Armor Support in Low- to Mid-Intensity Conflict

Since 1945, wars of low intensity have increased in frequency. Both insurgent successes and failures have significantly altered the strategic balance of power in the last 40 years. Given the socio-economic climate of Third World countries, this trend will likely continue with support from the Soviet Union, which since 1961 has pledged support for insurgencies around the world.

In Third World countries, where a low- to mid-intensity conflict would most likely occur, the availability of modern weapons and equipment is impressive. In many areas of the world, local forces can deploy a wide range of light and heavy armor, modern jets, and artillery. Even South Yemen, with a population' of only two million, can deploy almost 1,OOO armored vehicles, including T-62 tanks.' Deployment of soldiers into a region such as this, without armor support, would not be doctrinally sound.

The United States must be prepared to deal with conflicts in the Third World in the decades ahead. Given that the spectrum of conflict ranges from peacekeeping operations to mid-intensity conventional and unconventional warfare (UW), the possibility of U. S. troop deployment to secure and protect vested American interests likely will occur in the foreseeable future. The United States has addressed this problem by resurrecting the light infantrv divisions. These lightly-equipped forces have the ability to deploy on relatively short notice. The 82d Airborne Division is also maintained in a high state of readiness for no-notice deployment.

These forces have little-to-no vehicular support. Once on the ground, the majority of these forces can only move as fast as they can walk, loaded with their substantial combat equipment. Only the XVIII Airborne Corps has an organic armor unit that trains and deploys with the 82d Airborne Division. This armored force is the only one that, in ano-notice, come-as-you-are conflict, could arrive with the assault troops and provide the mobility, firepower, and shock effect needed to destroy enemy armor and infantry forces. Much has been said about the armor-defeating capability of the infantry forces, but these theories have gone largely unproved. Case in point: Of the more than 6,000 guided antitank missiles fired by Syria and Egypt against Israeli armor, those missiles accounted for less than six percent of the armor defeated.

Our medium and heavy personnel-fired antitank weapons are wire-guided, causing employment problems in areas of vegetation or urban environments.

They are heavy, contributing significantly to the overall combat weight for the individual soldier, and it is not realistic to deploy these weapons in an offensive mode. This matter must be addressed because our forces deployed into a low- to mid-intensity conflict will almost certainly meet an armored force. To pit our infantry against a force with mechanized capability would be tactically dangerous. In our hemisphere alone, virtually every country against which we may engage in hostilities or in which we conduct stability/police actions, has an armor capability.

These areas of potential conflict range from the country of Haiti, with nine M5A1 tanks and six V-150 Commando armored cars (all with armament of sorts) to the country of Nicaragua, which maintains an army that includes approximately 150 T54/55 tanks, 25 PT-76 light tanks, 50 BRDM-a, 40 BTR-60s and up to 105 BTR - S, all with armament of one type or another. We will have to provide our forces with an armor complement if we expect them to accomplish their mission without unnecessary casualties. At this time, the 3d Battalion, 73d Armor, is the only armor asset that can be immediately deployed into a low- to mid-intensity conflict. Many will argue that the Army's armored cavalry regiment would. be feasible to employ. However, studies show that a squadron deploying in its first echelon would require ten C5B Galaxy and 12 C141B StarLifter aircraft sorties to deliver 38 armored vehicles (M3 CFV) and assorted support elements? The tank-killing ability of the M3 CFV is limited to a wire-guided missile. These sorties would have to land in a secure area to unload. v

- -ARMOR - Sepfernbef-October 1990 15 Those same ten C5B aircraft can deliver 40 M55lA1 Sheridans and at least 730 airborne personnel in the airhead if needed. This in itself would provide the U. S. commander with one full infantry battalion and ten armor platoons. This has not even taken into consideration the C141B sorties that the cavalry regiment would need in their first echelon. Granted, support equipment will have to be provided to the armor; however, this could well follow the lead echelon, depending on how far the armor element has pushed forward before meeting resistance.

Some will argue that the U. S. Marine Corps would be a viable combined arms force in the low- to mid-intensity conflict!

While this may be true, one consideration is that its ships must first be in place to support the operation. Massing forces and waiting for movement such as this may telegraph intentions and compromise the element of surprise.

With only one battalion of light armor vehicles available for immediate deployment with U. S.

Army forces, survivability of this force must be maintained. Currently, there are only 57 M55lA1 Sheridans on hand with XVIII Airborne Corps. Fifty-four of these belong to the armor battalion, and three belong to the supporting maintenance battalion for use as float vehicles? Taking into account the antiarmor threat posed in many of the Third World countries, consideration should be given to rebuilding and placing in storage another battalion's worth of these vehicles. At a minimum, this will provide immediate replacement of damaged equipment and could lead to the formation of another bat-The M551 Sheridans are useful in low-intensity conflict, but there are not many talion to be used if more than one conflict occurs. A preferable option would be to field alight armor battalion within each light division, making it possible for each of these divisions to train as a combined arms force before being deployed into a conflict.

The Army currently tracks Sheridan-qualified personnel with a R-8 ASI. As this weapons system currently falls in the 19D cavalry scout career field, it may be prudent to add to the advanced training program at Ft. Knox, Ky., enough time to familiarize the 19D personnel with the vehicle and its fire control equipment. This action would expedite the training of replacement crews coming into the battalion. The M55lAl Sheridan could be a stopgap measure because much thought is still being given to procurement of an Armored Gun System (AGS). However, until an AGS is procured and fielded, the availability of the Sheridan will meet the needs of the commander on the ground in the low- to mid-intensity conflict.

The combined arms force will be the key to successful missions in the future, as in the past. Our assault troops must have armor support in available. the initial stage of the conflict. This author feels that in these days of budget constraints, we should consider the preceding option. Notes 'Olsen, William J., The Light Force Initia- 'The Militarv Balance 1987-1988, Interna-tive, Miiitarv Review, June 1985, p. 9. tionailnstitute for Strategic Services. 3Bacevich, A. J., LTC, and hrany, Robert R., LTC, "Deployable Armor," Militarv Review, April 1987, p. 19. 4Harnmes, Thomas X., MAJ, "Insurgency: The Forgotten Threat," Marine Corns Gazette, March 1988, p. 44.?his does not include current war stocks at various Army depots. s First Sergeant Harold G.

Beverage is currently serving as first sergeant, C Company, 3-73 Armor. He has also served as the S2 NCOIC of 3-73 Armor, 82d Airborne Division: and as a Sheridan platoon sergeant. A graduate of the U. S. Army Operations and Intelligence Course, he has served in a number of positions in various cavalry and armor battalions.

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