Peacekeeping With Light Cavalry

alight infantry division cavalry squadron deployed on a peacekeeping mission. This article discusses the experiences of 3-17 Cavalry and lessons learned from this operation.

When alerted for deployment, A Troop and Squadron HQ were hastily pulled out of field exercises. Preparation for deployment began with country orientations and the units training for what they might encounter. Equipment was prepared for operations in an austere desert-type environment. While units prepared for deployment, the leaders and staff began the task of defining missions, end states, and forces required to deploy. Initial deployment guidance was vague and changed almost daily.

Meanwhile, equipment and personnel shortages were rectified. The requirement to develop a task organization that could complete the assigned mission was a difficult chore. Task organization frequently changed prior to deployment, due to lack of a clearly stated mission and ever-changing manpower ceilings, ranging from all of the task force (over 360 personnel) to a low of 180. The need for preparation, planning, and training to take place concurrently presented quite a challenge to the leadership of the squadron. In the end, the unit deployed with only a few problems. But all of the squadron’s equipment was shipped before the squadron learned that only 180 would deploy. No clear reasons were provided for the personnel ceiling. Deploying soldiers received a great deal of deployment training in country briefings, signal procedures, safety, and field sanitation. Tactical classes, terrain board exercises, and situational training exercises refined and rehearsed convoy security, checkpoint operations, mine detection, and disarming civilians. Rules of engagement classes included situational vignettes. A sudden rush of new equipment reached the squadron just prior to deployment including MK19 machine guns, AN/PSS-12 mine detectors, and global positioning system (GPS) receivers, but pre-deployment training with this new equipment was minimal.

Our deployment to Somalia provided several lessons learned: Expect rapidly changing requirements immediately prior to deployment. Leaders and personnel need to remain flexible and rapidly adapt to the latest guidance. The training that was conducted prior to deployment was extremely useful.

Unit Background The 3-17 Cavalry is alight cavalry squadron of alight infantry division, also known as the reconnaissance squadron. Activated in the 1986 to 1988 time frame, during the organization of five light infantry divisions, these units represent the first attempt to create rapidly deployable light cavalry. Unfortunately, severe force design constraints limit their capabilities. Light infantry division design certification began with unit Army Training and Evaluation Programs (ARTEPS), then culminated in a division exercise entitled CELTIC CROSS IV, in August 1986.

Although the cavalry squadron was not employed doctrinally, both Armor School and Aviation School subject matter experts stated that the cavalry squadron could not perform its doctrinal missions as structured.

The squadron’s single 26 ARMOR — The 10th Mountain Division’s 3-17 Cav Deploys to Somalia Peacekeeping With Light Cavalry by Lawrence G. Vowels and Major Jeffrey R. Witsken ground troop could only cover a brigade-size front or flank, given its structure. Table 1 summarizes the observations made during light infantry division certification.

After serious official and unofficial debate, the cavalry squadron design was fielded and it remained to unit training and actual operations to further test the design.

Some of the weaknesses noted before and during CELTIC CROSS IV were corrected. Since then, the cumulative experience of the active cavalry squadrons in field exercises, deployments, National Training Center (NTC)/Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) rotations, and peacekeeping missions in Panama and Somalia has confirmed that the current cavalry squadron cannot fully accomplish its doctrinal missions for the division as specified in FM 17-95 due to shortcomings in the design. The largest contributor to this inadequacy is the presence of only one ground troop in the squadron.

Area Of Operations The area in which 3-17 Cavalry operated included almost the entire southwest of Somalia, an area much larger than any the squadron had been able to train in prior to the deployment. A Troop operated primarily on the main supply routes from Baledogle to Mogadishu and from the Afgooye area to the Marka area in the Shebelle River Valley. The air troops operated over the breadth of southern Somalia, from east of Baledogle, to Baidoa, to Bardera, to near the Kenyan border, to Kismayo, to Marka, and to Mogadishu. The assault helicopter unit attached to the task force also flew missions up to Belet Uen.

Task Organization Squadron - Task force (TF) 3-17 Cavalry (one ground troop, two air troops) deployed with only 180 personnel. B Troop provided the bulk of the Division Ready Brigade (DRB) aviation command and control slice deployed initially to Kismayo. The B Troop soldiers, under command of the squadron S3, became known as Team Bandit. The team’s organization changed throughout Operation RESTORE HOPE, based on the requirements of the next mission. This team initially consisted of the four-aircraft DRB command and control slice. Its strength grew to six OH-58s, four AH-1Fs, ten UH-60s, and well over 100 personnel for some missions.

The squadron (minus) based its operations in Baledogle with the 10th Aviation Brigade. The squadron was usually augmented with a counterintelligence team and interpreters to conduct ground operations. The squadron became the Army Forces aviation headquarters in February when the 10th Aviation Brigade HQ redeployed, assuming attachments of an assault helicopter company, an aviation intermediate maintenance company, an Air Force weather team, and an air traffic control team. Ground Troop - A Troop deployed with only 42 of its authorized 66 soldiers. While it had all 22 of its assigned vehicles, ultimately only 13 were used once in country. At the ARMOR — 27 time the vehicles were shipped, the personnel ceilings weren’t known.

The troop wished to maintain three-man crews on its vehicles, so the remainder were used by other squadron elements or kept as spares. A Troop was organized into three platoons with both M1025 and M966 high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs). Shown in table 2 is the normal troop vehicle and weapons assignment.

The ground troop was routinely supported by a medic team (HMMWV ambulance) and a maintenance contact team (three mechanics in a HMMWV with trailer).

Air Troops - B Troop and C Troop both deployed. As mentioned, the B Troop scout platoon formed the nucleus of the DRB command and control slice deployed to Kismayo. The number of aircraft and crews under each troop varied throughout the deployment as task organization and troop strength were adjusted for all missions.

Two primary lessons were learned from the task organization. First, the unit must remain flexible because the task organization changed with nearly every new mission.

Second, the squadron must be prepared to operate as a task force headquarters, accepting aviation and ground elements from many sources.

Squadron Operations Throughout deployment, squadron operations were characterized by extended communication distances, the need to cover large areas of responsibility, and continuous operations. The squadron was assigned zones to operate in, to allow the light infantry battalions to concentrate in other areas. Because of the large area of operations, robust sustainment and long-range communications were prevalent. The squadron routinely conducted continuous operations to uncover bandits. Whenever possible, ground and air cavalry worked together to facilitate mission accomplishment. The following missions were assigned to TF 3-17 Cavalry elements:

•Area reconnaissance (air and ground)

•Armed reconnaissance (air)

•Convoy escort (air and ground)

•Convoy security (air)

•Raid (air and ground)

•Air assault security (air)

•Air assault (by an attached UH-60 assault company)

•General support aviation

•Show of force

•Quick reaction force

•Force protection In addition to these missions, the ground cavalry troop frequently conducted “village assessments” to gain intelligence, determine what assistance a village needed, and determine which clan controlled the village.

These missions established a strong presence and had a psychological impact on the civilians in the area of operations.

The extended distances required the squadron to continuously maintain two or three command posts. The squadron primary tactical operations center (TOC) and air line of communication (ALOC) were located at the fixed base in Baledogle. This facility was co-located with the 10th Aviation Brigade TOC and the 2d Brigade 10th Mountain Division TOC. A squadron jump TOC supported A Troop area reconnaissance missions. A command and control console UH-60 supported both quick reaction force missions and complex, long range missions. The squadron commander usually commanded from an OH-58 except when accompanying A Troop in a HMMWV.

Mobile subscriber equipment (MSE), the tactical satellite (TACSAT) system, and high frequency (HF) communications were all required to overcome the long distances between elements.

proved to be more reliable than HF communications, which could not always be established. TACSAT and MSE were the most dependable.

The entire 10th Mountain Division was severely challenged trying to cover its wide area of responsibility. The challenge was particularly acute for the squadron, as it often ranged throughout the division area of operations. Additional air and ground cavalry troops would have permitted sustained continuous operations and added significantly to the squadron’s capability.

ARMOR — Troop HQ CO (3-man crew) XO (2-man crew) 1SG (2-man crew) Supply Sgt (2-man crew) M1025 (M60) M1025 (MK19)

Soft-top HMMWV 5-ton truck w/water trailer 1st Platoon 4 vehicles (3-man crews) One M1025 (MK19) One M1025 (.50 cal) Two M966 (TOW/M60s) 2d Platoon 4 vehicles (3-man crews) One M1025 (MK19) One M1025 (.50 cal) Two M966 (TOW/M60s) 3d Platoon 3 vehicles (3-man crews) One M1025 (MK19) Two M966 (TOW/M60s) Table 2. Ground Troop Assignments

•Cavalry squadron needs its own fire support element (FSE).

•Ground cavalry troop requires mutually supporting weapons.

•Ground cavalry troop may require an XO.

•Ground cavalry troop requires an NBC NCO.

•Add a second ground cavalry troop to the squadron.

•Add a third air cavalry troop to the squadron.

•The ground cavalry troop may require a fire support team.

•The ground cavalry troop needs motorcycles Table 1. Observations made during light infantry division certification. The squadron as currently organized has no organic mortars, so it depended on the attack helicopters of the air troop for fire support. But the air troop’s support was limited to several daylight hours and several hours at night, due to split-based operations and the long distances between Baledogle and A Troop’s area of operations. A mortar section would have been useful to illuminate night operations, to provide reliable, continuous fire support to A Troop while operating far from Baledogle, and for base security.

Air elements worked with A Troop during all ground troop missions.

They were invaluable in helping to locate villages that were not on maps, finding routes to villages or across irrigated agricultural areas, covering areas not accessible to HMMWVs, providing security during operations where much of A Troop had to dismount, or where A Troop could not cover all routes in or out of an area to be searched, and to provide fire support on call. FM communications provided the link between air and ground elements.

Due to the split operations, fuel resupply was especially difficult. The squadron does not have an organic support platoon, and the brigade III/V platoon was only equipped with 5-ton tank and pump units. For resupply, the aviation brigade relied on heavy expanded mobility tactical trucks from units in Germany. A large number of convoys were required to build up the bulk supplies of aviation fuel needed at Baledogle.

The brigade’s class III/V platoon provided outstanding support, but was stretched thin by having to conduct refueling operations at two airfields, as well as in the field. An organic support platoon (equipped with HEMTTs) would have provided the squadron with a more robust and capable fuel resupply.

GPS units in both ground and air elements made location and coordination easy and efficient. They were used on aircraft and ground vehicles (troop commander and platoon leader vehicles only). They worked well, allowing accurate cross-country maneuver, particularly in terrain with no significant landmarks. GPS also allowed units to link up for resupply in vast, featureless areas.

saves fuel, flight time, and crew endurance by facilitating reliable point-to-point navigation. GPS should be issued to each scout vehicle.

Junior leaders must be confident and competent to make quick, hard decisions in their dealings with civilians. These decisions had to be made while operating relatively independently and out of communication range with their superiors. Counterintelligence teams and interpreters are critical to the success of reconnaissance operations in this environment, where the best sources are the people. Each scout platoon should have an interpreter. The cavalry squadron must have reliable long-range communications.

The squadron is expected to operate over extremely large areas, and in this instance, the split operations and the great distances between elements strained the capability of the communications available.

Sustainment of operations at two separate locations stretched squadron assets to the maximum. This level of support required intensive maintenance, carefully managed missions, and support of only the highest priority missions.

Troop/Platoon Operations The ground troop received long-range missions requiring extended operations away from the secure base at Baledogle.

The ground troop was nearly always out of range of fire support due to the large areas covered, although air cavalry was usually 10-30 minutes of flight time away. The ground cavalry troop reduced the amount of ammunition and equipment carried in its HMMWVs to maximize space for the extra water and fuel needed for extended range operations. Full basic loads were not carried. The troop traveled with full fuel tanks, 4-5 fuel cans per vehicle, and 4-5 water cans per vehicle. All trucks were sandbagged.

Ground scouts employed binoculars and TOW missile sights during the day. At night, ground scouts used PVS-5s, PVS-2s and the TOW thermal sights, which were invaluable in providing early warning of approaching personnel, vehicles, and animals during assembly area and checkpoint operations at night. The number of night vision goggles was extremely limited, with one PVS-5 per vehicle and a PVS-2 per M60 machine gun. The number of night vision devices is limited and should be increased to a device for each scout. Additionally, each vehicle needs a thermal sight capability for night operations. Scout platoons were mounted during the majority of operations. Dismounted patrolling was done by engineers, ARMOR — 29 Somalia Scenes light infantry, and other personnel from the base camp. Scouts used dismounted movement during some area reconnaissance operations in areas not readily accessible to HMMWVs, but only for very short periods, in small groups, and within supporting distance of scout vehicles. Scouts did not routinely conduct surveillance missions, so, dismounted observation posts were not used.

Convoy security was normally a platoon mission that rotated among platoons. Usually, there was only one such mission a day. The convoys were military supply runs only (no humanitarian assistance convoys were escorted). Being based at two different locations exacerbated fuel resupply. Scout platoons were not employed in ambushes or night observation posts. Road checkpoints were employed instead. Leaders decided the location of a checkpoint after an initial daylight reconnaissance, then the platoon executing the checkpoint would move in after dark. Each checkpoint consisted of four vehicles, two HMMWVs parked on the road and two more set up off the road in a position to provide immediate support or to intercept vehicles that did not halt. TOW thermals provided early warning when vehicles approached.

The checkpoint was set up in one location and was maintained all night.

Movement always occurred in groups of at least two vehicles. When a troop encountered a village, the troop would cover the area outside the village and send two vehicles in. The intent was to determine the population of the village, locate the village elder, and ascertain the identity of the clan occupying the village.

Inhabitants were questioned regarding bandit activity, clan rivalries, and what type of assistance was needed. Another objective was to spend some time in the village and try to build good will. The mix of weapons (.50 cal, M60, MK19, TOW) available within the scout platoon proved flexible and successful. However, a lesson was driven home — scout platoons require four-man scout crews because the three-man crew does not allow a two-man scout team to dismount while the vehicle is still crewed with gunner and driver. Platoons routinely found themselves in a situation where more dismounts were required than were available.

Conclusions The 3-17 Cavalry’s experience in Operation RESTORE HOPE provides a good understanding of the divisional light cavalry’s strengths and weaknesses. Clearly, light cavalry has utility for operations in peacekeeping operations and other types of conflicts. The squadron’straining in preparation for war was also excellent preparation for the operations performed in Operation RESTORE HOPE. The preparation for austere conditions and training in the requisite combat skills allowed the soldiers of 3-17 Cavalry to acquit themselves in an outstanding manner during the operation. But Somalia indicates, as does previous peacetime experience, that divisional light cavalry squadrons need to be more robust and self-sustaining. The addition of a third air troop and second ground troop, organic fire support, and additional logistics support (especially class III) assets would provide the light division commander additional capability and flexibility.

(The addition of a third air troop and a second ground troop were presented to the Chief of Staff of the Army in December 1993, during a Force Design Update. The CSA deferred action to the Force XXI design at that time.) For operations in Somalia, the ground cavalry troop had an adequate mix of weapons, but could have used additional GPS devices, night vision equipment, and long-range communications equipment.

These fixes, among others, would optimize the light cavalry’s potential and flexibility.

Light cavalry is deployable, responsive, and flexible. Its ability to cover large areas with minimal personnel, and its relatively high level of tactical mobility and firepower,- allowed the 10th Mountain Division to concentrate its light infantry battalions in other essential areas. The squadron also performed invaluable service as a division quick reaction force. The task organization of TF 3-17 Cavalry was in constant fluctuation with each new mission assigned after deployment. The squadron’s inherent flexibility enabled it to employ organic and attached assets to accomplish each mission. The light cavalry squadron, with its combination of ground and air troops, has proven to be a very versatile organization.

ARMOR — In Our Next Issue...

Cavalry troopers of the 3-17, tasked with protecting humanitarian relief operations in Somalia and keeping the peace, conduct extensive checkpoint operations along rural roads.

Major Jeffrey R. Witsken is a 1981 Distinguished Military Graduate of Xavier University. A graduate of AOBC, AOAC, CAS3, and CGSC, he has served as a tank platoon leader, support platoon leader, and battalion S4. He has commanded D/5-12 Cavalry, A/3-17 Cavalry, and also served as S3, 3-17 Cavalry. He is currently assigned as chief, Analysis Division, Directorate of Combat Developments, USAARMC.

Lawrence G.

Vowels received a BA in Mathematics in 1970 from Bellarmine College in Louisville, Ky., and an MS in Engineering Management from the University of Louisville in 1980. A career civil servant, for the last 13 years he has worked as an operations research analyst in the Analysis Division, Directorate of Combat Developments, Ft.

Knox, Ky. He has also worked for the U. S. Army Reception Station, Directorate of Industrial Operations, Comptroller, Management Information Systems Officer, and U. S. Army Armor and Engineer Board, all at Ft. Knox. He also worked for the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers and Naval Ordnance Station in Louisville.