German Antiguerrilla Operations in the Balkans, 1941-44

Special Book Feature German Antiguerrilla Operations in the Balkans, 1941-44 Reviewed by Second Lieutenant Andrew D. Goldin, USAR German An@uem7la OperatFbns in the Balkans, 194144 is a historical study published by the Army Center of Military History in the years immediately after Wodd War Two. Many of the book's facts are based on interviews of high ranking figures who played key roles in the occupation of Yugoslavia and Greece. In addition, the study makes extensive use of unit histories and other official accounts. The purpose of the study is not to give an exhaustive account of the German occupation; rather, it is to describe the military aspects of the guerrilla movement and the German operations against them. Allied actions and political considerations are included only to the extent that they affected Axis activities. For the same reasons, actions of German allied armies (Italian, Bulgarian, and puppet government) are only briefly covered. What makes the book a valuable and timely addition to anyone's library today is the study's description of the rise and development of the assorted guerrilla movements, the German reaction to them, and most importantly, the lessons learned from the German occupation experience. According to the author, Yugoslav and Greek forces were 'stunned, rather than crushed, by their sudden defear at the hands of the modem and mechanized Germans. After the armistice in May 1941, prisoners were quickly paroled and various puppet states were established in the German and Italian areas of occupation. While " ... the German authorities were cognizant of the threat (presented by) these unemployed ex-soldiers and other dissident elements, little was done to forestall the obvious threat of revolt' Mismanaged occupation and bfutal repression of the population fanned the smoldering resentment against the Axis forces, and as a result acts of sabotage and convoy ambushes became m-monplace throughout greater Yugoslavia by the end of 1942. To their credit. the Germans and Italians did establish various client states in their respective zones. This proved useful both polilically and militarily, as granting a token amount of selfdetermination helped establish a veneer of legitimacy to the German occupation. Furthermore. the establishment of these vassal states facilitated the handoff of daily policing duties from the over-stretched German Army to the local authorities, thereby reducing the German's occupation burden. While the technique of "divide and conquer" was a useful political tool. and eased Axis administrative and policing duties, the military units formed by these national states proved to be of little use in combating insurgents. Consequently. much of the actual fighting fell to the regular WehmcM (German Army) troops. who were desperately needed elsewhere.

Significantly, both the Germans and the Allies considered Ihe Balkans in general, and Yugoslavia in particular, a secondary front. Accordingly, neither side was willing to make a serious commitment of forces there. Although Yugoslavia had a key location and valuable natural resources, the Germans did not and could not commit more than the minimum number of troops necessary to keep order. As a result, 'suppression of the resistance movement remained a makeshift affair.'

Meanwhile, the organizations and equipment of the inwr-gents varied widely. The groups were divided along ethnic, reliiious, a d political lines. Chetniks (royalists) preferred to conduct primarily small scale operations of sabotage in order to limit likely Axis retaliation in their fixed base areas, i.e.. local cities and villages. Meanwhile, the Partisans (Communists) operated in battalion and larger sized mobile maneuver groups not limited to specific regions. With little or no "base area. to protect, the Partisans were more willing to attack German and Italian units directly and incur the possibility of greater retaliation against the local civilian population. By mid 1943, the political and military picture became muddled. In addition to the existence of Serbian. Croatian. and Bosnian (Muslim) Axis client states, the presence of German and Italian troops, and the activities of the predominantly Serb Partisans and Croatian Chetniks, there were also guerrilla groups who acted with no authority other than their own. Conflicting nationalistic. political, and religious ideals soon brought on infighting even under the yoke of foreign occupation. As the study obsenres, "A conflict within a conflict soon developed, with one Yugoslav force attacking the other while that force was already engaged against the occupation troops.'

A case in point is the Montenegran revolt against the Italians in 1941. The Italians, although strong and well equipped, found it necessary to enlist the assistance of Chetnik irregulars to suppress the insurrection. In return for keeping the area free of Partisans. the Chetniks were rewarded with arms, territory. and control of much of the wr-rounding countryside while the Italians restricted themselves to garrisoning cities. In this manner the 'insurgents' were defeated.

In 1942. guerrilla operations were being conducted in h e German sector. albeit more cautiously and on a smaller scale. Mines were laid, wire communications were cut, and roadside ambushes were well planned and vigorously executed. Guerrillas took full advantage of the remote, wooded mountains that characterize much of Yugoslavia to hide from pursuers and prepare for future operations. German reaction to these attacks, I... resulted in a large number of casualties and arrests, but accomplished little in effectively curbing the guerrilla movement. Nor did the shooting of hostages or the burning of homes of suspects and whole communities suspected of sheltering guerrillas achieve the desired results.' The next year saw the German situation in the Balkans become increasingly difficult. Guerrilla actions became larger and more aggressive while the Germans themselves had fewer units with which to meet the threat. In addition, the Italian surrender compounded the German manpower shortage while at the same time nearly doubling the area they had to occupy. At the same time, the German high command felt the need to defend Yugoslavia and Greece from a possible Allied seaborne invasion.

The German response to these dangers took three forms. First, they shifted units within the theater in order to insure adequate coverage of aitical areas. This induded an expansion of the Bulgarian area of responsibility, the temporary addition to the region of a combat hardened division from Russia, and various corps-level operations against known guerrilla concentrations. Most interesting, however. was the formation and use of companysized units to conduct long range, long duration, Ranger-type patmls. These companies (unlike the preponderance of the German garrison units in the region) were composed of young, combat experienced soldiers who used a combination of stealth and subterfuge to identify, track, and attack insurgents. Although effective, 30 September-October 1993 these units were not numerous enough to seriously affect the outcome of the campaign.

Overall, German activities were successful in inflicting casualties on the guerrillas, but these operations had little lasting effect. Despite serious losses of men and equipment, resistance continued to grow stronger.

With Allied logistical backing, captured equipment, and a populace ready to revolt, the Partisans and Chemiks took on more of the characteristics of a regular army, complete with uniforms, a semblance of standardized equipment, replacement organizations, a functional chain of command, and rigidly enforced regulations. At the same time the insurgents became bolder by attacking German and Italian units directly; at one time during the confusion surrounding the surrender of the Italians, they were able to briefly shut down several key installations and obtain large stocks of war material.

By 1944 the German situation in the Balkans became increasingly distressed as the Allies threatened by air from Italy and by land from the east. At the same time, the Germans saw increasing defections from their Croat and Serb auxiliaries to the guerrilla side. Yet, despite their difficulties, the German army in the Balkans remained a powerful fighting force. with 500,000 men that could mass and crush whatever resistance the irregulars could put together. Although another series of operations against guemlla units was successful, the collapse of German forces on the Russian front, and the ensuing westward retreat, soon forced the issue of the German occupation and made German antiguerrilla operations in the region moot.

The study is careful to note that the various guenilla forces of 1944 were substantially different from those of late 1941. The change was so pronounced that the German and allied forces in the area "... expressed the view that the size, armament, organization. and operation of the Partisan units justified the Germans' considering them as an enemy on the same plane with the regular forces of the other nations with which the Reich was at war: With the help of Allied assistance, the major guemlla organizations (Partisans and Chemiks) had become fighting forces in their own right, and had eamed that recognition by their enemy. It was a combined force of Partisans and Red Army soldiers that liberated Belgrade on 20 October 1944, and by doing so hastened the withdrawal of German forces and their collaborationist auxiliaries from the majority of the Balkans.

In conclusion, the guemlla movement had a significant impact on the overall German war effort. As the study writes, The resistance forces, with the assistance of the Allies and aided by the worsening German strategic situation, had finally been able to emerge as an organized for ce... and contributed materially to the liberation of their respective countries. In turn. these resistance forces had speeded the breaking of German power by tying down well over one-half million German troops and preventing their commitment to other fronts."

What lessons are them to be leamed from the German experience in the Balkans, particularly Yugoslavia? And if a foreign force, such as NATO, were to impose itself on the Yugoslavian population, what sort of conditions would it face? Again, the study is a valuable guide. The study concludes, %e success achieved by the guerrillas against the Germans, Italians, and Bulgarians in the Balkans ... strengthened considerably the tradition of resistance to foreign oc-cuoation forces.' And continues to say that, "... them is little doubt that a foreign invader today, from East or West, would be confronted with a formidable task of pacification following a successful campaign against the regular forces of the Balkan nations." If some sort of multinational suppression of resistance to international will were to occur, the writers of the study felt that, to be successful, the occupier must, I... begin his administration with a clear-cut statement of policy, including a promise of eventual withdrawal ... and self determination for the people; a unified military command and distinct delineation of responsibility in the military and political fields; the assignment of trained, well equipped combat troops to the area; the taking of prompt and effective though not excessively harsh measures to quell disorders; and an extensive propaganda campaign to explain the purpose of the occupation and the benefits [of the maintenance] of law and order ..." Although written over forty years ago, the book's accounts of religious and ethnic violence during the German occupation sound as if they were right from today's headlines. The irony here is twofold. First, even the occupation by a hostile foreign power was insufficient motivation for Croats, Serbs, and Muslims to overcome their religious, ethnic, and political hatred to work together -even briefly -against a common enemy. Second, the experience of World War Two and the passage of time since then has made passion and hatred in the region stronger, and not weaker. Indeed, the atrocities committed by these groups on each other has only given the other side further justification to mobilize their respective populations and attack their enemies. It is often said in military history ardes that those who do not know the past are bound to repeat it. This book's eighty-two pages are a quick and valuable read and go far in explaining the difficulties the Germans faced in imposing their will on an unreceptive populace. While the world has changed significantly since the 194Os, to some extent the Balkans (particularly Yugoslavia) has not. Consequently, the lessons leamed by the Germans half a century ago remain valid today and, considering the possibility of American involvement in that area, are worth dose examination. German Antiguerrilla Operations in the Balkans (1941-1944), CMH Pub 104-18, Facsimile edition, 1989. is available at the US. Government Printing Office in Washington, D.C. and costs approximately eight dollars. You may order a copy by calling (202) 783-3238 (commercial); copies may also be available at your regional Government Printing Office. Time spent reading this study is time well spent.