Give Me a Heavy-Light

Can light infantry fight on Europe’s mid-intensity battlefield? This article submits for consideration a means of synchronizing light and heavy operations to extend a heavy division’s combat effectiveness in time and space. What follows is a brief description of the 3rd Armored Division3 exercise plan for Caravan Guard 89 and its implications for heavy-light doctrine. The plan demonstrates that light forces have a role in the NATO fight; it is a role that both complements heavy operations and aids survival of the light force. The conclusion: light infantry is a combat multiplier in a European mid-intensity conflict. It gets the heavy division deeper faster.

2. Mission. 2d Brigade, 10th Moiii-tain Division (LI) conducts zone recon coriiriteiicing I718002 Sep 89 and to be coriipleted NLT 1804002 Sep 89 from PL VIPER to PL UNITAS to detennirte erieriiy dispositions and seaire passage lanes for 3d AD main attack; assists forward passage of division niairi attack arid srip-porting iiiiits between PL VIPER arid PL UNITAS; conducts air assault raid east of Wed River arid PL UNITAS to disrupt erieriiy defenses arid interdict sieniv forces reinforcing tlie fight west of PL COBRA; attacks targets at 1806002 Sep 89 between PL VIPER arid PL COBRA to disrupt syicliroriizatiort of aieiiiy response arid lateral ntoiwiierit west of PL UNITAS?

The above mission statement was that of the 2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division during the 3rd Armored Division’s counterattack phase of Caravan Guard 89. 2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division (Light) was OPCON to 3rd Armored Division in this phase.

Separately, its specified and implied tasks present no new doctrine for alight brigade in support of a heavy division. Together, they represent afresh look at light infantry and armored operations on the AirLand Battlefield. They represent an extension of the heavy division’s offensive culminating point, the point where the strength of the attacker no longer significantly exceeds that of the defender, and beyond which continued offensive operations risk overextension, counterattack, and defeat.”?

The 3AD attack force included the division’sown 1st and Combat Aviation Brigades, the 5th Panzer Grenadier Brigade of the West German Bundeswehr, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, and the 2nd Brigade of Fort Drum’s 10th Mountain Division (Light). The 3AD mission was to attack to restore the International Boundary (IB) breached by the enemy earlier in the exercise. Critical to mission accomplishment was successful synchronization of light and heavy force capabilities, a concept often written about but still embryonic in practice.

Command and control of the light forces supporting 3AD came from 2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division. Maneuver units were the 5-502nd Infantry Battalion of the Berlin Brigade and the 5-5 Cav (Mech) of the 3rd Armored Division. The men of these battalions had trained hard and well for their missions as dismounts, but their equipment was that of their parent units and, therefore, differed from that of a truly light battalion. While they lacked some of the equipment organic to alight division (notably 81- and 60-mm mortars in the case of 5-5 Cav), they could effectively test the integration of light and heavy forces on the European battlefield. They required the same communications, air defense, engineer, and other augmentation essential when alight brigade is attached to a heavy division.

Exercise rules allowed the attacking force to send a large dismounted contingent across the line of departure/line of contact (PL VIPER, see Figure 1) up to 12 hours before mechanized maneuver was permitted. Either foot movement or air insertion was acceptable. 2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain leaders had seven line companies -four in the 5-5 Cav and three in the 5-502 Infantry. The 5-502 Infantry was to infiltrate two companies by foot between PL VIPER and PL UNITAS; the 5-5 Cav was to do the same. These units were to reconnoiter routes for the heavy units’ attack the following morning, determine which were acceptable from both the standpoint of terrain and enemy disposition, and provide reconnaissance reports to the brigade headquarters. Furthermore, as the 11th ACR began its covering force operation, the light force would attack to disrupt the synchronization of the defense. In addition to these four companies performing zone reconnaissance and attack missions, each of the two dismounted battalions was to insert a company by air for operations in zone east of PL UNITAS, but west of PL COBRA. This force would attack command and control nodes, ARMOR - Septernbef-October 7990 field artillery positions and combat service support facilities just to the rear of what was thought to be the enemy FEBA (PL UNITAS). These two companies would also ambush any unit attempting to reinforce the covering force fight, would provide additional information on defensive dispositions west of PL UNITAS, and could assist in seizing Wied River crossings. The seventh and final dismounted company was kept in reserve to commit against deep targets. Using the reports from its forward units, the 2nd Brigade commander was to identify the axis which offered the division the greatest opportunity for success with its mounted attack. CG, 3AD would then commit the 11th ACR the following morning. The regiment was to rapidly penetrate enemy defenses and pass the division's exploitation force of two brigades. Fifth Panzer Grenadier Brigade and 1st Brigade, 3rd Armored Division, would continue the attack to complete the destruction of the enemy and restore the international border.

At the request of the light force commander, 3AD planners prioritized routes between Phase Lines VIPER and UNITAS in order of suitability for mounted maneuver. 3AD G3 Plans section determined routes that supported the concept of operation. These, in turn, were analyzed by the division's terrain team and divided into those capable of passing traffic of various weight classifications. The G3 planners then reviewed the routes a final time to determine final priorities for reconnaissance. Given limited time, higher priority routes would be reconnoitered first.

The soldiers of the 5-5 Cav and 5-502 Infantry were to report the results of their reconnaissance by color. A green route was capable of handling M1 traffic, an amber route up to MU3 traffic, a red route wheeled vehicles only. A black route was impassable either because of its physical condition or due to enemy defenses and obstacles. Collocation of the 2/10th Mountain and 11th ACR command posts would ease dissemination of this critical information. The mounted cavalry would thus have an excellent picture of the enemy's dispositions during its early movement. By 1304002 Sep PL VIPER

Figure 1 3d Armored Division Ground Maneuver Units in Zone 89 (ten hours after the start of dismounted operations), the commanding general, 3AD, was to have an overlay of route conditions and a recommendation by the commander, 2/10th Mountain for an attack axis, based on analysis of the terrain west of PL UNITAS.

AirLand

Battle doctrine prescribes the use of light infantry in a zone reconnaissance role for a heavy force. Movements to contact and deliberate attack are missions in which such use of alight force is feasible. The nature of AirLand Battle will require divisions to attack during the execution of an operational-level defense.

With the limited number of divisions NATO has at the beginning of a European conflict, preservation of combat power will be key to Western victory.

None of the tasks inherent to the 2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division's mission were especially innovative in light of current doctrine. FM 71-100, Division operations, specifies "reconnaissance," "infiltration at night," "breach obstacles," and "air assault to seize objectives" as appropriate tasks for the light force in the attack? The mission assigned the 2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain was, therefore, within the doctrinally accepted capabilities of the force. FM 71-100 further states: "In ofleiwive operations, itemy forces can lose the ability to ritariemer when confronted b-y eneiity forces 011 key ternin dominating fneiidlv mites of adsance. Light forces can conduct ofieiisive operations at night to seciire a critical pass, destroy erieiiiy foxes, control k q terrain, arid sectire the route of advance for the Item?, forces.,+I Such use for light forces has proved its worth in past battles. Soviet partisans performed forward ARMOR - September-October 7990 reconnaissance and guided Red Army heavy forces through German defenses during the successful Bagration operation in June and July 1944. They thereby delayed the Soviet force’s achievement of its offensive culminating point and preserved the integrity of its center of gravity as it rapidly moved west to destroy Army Group Center. It was a similar extension of the 3AD offensive culminating point that was sought with the reconnaissance by dismounted soldiers on the night of 17-18 September 1989. The 11th ACR and following heavy units would preserve their combat power by minimizing unnecessary contact with the enemy; the heavy force would avoid well-organized enemy positions until they reached PL UNITAS, 10 kilometers deeper than had there been no dismounted operations. The extension of the covering force’s capability would translate into commitment of the main attack force at a point deeper in the enemy defenses. The enemy would be unable to strip off friendly mounted reconnaissance units.

These units would begin their work by seeking weaknesses in the enemy’s main battle area defenses rather than after a costly covering force area battle.

The use of light forces in a zone reconnaissance role prior to heavy force commitment has been shown to be doctrinally and historically viable. Unconsidered, however, is the survival of the dismounted force. Too often in training with heavy commands, the light force is overextended and left to a fate similar to that of the British 1st Airborne Division in Operation Market-Garden. Several factors worked in favor of the dismounted force’s survival during Caravan Guard. First, the bulk of this force was in the enemy covering force area where the density of enemy units was lower than in the main battle area. Detection of foot soldiers would be difficult and less likely than in the main battle area, with its numerous combat, combat support, and combat service support troops. Secondly, the close proximity of the dismounts to enemy positions reduced the likelihood of the friendly units being targeted by enemy artillery or chemical weapons. Finally, the light force did not originally seek contact; it would attack only in conjunction with the mounted attack the next morning. Link-up with the heavy force would come quickly; the enemy would have few opportunities to engage isolated dismounted forces with heavy units. The concept was feasible and the dismounted force survivable. The dismounted soldier would prepare the way for the 3AD attack. Unfortunately, a last minute change of exercise plans altered the mission of the 2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division and the concept remained untested in Caravan Guard 89. However, the conclusions and potential remain.

Synchronization of heavy and light planning and operations is essential. Prioritizing the routes for reconnaissance allows efficient use of the limited time available and ensures the reconnaissance focuses on axes that support the division plan. 0 The light force delays attainment of the offensive culminating point for both the covering force unit (here, the 11th ACR) and the main body, thus preserving the integrity of the center of gravity for a longer period and to greater depth. 0The light force can survive. The zone reconnaissance mission delays high-risk exposure until shortly before link-up with friendly heavy units.

Caravan Guard provided the forum for thinking, planning, and ARMOR - September-October 7990 analyzing the role of the light force in Europe. The light force in the offensive seems to have found a niche.