTC Pasquarette’s reasons for making the Army a career ‘sound ridiculous to the average junior officer’ at all. Having been recently commissioned a 2LT in Armor and still waiting to start OBC, I am just about the most junior of any officer out there. There is no other career in the world that I would rather have than serving in the Army, and no other branch in which to serve than Armor. LTC Pasquarette’swords really hit home with me as I hope they did with my fellow junior officers.

Tank-busting Is Only a Part Of Armor’s Battlefield Mission

Dear Sir: The letter from Mr. Harry Roach in the Jul-Aug ’01 issue of ARMOR posed the interesting question, “Has the tank reached the apogee of its historical cycle?” It’s very possible that future battlefield technology may lead to a radical evolution in armor branch in the 21st century, as Mr. Roach suggests. But he veers wide of the mark in his illogical conclusion to the story of how the railroad industry failed: because its executives thought they were in the railroad business and failed to recognize they were really in the transportation business. Harry Roach concludes that force developers must consider the evolution of armor in the sole context of being in the “tank-busting business.”

This statement reveals a grave miscompre-hension of the role of armor on the modern battlefield. The role of armor is shock, firepower, and mobility. Any peasant with an anti-tank rocket can “bust” a tank, but only armor units give the battlefield commander the decisive firepower and maneuver capability offered by today’s tanks. The tank’s futuristic replacement may indeed be a very different piece of equipment: perhaps a hybrid descendent of the Abrams tank and the Apache helicopter, or a flying saucer with a ray gun, or the armored suits of Robert Heinlein’s Starship Troopers. But whatever the Army develops won’t come from thinking of armor branch as being in the “tank-busting business.”

Armor will still be in the business of providing shock, firepower, and mobility on any future battlefield.

MAJ, MI, USAR, (Ret.)

Where Did All the Horses Go When the Horse Cavalry Disbanded?

I wish to provide some information related to the query by Gordon Douglas (Page 49, July-August edition): “What happened to all the horses, stud farms, and saddles/bridles/ harness?”

My father, a lifelong horseman, has told a story over the years of attending an auction at the Cavalry Remount Station in Front Royal, Va., near Washington, D. C. (He describes the Remount Station as a large complex of barns, paddocks, and pastures. I expect by this time it is covered with town houses.)

The sale occurred sometime in 1941. Dad remembers that horses were openly offered for sale to all bidders, but couldn’t remember if they were sold individually or in lots. He describes the horses being sold as “heavy,” “medium,” and “light,” making a clear distinction between the heaviest draft animals, lighter artillery teams, and cavalry horses. It is not clear how successful these horses were as riding and plow horses. Dad said they were all “trained to charge” and once they got their head, they would “run away” and “couldn’t be stopped.” Dad’s opinion is that these “civilianized” horses were pretty much “used up” within less than a dozen years, either being worn out on the many farms still using real “horse power” or as dog meat.

Based on the quantity of McClellan saddles and other tack in evidence in museums, antique shows, farm auctions, and in the hands of collectors, it is a reasonable assumption that this equipment was also auctioned off when the horse cavalry was dis-established. While Dad has no direct memory of how the equipment was disposed, we have certainly owned and used a lot it over the years. While growing up in then-rural Maryland, I recall that almost every farm seemed to have at least one McClellan saddle hanging in a barn serving as a foundation for a bird nest. Dad once acquired about 300 lbs. of old tack with a $.25 auction bid — enough to fill the trunk of his car. Digging through this treasure, my brother and I were thrilled to discover bridles, bits, and other tack clearly marked “U. S.” To this day, I still own a McClellan saddle and a bridle, proudly displayed in my office while on active duty. There are also stories heard over the years that the Army burned large amounts of cavalry equipment just to get rid of it. This would be consistent with our dumping of massive amounts of equipment into the ocean at the end of WWII and burying every manner of equipment as we departed Vietnam. “Excess,” it seems, will always be with us.

I hope that these tidbits of information are of interest to all cavalrymen and serve to document details of the end of the horse cavalry era now fast fading from memory. Garry Owen!

COL, USA (Ret.)

Littlestown, Pa.

Could Tracked Howitzers Fulfill a Dual Purpose Role?

I would like to put in a suggestion supporting the M113 APC as the proper vehicle for the Interim Armored Vehicle (IAV) program. It exists in large numbers. It has excellent logistics support and a wealth of experience on conversions. Experience with fiscal realities should indicate how the LAV III will be funded: remember the M8 Armored Gun System.

To get some kinetic energy weapons into service, one could use some of the many M109 self-propelled howitzer (SPH) vehicles. [We could] replace the existing 155mm howitzer with a M68 105mm tank gun, retaining the howitzer’s elevation limits and add tank gunner/night vision gear while retaining the artillery fire control equipment. This dual-purpose antitank/artillery vehicle is “portable” enough to get to the action, along with the M113s, in C-130s. Ammo for 105mm guns is readily available worldwide. Use 105mm howitzer HE shells for artillery purposes. The Navy “trick” of using reduced propellant charges will allow the gun to be used as a “howitzer” with greatly-reduced barrel wear. Armor is comparable to the M113, and can be upgraded to M113A3 level as needed. Add grab rails topside to allow troops to ride the vehicle — providing more mobility for airborne troops who would otherwise be on foot.

This proposed conversion is no panacea, but it may be available relatively soon and at much lower cost than an entirely new vehicle. My viewpoint on such conversions was learned as a naval architect in a Navy yard where conversions allow one to continually upgrade existing vessels to gain increased capabilities.

GORDON J. DOUGLAS JR.

Fullerton, Calif.