Remembering General I.D. White

Remembering General I.D. White A Nervous Captain Facing Combat in Korea Has a Three-star Visitor "I want to establish a direct link between your company and my forward Cf, and I want it now.

What are your requirements?" by Major General Geo-rge S. Patton, USA (Ret.) On 18 June, 1990, as I approached the little town of Peterborough, New Hampshire, in order to attend General I.D. White's last formation, I was not surprised to see every flag in the vicinity at half mast. This was a last and well-deserved tribute to a truly great soldier and American who had passed on a few days before, at the age of 89.

I remember him well:

0As Commanding officer of the 82d Reconnaissance Battalion, 2d Armored Division at Ft. Benning, Georgia in 1940-1941 (I was a teenager living there at the time). 0 As commanding general, United States Constabulary in Stuttgart, Germany. .As commanding general, U.S.

Army Armor Center, Fort Knox, Kentucky. .As Commanding general, X US Army Corps, during the Korean War.

Both General White and this writer had the singular honor of commanding the 2d Armored Division, "Hell on Wheels." I did not know him during the World War I1 period, because I was "secure" at West Point at that time. I.D. White, a great soldier, cavalryman, distinguished warrior, and close friend, now rides on to Fiddler's Green. However, I believe it important to his memory that an incident that made an everlasting impression on me should be recorded in ARMOR, the voice of his branch and ours.

In February 1953, I was transferred from assignment with the Command and Staff Department of the Armored School to the Korean Theater as a replacement captain. At that time in my career, I was without combat experience, and, frankly, because there was a war in progress, I was determined to correct that situation. I had been teaching platoon and company tactics to Korean returnees and, without a service ribbon of any type on my uniform, felt that I could not remain longer in that condition without experiencing combat myself. Following the usual administrative processing at the replacement centers in Japan and Yong Dong Po, near Seoul, I was assigned to the 40th Infantry Division, a major subordinate unit attached to X Corps, LTG I.D. White, commanding. Further processing directed me to the 140th Tank Battalion of the division with orders to take command of " A Company of that battalion.

The 140th Tank Battalion was organized with three line companies and a headquarters company. Each company had four platoons assigned, with five M46 (90-mm gun) tanks per platoon. Two headquarters tanks provided a total of

22. I was delighted with this assignment, because I retained some knowledge of this type unit, having commanded a similar one for two years in Germany.

"A" Company was under the operational control of the 12th Republic of Korea Division, which occupied very mountainous terrain in the Soyang River Valley, slightly east of the "Punch Bowl." This general area was known as "Luke's Castle." The tactical situation in February and March 1953 was nearly a stalemate, quite characteristic of the trench warfare of World War 1. We were in fured, hull-defilade positions and engaged enemy targets assigned on a daily basis. We used the long-obsolete M39 weapons carriers to transport ammunition and other supplies to the combat elements. We frequently supported the elimination of hostile probes into the 12th ROK main battle positions. In all candor, other than a few incoming rounds of enemy high-angle fire (mainly 120-mm mortar), there was little action. Our principal problem areas related to the liaison functions between my unit and the several infantry regiments, organic to the 12th ROY which it was our mission to support. These challenges largely were eliminated by the very helpful actions of the U.S. advisory personnel, under the able leadership of COL George Isham. Because of these fine Americans, my relationship with the division was satisfactory.

"A" Company had been "on line" for several months prior to my assumption of command. The troops were tired. The equipment was in marginal condition. Maintenance requirements were increasing, and morale was below standards. Thus, in early May, we learned that we would be relieved in place by "B" Company, lath, and withdraw to corps reserve at Dodge Range, a small but adequate training area located slightly south of the X Corps main CP.

As I recall, "B" Company, commanded by Captain Duane Doherty, replaced my elements on position without incident. With this relief in place completed, "A" Company marched south to the Dodge Range training area in late May 1953. Our assigned mission was rehabilitation, training, and a short but necessary refresher period on tank weapons. On or about 27 May 1953, I learned that heavy enemy attacks were taking place all along the 12th ROK front. In view of the "B" Company losses of several tanks and personnel, I was alerted to be prepared to return to the Luke's Castle area, relieve "B" Company in sector, and assume its mission. A few hours later, I was directed to execute the order and move with all possible speed, to accomplish that specific mission. This was to be a night march to a forward assembly area, at which "A" Company would receive more detailed instructions. The move took place.with an excellent corps military police escort, and we arrived at the designated assembly area with all our assigned tanks just before dawn.

Because of the very difficult terrain, narrow roads, and enemy activity, the relief of "B" Company took the greater part of the next day. Ridgely Gaither, commanding general, 40th Infantry Division, provided the order. In simple terms, I was to: 0Support the 12th ROK Division in sector 0Be prepared to execute continuous delay to the south 0Be prepared to protect and screen the southward movement of the corps and 40th Division artillery, should they be ordered to displace.

The enemy attacks were intense, penetrating the 12th ROK position in several areas. However, through the liaison provided by COL

Isham's advisory teams, I was able to remain reasonably current, maneuvering my elements in accordance with the deployed division, which appeared hard-pressed and fighting for its life. ROK infantry casualties were heavy all along the line.

Our single, most vexing problem was the maintenance of communications with both the 12th ROK CP and my own battalion headquarters, which was providing logistic support during this three-day engagement. At some point in this action, the entire radio repair capability of "A" Company was destroyed by shellfire. Lt. Bob Knight, the communications officer, was severely wounded and was evacuated, along with most of his repair team. His spare sets and basic load of repair parts took a direct 120-mm mortar 'hit and were also destroyed. "A" Company simply was unable to communicate, and to support a ROK unit which did not speak our language was also somewhat vexing. We were simply not informed. Due to other commitments, the repair capability of the 140th was stretched to the lit , and communications help in that area was practically non-existent. Putting it mildly, this captain was deeply concerned. Just at the height of this crisis, with no commo, no current orders, heavy fighting, and the confusion of battle (known to some as the "fog of war"), I heard the sound of two helicopters approaching my observation post, slightly south and east of the most intensive battle area. As the aircraft landed, and the passengers dismounted, I quickly noticed three stars approaching. I reported to the visitor, provided a short "hood top" briefing on the situation as I understood it, and waited for a response from LTG I.D. White, the X Corps commander. He thanked me for my information, however inadequate it was, and then informed me that "A" Company was in a very critical position vis-a-vis our mission to cover the displacing corps and division artillery, if so ordered. He further stated that he was unsure if the ROKs could hold their current line. He then requested my views. Because of our communications problems, I was unable to give the corps commander more than a very general response, explaining to him the loss of my communications capability earlier that morning. I will never forget that visit. He put his arm around my shoulder and, accompanied by his aide, walked us off a few feet from the group. He said, "I've known you since you were 16. You ate doing well, as I expected you would. Your position here is more critical than you realize, because if you fold or are penetrated in force, we could lose all of the artillery to the south. With that thought in mind, I want to - -establish a direct link between your company and my forward CP, and I want to do it now! What are your requirements?"

Luckily, I was in possession of my list of communications needs, to include personnel replacements, and I informed the general accordingly. He summoned his aide, CPT Bob Drake, and handing him my list, ordered him to take the helicopter to altitude, call corps, and "Get 'em!" Within two hours, several repair and supply personnel airived by helicopter with extra sets and spare radio parts of the type I needed. "A" Company's communications problems were quickly solved. This, then, was I.D. White at his characteristic best. He displayed trust and confidence in his subordinates. He was decisive, and, as all good commanders should do, he came to the forward battle area to see for himself. Above all, he took action quickly and without fanfare or confusing staff work. Shortly thereafter, the situation stabilized, and the enemy units pulled back to their former battle positions, after very heavy losses. In that connection, and with the vital assistance of a section of quad SO-caliber machine gun mounts, we piled up over 800 Chinese in front of our position during this three-day battle. I have written this story as an example of battle leadership by a distinguished senior officer whose perception, instinct, and faith in his subordinate paid off in high dividends, in lives saved, and enemy eliminated, during those f ~ a l days of the Korean War.

He was all any soldier would hope to be. It is unfortunate that his like does not appear often in our ranks. I am a better soldier for having known and served for Isaac Davis White, General, United States Army. May he rest in peace. Major General George S.

Patton was commissioned from the United States Military Academy in 1946. He commanded 2d Medium Tank Battalion, 81st Armor, 1st AD at Ft. Hood from July 1963July 1964, and 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment from July 1968-April 1969. In 1975, he made history by assuming command of the 2d Armored Division, which had been his father's first divisional command.

He served as Assistant Commandant of the Armor School from April 1971 July 1973.

From

November 1977-February 1979, he served as Deputy Commanding General, VI1 Corps, USAREUR.

He retired in 1980 after 34 years active service.

In retirement, he divides his time between farming and public speaking. He is the Honorary Colonel of the 11 th ACR.

LETTERS Continued from pg 3 Department - made a concerted effort in the 1930s and early 1940s to develop the Christie concept into a fightable vehicle. The combined arms concept was far from a mind-set, in spite of events at Fort Knox. The branch chiefs still retained their own priorities and provincial attitudes. When the Army Chief of Staff made the decision in 1931 to allow each combat arm to mechanize separately, it caused somber problems for Ordnance officials, who had to meet separate infantry and cavalry requirements for fighting vehicles. This was also a period of grave economic turbulence, when the US. military was subjected to budgetary limitations by a Democratic Congress elected by constituents whose mood in the 1930s reflected neutrality and anti-militarism. In the Soviet Union, conditions were more favorable for armor development because of the totalitarian regime of Stalin, where the people were dictated to, rather than persuaded. In addition, the Red Army benefitted from the series of defense-oriented Five Year Plans. This allowed armor supporters, such as General Khalepski and his mentor, Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevski, to expand their ideas on mechanization and mobile warfare without the constraints of budgetary limitations and a pacifistic mood of a people who were engaged in dealing with reform liberalism in order to solve the Great Depression.

GEORGE F. HOFMANN, Ph.D.

University of Cincinnati Dr. Hofmann's account of Christie's dealings with the Ordnance Department appeared in the February 1975 issue of Militant Affairs, published by the Kansas State University Department of History. -Ed.

Convert Bradleys as Heavy Mortar Carriers Dear Sir: The recent U.S. Army decision' to replace the M3A2 Cavalry Fighting Vehicle (CFV) with the High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle could provide a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to enhance the heavy mortar capability in heavy divisions.

I propose that M3A2 CFV assets be used as follows: 0 Separate the CFV Into two subsystems: the TOW/Bushmaster armored turret (T/BAT) and the chassis. 0 Store the T/BAT assets for use as combat spares to repair battle-damaged M2A2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFV). 0 In the near-term, convert the CFV chassis into armored mortar carriers, replacing the M106 in heavy mortar platoons.

0 In the long- term, consider retrofitting a 120-mm breech-loaded turret mortar (BLTM) on the CFV chassis. This proposal has the following advantages: 0 All M3A2 subsystems, including turret and chassis, would be used in alternative _ _ ~ heavy force roles. Nothing would be wasted.

0 Upgraded mobility and survivability would be provided for heavy mortar crews in tank and mechanized infantry battalions remaining in the total Army structure after implementation of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. 0 The 120-mm BLTM would enhance employment flexibility by adding a direct-fire capability for heavy mortars. 0 Alternative designs of 1-m BLTM are available for "off-the-shelf" adoption. 0 Near-term availabllity of CFV chassis would negate the need to increase funding for the Armored System Modernization Program (ASMP), which does not yet include an armored mortar carrier. For heavy force mortars, opportunity may knock only once.

RICHARD K. FICKETT

Annandale, Va.

Building Flexibility Into Armor's Future Dear Sir: The reduction of heavy forces is not something we can control. We must demonstrate our renowned flexibility and adapt to the situation. Light forces are best for our most probable future military operations, interventions like Grenada and Panama, where mid- and high-Intensity combat is not likely. Heavy forces will have to be maintained for deterrence, to reinforce a light force deployment should a situation prove too much for them, and for the heavy-force battles for which they were designed.

The equipment from deactivated units should be issued to National Guard and Army Reserve units. This will provide a heavy reserve force to back up a light active Amy force.

We must be prepared to expand the heavy force to meet a future emergency. This is only possible by having tank commanders and tank platoon sergeants available to form new units. The only way to do this is to train tank crewmen to be tank commanders, and tank commanders to be platoon sergeant/piatoon leaders. There will not be enough officers to fill platoon leader slots during such a quick expansion. Hans von Seekt trained the Relchswehr like this, which enabled the rapid expansion of the Wehrmacht, from 100,OOO men in 1935 to the millions deployed across Europe by 1944, with little loss of effectiveness. Light infantry can accomplish nearly all missions without tanks, but only at a much greater cost. The light forces are going to need light tank battalions. How to equip these units is another problem. The quick flx is to use the M551 Sheridan, and several hundred are being refurbished by Anniston Army Depot, Ala. Even with modifications, there are many problems facing Sheridan crews. The 152-mm M81E1 weapon/fire control system is not reliable enough. I would not bet on any M551 being able to fire a basic load without a malfunction. Even if it did, the missile system has to be checked for a GO, and the tracker aligned, when switching from conventional ammunition to missile. The six to nine seconds needed to reload the 152 is just TOO LONG. The M176 grenade launchers are useless. The commander's cupola provides no overhead cover when the hatch is open, and the "chicken plates" raise the height. The bustle rack is too small. The flotation kit is questionable, even when it is not being shot at. How is it to remain functional under fire? Oll-cooling the engine would be much better than the existing water cooling. The seals on the road and idler wheels are too easily damaged. The tank has NO survivability, against even the lightest antitank weapon, and its vulnerability to mines was proved in Vietnam (wonder where ail those mine plates went?), The ammo, and the way it is stored, are an explosion looking to happen. Reactive armor and a Halon fire-suppression system are a must. What are we to use for recovery (any M578s left)? There is the problem of assault bridging (any M113 LABS around)? The Class 111 needs of an M551 are only those of an M113, but Class V needs match those of an M60 tank. How are light infantry divisions to deal with this? We can sit and cry in our diesel (JP8 for you M1 types) or prove what the Armor community is made of. We led the way in the heavy fight doctrine: now let's get into the light one.

H makes no difference if light or heavy forces are fighting a battle; history proves combat is based upon combined arms teamwork.

CHRIS SCHNEIDER

SSG, Armor 1/238 Cav., IANG Noblesville, Ind.

NTC "Deficiencies" Are Just the Learning Process Dear Sir: Please allow me to take issue with several specific points and the thesis of Colonel Hawley's article, "Our Need to Develop Brilliant Battalions," published in your March-April 1990 issue. Colonel Hawley first states many of the repetitive mistakes made at the NTC and CMTC by battalions trainlng there. He is "disconcerted" because the "problems" he addressed do not go away. He then concludes the reason is "the failure to manage and move vital information." I disagree.

First. the mistakes Colonel Hawley specifies are made over and over, but not to the same degree by each battalion as it is trained. That is why NTC and CMTC exist. Not all battalions can train to go nine for nine at NTC for numerous reasons, the most obvious including personnel turbuiance and training resources. A task force that Is task organized with all its slice elements at home station and all key leaders in place six months or more out has a much better chance of &L-medlate success, especially when such a task force is given all the training resources (MILES, blank ammo, land) of the division. Many battalions go to the NTC or CMTC with commanders who have been in command less than three months. Units particularily go to CMTC having had no task force FTX for over a year before they are put "in the box." Clearly, the problem is not an inability to manage information or make decisions; the problem is a lack of practice. Units at CMTC and NTC grow enormously. A more pertinent question would be how many task forces display Colonel Hawley's listed weaknesses in their last one or two missions? I also disagree that lack of initiative and the ability to see and then seize an opportunity "center" on information management. Likewise, violation of the one-third/two-thirds rule by task forces or failing to perform a leader's recon are not attributable to information management but to lack of training and/or practice.

Rommei, Guderian and Patton all seized the initiative and were very aggressive with or without "complete information." There are a host of timid generals (McClellan at Antletam comes readily to mind) who rarely make timely decisions even when provided a copy of the enemy's plan.

In short, leadership, "great captains," are, in fact, born and, although providing better information early is certainly helpful, the self-confidence that is both innate and that stems from frequent success is far more important than information management.

Why does OPFOR win 80 percent of the battles? It trains 200(+) days a year. Leave a Blue Force brigade at NTC for six months and see how many battles OPFOR wins after the first two weeks. Colonel Hawley's Golan Heights example Is equally flawed. Where Is the correlation between superior Information management by the Israelis and their SUCcess. What about superior Israeli leadership, tactics, tactical situation, etc.? If Colonel Hawley is going to make such a bold assertion, he ought to provide some analysis. Unfortunately, Colonel Hawley's panacea for NTC "failures" (they aren't failures when units are far better trained coming out than going in) is mere technology. Here is where I really disagree. Please, as we wisely move into a peaceful period of less money for the armed forces, let us not spend It on enormously expensive, fragile, and unreliable digital information systems, graphics displays on each tank, position locating systems, and so forth. Please let us spend the money to train our units.

PHILIP D. ALLUM

LTC, Armor FRG

Future Heavy Division Concept Exists Now in the 9th ID Dear Sir: As I read through Captain Stephen L. Melton's article, "The Future of Armor," MayJune 1990, 1 found his proposals for the heavy division of the future vaguely familiar. I feel that the answer exists now, in concept, with the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) at Fort Lewis, Washington. The original mission of the division was to be able to rapidly deploy to a contingency area, establish or expand a lodgement, and defeat enemy forces ranging from light infantry to tank and motorized forces. The lack of key equipment, (Assault Gun System, ground-mounted Hellfire, and more mobile field and air defense artillery platforms, to name a few, have sounded the death knell for a force tailored to fulfill the needs of the Army into the next century.

It has been interesting to note the recent thoughts put forth in ARMOR about equipping scout platoons with HMMWVs. It may be a new concept to some, but it is a working reality here. Add to that the ability to sling-load vehicle mounted antiarmor systems under the CH47D.

As a participant in both motorized rotations at the National Training Center, it appeared to me that the major limitations weren't the doctrine, but a lack of equipment designed to accomplish assigned missions. The TOW I1 afforded a significant antiarmor capability, but its slow rate of fire and reload served to hamper the brigade's offensive capabilities during its first NTC rotation. The addition of an armor battalion during the 91D's subsequent brigade rotation did much to add to the offensive thrust. The coordinated use of maneuver, field artillery, and close air support, as well as the other battlefield operating systems, allow the motorized unit to create disruption in an enemy force, while using its rapid mobility to exploit that disruption. Numerous field exercises at Yakima Firing Center, Wash., have borne this out, on terrain very much like most Third World countries. The motorlzed division was not designed to stand toe-to-toe and slug it out with a heavy armored force; it will lose that battle. However, by using basic tenets of the Airland Battle doctrine -speed, agility, and synchronization - a force exists that can deploy rapidly for LIC contingencies, in addition to countering an armored threat until friendly armor can be brought to bear.

I spent two years as the Air Defender for TF 2-60 IN (CABH), an infantry battalion whose MTOE consisted entirely of HMMWV-mounted weapon and support systems. There was a cavalry flair to almost everything we did (the battalion motto was " Scouts Out"). In fact, our brigade commander and S3 were both cavalry officers.

It is my belief that the motorized division was not designed to be an upgunned light infantry division. However, that seemed to be the perception, and it is what killed us. Had the perception been more along the lines that the 9th ID (MTZ) was a mobile light armored force, or even light cavalry, 1 think the powers that be may have seen it for what it really is: a cost-effective force that can deploy qulck-ly, hit hard, and be configured to fit contingency missions across the entire spectrum of conflict.

PHILIP J. LOGAN

lLT, AD Fort Lewis, Wash.

Light Armor: The Torch Passes Dear Sir: i read Captain David L. Nobles' article, "The Light Armored Force," (MayJune 1990 ARMOR) with great interest. It is refreshing to see that some young officers today do understand and appreciate the roles and missions of light armored units. It is an area in which the Army has been deficient for 30 years. I know, because I spent 25 of those 30 years writing numerous articles on this deficiency. I still maintain that the XR311 would have been the best scout vehicle we could have fielded. I got down on my hands and knees to stop the demise of the excellent ARSV concept. It would have matured into a great asset.

An XR311 being testad at Fort Knox. During the infamous "Armored Combat Vehicle Technology Program" in the early 198Os, we noticed that there seemed to be a genetic code, passed from father to son, contending that tracked vehicles were better in all scenarios than wheeled vehicles. Even mobility experts like Cliff Bradley and Dr. Greg Beckker could not change this mindset.

There is no void today in light armored vehicle technology. We have the designs we need to go forth into the 21st century. I hope that Captain Nobles, and others who share his thinking, can get far enough up the ladder to have an influence on a well-rounded Armor Force. I don't think the Soviets are likely to be coming through the Fulda Gap soon. BURTON S. BOUDINOT

LTC, Armor, Retired 31st Editor, ARMOR