Brigade Deep Operations: Task Organizing for Victory

by Captaln Wllllam K. McCurry Jr. and Flrst Lieutenant Joel R. Phllllps “Exploitation of depth in operations demands imagination, boldness, foresight, and decisiveness in leaders. Commanders must see beyond the requirements of the moment, actively seek information on the area and the enemy in depth, and employ every asset available to extend their operations in time and space.”’ Somewhere at the National Training Center... Time NOW...

“Bravo Zero Six. this is Golf Zero Six, 36 BMPs and 12 T-72s have penetrated Phase Line TEXAS and are moving west. My task force reserve has been destroyed.”

“Roger, Golf Zero Six. break; Bravo Zero Five, this is Bravo Zero Six. Move the brigade reserve to attack by Fire Position Alpha Zulu now!” “Bravo Zero Six, this is Bravo Zero Five. The brigade reserve was forced into MOPP 4 by an OPFOR chemical attack. As they were repositioning they ran into an OPFOR FASCAM mi‘nefield, break; the reserve is down to two MIS and three M3s and can’t be in position for at least I 2 minutes.’* Bravo Zero Six took off his CVC helmet and threw it on the top of the tank, narrowly missing his slnprised loader. Throughout the preparation of the order and the maneuver rehearsal the brigade commander had counted on his battalion task forces to buy the time needed to react to the enemy’s main attack. But their fight With a forward detachment, and then the advance guard had not gone as expected. Chaos filled his command net. Confusion reigned. Command and control deteriorated further when the OPFOR regimental main body rolled forward at maximum speed to exploit the success of the advance guard. The company that opposed the OPFOR main effort was quickly ovenun. Bravo Zero Six cursed under his breath. Everything had happened so fast. There was no time to implement the plan that the brigade had so painfully refined during the past 36 hours. If he could have slowed the enemy down, disrupted and attrited their lead elements, the Outcome might have been different. His brigade had been defeated. Now there was nothing left to do but endure another grueling AAR.

The problem confronted by Bravo Zero Six is not new. The heavy maneuver brigades of the U. S. Army lack the organic reconnaissance and surveillance assets to effectively fight a deep operation as depicted in FM 100-5, Operations and FM 71-3, The Armored and Mechanized Irlfantry Brigade. But the lack of organic assets does not eliminate the requirement to fight the deep operation. FM 71-3 states that “Brigades can direct battles against enemy battalions and regiments up to 15 kilometers forward of the FLOT...”* Brigade Deep Operatlons As often practiced, the brigade deep operation only extends to the battalion scouts located five to seven kilometers forward of the main combat force. The remaining gap is supposed to be covered by army avhtion assets, elec-mnic warfare systems, and close air support (CAS). Unfortunately, these systems are seldom under the direct control of the maneuver brigade commander. As a result, brigade targets are ignored, or not covered due to lack of assets. An option available to the brigade commander to overcome this limitation is to task organize a brigade deep operations force. Such a force would concentrate on fdling the reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) void between division assets and battalion assets. ‘Throughout history, military leaders have recognized the importance of R&S. Gaining and maintaining contact with the enemy is essential to win the battle. Our own military history contains many examples where our knowledge of the enemy, or lack of knowledge, directly led to victory or defeaLn3 Effectively increasing the R&S zone allows the commander to employ one of the key tenets of our &Land Battle doctrine - depth. “Depth is the extension of operations in space, time, and resources. Through the use of depth, a commander obtains the necessary space to maneuver effectively, the necessary time to plan, arrange,. and execute operations, and the necessary resources to win. Momentum in the attack and elasticity in the defense derive from depth.’“ Organlzatlon for Brlgade Reconnaissance A brigade going into combat today would require a reconnaissance organization under its direct control to act as the brigade commander’s “directed telescope.’J Brigade observation posts are a possible answer to today’s warfghting needs. Although a separate, independent reconnaissance troop would be preferred, this solution is not in the cards for the near future. The alternative is to do nothing, or organize existing forces within the brigade.

September-October 7993 According to FM 71-3, Armored And Mechanized Infantry Brigade, the effective task organization of the brigade assets is a critical part of the brigade command and control (C’) process. Furthermore, a specified task of that C’ process is the positioning of “intelligence resources to facilitate fighting the’battle in the brigade area of operations.”6 The brigade S2 is re sponsible for making recommendations to the commander “on changes to the task organization required to accomplish the reconnaissance, surveillance, and counterreconnaissance Where can the brigade pull reconnaissance forces from? One technique is to “task organize” the scout platoon from the reserve battalion under brigade control. Under the new ten-HMMWV scout platoon Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) the brigade could adequately meet its deep R&S requirements by tasking teams from the reserve task force’s scout platoon and augmenting their scouts with Ground Surveillance Radars (GSRs), Combat Observation/Lasing Teams (COLTS) and OH-58D Kiowa helicopters. To make this organization effective takes prior training and good standard operating procedures (SOPS). plan.”7 Tasking four HMMWVs, each manned with four scouts per team, could provide the brigade up to eight observation posts (4 x 2 man dismounted OPs and 4 x 2 man OPs located near the HMMWV). Combine this with two GSRs from the brigade’s slice, and three COLTS, and the brigade has 13 OPs to assist with the deep fight. In addition, one of the brigade RETRANS/Radio 0 teams will be tasked to ensure long range communications (see Figure 1). The change to the HMMWV-equipped scout platoon adds a degree of stealth that was lacking with the M3 Bradley. Although the HMMWV lacks the antitank weapon systems the M3 provided, it should be remembered that the scouts primary mission is reconnaissance and surveillance, not fighting. One vital piece of M3 equipment that is now missing from the HMMWV scout organization is a thermal night sight. This MTOE deficiency will won be corrected. With this exception, the equipment necessary for the scout platoon to accomplish the deep R&S mission is already apart of its MTOE or is available within the army supply system (see Figure 2).

Brlgade Reconnalssance Techniques The brigade deep operation is planned by the brigade staff. The brigade executive officer controls the deep fight and coordinates deep operation activities from the brigade main command post. He is assisted by the Equipment List PER TEAM x hrc99j3 1 x GPS 1 x DIRECTIONALANTENNA x COMPASS x OE-254 1 x PRC-77 WITH KY-57 x PRC-77 BAllERlES 1 x VRC 46 WITH KY-57 x SPOOL OF COMMO WIRE x TA-312 WITH BATTERIES x TA-1 2 x BINOCUIARS (20 x 80) x PVS-7s 10 xVS17 PANELS x 2 QUART CANTEENS x 1 QUART CANTEENS x MAP OF AREA OF OPERATIONS x MREs FIELD UNIFORM PER SOP x M16A2 CLEAR TRASH BAGS x M 2 3 x 5 GALLON WATER CANS x 1 GALLON COLLAPSIBLE WATER CANS

Figure 2 Brigade Deep Operations Template (Offense) m dv -v --A u a A COLT A

-Figure 3 brigade tactical command post and the brigade R E M S to maintain FM radio communications.

In the offense, the brigade conducts its deep fight throughout its zone of attack up to the objective and beyond to a limit of advance. The mission of the brigade OPs is to conduct reconnaissance along the axis of attack and of the objective. Surveillance would then be established on the objective, which will be designated a deep engagement area. The designation of the deep engagement area is the result of a joint staff effort between the S3, S2, FSO, Army Air Liaison and Air Force Liaison. This allows the brigade commander to fight the deep battle with a true combined arms team that has a dedicated R&S asset in place to pm-vide the intelligence necessary to direct the fight. (See Figure 3) In a deliberate attack, the brigade deep fighters would begin infiltration 36 to 48 hours in front of the main body (they will carry a basic load of supplies to operate 72 horn before resupply). If helicopters are available, the dismounted OPs or the vehicles I can be inserted near the objective. The ground infiltration would ideally begin under the cover of darkness. Assisted by the GSRs, COLTs and possibly the OH-58Ds, the ground teams would begin movement in teams of two vehicles each using abounding overwatch technique. In addition, one battery from the brigade’s direct support (DS) artillery battalion must be in position to provide indirect fires along the entire infiltration route. To be successful, the teams will have to use the concealment provided by the terrain and the patience to stop, look, and listen, as they progress along their route. The brigade S2 and the scout platoon leader will conduct detailed intelligence prepamtion of the battlefield (IPB) to determine the infiltration route and to identify potential danger areas. The progress of the deep operation force will be monitored by the brigade S2 over the operations and intelligence net. Once in position, they will be able to provide the brigade commander critical information up to 15 kilometers in front of his main force. Concurrently, they can begin harassing and attriting enemy forces with artillery and CAS.

The GroundIVehicular Laser Locator Designator (G/VLLD) that the COLTs carry forward allows the deep force to attack targets with the pinpoint accuracy that Copperhead provides.

The benefit of this technique is that the brigade commander receives the intelligence necessary to fight the deep operation, and he has a valuable asset capable of reporting critical information throughout the battle, such as where and when the enemy com- mits his reserve.

In the defense, the concept works much the same way. A major difference is the brigade’s deep operations force does not have to infitrate through enemy lines to get to the objective and establish deep engagement areas. The IPB process will identify the enemy’s most likely avenues of attack, and the brigade staff will plan the deep engagement areas along those avenues. Target reference points (TRPs), carefully marked in each engagement area, allow the deep force to quickly send spot reports and accurately target enemy vehicles, which increases the lethality of the deep fight (see Figure 4).

The brigade deep force will be positioned to observe deep engagement areas with the COLTs and OH-58Ds having initial priority of fires within the brigade. As in the offense, one battery will be positioned so that it can range the deep engagement areas with Copperhead. In addition, the brigade deep force will be in position to support other combat multipliers, such as army aviation and CAS. Brigade Deep Operations Template m (Defense)

- dw -v -A u r n A ODLT A

PLcoLmADo PLKANSAS

I- -P I I -Figure 4 Notes ‘FM 1009.

Opmfim.

Washington, D. C., Headquarters, Department of the Army. May 1986, p. 17.

2FM 71-3. Armored ond Mechanized Infantry Brigode, Washington, D. C.. Headquarters. Department of the Amy, May 1989. p. 1-1.

3FM 34-2-1, Tocfiu. Techniques and Procpdures For Reconnaissance and Surveillance and Intelligence Support to Counlerreconnaissance, Washington. D. C.. Headquarters, Department of the Army, 19 June 91. p. 1-1.

4FM 100-5. p.16. ’Van Creveld. Maltin. Command In War. Haward University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1985.

6FM 71-3, p. 2-2. ’Ibid.. p. 4-16.

This organization allows the commander to increase the depth of the battlefield in terms of terrain and time. Based on a 20 KMPH rate of march, the brigade OPs can provide the commander up to 90 minutes waming of approaching enemy forces. When combined with the effect that air and artillery will have in attriting and disrupting the enemy’s echelons as he attacks, the commander has the opportunity to establish the conditions for victory. control to act as the brigade commander’s ‘‘directed telescope.“ We must train in peace as we intend to fight in war. A brigade deep operations force is a possible answer to today’s warfighting need. “Bravo Zero Six, this is Bravo Zero Five. Deep OP One Alpha has identified the regimental main effort moving east along Axis COBRA, break; He just passed through Deep Engagement Area PLUTO, and his strength is down to 24 BMPs and seven T-72s. over.”

“Roger Bravo Zero Five. Execute Trap Play Lightning now!” “Wilco. we estimate our forces will be in position and set at least five minutes before the enemy arrives at Phase Line Colorado.”

We would like to thank Major John F. Anta1 for his assistance and contributions in preparing this article.

Task organizing the deep operations force at brigade makes sense. It is the only way to execute AirLand Operations doctrine with the current MTOE organization. This technique can be an important part of battlefield success. It requires extensive training and practice to be effective. Task-organized brigade deep operations forces should be seriously considered as apart of every brigade’s warfighting techniques. If we went to war today, the brigade would require a reconnaissance organization under its direct Captain William K. McCuny Jr. is the S2 of 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division (Mech). He served as the S2 of 2-34 Armor Battalion during Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM and an NTC rotation. His previous assignments include company FSO, artillery recon and survey officer, and artillery platoon leader. He is an ROTC graduate from Northwestern Oklahoma State University.

First Lieutenant Joel R. Phillips is currently the assistant S2 for 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division (Mech). He graduated from the University of Iowa in 1989, attended Military Intelligence Officer Basic Course, and then Ranger School before serving as a ground surveillance radar platoon leader and company executive officer in the 102d MI Battalion, Korea. He then served as the assistant S2 for 3-37 Armor Battalion.