Assault Gun Battalion 96

assault gun battalion requires the following attachments:

• A battalion fire support section with a BN FSE and company-level FIST teams.

• A USAF TACP for directing tactical air support.

The organic maneuver elements of the AG battalion are formed into three AG companies and a scout platoon configured as follows: The Assault Gun Companies — The AG companies will be organized similar to tank companies, with four CCVLs in each platoon and two in the headquarters section, which will also have two HMMWVs. The AG companies will train for operations both as part of the AG battalion and as separate companies attached to infantry brigades or battalions. The primary capabilities of the AG company are as follows: (Figure 2)

• Suppress and kill heavy and light armored vehicles with the 105-mm gun.

• Suppress and kill enemy bunkers, field fortifications, or positions in a built-up environment (MOUT) with the 105-mm gun.

Assault Gun Battalion 96 by Major Martin N. Stanton Assault Gun Battalion Figure 1 Assault Gun Company Figure 2 38 One of six preproduction versions of the XM-8 Armored Gun System now going through extensive testing. A final decision will be made on full-scale production after March, 1997.

• Suppress and kill soft targets with the 105-mm gun and machine guns.

• Provide limited air defense with organic mounted machine guns.

• Engage and suppress or kill enemy systems or positions at night or in limited visibility.

The Battalion Recon Platoon — The scout platoon organization is exactly the same as that of a J-Series light cavalry platoon. The platoon will be authorized four additional .50-caliber machine guns for employment on the TOW HMMWVs when there is no armor threat for the TOW systems to engage. The platoon would have the same missions as a tank battalion scout platoon when the AG battalion is operating as a battalion-level formation. The platoon can also be cross-attached to the infantry brigades in the same manner as an AG company should there be a requirement for a mounted reconnaissance element. In this case, the platoon will draw all support and classes of supply from the unit of attachment. (Figure 3) The CSS and C2 structure would be similar in function to the normal J-Series TO&E tank battalion, but because of aircraft restrictions and the desire to economize on space and weight, certain vehicle types are going to have to be substituted for their tank battalion counterparts. For example, the M577s of the battalion headquarters will have to be replaced with HMMWVs configured for TOC operations. Likewise, the battalion’s ambulances and maintenance contact team vehicles will also have to be HMMWVs, as opposed to M113s. The battalion support platoon will operate out of 5-ton trucks because of size and weight restrictions. The idea is to keep vehicle types to a minimum for both weight and PLL considerations. Ideally, we should have just four, CCVLs, M578 recovery vehicles, 5-ton truck variants (fuel tanker, wrecker, cargo, PLL) and HMMWV variants (scout, C2, TOC, cargo). We will address each C2 and CSS organization in more detail.

Command and Control Battalion Command Group — The battalion command group would consist of three HMMWVs for the battalion commander, XO, and S3. Each would have dual FM RTs and one auxiliary receiver, all secure capable. In addition, the battalion commander and XO HMMWVs would have MSE systems installed.

During operations when the battalion commander was forward in his AG, the battalion CSM would use the commander’s vehicle to assist the XO and HHC commander in ensuring the smooth flow of support to the companies. The CSM’s HMMWV would also act as a relay if communications ranges became extended too quickly for the communications platoon to establish a relay or RETRANS. The command-configured HMMWVs would also be useful in liaison roles, providing an LNO with a robust communications setup from which he could more effectively coordinate with the AG battalion.

Battalion Communications Platoon

— The battalion communications platoon would be similar in design and function to that of a J-Series tank battalion, with the exception of the M577/M113, which would be replaced by a C2-configured HMMWV. The Battalion TOC — The battalion TOC would be configured much like a light infantry battalion TOC. Its equipment would consist of HMMWVs with 3⁄4-ton trailers. Unlike the light infantry TO&E, however, I recommend that the S2 and S3 sections each get their own separate HMMWV, as opposed to sharing one as they do in the J-Series Light Infantry TO&E (which is one of the dumber things the U.S. Army has done in this century). These HMMWVs could either be cargo HMMWVs customized for C2 or ambulance HMMWVs (4 stretcher) customized for C2. The tent they would use is the same Standard Integrated Command Post System (SICPS) used by the light infantry battalion, a lightweight frame and canvas tent that folds up to a fairly small package and fits nicely in the 3⁄4-ton trailer. A good TOC crew can erect a two-module SICPS in about 10 minutes. If necessary, they could pull up side-by-side (not back-to-back as they’re both dragging trailers) and operate for short periods of time. The TOC would have the same communications capabilities as a normal tank battalion TOC to include MSE. The battalion FSO should have a similarly equipped HMMWV for the battalion FSE section that boots into the TOC in the same manner as the other two sections. In addition the battalion FSE would have his own dedicated HMMWV as well as a FIST

HMMWV for each company.

The total signature of the TOC would be four HMMWVs with trailers (battalion S3 section, S2 section, FSE, and a communications section HMMWV). The TOC would have no weapons larger than 7.62 machine guns. In LIC operations, where dispersion of C2 and CSS assets is not as critical a factor due to a low indirect fire threat, the battalion XO might want to consider combining his combat trains location and TOC location in order to combine firepower and troop strength for security. This technique was used by my battalion successfully on several occasions, including our deployment to Somalia. The downside is, of course, if your security is sloppy or inadequate, you stand to lose C2 and CSS in one fell swoop. It’s a METT-T consideration. CSS Structure Combat Trains — The AG battalion combat trains would be similar in form and function to those of a tank battalion. The main difference would be in the configuration of the ALC, which would consist of two C2-configured HMMWVs similar to those used in the battalion TOC (one each for the S1 and S4 sections) and one SICPS tent. Communications equipment would also mirror the tank battalion TO&E and would include MSE. Field Trains — The AG battalion field trains would mirror the function of a tank battalion field trains. They would co-locate with either the BSA of the supported infantry brigade or the MSB. If neither of those organizations was within practical distance, the field trains would co-locate with Scout Platoon Figure 3 the combat trains or position itself separately. However, due to the small number of personnel in the field trains and its lack of combat power, every attempt should be made to co-locate the AG battalion field trains with other assets.

Support Platoon — The AG battalion support platoon is organized along the lines of a tank battalion support platoon, with the exception of the mess section. It would service only a consolidated battalion mess, both in garrison and in the field. The primary reason for this is air transport considerations. The AG battalion is too small to justify four separate company mess teams with MKTs.

When subunits are cross-attached for long-duration missions (i.e. one company of the AG battalion goes on a contingency mission as part of an infantry brigade package while the remainder of the AG battalion stays at home station) then the AG battalion commander can attach one of the mess teams and MKT to the cross-attached company. Normally though, the cross-attached AG company would receive Class 1 — both MREs and hot meals

— from the unit of attachment (i.e. the infantry brigade).

The transportation section would have the normal fuel, ammunition, and supply sections that are found in a tank battalion, but instead of HEMTTs the platoon would have 5-ton trucks, thus losing some cargo capacity. The support platoon HQ would have two HMMWVs (PL and PSG) with dual net capability (secure). (Figure 4) Medical Platoon — The aid station would be organized like a tank battalion aid station, with a HQ section, aid station section, an evac section, and company aid teams. The HQ section consists of one HMMWV with two FM secure radios for the platoon leader. The aid station section would have two HMMWV ambulances with 3⁄4-ton trailers. The aid station itself would consist of SICPS tents booted in to the aid station HMMWVs in a style similar to that of the battalion TOC. The evac section consists of two HMMWV ambulances.

Each company aid team would have one HMMWV ambulance.

The teams would be dedicated to each line company on a permanent basis. Radio configuration of aid vehicles would be similar to that of a tank battalion.

(Figure 5)

Maintenance Platoon — The maintenance platoon would be organized along J-Series tank battalion lines with all maintenance assets consolidated at battalion and cross-attached out. The platoon would have one extra major recovery vehicle, an M578, to compensate for the fact that there are no other armored-type units in the division, and two 5-ton wreckers. The platoon would have the same recovery and maintenance functions as the maintenance platoon of the tank battalion. (Figure 6) Tactical Employment of the Assault Gun Battalion The AG battalion represents the most concentrated and mobile firepower available to the light/airborne commander. The CCVLs will be the most potent fighting vehicles in his organization, and the temptation to employ them as light tanks will be a strong one, but it is a temptation that he should resist. The CCVLs have several important limitations.

• The assault gun (CCVL) should not be used for close assault because it is more vulnerable than a tank to shoulder-fired infantry antitank weapons. If close assault tasks are unavoidable, dedicated infantry elements attached to the CCVLs should protect them from this threat. The assault gun is also vulnerable to enemy infantry when employed in restrictive or close terrain.

Dedicated infantry security will be necessary there, too.

• The assault gun can’t traverse slopes or difficult ground like the M1A1. It cannot swim, and requires bridging or rafts to cross water obstacles of greater depth than its fording capability. The assault gun’s fording capability is less than an M1A1.

• The assault gun’s smaller 3-man crew will become fatigued more quickly on continuous operations, and there will be fewer people to perform vehicle maintenance and security.

• The 105mm may not be capable of penetrating the frontal armor of modern main battle tanks (Leopard 2, Merkava, M1s, T-80s, etc.). The CCVL’s concept of employment should go back to the divisional tank battalions of the 1940s and ’50s; that is to say, the CCVLs will usually be supporting infantry, as opposed to breakthrough, exploitation, and pursuit. In effect, the CCVL unit would function like the German Stur-mgeshutz units of WWII. Although the AG battalion will have the capability to operate as a battalion, the LIC/contingency aspect of most deployments from light divisions (i.e. brigade force packages) will drive the cross-attachment of AG companies. AG Company Missions As part of an infantry brigade force package, the AG company can remain consolidated to weight the brigade main effort, provide a reserve, or be broken up into platoons for cross attachment to infantry battalions. The decision is METT-T dependent, but a good rule of thumb would be that the assault gun platoons would be more likely to be cross-attached during offensive operations and kept consolidated in the defense. (Figure 7) Offensive Operations — In the offense, the assault gun company or platoon would be most effective working Support Platoon Figure 4 Medical Platoon Figure 5 Maintenance Platoon Figure 6 for the infantry battalion(s) they are supporting. This is true especially in a MOUT and/or restricted terrain environment. It would not be uncommon to find the platoon cross-attached down to the infantry company level. The assault guns would operate in a close support role, normally within 2,000 meters of the enemy (possibly as close as 20 meters, depending on visibility and the ability to get a clear shot at the target). The infantry would provide security for the assault guns as well as target designation. In turn, the assault guns would destroy point targets that the infantry designates. This designation might be made by voice (FM), tracer, smoke, or any combination. This employment would very much resemble the classic tank-infantry teams of WWII, Korea, and Vietnam. In spite of the improvements in antitank technology, recent events across the world in places such as Somalia have once again proved the worth of this tried and true formula. When terrain is more open and it is possible to employ more than one platoon with each company, then the brigade or battalion commander might wish to consider creating a heavy company team by cross-attaching one AG platoon per infantry platoon. This would allow the brigade or battalion commander to have a heavy force of two AG platoons, enough vehicles to permit cross-attached infantry to ride on the vehicles. This force could be displaced quickly from one position to the next to provide massed fires, with the cross-attached infantry providing local security.

Defensive Operations — In the defense, the infantry brigade commander would want to keep his assault guns consolidated to be able to mass their firepower on the main enemy threat. This would probably entail positioning them in depth, rather than forward. All this is METT-T driven, the brigade commander analyzing his avenues of approach and weighting them accordingly. Considering that the AG company is the only rapidly reposi-tionable asset he would own, it is unlikely that a commander would commit it to a specific avenue of approach unless it was the only one. It must also be remembered that the AG company requires infantry security, no matter where it is positioned initially. LIC Missions — The AG company can perform the same infantry direct fire support missions in LIC as it does in conventional warfare. The AG unit is still basically dependent on the infantry for security and target acquisition, identification, and designation. In addition to acting in their traditional support role, the AG company can perform other important LIC tasks. # Act as a blocking force. When terrain permits (i.e. more open, better visibility), the AG company with attached infantry can act as a blocking force or as part of a cordon. The ability of the AG company to move quickly can allow it to move rapidly into position before the enemy can react. Although ill-suited for actually chasing LIC type enemies, the AG company can be used as an effective “stopper in the bottle.”

• Provide convoy security. When convoys are operating over short to medium distances (less than 100 km) on a continual basis, the AG company can provide convoy security. A platoon of assault guns and a platoon of light infantry, in addition to the weapons of the transportation personnel, can present a formidable force to any would-be ambusher in an LIC environment. Although convoys of longer duration and range are possible, these operations would entail refueling on the march and the need to attach recovery assets. The requirement for extended range convoy escort should be balanced against the support requirements, the amount of wear on the vehicles, and the threat. If not required for reconnaissance purposes, the scout platoon of the AG battalion, configured with MK 19s and 50-caliber machine guns in a 50/50 mix, would be ideal for this type of mission.

• Critical site security. Although armor soldiers cringe at this, critical site security is one of the most useful missions an armored unit can perform in LIC. In Vietnam, on more than one occasion, the presence of just a few tanks made the difference between a firebase or logistics base being overrun or successfully repelling its attackers. In LIC, the tendency will be to consolidate critical assets into large, easily guarded sites due to the lack of significant artillery or air threats. Putting assault guns in fighting positions on the perimeter will add considerable firepower to the defense, and the CCVL’s thermal optics will provide significant early warning capability.

AG Battalion Missions Even though the primary mission of the AG battalion is to support the infantry brigades of light divisions, there will be occasions when the light division commander may wish to use the AG battalion as a separate maneuver element. The missions would reflect the desire to achieve short-term objectives from the massed application of speed and firepower, as opposed to any long-term use of the AG battalion in this manner. Offensive Missions — Since the AG battalion’s companies would normally be attached to infantry brigades, an AG battalion offensive mission would most likely be a special mission that could not be accomplished by the normal infantry brigade task force. This type of mission would most likely involve the ability of the AG battalion to move rapidly and apply firepower. For example, the division could use the AG battalion with attached infantry riding on the vehicles as a “forward detachment” to seize key terrain (i.e. bridges, river crossing sites, defiles, etc.). Obviously this is a high-risk operation, especially from the point of view of the infantry who would be riding on the assault guns or accompanying in trucks.

The AG battalion could also be part of a task force with cross-attached infantry, cavalry (LT), and air defense units (Vulcan) to form a heavy firepower task force that could be used to quickly move from one brigade sector to another to reinforce success or provide additional firepower to the at-Assault Gun Company TM (Attached Slice) Figure 7 tacking infantry brigades. This TF would normally include two AG companies, an infantry company for security, and other assets if available (i.e., the TOW platoons of the ground cavalry troop and Vulcan platoons, if those are still in the inventory). Because infantry brigades attack at a walking pace, the AG TF would be able to reposition between elements at mechanized speeds and could effectively concentrate combat power at the time and place needed. The AG battalion TF could also be allocated to the aviation brigade to act as part of the divisional covering force. This would both increase the frontage the light cav squadron could cover and provide it with considerably improved firepower in the event of chance contacts.

Additionally, it is possible that there will be times that the AG battalion and the light cav squadron are the only elements deployed from a light infantry division. For example, although the 10th Mountain Division did not deploy to DESERT SHIELD, its AG battalion, had it existed at the time, might have been cross-attached to XVIIIth Airborne Corps to improve the AT capability of the 82d Airborne. It is not inconceivable that this may happen in the future. The Army’s ability to fly AG units on C-17s opens up many new possibilities for cross-attachment. Although by no means a heavy division, the 82d Airborne with three AG battalions (1 assigned, 2 attached from 25th ID and 10th MTN) along with the air transportable 2d ACR (LT) would have presented a much more formidable force than the division projected in Saudi Arabia in Aug-Sept 1990.

Defensive Operations — The AG battalion’s defensive role would be limited mainly to being the division commander’s counterattack force.

Light divisions normally defend in terrain that has limited avenues of approach for armor/mechanized forces. The AG battalion would be employed as a battalion when there was a significant enemy armor/mech threat and when there was more than one avenue of approach into the division sector. Due to their relatively immobile nature in the face of an armored threat, the infantry brigades would be emplaced in depth along the avenues of approach and in and around key terrain features, such as towns with road network intersections, etc. The intent would be for the infantry to take the initial shock of the enemy attack and force the enemy to commit his reserve and define his main attack. At that time, the AG battalion would be released to counterattack by fire. Since light infantry would be defending in terrain that normally has only battalion avenues of approach or smaller, the concentration of the AG battalions weapons would have a good chance of blunting the enemy attack. CCVLs in the 2d ACR The 2d ACR’s CCVLs should perform the same functions as tanks in a heavy ACR. The 2d ACR Light is obviously less capable of toe-to-toe combat with enemy heavy forces than its heavy counterparts. The ACR will probably not be used for offensive or defensive guard type missions that require decisive engagement and no penetration by enemy forces. However, the CCVLs will allow the ACR to screen more effectively and fight through resistance that would have stopped it in its previous pure HMMWV configuration. Conversely, in defensive screening operations, it will be better able to strip off enemy recon and advanced guard elements before collapsing the screen and conducting a rearward passage through friendly elements.

42 ARMOR — September-October 1994 The XM-8 Armored Gun System fires its 105-mm cannon in a California test. The gun is fed by an autoloader, so the crew is reduced to three. A “pepper-pot” muzzle brake helps reduce recoil effects on the 19.5-ton vehicle. Because the basic cavalry missions have not changed, CCVLs should be allocated two platoons per cavalry troop and three per squadron AG company. The only difference in total authorization of vehicles is that I would recommend that the cav troop commanders and the cav squadron commander/S3 work out of hard-top HMMWVs, as opposed to CCVLs, due to the limited space within the CCVL.

Therefore the cav troops would have eight CCVLs and the squadron command group would be strictly HMMWVs. The assault gun company would be the standard TO&E of 14.

Working with Infantry The AG battalion is going to have to resurrect some armor skills that have been dormant for 20+ years. We have not had armor that fought “one or two tanks, surrounded by infantry, carefully nosing forward along a jungle track” to quote Field Marshal Slim of Burma. Not since Vietnam has American armor done this sort of close infantry support.

This is not an insurmountable problem. Most of the tactics used by tank-infantry teams in WWII, Korea, and Vietnam are still applicable today. There is certainly no shortage of documentation.

The assault gun itself does lack one feature that has been eliminated in our most recent armored vehicle designs. That is the external phone. The kind of fighting this vehicle is likely to do could be quite close in nature. It may not be the healthiest thing in the world for an infantryman to stand next to a CCVL and talk to the TC. Providing a phone would allow an infantryman to direct the assault gun’s fire while keeping in cover behind the vehicle. It should also allow the vehicles to be included in an infantry phone hot loop. Target designation is the big problem when fighting close-in with infantry. Assault gun units and the infantry they support should work out SOPs in which the infantry marks targets with either smoke or tracer. This designation, combined with verbal instructions over either FM or external phone, should be sufficient to get rounds on target.

In addition, infantry could be ahead of the vehicle to either side as part of its security. Both the infantry and the assault gun crews will need to be trained about the hazards of the 105-mm gun so that the infantry security does not inadvertently mask the assault gun’s fire.

In another probable use of the assault gun in support of infantry, fighting in a MOUT environment, the assault gun crew will have to train at firing at targets that are very small and normally within 500 meters. They will have to do this while exposing as little of their vehicle as possible for the least amount of time. Although the present tank gunnery tables give the fledgling AG battalion a basis to start from, I feel that we should add some special infantry support tasks. There should be a vehicle battle run through close terrain with an infantry platoon that designates targets. (Battle “run” is a misnomer, since it would be done at a walking pace.) The accompanying infantry would make contact and designate with tracer smoke and verbal instructions. There would be a day and night phase, with thermal targets representing men in the embrasures of camouflaged bunkers.

There should also be a MOUT battle run, but this would probably have to be fired with a subcaliber ammunition. The cost of rebuilding a MOUT site after using main gun training rounds a few times would no doubt be prohibitive. The range could be a simple version of a maze of “street fronts,” similar to a Hollywood lot. The assault gun would negotiate it using an infantry squad to designate targets at ranges of 50-500 meters. Since only subcal ammunition would be used, the range would have a fairly small fan (all second or third story targets must be positioned to ensure that the arc of the bullets do not endanger overflight). The assault guns should participate in live fires with infantry units on as many occasions as possible. They should also train together as much as possible. Infantry must be familiar with the capabilities and limitations of assault guns. In particular they should be acutely aware of the security limitations of a three-man crew. There should be a company of normal attachment dedicated to each brigade, and this company should not change. Every infantry platoon and company in the brigade should be familiar and comfortable in working with assault guns. The assault gun company commander should be included in all training meetings at brigade. They have to be tight. In closing, I can only say that the Armored Gun System has been a long time coming and was long overdue. We now have the opportunity to make up this shortfall in the structure of our rapid deployment forces and improve their capability exponentially.

We could have used them in Somalia. They would have saved lives. There will be other times. Let’s be ready. ARMOR — September-October 1994 43 “Although the present tank gunnery tables give the fledgling AG battalion a basis to start from, I feel that we should add some special infantry support tasks. There should be a vehicle battle run through close terrain with an infantry platoon that designates targets.” Major Martin N. Stanton received his Infantry commission in 1978 from Florida Tech. He has served as a company XO with 1st Infantry Training Brigade at Ft. Benning; rifle and TOW platoon leader with 1-9 Infantry in Korea; asst. G3 staff officer with 9th ID, and commander, D Co, 2-2 Infantry, both at Ft. Lewis, Wash.; company and S3 observer/controller at the NTC at Ft. Irwin; senior brigade advisor, 2d Saudi National Guard Mech Brigade, Hofuf, Saudi Arabia; and as S3, 2-87 Infantry, Ft.

Drum, N.Y.

His combat service includes the Gulf War in 1991 and Somalia 1992-93.

He is currently at the College of Naval Command and Staff, Newport, R.I.