Counterreconnaissance: Defining the Nature of Security Area Operations

COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE

Defining the Nature of Security Area Operations by CPT Blaise Comell-d’Echert Jr. One of the most common recurrent themes in the combat arms professional journals is the success or failure of countemonnaissance based on experience at the various combat training centers. There continues to be a valid concern that many units lack a clear understanding of how to win the counterrecon battle. Much of the finger-pointing is aimed at the task force (TF) scouts. That this problem is an enduring one is evidenced by the conduct of a special focus rotation (87-1) at the National Training Center (Nn3) at Fort Irwin in 1987. That rotation produced an excellent study which examined not only scout performance in reconnaissance/counterreconnaissance, but the integration of the TF staff in planning and executing those tasks. That study led to the adoption of the HMMWV scout MTO&E, and a transition to a stealthy scout. Now, five years later, we continue to observe critical deficiencies in reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance at the TF level. The consensus is that there is a doctrinal void about reconnaissance and security operations, except in cavalry manuals. Further, that units lack the ability to differentiate between reconnaissance, countemconnaissance, and security tasks, making them unable to focus their efforts. At a lower level, there is still much blame attributed to the scout platoon and its inability to win both the recon and countemcon battles. Finally, there is a growing awareness that reconnaissance and surveillance planning lacks the level of emphasis it requires as the critical fmt step in planning operations.

The source of many difficulties in planning and executing countemcon is the failure to understand what counterrecon is, and how it fits into the framework of the defense. Foremost is the notion that countemon is a mission or an operation in its own right. It is not. Counterrecon is a security task, and understanding that helps integrate counterrecon tasks into the framework of the defense. But before we go into greater detail, it is essential that there be no failure to comprehend key terminology which will figure prominently in the ensuing discussion. .Reconnaissance -the directed effort to collect information about the enemy and the area of operations. .Security - measures taken by a unit to protect itself from all acts that may impair its effectiveness. .Surveillance - systematic observation by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. .Security operations -operations designed to obtain information about the enemy and provide reaction time, maneuver space, and protection to the main body. (A security mission in a TF would be a screen.) .Screening force -maintains surveillance, provides early warning to the main body, impedes and harasses the enemy with indirect fires, destroys enemy reconnaissance elements within its capabilities. counterr reconnaissance -the denial of enemy reconnaissance efforts. The directed effort to prevent visual observation or detection about our activities by enemy reconnaissance elements.

Counterrecon or Security Force? I contend that there is no doctrinal void, but there is a poor appreciation for developing the security area as an essential piece of the battlefield. There is poor integration of reconnaissance and security tasks between the 17- and 71-series, and the presentation of security and counterrecon tasks could be better in the 71- manuals. However, the doctrine is there, and if applied would solve many problems for the task force.

What does FM 71-2 say about security forces? It tells us that the security force assists the passage of any covering force, gains and maintains contact with the enemy, locates and destroys enemy recon elements, and closes gaps in forward obstacles. Security forces serve as part of the TF commander’s surveillance, counterrecon, and deception effort. Where the difficulty occurs is in the recommendation and selection of the security force. FM 71-2 is not prescriptive on this issue, except for the comment that scouts are the primary coun-tkonnaissance asset of the task force. Earlier (in Chapter 3). the notion that the scouts are normally the TF security force is implanted. However, if you read the sequence of defense, defense of a sector, and the counterrecon subheadings in Chapter 4, there is very little question about the importance of developing the security area, and designating the elements that constitute a security force. The fmt phase of every battle is a battle for information. Reconnaissance is the active measure of acquiring information, so the recon battle is one side fighting to get information while the other attempts to deny it. Hence the term counterreconnaissance. But countemon is only one aspect of the security area, and the security mission. Suppose the enemy did not echelon, or layer his recon assets. Does that mean there is no requirement for a security area? Of course not: the security area is that buffer which allows the defender to hold the attacker at arm’s length until conditions are favorable, either in force ratios or information. The forces operaling in the security area have a significant role in the sequence of the defense. They allow uncompromised occupation and development of the main bat-Very few units will assign a securiiy area mission to a companybeam, yet it is very clear that this is what is required to accomplish the security area mission. Routinely, the security area is screened only by the scout platoon and, at a certain point in time (12 hours prior to defend NLT time), a counterrecon force is dispatched to occupy positions in the security area. tle area They defeat enemy recon efforts and probing attacks by advance guard formations. They observe and repor& the approach of the enemy main body, and some elements remain in place to monitor the approach of subsequent echelons. Finally, they serve as the means of ejecting or destroying enemy remnants following a successful defense.

Very few units will assign a security am mission to a company/team, yet it is very clear that this is what is required to accomplish the security am mission. Routinely, the security area is screened only by the scout platoon and, at a certain point in time (12 hours prior to defend NLT time), a counterrecon force is dispatched to occupy positions in the security area. This is a result of perceiving counterrecon as a separate, rather than an integrated task. Part of this misconception is perhaps derived from FM 17-95 and 17-98, which talks about options for the counterrecon force. However, Fh4 71-2 clearly suggests using a companybun as the security force.

Some of that clarity may be muddied by references to the scouts being augmented for countemon tasks. Still, the concept of using a company/team as a security force is reinforced by the description of tasks for a companylteam assigned the reserve mission in FM 71-1.

A company assigned a screen mission will accomplish one or more of the following tasks. deny observation of main defensive positions, destroy enemy reconnaissance, deceive enemy about the location of the MBA, and delay enemy flanking maneuvers. A company assigned a screen mk-sion must accomplish the following critical task maintain continuous surveillance on all high-speed battalion-size avenues of approach, destroy or repel all recon patrols, locate the forward security element of an advance guard main body and track its movement, while withdrawing, maintain contact with each FSE from each advance guard battalion, report its activity, and make maximum use of artillery and mom to delay, harass, and destroy the enemy.

If we remember what needs to be done in the security area, it becomes very easy to decide who can do it. That is, after all, the purpose of task organization. Scouts can acquire enemy recon elements, they can maintain surveillance on NAIs, and they can escort covering forces back through or around the TF MBA. A company/tm can prevent enemy pursuit of covering forces; a Conm’s engineers can close gaps in and construct forward obstacles; a CoDm has a C2 structure to synchronize the ele ments in the security area; and a Conm has the logistic support structure to sustain operations in the security area (maintenance, medevac, and resupply). Key points to remember are that scouts are trained and equipped to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance, while infantry/armor teams have the training and equipment to conduct fire and maneuver to destroy enemy reconnaissance. Security involves reconnaissance, surveillance, and counterrecon tasks. If counterrecon is the preliminary battle fought mainly in the security area, then success will require the integration of all battlefield operating systems @OS) in planning and executing counterreconnaissance as a function of security.

RBS Plan Supports Counterrecon Efforts One of the best sources for planning countmonnaissance is the recently published FM 34-2-1 (19 June 1991). A tactics, techniques, and procedures manual, it spells out, in excellent detail, how R&S planning supports counterreconnaissance. It is not my intention to go into the fmer points of developing an R&S plan, but it is important to understand that the R&S plan is the mechanism that focuses the security efforts of the whole TF to counter the enemy’s reconnaissance effort. The R&S plan provides the means to position assets to locate, target, and destroy enemy recon assets by integrating IPB and staff planning with a dual focus on both recon and main body approaches.

The typical IPB products generated during the threat integration phase of the IPB cycle at the situation and event template. There is a clear distinction between situation and event templates for recon elements and main body elements. The S2 will generate a situation template based on enemy recon principles. He will consider that the recon will use routes that offer goad cover and concealment, may favor nominally “no-go” terrain, will want to establish dismount points and Oh, as well as overwatch positions. While the situation template is normally concerned September-October 1993 with how the enemy will be constrained by terrain, based on the modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO), those same constraints would now be considered mobility comdors for the enemy reconnaissance.

Based on the recon Situation template, the S2 has an idea of where he can expect to find enemy recon elements. Considering line of sight (LOS) limitations, weather and terrain, as well as the enemy’s capabilities (thermals, infrared, GSR, etc.), the S2 will try to define enemy recon-specific key terrain. These areas will be labeled as named areas of interest (NAIs) on the event template. He will also want to establish a limit of enemy advance (LOEA), a line beyond which the enemy will be able to detect or acquire elements in the main battle area. Essentially, the LOEA becomes an enemy recon “no penetration” line. It is at this point that the S2 integrates these products in the development of the R&S plan.

The LOEA establishes the rear of the security area, beyond which R&S assets must be focused NAIs were determined during preparation of the recon event template, and will probably have some overlap with NAIs designated for the main body event template. Based on these NAIs, and to answer the commander’s PIR/IR, the S2 will develop specific information requirements (SIR), which are matched with NAIs and specific R&S assets. These will all be enumerated in the R&S tasking matrix. One of the key features will be to consider redundant collection assets, especially after considering LOS limitations. Staff Integration In R&S Plannlng The S2 is not working on the R&S plan in isolation. Why is this so? While the S2 has primary responsibility for the R&S plan, it is but one element of security for the task force. Counterreconnaissance is another, and much as the S3 is responsible for the TF OPSEC and deception plans, he is also in charge of counterreconnaissance. The S2 will identify enemy recon high value targets, recommend engagement areas and ambush sites (targeted areas of interest - TAIs), and evaluate the R&S assets’ vulnerability to enemy recon elements. The S3 will integrate fire, maneuver, obscmts, and early warning to support the security area. He will task organize the security force to defeat the enemy recon elements well forward. He will plan fire control measures for TAIs, and use targeting data from the S2. He will also develop, execute and monitor the unit’s OPSEC and deception plans. The S3 needs to issue the R&S orders to the TF at the same time he issues the warning order for the u p coming mission.

The TF fire support officer and engineer both have key roles in R&S and security area operations planning. The FSO plans and coordinates all indirect fires to destroy or suppmss enemy recon. To do that effectively requires that FOs are in place to adjust fires. These FOs become another R&S asset for the S2 to consider for collection tasking. The FSO also provides fire support coordination measures to protect security area forces, especially the surveillance elements (scouts and GSRs). In conjunction with the S2, the FSO will recommend high payoff targets and TAIs. The TF engineer ensures that security forces know the locations of all known obstacles in the security area. He plans additional obstacles, especially those that target the mobility of the enemy reconnaissance elements. Any engineer activity in the security area as part of the TF mobility, countermobility effort must be integrated in the R&S plan as well as the scheme of maneuver for the security force. The TF engineer will also assist the S2 with terrain analysis and insights to enemy counterobstacle capabilities or reconnaissance. The XO, as the staff coordinator, ensures that all elements of the staff are working together to develop a product in a timely manner. In conjunction with the S4, he will also develop a logistic sustainment plan for the security force. Key concerns are issues of MSRs into the security area, techniques of resupply, control of movement at night, resupply of pre-stockage of key classes of supply to support the security force’s subsequent mission. For the XO, the underlying concern is ensuring that security operations commence as early as possible. This may require hasty planning and hasty occupation of the security m, followed by refinement as the plan is developed and subsequently approved by the commander.

Doctrinal Fundamentals The fundamentals which must be addressed in the plan for organizing and occupying the security area are listed below: .specify the security force mission oprovide sufficient assets .establish security early and well .put security in the right place oprovide adequate command and .plan to recover security elements .plan for subsequent reconnaissance .enforce local security in the main forward control operations battle area.

By specifying the security force mission, we identify the means and methods to conduct long range observation of avenues of approach, to neutralize or destroy enemy reconnaissance, and to prevent direct enemy observation of our defensive preparations in the September-October 1993

THE R&S OVERLAY

MBA. Task organization, a result of mission analysis, will ensure sufficient assets are allocated. Doctrinally, a screening force is the minimum requirement to detect and destroy enemy recon elements. Remember that TF scouts cannot screen in the doctrinal sense: they have only defensive weapons and cannot destroy enemy reconnaissance. Assigning a Screen mission to a Conm will enable enemy recon to be destroyed, as well as providing greater resistance and deception to the enemy. In addition, the R&S effort is enhanced by focusing the scouts on surveillance. Recon specific IPB and a good R&S plan will facilitate putting security in the right place. This does not necessarily constrain the security force commander, he may adjust elements to suit his scheme of maneuver while still accomplishing specified R&S tasks. However, the TOC must be informed of all changes to unit positioning. Because the TF does not operate by itself, there must be coordination with adjacent security forces, plus there are the R&S requirements imposed by brigade that must be met. The S3 and the security force commander should coordinate contact points, not only in the security area, but also with adjacent security forces. One of the most critical issues that plagues task forces is the provision of adequate command and control for security forces. The cavalry squadron has the advantage of a TOC in each troop. There is no similar capability at the TF level. Because of the critical nature of security area operations it is essential that C2 facilities be adequate to the task. While the security force is performing its mission, the rest of the TF, TOC included, is heavily engaged in preparing the defense. The required degree of attention and focus on the security area won’t be uppermost in the commander’s and staffs thoughts. For this reason, all elements in the se-POSITIONING SECURITY FORCES curity area must be under the command of one leader. There must also, because of the large number of subordinate elements in the security area, be a detailed communication plan to support security area operations. This will require the signal officer to do an equipment survey, determine radio line of sight limitations, establish retrans site if needed, and refine a net structure to ensure information flow. Communications must be effective not only within the security area, but must also be able to be monitored in the TOC and, if possible, at each CoEm HQ in the MBA.

If, as will probably be the case, the security force is also the designated reserve, the plan for recovering the security force must be considered during the development of the defensive scheme of maneuver. Further, the TF commander will want to retain as much combat power in his reserve as possible, so the security force commander will need specific engagement, movement, and disengagement instructions. If the security force is to withdraw through or around units in the MBA, those routes must be planned and rehearsed in detail. Planning the recovery of the security force as a rearward passage of lines makes the most sense. There will still be a need for the commander to “see” the battlefield forward of the MBA during the defense, so the security force or some elements may be left in place, may displace laterally, or may hide for a counterattack by fm or maneu-The fmal element of the security plan deals with security in the main battle area. While it has no direct bearing on the operations in the security area, the MBA is considered and units are tasked in the R&S plan. Security considerations in the MBA will have an impact on counterreconnaissance, OPSEC, the deception plan, and a relationship to the scheme of ma-ver. neuver for the defense. Foremost, anticipate that enemy recon elements will slip through the security area -if not yours, then perhaps an adjacent unit. This is why the S2 considers in his R&S plan dead space or no-go terrain that enters the TF sector on the flanks. The S2 will designate NAIs with attendant SIRS within the TF sector and assign responsibility to units in the MBA. Each unit will also be assigned an area of responsibility for security and local patrols. The S2 focuses those efforts with the R&S plan.

Details of the Security Area The commander of a unit assigned the security force mission has a great deal of work to do in a limited time. However, the limited time must not force the commander to forego some planning and preparation fundamentals. A problem every task force will have to address in its SOP is how the security force gets briefed and conducts coordination and rehearsals, while still ensuring that the TF is adequately secured.

If the staff has done its job, the security force commander will have plenty of focus for his effort. Acquisition assets will already be designated (scouts, GSRs, FOs, combat observa-tionilasing teams (COLTS), ADA EW, etc.) as well as tentative positions, or at least NAIs where they should be looking. This facilitates the commander’s division of responsibility within the security area. However, the command relationship with those other elements must be clearly defined. Are the scouts attached, or OPCON? Are mortars attached, or indirect support, etc.? The major task in the commander’s planning is how he develops the security area to track and destroy enemy reconnaissance elements. He will probably use the same planning considerations as for a mobile defense in sector. As the countemonnaissance element, he must develop and communicate a plan which actively hunts or ambhshes the enemy recon elements. Only in very rare circumstances will a passive trapping technique be effective. Key to the effectiveness of the “killers” is the manner in which the “finders” vector them in to the enemy recon elements. This is one of the most pressing reasons for security force rehearsals. The security force will need to become very familiar with the terrain where they will be operating. Two tasks can be accomplished at the same time if the platoons conduct reconnaissance (gaining information about the area of operations) by driving or patrolling every route, trail, or path in their sector. One is that they gamer a better familiarity with the terrain, and two, they may flush out previously unidentified “stay-behind” or remnant forces from their surveillance positions. Equally important is for the commander to establish maneuver control measures to facilitate the vectoring of killers. While common graphics will help, better would be some method of thermal or passive markers (similar to direct fire m s ) which can be seen by both the finders and killers. Another device the security force commander can use is an amplified sector sketch. After all elements have established themselves overwatching NAIs, TAIs, or EAs, they prepare detailed observation (range) cards. In this case, we are more concerned with what can be Seen and not seen. Accuracy of limits of observation, line of sight, and visual dead space become very important. Depth is more important than an unbroken line of overlapping sectors of observation. Once a target has been acquired, it must be tracked and handed off from asset to asset until the killers announce “target destroyed.” The commander prepares a detailed sketch of the security area showing the overlap, limits, and gaps. Gaps in acquisition coverage are evaluated for patrols, or accepted as allowable risks. This detailed plan is shared with the S2, who will further refine the R&S plan. This pldover-lay also serves as the control graphics for the TOC to monitor operations in If the signal officer did not get involved in producing a commo plan, it is critical that the security force commander do so. The planning responsibility for communication is from higher to lower, so the commander must ensure all the elements in the security area can communicate, and know to whom they should talk. The communication plan is not complete just by assigning particular nets: it must be detailed and refined as the security area develops. Scout section A at OP‘1 knows that GSR 2 and FO team 1 are looking along the same mobility corridor, and all three know that B section of 2d platoon are the killers for that comdor. All know each other’s call signs and have rehearsed tracking and handing off a target (the XO’s vehicle). As you can see, the security force commander organizes the security area much as he would a sector de-the security area. fense, only with greater number of acquisition assets. It is important that he not lose focus on the specified ing requirements. Because of the number of assets for which he is responsible, and the attendant reporting requirements, he should organize his HQ element into a functional mini-TOC. Maximum use must be made of all personnel, drivers, RTOs, commo NCO, chemical NCO, etc. They should, however, have received adequate training in C2 tasks beforehand. There will still be some strain on the Corm’s logistic functions as both the XO and 1SG will likely be deeply involved in supporting a larger organization as well as assisting in command and control functions. Once the security force is in place and preparations in the MBA are well underway, it is not slack time for the tasks Of the R&S plan and his report-TF staff. There is still a responsibility to monitor operations in the security area, refine the R&S plan, facilitate the C2 process for the security force commander, request additional assets from brigade, alert MBA elements of developments in the security area, re-task assets, coordinate with adjacent security forces, coordinate indirect fires, etc., etc.

A number of key activities takes place in the MBA as well, especially during limited visibility. Patrols are directed and coordinated by the S2, obstacles are secured by direct fires and observation, local security measures (patrols, thermal watch, synchronized engine start/stops, etc.) are enforced. Vehicle movement “freeze” times are designated. Direct fire weapon control status should be tight. Reports, even negative sitreps, must arrive on time. Elements in the MBA IPB PROCESS

MCOO

SITUATION TEMPLATE

1 EVENT TEMPLATE

4 1 4 R&SPLANNlNG

NAls PIR/IR SIR

1 1 ANSWERS

DECISION SUPPORT TEMPLATE

SOR

TAls DPs Relationship Between IPB and R&S Planning must be kept informed of the counterrecon effort in the security area, and they must be prepared to ambush any “leakers” that have gotten through.

The break of dawn is not the time to pull the security force out of the security area to occupy their reserve position. The need for a security force still exists even if BDA suggests that all of the enemy recon assets have been destroyed. Because the OPFOR depends heavily on reconnaissance, if his recon did not penetrate the security area, he will probably reorganize and assault in an advance guard or forward detachment formation. If the security force is still in place they will be able to reduce the effectiveness of the attacking echelon’s reconnaissance, as well as track and delay the main body approach. Disengagement and the requirement to not become decisively engaged will be tough to control, but the benefits far outweigh the alternative of not having a security force in the security area as the main body approaches. Vacating the security area is event - not time -driven.

Focused Training Given the relative importance of the security area to the outcome of a defensive battle, training for security tasks should have a fairly high priority in both the TF and CoDm METL. For the CoDm, there are two distinctly security-oriented tasks in the ARTEP 71-1-MTP. However, the guard mission is not a relevant security area task for counterreconnaissance. The screen mission (17-2-0312) is, but has its limitations. The underlying assumption in the task performance measures is that the CoPm is the only element in the security area, and that the screen mission is a stationary line of OPs, backed by tank platoons. What we need to accomplish in training for security area operations is the full integration of all BOSS, the staff work and the interaction of multiple units responding to the designated commander. Obviously, each subelement has incremental training tasks it can accomplish to prepare for security area tasks, but until all the pieces are brought together, there will be no synergistic effect. To what extent can simulations assist in the training process? SIMNET probably has the greatest viability because it allows the crews to maneuver and respond to vectoring instructions. The lack of simulated limited visibility conditions is not a problem. The OPFOR controller must have specific instructions and replicate the methods which will be used by OPFOR reconnaissance elements. Multiple training scenarios should be developed to focus on fundamentals: layering or redundant positioning of assets to exercise target acquisition, another to exercise movement control as platoons conduct zone reconnaissance, another to practice vectoring, etc. Simulations such as the Battle Focused Trainer (ak.a. JANUS) are not as effective, but could be used in the early cognitive skills stage of training. Changing Doctrine In the 1970s. our doctrine underwent significant revision, and one of the methods contrived to inculcate that change was the publication of “How to Fight” manuals. As a result of experiences at the NTC, and a belief that the HTF manuals restricted options and constrained initiative, another major shift in our doctrinal publications followed. In conjunction, the schoolhouse made a commitment to teach officers how to think. It is, therefore, somewhat surprising that there is a trend to revise our tactical publications with the inclusion of “Tactics, Techniques, and b e -dures.” Have we accepted that there! is a critical deficiency in our baseline publications, or that our officers can’t think?

As stated earlier, there is no failure in our tactical doctrine to address counterreconnaissance as an element of security area operations. The results of CTC rotations are skewed because of the OPFOR’s excellence. Rewriting doctrine is not the answer, nor is creating a TTP which will connote ‘do these things and you will win.’ The answer to poor performance lies in carefully structured training programs that are clearly missidtask oriented. It starts with the TF commander training his staff and commanders how to think, and how he thinks. Commanders and leaders at all levels must stop assuming that the schoolhouse will produce highly trained, well rounded soldiers and leaders. Training that will lead to success in combat or the CTC only begins at the unit level. Too many of our leaders are using what they think they know about doctrine, rather than studying it and training it. All of the preceding article was derived from existing publications, and is easily accessible to a TF leadership and staff. So, for your next rotation at the NTC or CMTC, do something different. Study doctrine and apply it!

Captain

Blaise Comell-dEchert Jr. is an Infantry officer currently serving as a scout observer/controller at CMTC, Hohenfels. His previous assignments over 15 years of service range from TOW gunner to company XO in the 82d Airborne Division, to company command and S3 in mechanized units in Europe.

Sep fember-October 7993