The Green Tabbers of Force XXI

ROGUE in mind. The support of a very capable heavy force to the U. N. operation in Somalia is a very good example of the deployment capabilities of today’s M1A1-equipped heavy force.

MAJ, Armor Leavenworth, Kan.

Where Is the XO?

The article “M1A2 Tank Distribution” by Lawrence G. Vowels (March-April 1994) was very informative, but one essential item was missing from all the proposed distribution plans. Where is the tank company executive officer?

The author proposed three distribution alternatives based on a company-size organization: All tanks are M1A2; the company commander, platoon leaders, and platoon sergeants have M1A2s; only the company commander and platoon leaders have M1A2s. Again, where is the XO? Since at least the mid-80s, tank companies have gone to war using the “Fighting XO” concept, where the XO has the same type of combat vehicle as the rest of the company. Even the infantry have adopted this tried and proven organization for their M2 Bradley companies.

The XO traditionally operates on the TF command net and monitors the company command net, collecting and forwarding reports and coordinating with other units within the TF. Operating in this manner effectively frees the company commander to fight his company. Since the XO is also the second in command, he must also be prepared to take command if the company commander is disabled or is too involved with his own survival to control the company. He must have a tank, just like his commander.

From what I have read, the M1A2 is a fantastic fighting machine that will allow our armored forces to continue to dominate the battlefield of the future. I fully agree with the author’s conclusion that M1A2-pure tank companies are the correct answer to the fielding of this system, but no matter how sophisticated the tank’s electronics package is, it cannot replace the company executive officer. The last thing the commander needs is to be so wrapped up with his vehicle and passing information that he can’t fight the company’s battle. JOHN D. KEITH

CPT, Armor 2-64 Armor Schweinfurt, Germany More Reaction to the “CAT Tank” Dear Sir: After reading “Armor in the 21st Century” by MAJ Spurgeon and Mr. Crist (Jan-Feb 94), and the two letters by David Nilsen and “Beau” Bergeron in the May-June 1994 issue of ARMOR, which commented on the “21st Century” article, I would like to make some statements of my own. I’ve been serving on M-48s and M-60s with my current battalion for nearly 16 years now, with over two years of command time with one of its tank companies. As an avid ARMOR magazine reader for basically the same number of years, I discovered an earlier article (Mar-Apr 1987 ARMOR) concerning the same topic as in “Armor in the 21st Century” namely, the combined arms tank (CAT), by the same authors, albeit, a captain instead of a major at that time. By reading both stories, I found that MAJ Spurgeon and Mr. Crist are NOT against tanks (being obsoleted by PGMs) as “Beau” Bergeron observed in his letter; the authors are against the main battle tanks, as compared to a combined arms tank. CPT RICHARD G. GEHRMANN

Cdr, C Co, 1-149 Armor Boulder Creek, Calif.

War Isn’t Value-Neutral Dear Sir: In the review of Panzerheld by Dr. Gregory T. Jones (Books, March-April 1994), SFC John T. Broom states that some members of the SS, “misguided though they might have been, were truly the best of men and soldiers.” I do not challenge the military competence and energy of these units, or of the value of study of their operations, but it seems judicious to ponder the phrase “best of men” when applied to the Nazi military elite.

After half a century, we have apparently reached a time wherein we cut more slack for the enemies of our fathers than careful reading of the record warrants. The SS were political soldiers and, like the NKVD, inoculated with a racial and pseudo-religious virus antithetical to the foundations of Western culture. It is wrong to suggest that, motivated by such hatreds and perversions, that they were “innocent as any American unit.” War is, of course, not a tea party, and to expect men to intimidate, destroy, and kill (and to suffer the same) while maintaining the disposition of a Saint Augustine is unreasonable. But to add to natural human weaknesses the philosophies of the SS is to guarantee the sorts of barbarism well associated with those units and is not an approach calculated to produce the best of men.

The development of military expertise requires and rewards the study of the past without distortion or deletion. Apologists for the SS are no less guilty of omissions and evasions than are apologists for the system of the USSR. In both cases, the political, ethical, and moral components of these societies led to their demise. In neither instance did military competence ensure survival. Both built a military house of cards upon a society in which the best of men were intimidated into silence, imprisoned, or killed. Thankfully, that has never been the American experience. However, if our society, and the soldiers drawn from it, should ever accept a value neutral moral standard from which to judge the merits of military operations, then successful or not, the reputation of our armed forces would be vulnerable to the sorts of stigmas rightly attached to some of our former enemies. JEFFREY OJEDA BELLINGER

Student of History University of Wyoming Wheatland, Wyoming The Armor-Antiarmor Arms Race Dear Sir: I read with interest the article, “Armor in the 21st Century,” in your Jan-Feb 94 issue. With nearly 30 years in the military, and over 10 of those years in an antitank platoon, I sometimes find it humorous to see and hear how tank men continue to strive for more and more armor. In my antiarmor experience, it seemed that every time the tankers came up with more and better armor, we’d come up with a weapon to defeat it. The “arms race” goes on, I guess. However, I would like to make a couple of observations on the subject, if I may. Like a submariner, who considers anything NOT a submarine to be a “target,” likewise we antitank men consider anything on tracks with a turret to be a “target,” and the bigger the better! There is nothing more enjoyable to a true tank killer than hunting tanks! They are the ultimate game. However, MAJ Spurgeon and Mr. Crist’s new proposed combined arms tank might pose a serious threat to future antitank soldiers. All tanks, even the much vaunted M1 and “new” AGS, are relatively blind when compared to an individual fighting man. Any tank foolish enough to attack without infantrymen would indeed make for some good sport shooting. If the armor attacks with infantry, then we (antitankmen) can be searched out, surprised, or otherwise attacked. Even knowing that infantrymen are present with the enemy armor poses a psychological threat to us. True, we can knock out a main battle tank, or a CAT (if one LETTERS (Continued from Page 3) existed), but we would fear the CAT the most, because of its infantry. Presuming that both the MBT and the CAT are basically equal in both armor and gun, then clearly the superiority of carrying its own infantry makes it a bigger threat. Tanks are fun, so is shooting at them (from an antiarmor perspective), but if and when the CAT is ever brought on line, things may start to get serious. MSG RICHARD L. TOWNSLEY

San Jose, Calif.

Benefits of On-Board Infantry Dear Sir: With the exception of his paragraph about PGMs making the tank obsolete, I agree wholeheartedly with “Beau” Bergeron’s letter (May-June 1994 ARMOR) concerning his comments about “Armor in the 21st Century” (Jan-Feb 94 ARMOR). After reading MAJ Spurgeon and Mr. Crist’s article several times, I concluded that the story was primarily about a combined arms tank, and only partially about reorganization, etc. My interpretation of their article is that PGMs (precision guided munitions) have basically made the MBT obsolete, and since a main battle tank or a combined arms tank (which offically doesn’t exist — yet) can both be defeated by PGMs, then why not use an infantry-carrying tank, since an MBT cannot operate without infantry anyway? Sounds pretty clear to me. DAVID ROBERTS

What Happened at Montrevel Dear Sir: I am writing in response to the article authored by Dr. A. Harding Ganz, entitled “The 11th Panzers in the Defense, 1944,” which appeared in the March-April 1994 issue of ARMOR. Specifically, I would like to address the comments made on page 29 of the article which refers to the actions of the 117th Cavalry Recon Squadron at the French town of Montrevel on 3 September 1944. In his article, Dr. Ganz states, “The 117th Cavalry Recon Squadron maneuvered to Montrevel to the north, but Bode’s Battalion 11 rolled up from Bourg on 3 September. Troops A and B were mauled, and the survivors surrendered. To GIs who ran afoul of the “Ghost Division” it was no “Champagne Campaign”.”

I realize that the subject of Dr. Ganz’s article was the 11th Panzer Division and its exploits in France following the Normandy breakout. However, I do take exception to the fact that Dr. Ganz does not include a little more about the battle at Montrevel and the heroic actions by members of the 117th Cavalry Recon Squadron on September 3, 1944. Far from being “mauled,” the 117th Cavalry Recon Squadron had “carried out ill-conceived orders; they had fought courageously to hold an untenable position” as described in Arthur L. Funk’s account of the battle at Montrevel, “Mandate for Surrender.” I refer the reader to this article for a complete and accurate account of what actually happened. Troop B, commanded by CPT John Wood, was ordered to “seize and hold” Montrevel by LTG Lucian Truscott, commanding general of the VI Corps, as part of Task Force Butler. At the time the order was given, Troop B consisted of 124 men, 10 armored cars, and 18 jeeps armed with machine guns or mortars. Troop A, under the command of CPT Thomas Piddington, was 200 miles to the east, patroling the Italian Border, while Troop C was attached to the 179th Regiment and was stationed 30 miles away in the Meximieux area. LTC Charles Hodge, commander of the 117th, protested, but corps headquarters refused to change the order. Troop A was released from border patrol to join in the mission, and drove all night in the rain to reach the squadron headquarters. Unfortunately, the entire troop did not arrive intact, as many vehicles were disabled along the way due to mechanical problems.

Troop B entered Montrevel and captured about 75 German soldiers still in the town. The troop established a defense of the town and waited. The 11th PD responded by sending Bode’s Battalion 11, equipped with Mark V Panther Tanks, to counterattack and retake the town. The battle lasted all day, with many heroic acts performed by the members of the squadron in attempting to defend the town. A number of decorations were awarded for these actions, including a number of DSCs and the Medal of Honor. Requests for reinforcements were denied, and the squadron was left to its own by the corps. In the end, the Germans captured 102 Americans, including 31 wounded. LTC Hodge, in his memoirs, writes, “It is noteworthy to note here that the commanding general of the 11th Panzer Division sent me a message through the doctor we had left in Montrevel. The CG said, ‘We just don’t believe that there is a small armored force here. We believe it is a big operation, and when we found out that it is only a squadron, we were utterly amazed, and would you please convey my congratulations to your commanding officer, who is putting up the strongest fight we have had in the war’.”

I hope this sheds a little light on what actually happened at Montrevel that September 3, 1944, and present this as a reminder to all who approach discussing a battle from only one side. The members of the 117th Cavalry Recon Squadron honored themselves that day by fighting a battle they had no hope of winning. FOTINOS S. PANAGAKOS

President, 117th Cavalry Assocation Westfield, N. J.

The Author Replies...

Thank you for your letter about the Montrevel fight reference my “11th Panzers” article (ARMOR, Mar-Apr 94), and for the copy of Professor Arthur Funk’s excellent “Mandate for Surrender” article. I have corresponded with Professor Funk on a number of topics, though I would appreciate the date and name of the journal in which the article appeared.

I hadn’t realized that anyone still believed that Troops A and B had not put up anything but a heroic fight at Montrevel, nor that they had not been given a “mission impossible.” Weigley in his Eisenhower’s Lieutenants (p.235) says the “cavalry clawed the Germans,” and the U. S. official history Riviera to the Rhine (p.179) says the cav were “holding on as best they could and mounting counterattacks to keep the Germans off balance.” It is not clear why General Truscott in Command Missions had been critical ten years after the battle; perhaps it reflects his frustration at finding his flanking moves constantly thwarted. As Professor Funk says, there is no justification for his remarks. The official history (p.180) gives the cav losses as 20 jeeps, 15 armored cars, 2 light tanks, and casualties including 126 men captured. The Germans probably lost 1 tank, 2 armored cars, and 4 other vehicles. Truscott simply assigned missions to the 117th “that were beyond its capabilities.” As I noted on my p. 29 about Recon Battalion 11’s heavier fire power, “That consequent battle losses reduce the ability of recon units to carry out their primary missions has generated an ongoing controversy about the role and weaponry of such units.”

I think it fully in character that the German colonel (Karl Bode) and the CG (Wietersheim) both complimented the cav on their stiff fight.

Associate Professor Department of History The Ohio State University Certain Victory: The U. S. Army in the Gulf War by Brigadier General Robert H. Scales, Jr. Director - DESERT STORM Study Project, Office of the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, Washington D. C., 1993. 390 pages. Certain Victory is the first official history of the Gulf War operations and considers Operations DESERT SHIELD, DESERT STORM, and PROVIDE COMFORT. The project group’s intimate familiarity with the Iraqi and Kuwaiti theaters of operation, in combination with exhaustive research, makes Certain Victory a readable and detailed work. A consistent focus on operational and tactical facets of Gulf War operations increases the book’s readability. Certain Victory’s objectivity and detail rank it among the best Gulf War histories yet produced.

Certain Victory is remarkable among other Gulf War volumes for its temerity in honestly addressing fratricide incidents and issues; its gritty focus on the sharp individual edge of combat operations instead of headquarters’ wrangling; and (given the slant of other noteworthy Gulf War tomes) a remarkable lack of private agendas, personal biases, or axes to grind. Produced by an eight-member research/writing team and three primary authors in the ranks of major through brigadier general, Certain Victory’s narrative is terse and remarkably seamless — a tribute to General Scales’ personal attention to the project. Vignettes from American, Iraqi, and coalition officers and men enliven and punctuate the text. The project’s liberal employment of DESERT STORM combat arms officers as authors provides great authenticity of emotion and tone throughout the text. Nevertheless, Certain Victory relies solely on establishing the facts of events as closely as possible. Fratricide incidents, especially, often receive quite detailed attention.

Certain Victory’s critical assertion seems to be that “Maintaining an immediately deployable capability for decisive land combat to end a conventional conflict successfully is the single most enduring imperative of the Gulf War” (pp. 359-360). Addressing strategic deployment considerations is not the work’s greatest strength, however. In temperament, Certain Victory clearly prefers the perspective and judgment of the operational level commander, in place, on the ground, whose “senses, sharpened and on edge after... days of combat, (are) almost overwhelmed by... surreal and foreboding scene(s)” (321). It is the perspective of operational and tactical commanders, the men at brigade level and below, that Certain Victory prefers as historical reality, not the more remote, detached perspective of a higher headquarters. Certain Victory is not perfect. An exhaustive order of battle annex would be an addition of inestimable aid to the book’s value as a research tool. Given the unfettered access of the work’s project group to official records, annexes could easily have provided unit listings and both deployment and redeployment dates for U. S. and coalition forces. While the book has detailed graphics, they wash out depicted objectives as the lines of coalition forces reach them. This hinders the sense of movement and continuity of effort the text works to sustain. It also makes appreciation of the speed, scale, scope, and range of advances harder to appreciate visually. The book’s scope and detail also have a downside — at 360 closely written pages, it will take most serving Gulf War veterans longer to read about their war than it took them to win it.

An excellent and timely illustration of the U. S. Army’s employment of the operational art, Certain Victory deserves attention from anyone interested in how we conduct ourselves operationally and tactically. Certain Victory is honest, comprehensive, and readable, I believe it is clearly the best of available Gulf War histories and recommend it unreservedly.

2LT, Armor Ft. Polk, La.

Hitler: The Normandy Deception by William B.

Breuer, Praeger Publishing, Westport, Conn., 1993. 273 pages, $24.95. It has become almost a cliché to state that a particular book is “a must read.” Unfortunately, Hoodwinking Hitler is not one of these books, but it is a fun book to read and a fascinating look at Bodyguard, the intricate deception plans concocted by the Allied Powers to protect the secrecy of the Normandy invasion during June 1944. Through a variety of secondary sources, Breuer describes the personalities and plans that resulted in one of the most successful deception operations in military history.

Breuer is at his best when he recon-structs the activities of a vast coterie of Allied and Axis spies and double agents involved in some facet of Bodyguard. It is fascinating to read about the exploits of George Howard Earle III, former governor of Pennsylvania and a Roosevelt crony, who was given a commission in the Navy and assigned the mission of penetrating the German espionage network in Istanbul. In addition to starting several barroom brawls with German agents, Earle played a major part in selling the stratagem of a possible Allied Balkan invasion in Spring 1944.

During the course of the war, Nazi Germany dispatched scores of spies through neutral countries and occupied Europe to Great Britain. Breuer capably depicts the superhuman effort of British Intelligence (MI-5) in capturing all of the Axis agents who made their way to the United Kingdom. Every agent was either jailed or turned into a double agent by the British. The “turned” agents were then handled by British Intelligence operatives who carefully “scripted” reports to be sent to Berlin. The British were careful to tailor the turned agent’s reports to make them consistent with the agent’s educational background and skills. Kernels of truth were interspersed with mounds of false information that the British wanted the Germans to have, in order to safeguard D-Day. Ultra code-breaking intercepts provided the necessary feedback on the effectiveness of the false reports.

Breuer concludes Hoodwinking Hitler with the Allied efforts to pin the German Army along the coast of France in support of Operation COBRA, the breakout from the beachhead. Hitler could no longer be hood-winked by the Allied intelligence services. The Bodyguard deception was finally over, a full two months after D-Day. While the title is slightly flip and the work mainly uses secondary sources, William B. Breuer has written an entertaining book. More importantly, Hoodwinking Hitler is just plain fun to read. Maybe that explains why I own five other books by Breuer, and why eight of his books have been main selections of the Military Book Club. ARTHUR W. CONNOR, JR.

MAJ, Armor CGSC, Ft. Leavenworth, Kan. D-DAY 1944, edited by Theodore A. Wilson, University Press of Kansas, 1994. 420 pages, $22.50.

On D-Day, June 6, 1944, Private Lindley Higgins admitted being “dumb enough not to feel the slightest trepidation... We really The Army’s Frank, Objective Account of the Gulf War BOOKS thought that we only had to step off that beach and all the Krauts would put their hands up.” Of course, Higgins and the other soldiers of the 8th U. S. Infantry were greatly mistaken. The Germans were much better prepared than anyone thought, and they fought desperately to hurl the invading Allies back into the sea off the Normandy beaches to preserve Fortress Europe. In June 1994, the world celebrated the 50th anniversary of this century’s greatest battle — D-Day, the invasion of Normandy. Acclaimed as the largest amphibious assault of all time, D-Day, June 6, 1944, marked a turning point in the war against Germany. The Allies had accumulated enough strength to amass an invasion fleet of 5,000 ships, to hurl over 150,000 soldiers ashore, and to create the decisive Second Front in France.

Much has been written about this epic battle, and even Hollywood has glorified its scope and impact many times on film. Now, noted historian Theodore A. Wilson has joined with 18 other eminent writers to produce a unique and intriguing collection of historical essays on D-Day, adding to the growing collection of historical research and observation. D-DAY 1944 is really an addendum to the 1971 publication of D-DAY: The Normandy Invasion in Retrospect. With updated information and renewed perspective, the essay contributors cover a wide variety of D-Day subjects and interests. Most of the contributors are historians who participated in writing the U. S. Army’s official history of World War Il and so bring remarkable credentials to this new volume. Prominent contributors include John S. D. Eisenhower, General Omar Bradley, and German Admiral Friedrich Ruge.

D-DAY 1944 does not offer a comprehensive, all-encompassing history of D-Day. Rather it is a selection of different aspects of D-Day that have not been examined or well-publicized before. The first five essays, called “The Muster,” deal with the prelude and buildup to June 6, 1944. These essays are excellent, for they cover the often-overlooked background and years of preparation for the invasion. One essay discusses Churchill’s hesitation about any attack directly on northwest France, preferring instead more indirect approaches through Norway or the Balkans. Another essay covers the tremendous obstacles the planners had to overcome, such as the lack of adequate shipping, the continual argument over dilution of resources to Italy and the Pacific, as well the uncertainty of weather for a channel crossing. The best essay of this section, by Robin Higham, provides a superb discussion of technology used on D-Day. Higham explores the advances in antisubmarine warfare, naval gunfire support, amphibious assault landing craft, radar, and the remarkable Mulberry and Gooseberry artificial harbors created by the Allies.

The eight essays which make up “The Battle” section of this book are unique in that they do not deal with the popular view of the truly hard-fought battle on the beaches and the landing zones. Instead, they deal with topics which before had been given little appreciation, but which made significant contributions to the overall battle. Two essays are concerned with analyses of naval operations. Most interesting is the essay written by German Admiral Friedrich Ruge about the weakness of German naval forces and their desperate attempts to stop the invasion fleet. Despite the courage of the crews of the few German destroyers, minelayers, torpedo boats, and submarines, however, the Allied naval forces’ greatest threats came from German mines and from unpredictable channel weather.

The essay entitled “Air Campaign” reveals the fragmented and volatile command relationships that constantly snarled planning, where egotistical infighting was a continual obstacle. Through all that, however, the Allied air campaign still produced air power’s greatest contribution to the war. All phases of air power were executed brilliantly, from strategic bombing to tactical missions and close air support of the front-line troops.

Other essays in “The Battle” section include discussions of special operations, anecdotes of “other men’s memories,” the correspondents’ view of D-Day, and the involvement of the French population of Normandy. Even though the press correspondents were viewed “as an annoying and mysterious band of roving gypsies,” the military knew the value of public opinion and how to best use the skills of the combat correspondents. Not everyone on D-Day was as naive as Private Higgins. Many soldiers felt that there was no way they could lose the battle. When asked by a correspondent if the Allies could be pushed back into the sea, an American general answered, “No. They’ll just keep throwing stuff onto the beaches until something breaks.”

The final section of four essays is titled “The Assessments” and includes an analysis of U. S. leadership during the battle, from the perspective of two U. S. Army division commanders. Most revealing is the excellent essay by Mark S. Stoler, “Dwight D. Eisenhower: Architect of Victory.” Stoler traces the formation of the D-Day operational concept back to Ike’s early days on the Army staff in Washington, working with General George C. Marshall. The final essay asks “was it all worth it?” Despite the price in blood and national treasure, the invasion of Normandy on D-Day, June 6, 1944, was the battle that changed the course of the war and truly laid the groundwork for the Allied victory a year later. D-DAY 1944 is a valuable addition to the history of this terrific battle and is a most suitable companion to Cornelius Ryan’s The Longest Day (1959) and Stephen E. Am-brose’s D-DAY (1994).

COL, USMC, Retired Overland Park, Kan.

Voices From Captivity: Interpreting the POW Narrative by Robert C. Doyle, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, Kan., 1994.

pages, notes, bibliography, index, $35.00. The gripping power of the story of any POW’s wretched agony generates a visceral, emotional response because those experiences appeal to the most basic of human instincts — survival. This book reviews the narratives of American POWs from a hundred years before our Revolution up to Kuwait. Dr. Doyle believes the captive’s narrative is an important literary form, one that has not altered significantly in nearly 300 years, and he has undertaken abroad and objective study of POWs’ stories to illustrate their commonality of structure and recurrent themes.

He examines seven phases of the POW’s experience that appear consistently in every such record: precapture autobiography; capture and initial experience as a prisoner; removal from the capture site and death marches; the prison landscape; prisoners’ resistance, torture, assimilation, and escapes; release and repatriation; and laments — the sense of loss, guilt purging, and condemnation of captors. Doyle shows how American POWs from each period responded in these phases, and demonstrates how the narratives are strikingly similar. He also explains how much of the cruelty (from the POW’s viewpoint) stems from the collision of conflicting beliefs and cultures. Two examples: During the Revolution, the British viewed the colonists as rebels against the crown, guilty of treason and hence criminals, undeserving of any protection as POWs. In World War II, the Japanese, raised on the soldier’s code of Bushido — honor, obedience, and valor, in which surrender was considered a cowardly disgrace worthy of the harshest retribution — felt no compassion for POWs they believed to have broken that code. In sum, this is an absorbing study of the commonality of POW narratives over the past 300 years of American history, and very useful to those who want to expand their understanding of the POW experience.

COL, U. S. Army, Retired Alexandria, Va.