Force Protection for Checkpoint Operations

Checkpoints are used to control movement of vehicles, personnel, or materiel along a specified route; and are classified as deliberate or hasty. They help prevent trafficking of contraband items, ensure proper use of routes by both civilian and military traffic, prevent unauthorized access or infiltration of restricted or controlled areas by local civilians or military forces, maintain continuous monitoring of road movement, and serve as local security and observation outposts. This article will focus primarily on the issue of force protection — planning for and implementing force protection measures for both deliberate and hasty checkpoints. It will also address some of the tactics, techniques, and procedures utilized during checkpoint operations. The article is based on the experiences of Apache Troop, 1st Squadron, 1st U.S. Cavalry from 1 January 1996 to 17 October 1996 in Northeast Bosnia-Herzegovina. The soldiers of A Troop established seven deliberate checkpoints in a five month time period, all on major routes through the Zone of Separation. Force Protection Planning Force protection and checkpoint defense are primary concerns in a stability operations environment, and are mutually dependent. Force protection was a primary concern and the buzzword of Operation Joint Endeavor. Many specific measures were taken to prevent the unnecessary loss of manpower — as outlined in the tactics, techniques, and procedures implemented and utilized for vehicular convoys, base camp protection, and checkpoint operations. Checkpoint force protection measures (the focus of this article) included the use of improved materials for cover and concealment of soldiers and checkpoint structures, obstacle and barrier plans, perimeter lighting, and operational procedures (to include defense contingency plans). Force protection planning for checkpoint operations requires in-depth troop leading procedures (TLPs) conducted at the platoon level. During mission analysis, it is important to focus on three specific areas — the Threat, the terrain, and the supporting assets needed during checkpoint operations. Each item influences checkpoint force protection planning and may influence the execution of operations. In a peacekeeping or peace-enforcing environment, the Threat is not always a visible, recognizable, or definable force. As the bombings in Beirut and Dhahran have both shown, invisible terrorists and factions dressed in civilian clothing, using guerrilla warfare tactics, pose a constant threat to our forces. During the planning phase, leaders must identify Threat avenues of approach (AAs) to the checkpoint (dismounted avenues of approach, possible sniper locations, and high speed vehicular AAs), and this vigilance must be continued by the soldiers manning a checkpoint. The Threat template incorporated with the checkpoint layout will assist in identifying threat AAs. The platoon leader, or checkpoint ground commander, must continually analyze, and if necessary, revise his threat IPB and make corrections to his CP defense plan. This becomes very important, especially if the checkpoint is located in a built-up area or if the activities in the area surrounding the checkpoint become more active. An example of the latter was our CP A2, established in January 1996. By early April, “Market Arizona” began nearby with a couple of dozen peddlers. By July, it had evolved into a large market with over a dozen permanent structures and more than a hundred merchants. The checkpoint provided the blanket of security for free-market trading and enterprise for merchants of all ethnic backgrounds, but like any built-up area, it was always considered a potential threat platform. The old adage, “Terrain Dictates,” is often true in checkpoint operations. Defense of the checkpoint and force protection for your soldiers must be a primary concern — good IPB will assist in both areas. Terrain will also influence or dictate the size of your checkpoint, operational planning, the obstacle plan, and resupply operations. Deliberate checkpoints should not be located on restrictive terrain, for example, low ground with minimal fields of observation, on a curvy road, or in a built-up area. Easily defensible terrain will support more efficient operations; it will support your obstacle and defense plan, assist in resupply and relief-in-place operations, and provide the ability to establish adequate force protection. On the other hand, the intent of a hasty checkpoint is surprise. These locations should limit detection from long distances. When planning a hasty checkpoint, leaders should analyze terrain and other restrictions as to how they will affect your CP. Key terrain surrounding your checkpoint must be observable at all times and targeted with direct- and indirect-fire weapon systems. 20 ARMOR — September-October 1997 Force Protection for Checkpoint Operations by First Lieutenant Patrick R. Milligan Two Bradleys guard Checkpoint Apache 2 along Route Arizona in northeast Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Also consider how the checkpoint will receive its supply and other support. How will supporting indirect fires be utilized? How will civilian contractors service the checkpoint? How will this affect operations, and will their presence increase the threat? These are common questions which must be addressed and answered with solid solutions. Resupply and refueling at your checkpoint must be specified with a plan. In it, you must address how your resupply element will conduct operations. Consider the LOGPAC’s direction of travel to the checkpoint, access points to be used, number of vehicles in the resupply element, how the checkpoint will be defended with additional assets on site, arrival and departure times, assets needed to support the LOGPACs arrival, etc. The lack of a reliable resupply or refuel plan will hinder and disrupt checkpoint operations at the most inopportune times, creating confusion that degrades checkpoint security and force protection. Consider the supporting fires protecting the checkpoint and what assets are most appropriate — battalion or troop mortars, direct support 155mm, or attack helicopters? Where is this support located, and how long does it take to deliver fires? If fires are released, what type of round(s) will be fired to support the checkpoint [the most common fire plan would utilize illumination due to the effects of collateral damage on the civilian populace]? What organic weapons do you have that can deliver fires to deadspaces surrounding the checkpoint, and what types and quantities of round should you have on hand? All of these common and specific questions must have answers in the checkpoint defense plan. Plan fire support and air-ground coordination exercises and rehearsals on a regular basis; by doing so you will be able to accurately determine if they will be able to support you when it counts. By the time you get fires released, the “war” may well be over, thus the rehearsals will provide you insight to adjust your CP defense plan as needed. Utilize organic M203 grenade launchers to cover deadspace within short range of the checkpoint; again, illumination will be the most likely round utilized. It’s also important to coordinate with supporting civilian contractors. An exterminator team arriving at your checkpoint at 0200 in the morning will most likely create immediate suspicion and tension within the guard force. All checkpoint personnel must know who your contractors are (access rosters do work), their normal arrival times, and what they do. Civilian contractors or their vehicles are an easy mode of transport for terrorists or terrorist activity. Coordinating the arrival of civilian contractors and keeping your personnel informed will assist in checkpoint force protection and allow the supporting civilian elements to do their jobs. Without prior coordination, access to the checkpoint should be denied — the OIC and NCOIC must enforce this unwaveringly. Checkpoint layout and level of preparation will be heavily dependent on the threat, terrain, amount of traffic, and duration of operations. Restrictions such as road width, vegetation, and minefields will often affect or dictate the size and layout of your checkpoint. The sketch above depicts the layout and composition for a temporary checkpoint (the author’s platoon SOP). This CP was occupied and manned for 48 hours by two 12-man scout sections. Force Protection Implementation Force protection measures will change with changes of mission, transition to a different phase of the same mission, or changes to the threat condition (THREATCON). The tactical commander must be flexible enough to plan and implement upgrades or reductions in force protection as needed. For example; about 180 days into our deployment to Bosnia, the force protection level was downgraded, which resulted in a change to the uniform requirement and a change in checkpoint operations. We transitioned from a rigid 100-percent vehicle search tactic to a more random method that facilitated freedom of movement through the Zone of Separation (ZOS). Outlined below are the materials and TTPs utilized during checkpoint operations. The items are all available through normal Army supply channels, and will assist in establishing and operating an effective and defensible checkpoint. Barrier Materials and Employment Hesko bastions (see photo) filled with gravel or rock, with filled sandbags placed on top, provide cover and concealment approximately 5 feet high and 3 feet thick — a good base of force pro-ARMOR — September-October 1997 21 Concertina Wire Temporary Checkpoint Warning Triangles and CP Sign; Up to 300 m forward of CFV

Speed bump Concertina Wire & Barrels M3A2

CFV

Search Man Barrier Security Speed bump Generator Light set Vehicle Search Area Speed bump Barrels M3A2

CFV

QRF

Team Concertina Wire & Barrels M3A2

CFV

Barrier Security Search Man Warning Triangles and CP Sign; Up to 300 m forward of CFV “Civilian contractors or their vehicles are an easy mode of transport for terrorists or terrorist activity. Coordinating the arrival of civilian contractors and keeping your personnel informed will assist in checkpoint force protection...” Continued on Page 47

Checkpoint Operations (Continued from Page 21) tional force protection measure. Medical evacuation planning and execution is a critical task for checkpoint operations, and can often test leaders and soldiers alike. Detailed planning of medevac (ground or air) procedures for numerous situations, such as individual or vehicle mine injuries, must be addressed. CP medevac plans must be specific, detailed, and rehearsed on a regular basis. Medevac rehearsals at CP A2 were incorporated with CP alert exercises to ensure all personnel could execute their specified tasks, and someone else’s, if needed. Restrictions and obstacles near the CP must be recognized and dealt with – for example, clearing vegetation or removing debris to support a helicopter landing zone. If activity surrounding the CP is too heavy to execute ground medevac or land a helicopter, then soldiers must know how to aeromedevac a casualty by hoist. During medevac or emergency situations, it is natural for checkpoint personnel to become focused on the immediate activity; however, leaders must ensure security and force protection are maintained. Relief in place during checkpoint operations will not differ much from the same activity executed in the high intensity conflict (HIC) environment. Reliefs ideally should be conducted during periods of limited visibility and during periods of minimal activity near the checkpoint. A plan for relief must address specifically time, method, and sequence of relief; time of transfer of responsibility for the CP; actions on contact during relief; transfer of responsibility procedures; target handoff procedures; contingency plans for changes of mission, etc. Execution techniques of the relief will vary by unit, however, a RIP checklist will facilitate ease of transfer between units. During execution of the relief, normal CP operations must continue; A2 was unique in that it was large enough that the outgoing unit could reposition vehicles to alternate positions and still maintain assigned areas of surveillance as the relieving unit occupied primary vehicle fighting positions on the CP. RIP operations conducted on a regular basis between organic units can become very efficient, but leaders and soldiers alike should not take this for granted and downgrade security measures for speed of relief. The RIP checklist should specifically address the following: current “enemy situation” (factional military or police operations, civilian activity or disturbances, criminal activity, expected factional operations, etc.), changes to the CP defense plan (TRPs, indirect fire target numbers and locations, obstacles and barriers added or removed, etc.), changes in supporting units (fire support assets, civilian contracted elements, LOGPAC times or methods of resupply, etc.), changes to access rosters, updates on suspected criminals, etc. “Regardless of the mission, commanders must protect their forces at all times. They must be ready to counter activity that could bring harm to their units or jeopardize the mission.” (FM 100-5, Operations) In the low intensity conflict environment, peacekeeping missions will often include ambiguous situations which will require peacekeeping forces to deal with tense or violent situations without becoming participants — one of the keys to success must be the preventive measure called force protection. Force protection is more than wearing your Kevlar vest and full battle rattle, or traveling in a four-vehicle convoy; all are necessary measures taken by leaders at all levels to ensure that our soldiers are not unnecessarily injured or killed. In this environment, FP is a critical element of checkpoint operations and requires detailed planning and stringent execution. This article is not all-inclusive regarding checkpoint operations, nor is it intended to be a doctrinal revelation. It is, however, intended to assist the scout platoon leader in planning, and executing, checkpoint operations, specifically addressing the important element of force protection. It is increasingly likely that the United States Army will continue to conduct stability operations throughout the world for years to come, and no matter the region, country or situation, force protection will be a major issue for every level of command, all the way to the platoon leader. Bibliography FM 7-98 Operations in A Low Intensity Conflict, October 1992 FM 17-98 Scout Platoon, September 1994 FM 100-5 Operations, June 1993 FM 100-20 Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, December 1990 1st Squadron, 1st U.S. Cavalry TACSOP 48 ARMOR — September-October 1997 1LT Patrick R. Milligan previously served as M3A2 scout platoon leader of A Troop and assistant S3 with 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry in Germany and Bosnia. He received a Regular Army commission in May 1995 as a finance officer, but was detailed to Armor. He recently attended Finance Officer Branch Qualification Course and is currently assigned to HHD, 39th Finance Battalion in Hanau, Germany, where he is the detachment executive officer. An ROTC Green to Gold Scholarship Recipient (2 year scholarship), he is a Distinguished Military Graduate of Austin Peay State University, Clarksville, Tenn. His prior enlisted service as an 11B and 19D (5 years) includes air assault squad leader, 3-502 INF, 101st Airborne (Air Assault) Division; HHT, 2d Squadron, 2d ACR, during Operation Desert Shield/Storm; and A Co., 2/4 INF, Neu-Ulm Germany. He has attended Armor Officer Basic Course, Scout Platoon Leaders Course, Airborne, and Air Assault Schools.