Employing the Bradley Stinger Platoon in Support of Task Force Operations

How should a Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicle (BSFV) platoon fight when placed in direct support of task force/ squadron operations? Few commanders understand the new benefits and tactics BSFV platoons bring to support TF operations. For many years, task forces and squadrons fought with self-propelled or towed Vulcans. Because of logistical challenges, these systems were split into sections and attached to individual CO/TMs. To the detriment of proper air defense employment, this simplified the Vulcan section’s scheme of maneuver, allowing it to simply integrate into the CO/TMs orders process, rehearsals, casevac plan, etc. While this plan briefed very well, it presented two major problems. First, both towed and self-propelled Vulcans failed to keep up with the faster Bradleys and tanks. Second, the platoon leader lost his ability to maneuver and emplace his teams at critical points on the battlefield. The combination of these two factors meant that air defense weapon systems were unable to mass combat power at critical times and defeat the enemy air threat. Now, with the advent of the BSFV, TFs can overcome these limitations. The BSFV is a fully functional IFV with the addition of a two-man Stinger crew. The platoon is also equipped with an M977 for missile/ammunition resupply and an M113 for casevac and logistical missions. The BSFV platoon enables air defense to share the same speed and flexibility as its combined arms brethren. The challenge is educating both commanders and BSFV platoon leaders on the BSFV’s capabilities and tactics in order to preclude commanders from employing their BSFVs using the outdated employment tactics of yesterday’s Vulcans. A BSFV platoon is designed to provide AD for the entire task force, not just one or two CO/TMs. The platoon leader must take the commander’s air defense priorities and build an air defense design that includes early engagement, weighted coverage, defense in depth, and balance of fires. To provide this type of protection, the platoon leader must have the flexibility to maneuver all of his fire units. The old habits and SOPs of the Vulcan days set the precedent for S3s and commanders to task-organize the Vulcan sections with CO/TMs. This method of task organization is outdated and must be revised for the BSFV. The platoon leader must retain command and control. He cannot effectively command and control from the inside of a TF TOC. He is issued his own M2A2 to place himself forward on the battlefield, where he can best influence the fight. He must be integrated into every step of the decision-making process in order to provide the appropriate type employment as the battlefield framework changes and develops. He is a key player and must brief his air defense design to the CO/TM commanders and task force commander. In each phase, everyone must understand the air order of battle and how air defense coverage must maneuver, adjust, and weight coverage to defeat the current threat. He briefs this AD design at the task force rehearsal. The platoon leader must conduct extensive platoon-level operations orders and rehearsals, to include mounted rehearsals. The platoon must understand the task force scheme of maneuver, air defense design, and commander’s intent. With respect to logistical self-sufficiency, the platoon’s MTOE is equipped to support the platoon without being ‘attached’ to a CO/TM. The BSFV platoon sergeant supports his platoon in the same manner a first sergeant supports his unit. He must attend all CSS rehearsals. His resupply truck must be integrated into the trains, and during a battle, the platoon sergeant retains control of his resupply truck to expedite resupply. He coordinates Class III and casevac support during the CSS rehearsal. The platoon also utilizes the task force UMCP. Under this new configuration, the platoon has the flexibility to mass at critical points on the battlefield. Fire units no longer follow an assigned CO/TM through the battlefield. This does not negate the ability of the commander to place a section with a CO/TM (if METT- T driven), but this is the exception, not the rule. The air order of battle and hostile air threat changes throughout the squadron’s battle space, requiring the platoon leader to constantly maneuver and readjust his coverage. The platoon leader is focused on denying the most likely hostile air avenues of approach (AAA). This is where he will earn his money, because with only four firing units available, he is forced to “vote” where to emplace his assets. The Bradley Stinger platoon leader can’t effectively command from a distant TOC. He needs to be forward on the battlefield to best influence the fight, author argues. All photos by Greg Stewart ARMOR — September-October 1999 37 learned the important lesson of tracking everything not only by quantity, but lot number as well. The distances traveled during LOGPAC made it critical that the LOGSTATs from the companies were correct and the packages built at the BSA contained everything listed on them. In the field at home station, the BSA or field trains were never very far from the assembly areas. If a LOGPAC was missing something, I could always go back and get it. It is sad to say, but in my experience (prior to Kuwait) there was never any real emphasis put on logistics. When we went to the field at home station, the focus rested solely on maneuver; we never trained our logistic tail. In Kuwait, however, it was apparent that the logistic tail had the very real probability of “wagging the dog.” Our logistic plan was based on reaction instead of anticipation and it was not going to work in our current AO. 1SGs who were not used to submitting a complete and correct LOGSTAT found themselves wanting for essential items. It was no longer possible for me to just turn around and go back to the field trains. This aspect of the rotation taught me, and a few others I believe, how important a well-thought out logistical plan is. Logistics is based on anticipation and planning. Reacting to events as they arise will not only put undue stress on yourself and your soldiers, but it will also have a disastrous effect on the morale and welfare of the soldiers you are supporting. These are a few of the lessons learned from my experience as a support platoon leader. I’ve omitted some and covered others in a perfunctory manner, but it runs the gamut from wide-eyed ignorance to a successful overseas deployment. Being the support platoon leader is a fantastic job because you do your job every day. Whether in garrison or in the field, every day you are supplying the food, fuel, and ammunition that allows the battalion to function. Everyone is different and obviously what worked for me may not work for you. However, this piece should offer the novice support platoon leader the opportunity to learn from some of my experiences (and mistakes). Good luck!

CPT John D. Fio Rito is a 1994 graduate of the United States Military Academy. He has served as an M1A1 and an M1A2 tank platoon leader, support platoon leader, tank company executive officer and S3 Air, all in 3-8 Cav at Ft. Hood. He is currently assigned to ODCSOPS, 7th Army, USAREUR. CPT Fio Rito is a graduate of the Armor Officer Basic Course and the Engineer Officer Advanced Course.

38 ARMOR — September-October 1999

From Warrior to Logistician, continued from Page 25

The bottom line is that the platoon is now focused on shutting down the air avenues of approach threatening the task force, not AAAs threatening an assigned

CO/TM.

In order for the platoon leader to maneuver his BSFV platoon, specific and rehearsed movement criteria are established in order to maximize AD coverage and eliminate fratricide. It is essential that every member of the platoon understands the commander’s intent and air order of battle to guarantee fluid execution in the absence of orders and/or the loss of communication. A well rehearsed chain of command is essential. These tactics have proven themselves lethal at National Training Center Rotations 98-01 and 99-01 and Joint Readiness Training Center Rotations 98-09 and 99-02. At the NTC, BSFV sections traveling 500-1000 meters behind and to the flanks of a CO/TM targeted by air were not only successful in defeating the air threat, they were credited with destroying numerous opposition forces targeting the TF flanks. Not tying the BSFV sections to the CO/TMs allowed the BSFVs to become extremely survivable. Individual teams were not targeted by the OPFOR’s chemical strikes, FASCAM minefields, etc. Situational awareness was achieved with a non-stop flow of information monitored and passed from the TF command net down to individual teams. Front line traces, chemical strikes, FASCAMs, enemy TRPs, enemy situation, etc., were annotated on squad and team graphics, painting a detailed picture of the battlefield. Teams cross-leveled information via the platoon net and the platoon leader passed critical information back up to the TF. In summary, a BSFV platoon is a battlefield operating system that must have the freedom to be employed throughout the entire battlefield framework. This requires intense synchronization with the other operating systems, which cannot occur if the BSFV platoon is attached/OPCON to a CO/TM maneuver element. CPT Douglas J. Waddingham, outgoing commander of ADA Battery, 1/3 ACR, earned a BA in Education from Slippery Rock University. His military education includes ADA Basic Course, Basic Airborne Course, Air and Ground Operations Course, and the ADA Advanced Course. Previous assignments includes Stinger platoon leader, Avenger platoon leader, Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicle platoon leader, executive officer, and brigade liaison officer, Ft. Stewart, Ga.; Officer Basic Course Mentor, Ft. Bliss, Texas.